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What historical lessons, positive or negative, can be gleaned from past Western 
interventionist activities within Haiti that have application to the desired future goal of 
rehabilitating or moving Haiti from fragile state status, to that of a fully functioning and 
stable member state within the international community of nations? 
 
This dissertation aims to determine what historical lessons, positive or negative, can be 
gleaned from past Western interventionist activities in Haiti that are applicable to the desired 
future goal of rehabilitating or moving Haiti from fragile state status to functioning and stable 
state within the international community of nations. At the core of that problem is the need to 
determine how to restrain the impulses of external nations who obstruct or divert Haiti’s chosen 
path forward.  
The findings show that the West has conducted a deliberate campaign against Haiti 
composed of three destabilizing elements: criminalization of opposition to interventions; 
economic warfare employing NGOs and SAP policies aimed at maintaining Haiti’s 
attractiveness as a source of cheap, plentiful labour; and a deliberate failure to exploit 
opportunities for fundamental, positive change in Haitian development. The analysis of Western 
interference in Haiti has exposed a number of trends, including the use of force to coerce money 
from the Haitian government; the deliberate undermining of Haitian sovereignty through 
constant interference in Haitian elections, despite free and fair elections being considered the 
bedrock of Western democracy; a preference for stability and the status quo in Haiti over social 
revolutionary trends; and an historical, targeted funding of Haitian security forces, military and 
police, despite both being the principal instruments of repression employed against Haitian 
attempts at social revolutionary change. 
iv 
 
As a metanarrative, the dissertation brings together various micro-narratives which 
highlight Western impact on specific areas of Haitian culture, including colour and class, 
militarism, land, and the predatory state. Set within a chronological framework, the dissertation 
provides historical insight into practices which have had a significant influence on hindering 
peacebuilding generally. Understanding those practices and identifying lessons from historical 
analysis will prove useful in future peacebuilding work in Haiti and should help inform the 
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Take a bow for the new revolution 
Smile and grin at the change all around me… 
Meet the new boss 
Same as the old boss1 
- The Who, “Won’t Get Fooled Again” 
-  
When you listen to the lyrics of The Who’s fabled song, “Won’t Get Fooled Again,” you 
would not be faulted for thinking they had been writing about Haiti. That thinking might have 
been shaken in December 1990, in what was a brief and shining moment in Haiti’s long and 
troubled history, when successful democratic elections, judged by the United Nations 
international observers to have been free and fair, appeared momentarily to signal the dawn of a 
new era in Haiti.2 The election of Père Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a former Salesian priest, to Haiti’s 
highest office was the result of a popular mass movement, Lavalas, which developed at the 
grassroots level through local church and community groups, and proved capable of not only 
pushing Jean-Claude Duvalier (otherwise known as Baby Doc) from power, but also ensured 
Aristide’s election with over 67 percent of the national vote.3 
 Despite the initial optimism, that shining moment was regrettably extinguished eight 
months later. Haiti’s military forced the nation’s first democratically elected president from 
power and consigned him to exile. Aristide’s return to office would not occur until 1994, and 
only then because the international community, led by the United States, turned away from a 
long, erratic and ultimately failed diplomatic strategy, and instead finally embraced recognition 
 
1 Lyrics from “Won’t Get Fooled Again,” The Who, 1971. 
2 In response to a request from the then-interim government in Haiti, the United Nations created and deployed the 
United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) which, in conjunction with 
Organization of American States (OAS) electoral observers and a number of other non-governmental agencies, 
certified that the 1990 elections were “highly successful.” The material presented is drawn from the United Nations 
backgrounders, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unmihbackgr1.html. 
3 The Lavalas movement was also largely responsible for the defeat of an attempted coup that took place only days 
after the presidential election and before Aristide had even been sworn into office. See Peter Hallward, “An 
Interview with Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” London Review of Books 29 no. 4 (February 2007): 9-13. 
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that the coup regime would only relinquish power and permit Aristide’s return to power when 
threatened with force.4 Aristide’s confirmation as president brought an end to close to three years 
of regime killings, economic pillaging and infrastructure destruction, all of which left Haiti in 
what can only be described as a catastrophic condition.5 
 During his second term of office following his re-election in 2001, Aristide was again 
confronted by violent rebellion. And again, Aristide was removed from power and forced into 
exile. Unlike the first coup, however, evidence suggests the 2004 coup was orchestrated by a 
Western coalition of nations that included Canada, France and the United States.6 All three 
actively opposed the return of Aristide to power.7 The Jamaican Prime Minister and Chairman of 
 
4 American involvement in the restoration of Aristide to power, and, for Haiti, a return to democracy, would not 
come about without significant concessions. The US demanded, through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, a host of financial conditions which included the privatization of a number of state institutions: 
those conditions, as will be shown, helped ensure that Aristide’s populist agenda was emasculated and, as has been 
argued, may well have forced his government to fall back onto the tried and true Haitian model of authoritarianism. 
See, for example, Eirin Mobekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti,” Democratization 8, no. 3 (Sep 2010): 173-
188; and J. Christopher Kovats-Bernat, “Factional Terror, Paramilitarism and Civil War in Haiti: The View from 
Port-au-Prince,” Anthropologic 48, no. 1 (2006): 117-139. 
5 See Bryant C. Freeman, “Strategy of Aristide Government for Social and Economic Reconstruction,” University of 
Kansas Institute of Haitian Studies Occasional Paper No. 4, August 1994. 
6 President Aristide, during an interview with Canadian journalist Naomi Klein, stated: “The coup, or the 
kidnapping, was led by the United States, France and Canada. These three countries were on the front lines by 
sending their soldiers to Haiti before February 29, by having their soldiers either at the airport or at my residence or 
around the palace or in the capital to make sure that they succeeded in kidnapping me, leading [to] the coup.” Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, interview by Naomi Klein, 20 June 2005, quoted in rabble.ca, “Aristide: on the record about 
Canada and Haiti,” June 23, 2005; http://www.rabble.ca/news/aristide-recordabout-canada-and-haiti. Canadian 
journalist, David Pugliese, likewise reported Canadian Special Forces soldiers from the Joint Task Force 2 (JTF-2) 
were present in Haiti and at the airport the night of February 29, 2004, their role apparently being to secure the 
airport. Because their missions are classified, Pugliese was unable to confirm that their mission was in support of the 
US-led alleged abduction of Aristide. See David Pugliese, “Elite JTF2 commandos are well aware of Haiti’s 
dangers,” Ottawa Citizen, February 27, 2004, A3; http://proquest.com. For an account of the 2004 coup and the 
interview with Aristide, see also Noam Chomsky, Paul Farmer and Amy Goodman, Getting Haiti Right This Time 
(Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2004). For an account of Canada’s role in the coup, see also Richard 
Sanders, “Top 10 Ways that Canada aided the 2004 coup in Haiti...,” The CCPA Monitor, April 2010, 
www.coat.ncf.ca. 
7 In response to a Caribbean Community (CARICOM) demand for the immediate deployment of a multinational 
force to protect the democratically elected Aristide government, Canadian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alan Rock, 
stated: “For our part, we, the international community, must now ready ourselves to respond when the conditions are 
right — not to defend one side or the other, but to protect the people of Haiti by restoring order and by creating a 
stable environment to enable democratic processes to unfold. Canada will do its part in such a coordinated and 
authorized international response.” Three days later, the Security Council would issue Resolution 1529 (2004), 
which acknowledged Aristide’s ‘resignation’ and the swearing-in of Boniface Alexandre as acting president, and 
called on the international community “to assist in restoring peace and security in Haiti” as well as “further[ing] the 
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the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) at the time, Percival Noel James Patterson, was one of 
the few international leaders to address foreign involvement in the coup and the active 
interference that prevented Aristide from remaining in power, stating:  
we are bound to question whether his resignation was truly voluntary, as it comes after 
the capture of sections of Haiti by armed insurgents and the failure of the international 
community to provide the requisite support. The removal of President Aristide in these 
circumstances sets a dangerous precedent for democratically elected governments 
anywhere and everywhere, as it promotes the removal of duly elected persons from office 
by the power of rebel forces.8 
 
 
 Far from being a precedent, the removal of Aristide from power was just one more 
instance of foreign interference in Haitian internal affairs. True, Aristide was a democratically 
elected president, making this the first instance of this type of interference. But foreign 
interference in Haitian affairs has been part of a recurrent pattern and has included other 
instances of thwarting democratic interests. Foreign trespasses have played a dominant role in 
Haitian affairs, both domestic and foreign. Analyzing foreign intervention and its impact on 
Haiti’s development and devolution into a “fragile state” is the crux of this dissertation.9 
The impact of foreign intervention in Haiti is central to my thesis. Specifically, I examine 
the effects of foreign intervention in Haitian affairs and how they contributed to Haiti’s 
continued appearance at or near the top of the ladder of “fragile states.” I am not arguing that the 
West has been responsible for all of Haiti’s development problems. While not within the scope 
 
constitutional political process now under way,” making it clear the CARICOM request to restore Aristide to power 
was not supported. See UN Security Council 3917th meeting minutes from 26 February 2004, S/PV.4917, 20; and 
UNSCR 1529 (2004), S/RES/1529 (2004), 29 February 2004, www.undocs.org. 
8 “This sets a dangerous precedent,” Jamaica Gleaner, March 1, 2004. http://jamaica-gleaner.com.  
9 A fragile state should not be confused with US State Department’s diplomatic term “state of concern” which 
denotes those states with “erratic authoritarian leaders” and which have a “history of sponsoring terrorism and 
pursuing NBCD programmes.” Instead, I am using the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) definition as any state with the “inability or unwillingness to provide for the physical security, legitimate 
political institutions, sound economic management and social services for the benefit of its population.” See Anne 
Friederike Röder, ed., Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States (OECD Publication, 2006), 17. 
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of my thesis, there are ample academic studies that show that Haiti bears considerable 
responsibility for its own national problems.10 However, documentation demonstrates the West 
has undertaken deliberate policies that have exacerbated and exploited Haiti’s problems. 
My historical analysis outlines how the West has employed a deliberate strategy against 
Haiti that corresponds directly to continued and prolonged Haitian fragility. That strategy of 
deliberate interventionist policies and activities began with Haitian independence and continues 
today. My focus is primarily on the United States but includes other Western nations as 
appropriate, to demonstrate how they also have stymied Haitian opportunities for real and 
sustained economic and political development through self-serving interference.  
My aim in completing such a macro-analysis of Western interference in Haitian affairs is 
not to assign blame, but rather to identify, first, lessons from past foreign interventions in Haiti 
and their consequences with the intent of informing future interactions with Haiti; and second, to 
provide some guidance on how to help Haitians help themselves in developing their national 
potential. By examining potential change in Haiti within the context of peacebuilding, a holistic 
and dynamic systems approach to development, the risk of Haiti slipping back into conflict can 
hopefully be reduced.  
Peacebuilding for a fragile state necessarily encompasses numerous missions and avoids 
treating state rehabilitation as an ad hoc and one-time activity.11 Without launching into a larger 
 
10 See, for example, Philippe Girard, Haiti: The Tumultuous History - From Pearl of the Caribbean to Broken 
Nation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); or Annabelle L. Torgman, “Haiti: A Failed State? Democratic 
Process and OAS Intervention,” The University of Miami Inter-American Law Reviews 44, no.1 (Fall 2012): 113-
137. Robert Fatton Jr. also explores the responsibility of the Haitian elites for Haiti’s failure to develop the political 
and economic institutions necessary for stable, democratic rule. See Robert Fatton Jr., “Haiti: The Saturnalia of 
Emancipation and the Vicissitudes of Predatory Rule,” Third World Quarterly 27, no. 1, From Nation-Building to 
State-Building (2006): 115-133, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4017663. 
11 Peacebuilding is a problematic term in that it is defined differently by various United Nations agencies, but the 
best is that of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: “a range of measures targeted to reduce 
the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict 
management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-
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doctrinal discussion, employing a peacebuilding framework provides a comprehensive approach 
to rehabilitating a fragile nation.12 For a fragile state like Haiti, the overarching objective of this 
development framework is the strengthening and broadening of civil society’s engagement in 
statebuilding, crisis prevention, and the development of resiliency that allows grievances to be 
managed without violence. 
Ideally, any discussion of rehabilitation is framed by the question ‘How can we help 
Haitians save Haiti?’ This is quite different from the normal conversation about Haiti that often 
ends up discussing how ‘we can fix Haiti,’ leading to ‘solutions’ solidly rooted in paternalism on 
a grand scale.13 The key to this discussion is collaboration. This implies choosing development 
priorities as determined by Haitians rather than by outsiders which in turn guides external 
assistance. With that understanding in mind, my research question is: 
What historical lessons, positive or negative, can be gleaned from past Western 
interventionist activities within Haiti that have application to the desired future goal of 
rehabilitating or moving Haiti from fragile state status, to that of a fully functioning and 
stable member state within the international community of nations? 
 
term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, 
structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that 
affect the functioning of society and the State and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and 
legitimately carry out its core functions.”   Peacebuilding then encompasses both state-building and nation-building 
and includes so-called stabilization and reconstruction operations. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(UNPKO), “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,” 2008, 18. 
12 One of the earliest discussions of a peacebuilding framework founded on a model of inter-American economic 
development was contained in a speech provided by Haitian intellectual Dantès Bellegarde, speaking to the 
Organization of Inter-American Economic Solidarity in 1940. Bellegarde spoke about the idea of a “Pan-American 
bloc” which would see individual nations preserving language, customs, law and education, while working on 
“uniform legislation” for commerce, fiscal policy and customs matters. His ideas would later be echoed by Winston 
Churchill’s 1946 call for the emergence of a “United States of Europe,” a concept which was later manifest in the 
contemporary European Union. Bellegarde understood that national and regional stability was contingent upon 
economic stability, something he saw as undergirding the regional Pan-American bloc approach. Bellegarde 
advocated for the establishment of the safe and secure environment, nationally and regionally, as the foundation 
necessary to ensure the development of an economic and political system “equitable to all, favoring personal 
autonomy, individual initiative, and the full expansion of social energies.” See Dantès Bellegarde, “The 
Organization of Inter-American Economic Solidarity,” Phylon (1940-1956) 1 (4) 1940: 327-335. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/272301.  
13 Googling ‘Haiti’ and ‘fix’ leads to a myriad of articles and papers on how to fix Haiti. Note, for example, the 
well-meaning discussion started by Mr. Alford, the co-founder of the US National Black Chamber of Commerce, 




 The thesis consists of an introduction, eleven chapters, a conclusion, and an afterword. 
The first four chapters explore Haiti’s recurring themes - colour and class; militarism; land; and 
the State – that have been manipulated by the West to shape Haiti’s development. Chapters Five 
through Nine are chronological and explore Western interventionist activities and their impact on 
Haitians. Chapter Ten examines the form of Western domination of Haiti while Chapter Eleven 
explores the lessons that have been extracted from past interventions and which ought to shape 
Western behaviour towards Haiti in the future. Finally, I have added an Afterword which 
provides some preliminary thoughts on the form and direction Haiti’s development could take.  
Chapter One explores issues of colour and class and discusses this theme in the context of 
lost opportunities. Colour and class issues continue to be cited in historical studies of Haitian 
society as a polarizing theme. Usually, this theme is understood as the means by which a vast 
sector of Haitian society, overwhelmingly black and poor, has been isolated from power 
(economic, political, and cultural). One of the key means by which the vast majority of Haitians 
have been denied opportunity has been through the control of education policy. The other means 
has been the manipulation of the Haitian military forces by Haiti’s political and economic elite to 
maintain the status quo in Haiti.14 This latter issue, and the failure of Haitian parliamentary 
 
14 The term ‘elite’ in discussions about Haiti is nuanced and evolutionary depending upon the historical period being 
discussed. For example, the Haitian elite which emerged from the revolutionary period was derived from the 
colonial “affranchis…often wealthy landowners, who had common economic interest with the whites, and who at 
significant stages of the revolutionary struggle allied themselves to the colonists against the slaves.” The 
“predominantly mulatto anciens libres retained the ownership of their lands” which became their source of power 
and hence their badge of elitism. However, they were quickly challenged for power by “a rival black elite…most of 
whom derived their power from [revolutionary army] positions,” and who were “particularly strong” in the north 
and rural areas, whereas the mulatto elite was centred in urban centres within the south and west regions of Haiti. 
This led to what David Nicholls identified as the nineteenth-century elite competition as between “a mulatto, city-
based, commercial elite, and a black, rural and military elite.” The elite would evolve with the mulatto elite 
eventually shifting their power base from the land, ceding that to others, and instead turning to politics for power 
and control. Other elite groups would emerge including several Syrian (or Arab) Haitian families who would 
eventually dominate Haiti’s commercial sector, some through to the current era. Suzy Castor identified Haiti’s 
disparate political elite as aligned through shared anti-democratic interests. She identified the grouping as including 
“factions of monopolistic bourgeoisie, businessmen who deal in smuggled goods, the landed and business oligarchy, 
7 
 
authority to subordinate the military to Haitian societal needs, will be explored in the next 
chapter on militarism. 
Chapter Two examines the development of Haiti’s militarism as a guarantor of Haiti’s 
survival within what has been, for most of Haiti’s existence, a hostile international community.15 
The overarching intent of this chapter is to develop an understanding of the complex civilian-
military relationship that developed in Haiti, and which has never seen the military embrace the 
principle of military subordination to civilian control. That relationship has a significant nexus 
with the issue of colour and class relations, particularly when the role of the military is that of   
controlling the majority of Haiti’s citizens.  
Chapter Three looks at Haiti’s land issues, including those related to the environment, 
and the impact of Haiti’s competing ideologies on the debate over land registry reform and land 
use.16 Culturally, land issues, like the challenge of militarism, cannot be explained without 
reference to colour and class. Understanding the cultural, social and economic significance of 
 
drug dealers, mid-level executives, the military hierarchy, and officials of the Catholic and Protestant churches.” 
Thus, discussions around Haiti’s elite must be understood not only as part of their era but as part of an evolving 
composite elite. See Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 7-10; and Suzy Castor, “Democracy and Society in 
Haiti: Structures of Domination and Resistance to Change,” Social Justice 19, No. 4 (50), Latin America Faces the 
21st Century (Winter 1992): 126-37. 
15 Militarism was defined by historian Alfred Vagts as “a domination of the military over the civilian, an undue 
preponderance of military demands and emphasis on military considerations, spirits, ideals, and scales of value….” 
Michael Klare went further: “ We can define 'militarism' as the tendency of a nation's military apparatus (which 
includes the armed forces and associated paramilitary, intelligence and bureaucratic agencies) to assume ever-
increasing control over the lives and behaviour of its citizens; and for military goals (preparation for war, acquisition 
of weaponry, development of military industries) and military values (centralization of authority, hierarchization, 
discipline and conformity, combativeness and xenophobia) increasingly to dominate national culture, education, the 
media, religion, politics and the economy, at the expense of civilian institutions.” See Alfred Vagts, A History of 
Militarism Civilian and Military, (New York: Free Press, 1959), 12. http://ktp.isam.org.tr/pdficn/071936ic.pdf; and 
Michael Klare, “Militarism: The Issues Today,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals 9, no. 2 (1978): 121. 
16 Those competing ideologies are Marxism, socialism, indigénisme and of course noirisme. David Nicholls explores 
ideology in Haiti from the period 1915 forward to 1946 and specifically identifies the development (evolution?) of 
class structure in Haiti, including the recognition of an emerging middle class. Central to that development is the 
role of land and its use vis-à-vis the different Haitian classes. See David Nicholls and Ch. Carlier, “Idéologie et 
mouvements politiques en Haïti, 1915-1946,” Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales 30, no. 4 (July-August 1975): 
654-679. See also David Nicholls, “Ideology and Political Protest in Haiti, 1930-1946,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 9, no. 4 (October 1974): 3-26. 
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land, particularly for the peasantry, will provide context for understanding Western 
(mis)behaviour and the effects of interventions.17 
Chapter Four will conclude this part of the thesis with an examination of the complex, 
related terms of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ under the rubric of state control and oppression.18 In 
particular, if the most important elements of a ‘good’ state are its governance institutions and 
agencies that allows all societal groups to live together in peace and relative harmony, this 
chapter will discuss why the Haitian state has not achieved that goal and, instead, has become 
largely dysfunctional, predatory in nature, and has been classified by the West as fragile. This 
chapter will also trace the history of state development as it evolved from a regionalized 
framework to a centralized framework, with state institutions centralized in Port-au-Prince, the 
former regional power bases having been eliminated from competition. Finally, I will explore 
how, in the absence of effective and responsive government, the peasantry has maintained a 
focus on local and cooperative/collaborative organizations in order to create some measure of 
control over their lives. 
Chapters Five through Nine break down Western interventionist activities and behaviour 
within into five specific periods: Haitian independence to 1914; the US Marine invasion and 
Occupation from 1915 to 1934; the end of the Marine Occupation to the election of François 
 
17 The peasantry as a term is used to designate the majority of Haiti’s rural population. Haitian historian Suzy 
Castor, for example, has identified “la grande masse rurale” as including “un grand nombre de locataires de petites 
propriétés de l'État, de métayers, demi-serfs dépendant des grands propriétaires fonciers, et enfin de paysans sans 
terre” as well as the Haitian Army’s “grades subalterns” which were reserved exclusively for peasants. See Suzy 
Castor, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 3e éd. (Port-au-Prince, Haïti : CRESFED, 1988), 20. 
18 Particularly relevant here is the idea put forward by Michel-Rolph Trouillot about Third World states suffering 
from inherent tensions because of their position on “the periphery of the capitalist world” requiring them to be 
outward looking “if only because they are economically dependent on capitalist centres,” yet they are required also 
to be inward looking to “exercise primary control over a definite territory and derive their momentum from the 
dynamics of coercion and consent within that space.” That permanent tension becomes the central feature of the 
Third World state, overriding its ability to focus on necessary domestic development and instead forcing it to make 
significant and continuous compromises. See Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 22-3. 
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Duvalier from 1934 to 1957; the Duvalier era from 1957 to 1986; and the post-Duvalier era from 
1986 to the present. Each chapter explores Western interventionist behaviour during a specific 
period and within the context of those four recurring themes. 
Chapter Five examines the period from Haitian independence in 1804 to the arrival of US 
occupation forces in Haiti in 1915. The chapter begins with a description of Haiti’s isolation, 
stemming from the lack of formal, diplomatic recognition from any major power after 
independence. It then turns to the significance and conditions under which the forced indemnity 
to France was signed in 1825 and the long-term effects of that mechanism. That is followed by 
an analysis of developments after 1825, and finally, an exploration of the influence and 
behaviour of the Great Powers in precipitating the US invasion in 1915 by destabilizing 
successive Haitian governments and fomenting a period of chronic coups. This includes a look at 
Germany’s role in spreading bribes within Haiti. 
Chapter Six covers the Marine invasion and occupation period from 1915 to 1934. 
Central to this period is an examination of the counter-insurgency campaign mounted by the 
Marines, a campaign which I will show morphed into an exterminatory campaign aimed at 
eliminating all Haitian opposition to the foreign occupation. Education policy also underwent a 
major reorientation during this period, determining the type and direction of Haitian education 
and limiting the opportunities of young Haitians.  
Chapter Seven discusses the years from 1934 to 1957, spanning the period from the end 
of the Marine occupation in 1934 to the election of François Duvalier in 1957. Moving beyond 
the reasons for the rise of the Duvaliers, this chapter will examine American economic activities 
centred on the Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (SHADA) rubber plant 
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cultivation fiasco, as well as the emerging role played by the United Nations in Haiti from 1947 
onwards. 
Chapter Eight examines the Duvalier era from 1957 to the departure of Jean-Claude 
Duvalier in 1986. As the primary focus is on US activities which supported the Duvaliers and 
allowed them to retain power, the chapter will include the economic transfers of aid monies, etc., 
military training programs provided to the Haitian military and police and arms and equipment 
transfers sold or transferred to Haitian security forces, including the infamous Tonton Makoutes 
paramilitary organization. 
Chapter Nine examines the post-Duvalier era, from 1986 to the present. This chapter will 
focus on the American responses to the 1990 election of Aristide, the lead role of the United 
States in the international work to restore Aristide to power following the 1991 coup, and 
generally, American attitudes toward, and work to undermine, Artistide thereafter until the 
second, Western-orchestrated coup removed Aristide permanently from power in 2004. An 
examination of the re-engagement of the UN in Haiti including its ineffective peacebuilding 
campaign will be examined, as well its role in suppressing democracy. 
Chapter Ten brings together the recurring themes and the historical survey of Western 
behaviour and, through trend analysis, isolates and outlines the strategy employed by the West 
against Haiti, a strategy which has perpetuated Haiti’s fragile status. That strategy targets those 
areas identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
definition of a fragile state, namely, national security, the development of political processes and 
institutions, the economy, and the provision of social services to the Haitian citizenry. 
Chapter Eleven extracts lessons from past Western interventionist activities and situates 
them within the concept of peacebuilding, but with an aim to positively influence future Western 
11 
 
behaviour on interventions. The approach taken is pragmatic and approaches interventions not 
from the perspective of whether they should or should not happen, but rather, it assumes they 
will happen, and therefore the priority is to identify lessons which will minimize the damage 
from those inevitable interventions. 
The theoretical framework for the trend analysis is visually represented in Figure 1 
below: 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between Themes, Periods and Lessons  
 
Finally, and rather than end on a negative note, the Afterword will briefly explore 
development strategies in relation to the recurring themes. By understanding the historic 
foundation of the Western strategy employed against Haiti and its impact on specific Haitian 
themes that have presented themselves throughout Haitian history, I will outline possible 
development strategies which can be employed to facilitate Haiti moving away from fragile 
status. Bearing in mind those extracted historical lessons relative to my research question and 












































































































keeping the adage: ‘How can we help Haitians save Haiti’ at the forefront, the proposed 
strategies will present a collaborative way forward that avoids, as much as possible, the 
neocolonial approach that has consistently underlain modern Western interventions. 
My thesis will add to the analytical literature about Haiti and Haitian development 
generally. The historical survey of Haitian development as influenced by Western interference 
represents a macro study of the problem, something I believe has not received adequate attention 
in the current literature. While specific periods of Haiti’s history have been explored vis-à-vis 
Western intervention, a comprehensive survey of Haiti’s ‘life history’ has been missing. I believe 
this survey will add to that particular gap. 
It also more generally explores the intersection between international interventions and 
fragile state development, particularly as it relates to the determination of successful 
peacebuilding, and seeks to add to an understanding of how to move peacebuilding away from 
neo-colonialism.19 Using Haiti as the basis for trend analysis and lesson development, I believe 
my thesis will add to the material available to guide future peacebuilding in fragile nations like 
Haiti. While each fragile country is different, and a template for a generic development 
framework has been proven to be a dubious concept, there are nonetheless axioms that should be 
captured and employed to guide future interventions. This is a further area where I believe my 
work can contribute to the literature on interventions.
 
19 For a definition of neo-colonialism, I fall back on that of Kwame Nkrumah: “The essence of neo-colonialism is 
that the State […] is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality 
its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.” Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, the 
Last Stage of imperialism (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., 1965). 
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Chapter One - Colour and Class in Haiti: Making Sense of the Struggle for Equal 
Opportunity 
 
Indigenist and revitalization movements occur generally under the impact of disruption 
from outside….1 
- Professor of Ethnomusicology Gage Averill 
 
The first attempt to overcome issues of colour and class in the newly independent nation 
of Haiti can be found in the Constitution of 1805.2 Jean-Jacques Dessalines, Haiti’s first ruler, 
included a number of articles that at first glance seek to tackle the deep animosities between 
anciens libres and the nouveaux libres.3 Specifically, Article 14 of Dessalines’s Constitution of 
1805 included the statement “…les Haitiens ne seront désormais connus que sous la 
dénomination générique de noirs [Haitians shall hence forward be known only by the generic 
appellation of Blacks],” while Article 3 identified all citizens of Haiti as being equal under the 
law.4 Yet that reading ignores the forced labour schemes that were embedded not only within the 
Constitution of 1805 but also within previous constitutions. Toussaint Louverture’s revolutionary 
Constitution of 1801, for example, included both Article 14 which states: “The colony being 
 
1 Gage Averill, “Haitian Dance Bands, 1915-1970: Class, Race, and Authenticity,” Latin American Music Review 
10, no. 2 (Autumn – Winter 1989): 209. 
2 The previous revolutionary Constitution of 1801, promulgated by Toussaint Louverture, provided some foundation 
for moving beyond colour and class in Article 4: “There shall exist no distinction other than those based on virtue 
and talent, and other superiority afforded by law in the exercise of a public function. The law is the same for all 
whether in punishment or in protection.” However, and like the 1805 Constitution, it too would shift its emphasis 
toward the pseudo-feudal system of forced agricultural labour (the fermage system brought into play by Toussaint 
Louverture). 
3 The typology of anciens libres (colonial freedmen of colour) and nouveaux libres (former slaves) would eventually 
‘shift’ into the more commonly understood societal divisions of mulatto elite and black peasantry. Distinction 
between the two groups was primarily class and colour based. A significant component of class is related to the 
social construct around land use and access. The anciens libres, for example, were identified as landowners and 
sometimes also had slaves, whereas the nouveaux libres did not. Both classes were linked with land in the Marxist 
sense of the feudal system then being entrenched in Haiti. Class and colour (social) distinctions would take on other 
identifiers including accents, education, religion (vodou versus Catholicism), language (Creole versus French), and 
of course, urban versus rural. A second category of nouveaux libres – not peasants – was comprised of soldiers, 
commissioned and non-commissioned officers, most of whom fought in the war for independence. These soldiers 
had joined and risen through the ranks of the military for social advancement, both before and after independence.  
Economic factors would also eventually come into play and of course, the typology would expand once a Haitian 
middle class began to emerge. 
4 Article 14 of the 1805 Constitution. From Julia Gaffield, “Race and the Haitian Constitution of 1805,” Unique at 
penn.  https://uniqueatpenn.wordpress.com/2015/12/21/race-and-the-haitian-constitution-of-1805. 
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essentially agricultural cannot suffer the least disruption in the works of its cultivation” and 
Article 15 stating: “Each plantation [habitation] shall constitute a manufacture that requires the 
gathering of cultivators and workers; it shall represent the quiet haven of an active and constant 
family, of which the owner of the land or his representative shall be the father.”5 The historical 
context provides a better understanding of the reason for Dessalines’ push to overcome colour 
and class issues. He saw unity as the only means by which Haiti could defend itself from the 
clear and present dangers threatening the new nation. 
With independence on January 1st, 1804, Haiti was in desperate straits. The new nation 
was decimated by the revolutionary war. With a population well below 400,000 people, Haiti 
had lost fully one-third of its pre-war population. It was bankrupt from the costs of the war, the 
colonial plantation system was in ruins and revenues from major exports close to zero. The 
alliance between the mulattoes and the blacks was tenuous at best and was unwinding quickly. 
Further, the international community included at least one nation, France, that was actively 
interested in re-establishing slavery in its former colony. For Dessalines, the threat was all-
consuming in terms of the scope of what was needed to secure the nation and required 
extraordinary measures to counter. Dessalines saw the threat against Haiti and decided upon a 
dramatic and necessary military tactic: the murder of virtually all French individuals remaining 
in Haiti. 
 
5 Article 16 did seek to cushion the blow of the imposition of a quasi-feudal system by employing the family homily 
and stating, “Each cultivator and each worker is a member of the family and shares in parts of the revenues.” See 
Laurent Dubois and John D. Garrigus, Slave Revolution in the Caribbean 1789-1804: A Brief History with 
Documents (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2006), 169. See also 




Some historians have portrayed the killings as a genocide, claiming that Dessalines killed 
all whites remaining in Haiti.6 However, the killings were selective. Laurent Dubois, for 
example, points out that a number of North American white merchants were able to dine in Haiti 
unmolested as the killings were taking place, indicating the killing only targeted the remaining 
French military and property owners, and not all whites as some writers have alleged.7 Julia 
Gaffield identified Dessalines’s February 22, 1804, proclamation as directing his generals to 
round up those French “known to have taken part in the campaign commanded by the French 
generals…Leclerc and Rochambeau….”8  
Among those spared included the Polish and German soldiers who had deserted the 
French army, many of whom ended up supporting Dessalines during the war for independence; a 
group of German colonists who had intermarried and settled in the colony prior to the revolution; 
and a small number of medical staff (mainly doctors), a number of whom were French.9 
 
6 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn have identified three motives behind genocides: “to eliminate a perceived threat; 
to spread terror among real or potential enemies; to acquire economic wealth; or to implement a belief, theory, or 
ideology.” Of the three, Dessalines’s motive appears to have been to eliminate a perceived threat, although the 
killings could and likely did have the impact of spreading terror amongst Haiti’s enemies. Finally, the killings did 
allow Dessalines to claim the French estates for the new state, although that could have been accomplished without 
the killings. Regardless, the killings were selective and while genocidal, cannot be understood as a genocide. See 
Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990). 
7 The presence of the German military engineers in the immediate post-independent period would reinforce that 
likelihood. 
8 Julia Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2015), 83-4. 
9 See Philippe Girard, “Caribbean genocide: racial war in Haiti, 1802-4,” Patterns of Prejudice 39, no. 2 (2005): 
138-161; and Sibylle Fischer, Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press 2004). The Polish soldiers were members of the Legia Naddunajska [Polish 
Danube Legion] and originally numbered around 6,000 strong. They were led by General Władysław Franciszek 
Jabłonowski, a Pole of African descent, who requested the Legion be sent to Haiti in May 1802. Jabłonowski died of 
yellow fever in September 1802 as did over 4,000 members of the Legion. Members of the Second Battalion of the 
Legion (then known as 113th French Demibrigade) were under command of Dessalines. Heinl and Heinl claim that 
when the Legion fought its way to the Cape, French General Leclerc remarked that the Poles remaining were “all 
but naked, badly armed, and due over three months’ pay.” Of those remaining, only 400 were identified as having 
requested to remain in Haiti with Dessalines, and of that number, only 120-150 Poles switched sides to join with 
Dessalines to fight against the French. See Jan Pachonski and Reuel K. Wilson, Poland’s Caribbean Tragedy: A 
Study of Polish Legions in the Haiti War of Independence 1802-1803 (New York: Eastern European Monographs, 
1986). See also Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 112n10. 
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Dessalines’s selective killings reinforce this as a military tactic. Dessalines was 
confronted with a strategic dilemma. His new nation was weak and vulnerable. Those French 
remaining understood the situation in Haiti and, for Dessalines, if they were simply deported, 
they would have been excellent sources of sensitive and militarily important information about 
Haitian vulnerabilities and combat capabilities. Alternately, had the French been allowed to stay 
in Haiti, they posed the risk of becoming agents of espionage against Haiti.  
Further, attempting to imprison and care for the numbers of French left would not have 
been feasible. The numbers of French killed have been estimated at between 1,000 and 5,000. 
While Philippe Girard has claimed the number is between 3,000 and 5,000, Julia Gaffield has 
provided a more detailed estimate that strongly suggests the number is no more than 1,000 
French victims.10 Whether 1,000 or 5,000, however, imprisoning and caring for that many 
French survivors, most of them soldiers, would have required a substantial diversion of fighting-
age men away from their primary role as defenders of Haitian independence and casting them 
into the unfamiliar and difficult role of prison guards. Given the new nation’s impoverished state 
at the conclusion of the revolution, it could have ill afforded the requirement to feed that number 
of prisoners for an indefinite period of time.  
Julia Gaffield points out one other key strategic consideration when examining 
Dessalines’s justification for the killings. Dessalines was given a copy of a petition signed by 
several French residents in Saint Domingue, demanding the French crown return Donatien-
Marie-Joseph de Vimeur, vicomte de Rochambeau, to Saint Domingue as governor, his role 
 
10 The number of French killed on orders from Dessalines is unknown. Gaffield has identified 1,000 at most as 
having been killed. However, several sources identify the number killed as “perhaps several thousand” while 
Philippe Gerard is more definite, identifying the estimated number of “white colonists killed after independence” as 
between 3,000 and 5,000 whites. See Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, 42; and Phillippe R. Girard, The 
Slaves Who Defeated Napoleon (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2011), 322. 
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being to re-establish slavery and French rule. Gaffield believes the killings were justified by 
Dessalines under the guise of “an execution…since it was a state-sanctioned punishment for 
[the] crime…of conspiracy against the government.”11 Notwithstanding the Haitian desire for 
retribution for similar atrocities (not to mention the horrors perpetrated throughout slavery), 
murdering the remaining French based on the compelling threat they posed would have appeared 
to be the best option available and, more importantly, justifiable as a military necessity.12 
At the very core of the Constitution of 1805 lay a war measures act, which provided 
Dessalines with enormous authority and outlined his strategy for defending Haiti. First, 
Dessalines laid out the Haitian chain of command, identifying himself as ‘head of the Haitian 
family’ (Article 14 identified Dessalines as the head of State), and confirmed himself alone to 
determine the direction of Haiti’s military strategy (Article 32 gave him the right to make war or 
peace, as well as conduct diplomacy).13 Haiti was to be governed by a military hierarchy with 
general officers governing each of the six military divisions that made up the new country.14 The 
generals of each division had direct access to Dessalines and were directly responsible to him for 
affairs in their individual divisional area of responsibility. 
Second, Dessalines sought to unite ‘his children,’ both mulatto and black, under the new 
identification as ‘noirs.’ The ongoing conflict between the two groups was, in Dessalines’s 
 
11 Gaffield also makes clear in her tweets that she views the massacre as having been greatly exaggerated. Julia 
Gaffield. “I will add a few points,” Twitter, April 9, 2019, 11:32 a.m., 
https://twitter.com/JuliaGaffield/status/1115684007558176768.  
12 Girard argues there were two other motives behind the massacres. The first was that Dessalines viewed the 
killings as a “form of nation building.” He quotes Dessalines as saying, “You suffered the same calamities, you 
struck your enemies with the same ardor, you faced the same punishment, so the same interests now make you 
inseparable.” The second was the post-killing looting and the confiscation of French estates. Yet the looting and 
confiscation were not dependent upon the killings. Dessalines, having won the war of independence then simply 
proceeded to confiscate the French estates as spoils of war legitimately belonging to the new nation. See Girard, The 
Slaves Who Defeated Napoleon, 322. 
13 Dessalines used the family metaphor liberally within his Constitution, referring to himself as the father of the 
Haitian family, and the quarrelling mulatto and black (noir) groups as his children. 
14 On the governance side of the house, Article 30 reserved for the Emperor the right to promulgate laws and appoint 
and revoke at will key members of government including the judiciary and the military. 
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opinion, distracting them from the real danger outside Haiti. As father (“chef d’état”), his duty 
was to promote reconciliation between his children through legislation. He also sought to prevent 
his ‘children’ from fleeing his call to arms under Article 7, which called for death or confiscation 
of property for those who abandoned their citizenship and instead called on all his ‘children’ to 
do their duty by recognizing the requirement to serve in the defence of Haiti. For this, Article 9 
required that, to be worthy of being a Haitian, one must “especially [be] a good soldier.”15 His 
Council of State was composed solely of generals. 
Dessalines went further in defining his vision. He recognized the importance of 
agriculture to Haiti’s future, crowning it the most important and most noble of the arts. Article 21 
under ‘General Dispositions’ went further and identified it as the most important area to be 
protected by the national military, setting the precedent for military forces to control those rural 
areas of Haiti outside of the metropole. Tied to agriculture was, of course, the sacred nature of 
land (Article 6) and the prohibition against any whites claiming the title “master or proprietor” 
from stepping foot on Haitian soil (Article 12). 
Despite the very real threats to Haiti, Dessalines’s vigorous strategic measures aroused 
considerable resentment and resistance. His reliance and enforcement of “caporalisme agraire,” 
or militarized agriculture, led to his assassination in 1806 and thrust the new nation into civil 
war.16 The civil war would result in Haiti being split into two parts, the northern Kingdom of 
 
15 Flight from military duty in this sense is reminiscent of marronage, or the “act or state of being a fugitive slave,” 
during the colonial period. Fick, Making Haiti: Saint Domingue Revolution from Below (Knoxville: University of 
Tennessee Press, 1990), 5-6. 
16 ‘Caporalisme agraire’ as Trouillot termed it, sought to forcibly coerce the plantation workers to remain on the 
farms, the intent being to generate revenues necessary for the state’s survival. That coercion required labourers to 
remain on specific, resurrected plantations and restricted movement to specific local areas. The military became the 
both enforcers and beneficiaries, along with the state, of the imposed restrictions, as well as ensuring labourers met 
specific production levels. Not surprisingly and despite the reasons behind it, the quasi-feudal system was 
tantamount to slavery, borrowing as it did many of the customs and practices associated with plantation slavery, and 
consequently inspired a significant degree of resistance. See Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 43. 
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Haiti under the control of Henry Christophe, Dessalines’s successor; while General Alexandre 
Sabès Pétion took control over the southern Republic of Haiti. 
The civil war and split would see the unravelling of the unifying national narrative spun 
by Dessalines and competing narratives emerged, albeit also authoritarian in nature. Christophe’s 
narrative, based on the continuation of the militarized plantation system as reinvigorated by 
Dessalines, was quite familiar and comfortable to Christophe who had served as a general under 
the command of Dessalines. Christophe understood and fully supported a military government 
system with its reliance on coerced plantation labour as its economic engine. However, his Code 
Henry did formalize the relationship between the landowners and the agricultural workers by 
establishing the responsibilities and obligations of both parties, and of course the consequences 
for violating that relationship. 
In the southern Republic, Pétion’s competing narrative reflected his more laissez faire 
approach and the cultivation of personal loyalty through gifts and favours rather than 
maximizing agricultural production. While most of his land grants went to key members of his 
army, he also allocated land to lower ranking soldiers, non-commissioned officers from the 
independence war, and others from the lower classes simply willing to cultivate it, leading to “a 
tremendous ideological impact” on them.17 Not surprisingly, Pétion was reported to have been 
quite a popular leader with the masses. 
 
17 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 47-8.  Haitian historian Dantès Bellegarde provided an excellent overview 
of Alexandre Pétion who believed “the best means of developing national spirit was to attach the citizen to the soil” 
through land ownership. Towards this end, Pétion broke up the large plantations and made what Bellegarde calls 
“national gifts” on a sliding scale with senior officers receiving considerably more than junior officers and non-
commissioned officers from the “Army of Independence.” Bellegarde argued the result was not only the birth of 
small peasant farms, but of “rural democracy” which he believes fostered a high degree of opposition to any form of 
“collectivism” save for the local co-operative programs known as “coumbite.” See Dantès Bellegarde, “Alexandre 
Petion: The Founder of Rural Democracy in Haiti,” Caribbean Quarterly 3, no. 3 (December 1953): 167-73. 
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The government regimes established by Christophe and Pétion did share one thing in 
common. Both governments relied on agricultural labour, and were responsible for establishing 
the trend that would see future Haitian leaders moving down the same path of peasant 
exploitation. They exploited their citizens in different ways, however.  
Under Christophe’s regime, the owner or lease holder of the land paid the government 
taxes and received half of the crop production. The plantation laborers or cultivateurs did not 
have claim to the land, and instead were given claim collectively to a quarter share of the crop, 
with the government receiving the last quarter.18 Pétion allowed peasants to own land and 
produce crops. The land-owning peasants were responsible for paying taxes on crop production 
directly to the government. That distinction aside, domination of the political arena by the elite in 
both states meant their respective citizens – peasant or cultivateur – were subjected to “political 
isolation,” which facilitated their continued exploitation.19 
Not surprisingly, the struggle amongst the black and mulatto elites for political control of 
the state and the resulting control of the Haitian peasantry is a longstanding theme in Haitian 
historical studies.20 Complicating the issue of control has been the impact of outside, foreign 
powers, the effects of which will be explored in later chapters. 
 
18 The plantation workers received a quarter share collectively, which was then divided based on a sliding scale 
according to position, sex and other factors.  
19 Trouillot argued that the Haitian elite eventually gave up control of the land in return for domination of Haitian 
politics. Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 40. 
20 Notwithstanding their competition for power, Haitian historian Suzy Castor identified the early black and 
mulattoe ruling sectors as “formaient une oligarchie homogène face au peuple.” Citing Arthur Millspaugh, 
American Financial Adviser-General receiver of Haiti from 1927 to 1929, Professor Castor identifies the ruling elite 
as composed of “la caste militariste, les grands seigneurs féodaux et la bourgeoisie marchande.” See Castor, 
L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 31. 
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Throughout Haitian history, the simplest and most visible means of categorizing Haitians 
by outside observers has been colour.21 Colour categorization began in the colonial period, 
partially as a preoccupation with social categorization based on intermarriage and interbreeding 
between slaves and owners. Examining colonial Saint Domingue, the French lawyer, writer and 
slave owner, Médéric Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry, devised a colonial skin typology which 
included nine colour variations based on the degree of ‘black’ or ‘white’ blood.22 With the 
independence of Haiti, the distinctions based on colour became more binary for non-Haitians, 
with the Haitian elite described as light skinned while non-elite masses were described as black. 
Even Haitian elite have been divided between the two, with the political and military elite in the 
north being black, while the southern elite was mulatto. For Haitians, however, skin colour alone 
– dark versus light – was a misnomer. Haitians understood colour as also incorporating other 
physical features, such as the texture of one’s hair and the colour of one’s eyes. 
To further muddy the waters, social differentiation also pertains to class differentiation. 
While it appears obvious on the surface, consider the 1843 Haitian proverb, credited to the 
guerrilla leader, Louis Jean-Jacques Acaau: “Neg rich sé mulat, mulat pov sé noua.”23 It roughly 
translates as “a rich black is mulatto, whereas a poor mulatto is black,” and demonstrates that 
 
21 One of the earliest examples of that simplistic categorization was one by James Redpath, whose ‘Guide to Hayti’ 
sorted “the blacks of Hayti” by African tribal origins. See James Redpath, ed., Guide to Hayti (New York: G. 
Woolworth Colton, 1861), 130-1. https://archive.org/details/guidetohayti00inredp. 
22 Doris L. Garraway, “Race, Reproduction and Family Romance in Moreau de Saint-Méry's Description de la 
partie francaise de l'isle Saint Domingue,” Eighteenth-Century Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Winter 2005), 227-46. 
Médéric Louis Élie Moreau de Saint-Méry’s Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et historique de 
la partie française de l’isle Saint-Domingue outlined a skin colour based upon nine categories of skin colour ranging 
from sacatra, griffe, marabout, mulâtre, quarteron, métis, mamelouk, quarteronné, and finally to sang-melé.  
23 Acaau was described as “jeune, fier et d'assez beaux traits.” In addition to being able to read and write, Acaau had 
been a lieutenant in the gendarmerie or rural police. He became the leader of the Armée souffrante once he launched 
the Piquet rebellion in 1844. 
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wealth can overcome colour.24 His proverb also shows that colour and class are intertwined 
concepts that should not and cannot be understood in isolation from each other. 
Colour and class have provided Haiti’s elite with the means to exclude the peasantry from 
politics. They have also been responsible for rivalry between the black and mulatto elites, both of 
whom have shown contempt for the largely black peasantry. But that contempt on the part of the 
mulatto elite was directed against black political figures as well as the black peasantry, and can 
be seen in their policy of “politique de doublure” or the “politics of the understudy.”25   
The political tactic originated in the aftermath of the Piquet rebellions of 1844-48, 
whereby the party of the mulatto elite rescinded their claims to presidential office and installed a 
series of black presidents, which they thought they were able to control. The tactic was intended 
to appease the black property owners seeking equal political access to the presidency and to 
appease the peasantry that had revolted under the leadership of Acaau for social justice and 
education. 
Colour and class have been identified and employed by Haiti’s elites as weapons aimed at 
suppressing attempts by the peasantry to become politically, socially, and economically active in 
influencing government policies at the national level that would benefit them. Critically, the 
international community has not only been complicit in suppressing peasant inclusion, it has 
actively supported undermining peasant activities intended to advance their development. 
Western powers have adopted a primary understanding of colour and class within Haiti. As 
 
24 Gustave d’Alaux argued the proverb should be understood in the longer form (“Nèg riche, qui connin li, écrit-cila 
milatt. Milatt pôvre qui pas connin li, écrit-cila nèg.”) which roughly translates as: “The Rich Negro who can read 
and write is mulatto; a poor mulatto who cannot read nor write is Negro.” James Ivy claims the proverb is found in 
Maurice Casseus’ novel Viejo. See James W. Ivy, “The Wisdom of the Haitian Peasant: Or Some Haitian Proverbs 
Considered,” The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct 1941): 485-8; Nicholls, Haiti in Caribbean Context, 
22; and Gustave d’Alaux, L’Empereur Soulouque et son empire (Paris: Michel Levy frères, 1856). Cited in Mimi 
Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers: Peasant Democracy in the Early Republic of Haiti,” New West Indian Guide 74, 
no. 1&2 (2000): 49. 
25 For detail on la politique de doublure, see Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 79. 
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historian and theologian David Nicholls has pointed out, “white racialism” has meant that 
Haitians were lumped together into a single grouping: black.26  
On those occasions when Western scholars have attempted to disaggregate Haitians, the 
most common Western stereotype has identified two main historical groupings.27 The first is a 
small but wealthy mulatto class, which has held positions of true power and authority within 
Haiti (colloquially, lelit or l’élite); while the second, the majority, is the poor, largely black 
peasantry, which lacks both power and wealth (the pep (peuple) or mas (masse)).28 Too often, 
Westerners and Western leaders have also understood Haiti as simply a black nation. The 
international community’s systemic racism meant that Haiti found itself isolated strategically, 
forcing the nation to fight for a place within the international community of nations as a peer 
nation. Unfortunately, that peer status continues to elude Haiti, and interventionist activities have 
reinforced its marginalized position within the international community, as will be shown in later 
chapters.  
Thus, discussions of Haitian colour and class differences must examine the power 
dynamics at play between the mulatto and black elite. Collectively, both have employed the state 
 
26 See Robert Fatton Jr, “Killing Haitian Democracy,” Jacobin 17 (2015). https://www.jacobinmag.com. Note Mary 
Renda provides a more complete analysis of the American attitude towards Haiti and Haitians generally, including 
the extremely paternalistic and racist attitudes of key Marines during the Occupation. See Mary A. Renda, Taking 
Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of US Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001). 
27 John Lobb, a sociologist, identified a slightly different typology for colour and class in Haiti. Writing in 1940, 
Lobb identified the two main categories of Haitians, the Elite and the Noirs, but then subdivided the two groups into 
three sub-categories. For the Noirs, the three groupings were “at the bottom, the poverty-stricken known as the 
‘unlucky’; the middle class…who get along on their small holdings; and at the top a small number of people of 
wealth and those powerful in the vodun cult.” For the elite, the sub-divisions included a “small but highly influential 
fraction” of the elite; “just below them in prestige is a small section definable as the ‘accepted’…though not held for 
so long a time” as the top elite; and “the ‘fringe’” elite. Surprisingly, the last group is identified as including “urban 
artisans, some of the domestic servants, and recently arrived country people, usually light-colored” who are 
described as defying immediate classification. See John Lobb, “Caste and Class in Haiti,” American Journal of 
Sociology 46, no. 1 (July 1940): 23-34. 
28 Gage Averill, A Day for the Hunter, a Day for the Prey: Popular Music and Power in Haiti (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 3. 
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institutions of power against the peasantry in a strategy aimed at control and containment, 
leading to a denial of opportunities for most Haitians to improve their quality of life. Opportunity 
is dependent upon unhindered access to education, employment, health care and position without 
colour or class-based discrimination. This chapter focusses on that power dynamic, 
understanding its impact on Haitian politics and its role in mal development which has led in turn 
to the most visible indication of stagnant social development, the late emergence of a middle 
class in Haiti.29 
So, what is meant by a ‘middle class’ and why is it considered important when judging 
development?30 In the urban centres, the middle class was generally a class of professional and 
business workers who are not engaged in manual labour and were usually educated. Education 
allows entry into professions like law, education, and teaching.  In the rural areas, large and 
middle-sized landowners could also be considered to have middle class status, but they did not 
represent the majority of the peasantry. A middle class requires an education system that is 
accessible to all and effective in transferring higher skills to the citizenry (students). Literacy 
training is the primary core skill required, followed by numeracy. 
The absence of an open and inclusive education system in Haiti doomed it to remain a 
quasi-feudal agrarian society possessing at best low technology assembly industry.31 A high 
 
29 By mal development, I am looking at the idea of ‘good governance’ as a development goal. Good governance is 
defined by a respect for human rights, the rule of law, equality, accountability, political participation, and 
legitimacy. When the goal of development undertaken by society’s elites take it down the path of kleptocracy, 
corruption, repression and deprivation of rights and freedoms, that can, in my opinion, be categorized as mal 
development. 
30 Most scholars accept that a real middle class (as understood in the context of Western nations) began to emerge in 
Haiti in the 1940s, as evidenced by the “Revolution of 1946” and the presidential election of Dumarais Estimé. The 
sociologist and anthropologist, George Eaton Simpson, for example, wrote about a “diminutive” middle class in the 
early 1940s, but identifying it primarily as small shopkeepers, rural coffee buyers, various artisans and mid level 
government employees. The distinguishing characteristic for him was that all were urban dwellers. See George 
Eaton Simpson, “Haiti’s Social Structure,” American sociological Review 6, no. 5 (October 1941): 640-49. 
31 Leon Pamphile’s Clash of Cultures provides an excellent recap of education and its development (or lack thereof) 
in Haiti. David Nicholls (From Dessalines to Duvalier) also provides an overview of key external influences on 
education, including the Roman Catholic Church and other European influences. For the period of 1804 through to 
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illiteracy rate, which has persisted to the present, has deprived Haiti of skilled labourers and 
condemned Haitians to producing low profit agrarian goods. Without access to higher exchange 
value, Haitian workers remain locked out of social and economic mobility within their society. 
Despite these dire conditions, the government of Haiti provides no economic safety net to 
ameliorate these systemic problems. Social programs are either absent or lack proper funding or 
are dependent upon foreign assistance. 
The economist John Maynard Keynes argued that the middle-class spurs consumption, in 
its desire to acquire goods and elevate its status over the lower classes.32 This in turn stimulates 
investment in consumer goods that demand a higher level of skilled labour and investment in 
high technology machinery and craftsmanship. With its lower propensity to spend, the upper 
class saves more and spends a lower percentage of its income on consumption than the middle 
class. And of course, the peasant class does not possess the wealth to invest in other than those 
goods and services essential for the maintenance of life. In Keynes’s opinion, the middle class is 
the engine of economic growth within an emerging democracy. 
There is a second important factor related to the later emergence of Haiti’s middle class. 
The absence of a large middle class in Haiti until arguably the 1940s was not simply a signal of 
mal economic growth, but also of stagnant social progress. From a Western perspective, a stable 
and thriving middle class is a signal of societal dynamism. Its absence points directly to a lack of 
opportunity for advancement within the society. In Haiti, stagnant social progress created what 
Trouillot spoke of as “urban parasites”, which he identified as including “professionals, retailers, 
soldiers and state employees” who had “latched onto the alliance between rulers and 
 
1915, see Job B. Clément, “History of Education in Haiti: 1804-1915 (First Part),” Revista de Historia de América 
87 (Jan. - Jun., 1979): 33-74, 141-181.  




merchants.”33 Their hopes for social progress, and of course the potential for personal 
enrichment, were based on the possibility of elevation into a government ministry, appointment 
to a diplomatic post, or “the field of haut commerce.”34 
Roland Wingfield and Vernon Parenton spoke of a similar problem that they identified 
from independence to the 1940s which featured “[a] small group of skilled workers, ruined 
politicians etc… usually moving up or down between the bourgeoisie and the mass. They did not 
constitute a middle class but simply a transient group with no particular class identification of 
their own.”35 Trouillot likewise saw a transient group, but one which he saw as urban parasites 
“augmented by individuals who had fallen from power or dropped out of haut commerce, as well 
as by peasants who had ‘come down’ from the countryside.”36 He saw them as parasitic by 
having established themselves as the intermediaries between the elite and the peasants, 
occupying state positions as bureaucrats or as soldiers. That allowed them to benefit from the 
surplus drawn from the peasantry by the government they served.”37 In return, this parasitic 
group was expected to keep the peasantry away from the ruling elite. The problem was that 
Haiti’s peasant productivity began stagnating at the same time urban parasitic groups were 
beginning to grow rapidly. While not stating it directly, Trouillot would certainly not have 
considered this parasitic group a middle class, especially when considering the stagnating 
production levels. 
 
33 The alliance to which Trouillot is referring was forged between the “elite group of light-skinned officers 
associated with the ruling mulâtres” and the foreign merchants operating in Haiti during the regimes of Pétion and 
Boyer from 1807 through 1843 and thereafter. The alliance saw the Haitian elites becoming fronts for foreign 
retailers; providing service companies like insurance and transport for haut commerce; or creating joint investment 
opportunities for “wholesale firms.” Trouillot points to their French education and language abilities as well as their 
lighter skin, making them more attractive and accessible to foreigners. Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 75,78. 
34 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 79. 
35 Roland Wingfield and Vernon Parenton, “Class Structure and Class Conflict in Haitian Society,” Social Forces 
43, no. 3 (March 1965): 339. 
36 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 80. 
37 Trouillot, 79. 
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James Leyburn also referred indirectly to a similar concept of a middle grouping. He 
pointed out that up until the 1920s, a class or grouping existed between the elite and the poor 
peasant class, being composed primarily of urban-dwelling wage earners. While he did not 
consider them to be a middle class, they did include “townspeople… [including] servants, day 
laborers, delivery clerks, menials in general… [who] considered themselves one step removed 
from the peasants….”38 They also included ex-soldiers or cultivators” who were fortunate 
enough to lease small plots of land. Suzy Castor likewise identified “les secteurs moyens” as 
suffering from “conditions de vie assez précaires” which have been masked by the absence of 
accurate historical data. She however believed their precarious condition was primarily related to 
the instability of retail trade in Haiti, as it suffered disproportionately from political upheaval and 
violence.39  
However, on the issue of a ‘true’ middle class in Haiti, Maurice de Young has argued it 
appeared only after 1959, stating that  
[a]lthough it is flatly denied by some writers that there is any sign of an emerging middle 
class, by the test of class solidarity both in the written word and in political action there 
appears to be no question that not only does such a class exist, but is today in Haiti one of 
the most important and active groups.40 
 
Education in Haiti is clearly linked to colour and class. Mimi Sheller has argued, “Haitian 
peasants recognized literacy (as well as class) as a status boundary excluding them from civil and 
political participation.”41 Yet understanding how and why education has been employed as a tool 
to suppress the Haitian peasantry, and by extension, the emergence of a middle class, requires a 
 
38 Leyburn, The Haitian People, 48, 98. 
39 Castor identified this middle class or middle sector as being small in numbers and including “les fonctionnaires, 
les petits commerçants, les artisans et les professions liberals.” See Castor, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 31-2. 
40 See Maurice De Young, "Class Parameters in Haitian Society," Journal of Inter-American Studies 1, no. 4 (1959): 
457. 
41 Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers” 49. 
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detailed examination of not only the Haitian elite for the role they played in the manipulation of 
education policy, but also that of the external powers like the United States who similarly 
exploited education doctrine and policy for their own ends.42  
At the same time, lack of access to education only partly explains the blockage in Haitian 
society. The other significant element was the manipulation of the economy and economic policy 
by Haitian elites and their Western allies. This section explores the means by which Haitian 
development was impeded as it related to colour and class in Haiti. Specifically, part of this 
chapter examines the manipulation of education and the economy to impede progress. 
In the immediate aftermath of the Haitian Revolution, Dessalines situated education 
within a national security framework, writing in Article 19 of the General Dispositions of his 
Constitution of 1805: “Dans chaque division militaire, une école publique sera établie pour 
l'instruction de la jeunesse.”43 That inclusion within the Constitution served two aims. First, it 
affirmed the importance of education (literacy in particular) to the new nation; and second, it 
linked the military to education in a very direct way. Dessalines’ assassination in 1806 meant his 
education policy would not be fully enacted. 
Nonetheless, both Henri Christophe and Alexandre Pétion recognized the importance of 
education within the context of national development and more so as a means of asserting 
equality for Haiti within the international community. Pétion stated his belief that “l’éducation 
élève l’homme à la dignité de son être,” and Christophe expressed similar sentiments in an 1818 
speech: 
 
42 Accepting that Haitian society incorporated lifelong learning into its culture through the vodou religion (for 
example, Claudine Michel, “Of Worlds Seen and Unseen: The Educational Character of Haitian Vodou,” 
Comparative Education Review 40, no. 3 (Aug 1996): 280-294), the term education in this chapter refers to the 
formalized process of teaching or instruction within a school or university. 




We will confound the calumniators of our race by proving ourselves in no respect inferior 
in moral and physical powers to other inhabitants of the globe, and by showing that we 
are capable of acquiring and practicing the sciences and the arts and attaining to an equal 
degree of improvement and civilization with Europeans.44 
 
Christophe also recognized the important role of education vis-à-vis Haiti’s national 
security, and its continued independence. He feared the French would seek to re-subjugate Haiti 
by employing “intrigue and corruption” against its citizens.45 Christophe believed those tactics 
could be countered by fostering literacy and the ability to reason as skills essential to Haiti’s 
survival.46 His education strategy, therefore, sought to invest heavily in schools and teachers. He 
went so far as to invite missionaries to establish schools in his kingdom and also enlisted English 
abolitionist intermediaries to hire a number of foreign teachers.47 He further intended to develop 
a national historical narrative to be taught within the school system, as a means of strengthening 
his citizens’ ties to his Kingdom through the propagation of its “anti-slavery mission.”48 
 
44 Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 8-9. In an earlier 1816 letter to Thomas Clarkson, Christophe had expressed similar 
sentiments, writing: “For a long while, my intention, my dearest ambition, has been to secure for the nation which 
has confided to me its destiny the benefit of public instruction…I am completely devoted to this project….So if God 
blesses my handiwork, and grants me sufficient time, I hope that the inhabitants of Haiti, overcoming the shameful 
prejudice which has too long weighed upon them, will soon astonish the world by their knowledge.” Earl L. Griggs 
and Clifford H. Prator, eds. Henry Christophe and Thomas Clarkson: A Correspondence (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1968), 91. 
45 In an 1818 letter to Clarkson, he elaborated upon this fear: “The French colonists would assuredly use every 
means within their power not only to perpetuate slavery in the Spanish part of the island, but also to sow the germs 
of dissension and revolt in Haiti, and by their intrigues to rob us of the peace which we at present enjoy. See Jennifer 
Y Conerly, “‘Your Majesty’s Friend’: Foreign alliances in the Reign of Henri Christophe.” Master’s thesis, 
University of New Orleans Paper 1625, 2013, 116. 
46 Note that his education strategy was aimed at the children of his Kingdom’s elite and was not a ‘public’ system 
including the children of his agricultural workers, etc. The system would likely have been extended to those 
identified for service within his public service as well, however. 
47 Jennifer Conerly provides an excellent overview of the relationship between Christophe and the abolitionists, 
Thomas Clarkson and William Wilberforce, and highlights their collaboration on Christophe’s education policy and 
reforms. See Conerly, “’Your Majesty’s Friend’,” 116. Note that Carl Campbell argues that Christophe was likely 
not the architect of education strategy for which he is given credit as “his education policies were too constructive 
for an illiterate man…” Instead, he believes the strategy was presented to Christophe by his educated advisors. See 
Carl Campbell, “Education and Society in Haiti 1804-1843,” Caribbean Quarterly 50, no. 4 Haiti – Essays in 
honour of the Bicentenary of Independence 1804-2004 (Dec. 2004): 19. 
48 Peter Wirzbicki, “’The Light of Knowledge Follows the Impulse of Revolutions’: Prince Saunders, Baron de 
Vastey and the Haitian Influence on Antebellum Black Ideas of Elevation and Education,” Slavery and Abolition 36, 
no. 2 Jul 2014): 279-80. 
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Christophe’s education planning was also aimed at ending Haiti’s international isolation 
and at convincing key international community members such as England and France, that Haiti 
deserved “the status of an enlightened nation.”49 Christophe saw intellectual discourse as a 
means of achieving equality. He wrote “[a]fter having established our rights by the sword, we 
acquire a new lustre in the eyes of the world, when we defend them by the pen.”50  
Unfortunately for Haiti, the international community did not cooperate. One of the 
international institutions that denied Haitians a proper education at this time was the Roman 
Catholic Church. Through the Jesuits, the Catholic Church had provided ministry to the slaves of 
Saint Domingue and, primarily with those slaves engaged in work on Jesuit properties, attempted 
to educate them as well. For their troubles, the Jesuits were ejected from the colony in 1763 after 
being found guilty of the charge of “corruptor of slaves” as a consequence of their educational 
work.51 The Catholic orders that replaced the Jesuits understandably showed little inclination to 
follow the Jesuit lead, nor did they possess the quality of missionaries, and from that point 
onward, the Church largely refrained from providing education to the slaves, focussing instead 
on indoctrination of Church rituals.52 
Following independence, the Church remained disengaged from Haiti.53 Citing the 
violence of Haiti’s birth as the reason for cutting ties, the Church would not re-establish itself in 
 
49 Conerly, “’Your Majesty’s Friend’” 11.  
50 Conerly. Christophe’s statement notwithstanding, he did not formally extend his education policies to include the 
mass of agrarian laborers. They remained, for the most part, illiterate.  
51 George Breathett, “Catholic Missionary Activity and the Negro Slave in Haiti,” Phylon (1960-) 23, no. 3 (3rd 
Quarter 1962): 284. 
52 International relations professor, Anne Greene, cites a 1794 letter from a Catholic priest in the colony claiming 
that “since the expulsion of the Jesuits, most priests in St. Domingue have behaved so indecently that the inhabitants 
and negroes have lost all of the religious sentiment that the Jesuits gave them.” See Anne Greene, The Catholic 
Church in Haiti: Political and Social Change (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1993), 79. 
53 The Church cut ties with the new nation because of the passage of laws which made the Church “subservient to 
the state…allowed divorce, required civil marriage ceremonies, and gave inheritance benefits to illegitimate 
children.” See Greene, The Catholic Church in Haiti, 87. 
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Haiti until the signing of the 1860 Concordat.54 Regardless, the Church’s absence after the 
successful revolution sent a specific message to the new country and its leaders.55 Trouillot 
makes the argument that the Vatican committed a sin of omission by failing to establish “an 
independent diocese in Haiti.”56 He points out that historically, Catholic dioceses were 
established quickly in colonies with substantial Catholic representation. Likewise, the diocese 
was charged with constructing a Catholic Church school system, its mission being to reinforce 
Catholic doctrine through instruction. Not surprisingly, the failure of the Church to establish its 
normal diocesan presence and its attendant education system led to Trouillot’s conclusion that 
the Holy See “crippled the Haitians’ chances of building a solid and wide-ranging system of 
formal education.”57  
After Christophe’s death in 1820, education policy had taken a dramatic turn in Haiti, 
shifting away from national security interests driving literacy, and instead adopting the idea of 
education as a tool for promotion of internal security or perhaps more accurately, exercising 
internal control over the black masses. In addition to the sin of omission committed by the 
Church, the administration of Jean-Pierre Boyer (1818-1843), Alexandre Pétion’s successor in 
the South, treated education with suspicion. President Boyer feared its ability to empower 
peasants and incite newly literate peasants to abandon their fields. He saw education as 
 
54 Greene suggests that the Concordat pursued by the Church was motivated partially because of President Pétion, 
and later, President Boyer’s, welcoming attitude towards Protestantism. However, she points to the popularity of 
Freemasonry in the nineteenth century as being of greater concern for the Church. See Greene, 85-6. 
55 See Tim Matthewson, “Abraham Bishop, ‘The Rights of Black Men,’ and the American Reaction to the Haitian 
Revolution,” The Journal of Negro History 67, no. 2 (Summer, 1982): 148-154. See also Greene, The Catholic 
Church in Haiti. 
56 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 51. Note that Protestant schools were established in Haiti, by those 
American blacks immigrating during Boyer’s administration in 1821. Those schools, however, would have been 
conducted in English and would have been mainly filled with Americans and not likely many Haitians outside of the 
elite families. See Clément, “History of Education in Haiti: 1804-1915,” 43. 
57 Trouillot would argue that by 1860, Haiti’s “urban elites had already tuned the educational system so that it would 
serve their needs exclusively.” Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 51. 
32 
 
enlightening the wrong people. He has been credited with declaring: “to extend education was to 
sow the seed of revolution.”58 
The education legislation enacted in December, 1848, during the imperial presidency of 
General Faustin-Élie Soulouque (1847-1849) aimed at providing a rural education focussed upon 
cultivating crops and tilling the soil, with minimal focus on the elements of religion, reading, 
writing and basic arithmetic.59 The idea of providing vocational education based on agrarian 
techniques, rather than a literary education, would become a familiar theme for rural areas of 
Haiti and would be continued by the US Marines once they attained control over Haiti’s 
education policy during their occupation. 
Even with the signing of the Concordat between the Vatican and Haiti in 1860, education 
in Haiti did not significantly improve for the masses. The Concordat, which channelled Vatican 
money into Haiti to pay for schools and teachers, nonetheless came about well after the formal 
and more comprehensive education system had been institutionalized in the hands of Haiti’s 
elite. The majority of Haitians, if they were even able to access the developing national system, 
were, in the words of Léon Pamphile, firmly held in a “French cultural grip on Haitian 
society…reinforced by the establishment of a Catholic stronghold.”60 This Catholic and French 
language hold on Haitian education would also undermine any competition with the Church, 
 
58 Wirzbicki, “’The Light of Knowledge Follows the Impulse of Revolutions’,” 280-81.  
59 The key legal articles were as follows: “Article 117: There shall be established on the rural habitations national 
schools where shall be taught the precepts of religion, reading, writing and the fundamentals of arithmetic. The 
pupils shall learn to apply the best possible methods for the most productive cultivation of the land. The girls shall 
learn to sew. Article 118: There shall be boarding schools where the greatest possible number of children of 
agricultural families shall be educated at government expense. They may also admit boarding and day students 
supported by parents or municipalities. Article 119: There shall be annexed to each rural school sufficient land 
which, when cultivated by the children themselves, shall provide for the total or at least a part of their subsistence.” 
Mercer Cook, Education in Haiti, US Office of Education (Bulletin 1948, No. 1): 15. www.dloc.com 
60 Pamphile argues that the masses of Haitians within the interior of the country were not reached as the Catholic 
school system tended to remain within the largest towns and cities like Port-au-Prince. By 1904, only three percent 
of Haiti’s school age population was attending regularly. Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 11-12. 
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including the challenges posed by the Vodou religion and use of the Creole (kreyòl) language. 
For the majority of peasants who spoke only Creole, the insistence on the monopoly of French in 
educational instruction would be particularly devastating and became a serious impediment to 
mass education.61 It would soon become apparent that the cost of Vatican recognition, late as it 
was in Haiti’s development, threw a wrench into the engine of Haiti’s social/cultural 
development – education. 
As late as 1940, sociologist John Lobb hoped that “[w]ith the broadening of educational 
opportunities…it may be anticipated that the cultural barrier will be lowered, and from the 
merging of the Elite "fringe" and the upper-stratum Noirs there will develop the necessary 
middle class.”62 Clearly, the use of education initially as a tool to reinforce control over the 
peasantry, and later, as a means of oppressing the majority of Haitians, can be understood as a 
lost opportunity. What will become evident in later chapters is that the outside world understood 
the importance of education, but rather than using it as a force for progress, instead wielded it as 
a tool to retard Haitian development. The US Marine Occupation (1915-34) treated education in 
the same sabotaging manner. Likewise, the United Nations would later treat Haitian education 
within a similarly oppressive framework, producing similar tragic results. 
 
 
61 Interestingly, the French historian Sylvie Laurent claims “[l]e français fut ainsi selon la légende nationale 
haïtienne le « butin de guerre » de la nation émancipée en 1804.” English, on the other hand and more particularly 
since the Marine Occupation, has become the language of the occupier. See Sylvie Laurent, “Littérature haïtienne : 
Edwidge Danticat, une créolité à l'américaine,” Esprit 376, no. 7 (Juillet 2011) : 48, 50. 
62 John Lobb, “Caste and Class in Haiti,” 34. 
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Chapter Two - Militarism and Haiti 
In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive 
Magistrate. Constant apprehension of War has the same tendency to render the head too 
large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive, will not long 
be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger, have been 
always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim 
to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies 
kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people.1 
- American Founding Father and President James Madison 
 
 James Madison’s warning foreshadowed the problems Haiti confronted following the 
Haitian Revolution, namely, that a large standing army serving a military government would 
eventually become an instrument of tyranny in repressing the peasantry of Haiti. Understanding 
how Madison’s nightmarish predictions came to pass in Haiti requires an understanding of the 
role militarism played in that nation, including the nature of the civil-military relationship that 
developed. That understanding will shed light on the question: how and why was the Haitian 
military able to avoid subordination to civilian control?2  
Militarism is defined as the “predominance of the armed forces in the administration or 
policy of the state.”3 A somewhat innocuous-sounding idea, at its core, it defines the civil-
military relationship built within a society.4 That relationship – repressive or otherwise - is 
 
1 Gaillard Hunt, ed.., The Writings of James Madison: 1787: The Journal of the Constitutional Convention (New 
York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1902), 3:317. https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1935. 
2 Note that while that avoidance can in part be found within colonial Saint Domingue’s past history, it is within the 
post-independence history that external influence comes into play to either exacerbate or encourage that continued 
militarism within Haiti. Accordingly, the question to be explored in Part Two of my thesis as it relates to militarism 
are the questions: to what extent did the behaviour of Western nations and international agencies like the United 
Nations exacerbate or encourage Haitian militarism? How did Western interventionist activities shape Haiti’s civil-
military relationship? 
3 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Boston: Houghton Mifflin), 2000.  Note the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary provided the following definition - “undue prevalence of military spirit or ideals” – which I felt 
was too general and not as useful for the purposes of this thesis. 
4 Without expanding this thesis to argue about the role of the military in its society, I would simply make the case 
that from a liberal democratic point of view, the ideal relationship is one in which the military has embraced and 
understands the importance of its subordination to civil control. That understanding is achieved through constant 
training of military members that would include acculturation leading military leaders to view military interference 
in society and societal politics as anathema to the military’s professional values. Save for the direst of circumstances 
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informed and shaped by past cultural behaviour and influences, both internal and external, and is 
frequently dynamic and evolutionary. In its worst form, militarism is embodied by a militarized 
state; therein, military and security forces are often less interested in protecting against external 
threats and/or interference and focus instead on suppressing internal criticism of the regime in 
power. Associated with authoritarian regimes, the militarized state is prone to conduct violent 
attacks on the very citizenry it has sworn to protect.  
 In the case of Haiti, the militarized state has flourished and has led to a historic civil-
military relationship that can best be described as toxic in nature. Militarism has and continues to 
be a significant, pervasive, and deleterious factor impairing normative development of any 
meaningful democratic institutions in Haiti.5 As this thesis will show, too often the response to 
any civil disturbance or protest in Haiti is a military response.  
 
Laying the Foundation: The Origins of Haitian militarism in colonial Saint Domingue 
For Haitian men citizenship first took the form of military service, and the army became 
one of the main avenues of male political participation, as well as a route to land 
ownership.6 
- Sociology Professor Mimi Sheller 
 
 Militarism in post-independence Haiti can be attributed to one major factor: the threat of 
the re-introduction of slavery. Haitian fear of a re-invasion that aimed to roll back the clock on 
slavery led to the retention of a strong army and the construction of expensive defensive works, 
 
(e.g. violent insurrection), military leaders ideally would view repressive policy enacted against political opponents 
or other interest groups within the society as completely contrary to the military’s raison d’être and therefore to be 
avoided. Unfortunately, for Haiti, this has not been the case. 
5 Interestingly, Martin Shaw has pointed out that the study of militarism as it relates to Haiti has been dismissed and 
viewed as “academically marginal.”  For a so-called academically marginal area of study, it has nonetheless sparked 
a fair amount of academic interest! This then raises the question: how to move militarism within Haiti from the 
margins of academic study and into the center of academic relevance? See Martin Shaw, “Twenty-first Century 
Militarism: A Historical-Sociological Framework,” in Stavrianakis and Selby, Militarism and International 
Relations (New York: Routledge, 2012), 19. 
6 Mimi Sheller, “Sword-Bearing Citizens: Militarism and Manhood in Nineteenth-Century Haiti,” in Alyssa 
Goldstein Sepinwall, ed., Haitian History: New Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2013), 165. 
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including the massive Citadelle Laferrière. It is important, however, to not over-emphasize the 
impact of that initial period on modern Haiti and its historical problem with militarism. Post-
independence regimes certainly had means and opportunity to change the military-civil 
relationship positively yet failed to do so. Understanding when those opportunities were 
available, and why they were not capitalized upon is critical to understanding the role of 
militarism in Haiti’s history. 
 By the mid-1700s, colonial militia service was moving towards a more ‘professional’ 
force which witnessed the emergence of career officers. To increase the prestige of militia 
service, colonial authorities began to expand the officer commissions to include responsibility 
for the local parishes, giving key militia commissions the added title and authority of “parish 
administrators.”  This gave militia officers responsibility for oversight of local infrastructure 
development and fortifications, in particular, maintenance of control over the local slave 
population; and the conduct of censuses.7 As early as 1755, royal officials within the colony 
were complaining about the usurpation of the judicial function by military leaders within Port-
au-Prince.8 This trend of the military encroaching significantly into areas of local governance 
would become a constant and unhealthy theme in Haiti which would continue into modern times 
in various forms.9 
 
7 Parish administrators would later be upgraded to the position of commander of the local parishes. Garrigus, Before 
Haiti, 30. 
8 Garrigus, Before Haiti, 31. 
9 That trend-cum-theme would see the institutionalization of merging political and military authority within outlying 
regions of Haiti and was to become a significant problem. Contemporarily, President Aristide’s regime ran into 
serious opposition and armed resistance when he announced plans to dismantle the section chief program. Many of 
those affected by the dismantling of the program would unite with other anti-democratic paramilitary elements and 
become a formidable force in opposition to his regime. See Irwin P. Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti: The 
Promise of Deliberative Democracy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 29-30, 241n33. For a broad 
overview of the chefs de section program including its historical background, see Max Blanchet, trans., The Rural 
Police: An Institution that Deserves to be Uprooted. By Tet Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen, ed., Bryant C Freeman, 
University of Kansas Occasional Paper No. 18, 1998. A more limited examination of the program can be found in 
Pnina Lahav, “The Division of Legal Labor in Rual [sic] Haiti,” Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee / Law and Politics 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America 8, no. 3/4 (1975): 465-81. 
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The emergence of the militarized state: Haiti looks to survive 
We have seen that the strategy of Louverture’s party had required a formidable army 
whose main task was to impose and maintain unconditional freedom in Saint-Domingue. 
Even before independence, the rebel slaves saw themselves first and foremost as a people 
united behind a military-type organization. The awareness of the nation came through 
this organization. The army thus played a crucial unifying role in the formation of the 
nation as a self-conscious community fighting for a new political order.10 
- Haitian Professor of Anthropology, Michel-Rolph Trouillot 
  
Michel Laguerre, too, pointed out that for much of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, Haiti was a militarized society.11 Members of government either rose to power through 
their military background and connections or achieved power as civilians through the support of 
the military.  This translated into the domination of Haiti’s government by its army, an unhealthy 
relationship that saw the military and government comingling. Early Haitian governments never 
formally subordinated the army to the civil government. Given the new nation lacked any real 
experience in democratic civil governance, and that the only real functioning service was the 
military, the predominance of the army was not surprising. Moreover, Laguerre noted that “the 
existence of the indigenous army preceded that of the [Haitian] nation and, in effect, made 
possible the state and the first government of the republic.”12  
Colonial Saint Domingue was an agrarian-based society, but with the colonial economy 
ruined by war, Toussaint as governor-general was forced to turn to drastic measures to re-start 
export production to generate the capital needed for his military objectives. To that end, he 
quickly embraced the armed plantation system or caporalisme agraire.13 Toussaint’s strategy for 
 
10 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 87. 
11 Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 25. By militarized, I am viewing the phenomenon through the lens of 
state-sponsored force used against its citizenry for any number of reasons. 
12 Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 26. 
13 The armed plantation system was a militarized extension of the plantation system, or système portionnaire,  
instituted by the French civil commissioners using ‘semi-free’ cultivators under the terms of the August 1793 
emancipation proclamation of Léger-Félicité Sonthonax and that of his colleague, Étienne Polverel, shortly 
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ensuring the viability of caporalisme agraire was outlined in his Constitution of 1801 that not 
only named him governor- general for life, but also laid the groundwork for the eventual 
militarized state that would emerge with Haitian independence.  
Articles 14 through 16 of the Constitution set the tone for his militarized system by 
giving the landholders dominion over those cultivators working on the land while at the same 
time denying cultivator rights to mobility or relocation.14 Under Article 67, Toussaint prohibited 
plantation cultivators from creating cooperatives, unions or guilds, for purposes that were 
considered “contrary to the public order.” The measure further denied economic and social 
mobility to cultivators who were also forbidden from collectively purchasing large tracts of land, 
thus preventing them from improving their social and economic status. 
Other articles rounded out the militarized system’s defenses by imposing censorship on 
Saint Domingue. Article 39 restricted the publication and circulation of any writings that could 
“corrupt mores or trouble the new colony” with the “authors or colporteurs” subject to sanction. 
Under Article 52, the military was cautioned not to question their orders – “they can never 
deliberate” – and were to be ready for mobilization at any time.15 Members of the militia were 
restricted to their parish unless authorized by the local military commander.  
In the post-independence period, Haiti remained under the threat of French invasion and 
the potential re-imposition of slavery. It was, virtually, an isolated nation, alone and feared by its 
 
thereafter. The system was taken over and reinforced by Toussaint Louverture whose Constitution of 1801 placed 
the farm workers directly under the supervision of the army. 
14 Note that the only property holders who still owned plantations during this period were those pardoned white 
colonists whom Toussaint allowed back into Saint Domingue to retake possession. His military and others who were 
leased abandoned or sequestered plantations from the colonial government as well as the managers for absentee 
proprietors, were referred to under Article 15 which refers to them, without additional specificity, thusly: “dont le 
propriétaire ou son représentant est nécessairement le père. Carolyn Fick to author, 18 July 2020. Personal 
correspondence. 
15 Under Article 53, “the Armed Forces” referred to both the paid and unpaid colonial guard. The latter included all 
the males capable of military service including the agricultural workers. 
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neighbours.16 Relief from the strategic threat posed by France would not emerge until 1825 when 
détente with France was made possible through the coerced agreement to pay reparations to 
French slaveholders for damage and loss of property suffered during the revolution. Until that 
time, maintenance of a large standing army, coupled to defensive preparations and an arms 
buildup, were strategic necessities, quite simply a matter of life and death.  
The problem for Dessalines became one of generating the funds necessary to pay for 
what was an enormous burden, financially and otherwise, on the new nation. Servicing the costs 
associated with maintaining a large standing army and financing the substantial defensive 
fortification projects erected in Haiti, were responsible for the diversion of significant amounts of 
tax revenue. During Dessalines’s regime, the Haitian army included some 10 percent of the 
Haitian male population and was involved in a massive defensive construction program that 
included the famous Citadelle Laferrière.17 The manpower requirements and resultant drain on 
the economy both in terms of salaries and lost productivity were prohibitive for the newly 
created nation and were key factors in preventing the development of infrastructure for national 
activities other than those associated with military defense.  
 
16 Mark B. Bird, The Black Man: or, Haytian Independence, 1869, 60, cited in Charles H. Wesley, “The Struggle for 
the Recognition of Haiti and Liberia as Independent Republics,” The Journal of Negro History 2, no. 4 (Oct. 1917): 
369-383. ‘Alone’ refers to the failure to receive any international recognition of Haiti by a major world power prior 
to 1825. Christophe issued a proclamation in 1816 that disallowed any negotiation between his kingdom and France 
until the economic and political independence of Haiti was recognized. Interestingly, Susan Buck-Morss points out 
that Europe and the United States did in fact recognize Haiti following its self-liberation, but “…only in the form of 
fear.”  Julia Gaffield builds on historian Lauren Benton’s concept of “layered sovereignty” which argues that 
international relations were undertaken at different levels and in different domains (diplomatic, economic, etc), 
allowing what appeared to be almost normal interactions at times between states but without complete and formal 
recognition. For Haiti, this meant that nations would be willing to trade with Haiti (including military supplies), but 
without extending formal recognition. Sovereignty then was considered divisible, leading to differing levels of 
diplomatic interaction. Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and General History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2009), 39; and Julia Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World. 
17 Heinl and Heinl claim the Army was closer to 15 percent. See Leyburn, The Haitian People, 37.  
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Not surprisingly, Michel-Rolph Trouillot has argued that Haitian militarism developed as 
a product of the “way in which production was organized and surplus extracted….”18 Post-
revolutionary Haiti presented Dessalines with a surplus of land, albeit bereft of most plantation 
infrastructure and ravaged by years of warfare, and with a shortage of agricultural labour.19 His 
1805 Constitution included the statement that all property that had formally belonged to 
Frenchmen now defaulted to the state. As head of state, he was then able to lease or rent out, as 
had Toussaint Louverture before him, former plantation lands to members of the elite, partially 
solving his revenue requirements.  
He also created an agricultural labour pool from those not in the military or not 
possessing an urban trade that could be exploited through taxation. The system was 
institutionalized, and the cultivators were controlled by regulating both movement and 
advancement outside the agricultural field. Family members of agricultural workers were not 
able to find employment outside agriculture without special permission, the intent being to 
ensure Haiti retained a steady and future supply of farm labourers.20 James Leyburn argues that 
 
18 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 27. Suzy Castor likewise argues that the feudal system implemented in 
Haiti after independence lent itself to militarism as “la survivance des rapports de production féodale faisait de 
chaque propriétaire terrien une force économique.” Note that during the period from 1804 to 1825, a number of 
European nations were still under the thrall of feudalism (usually some variant of serfdom), so Haiti’s turn to its own 
form of feudalism in the form of caporalisme agraire should not necessary be seen as unique or unusual. Castor, 
L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 30. 
19 There is disagreement over the state of Haiti’s economy inherited by Dessalines. James Leyburn wrote that “[t]he 
warfare of 1802-3 had left the country in chaos. Plantations and agricultural projects were almost totally ruined. His 
point of view is supported by a number of other academics as well. Yet Mats Lundahl points out that that whereas in 
1795 “none of the major exports was even up to 3 percent of its 1789 volume…In 1802, coffee was up to 45 percent, 
sugar to 38 percent, and cotton to 58 percent of the pre-revolution level.” While Dessalines had a tough road ahead, 
Lundahl believes it was considerably easier than that which Toussaint Louverture had faced. See Leyburn, The 
Haitian People, 33; and Mats Lundahl, “Defense and distribution: Agricultural policy in Haiti during the reign of 
Jean-Jacques Dessalines,1804–1806,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 32, no. 2 (2011): 85. 
20 Such a regulated system of plantation labor was continued under the rule of Dessalines’s successor, Henri 
Christophe (1807-1820) and then of President Jean-Pierre Boyer (1818 to 1843), the latter having introduced 
legislation that sought to force workers to remain on the land. Boyer’s Rural Code of 1825, for example, included 
Article 4 that prohibited the emigration of those “whose employment is agriculture …” without permission. 
Ironically, the indemnity signed in 1825 should have allowed some respite from the massive expenditures involved 
in national defence. Instead, the indemnity imposed new financial hardship that Boyer felt necessitated the 
continuation of the semi-feudal system with its targeting of future Haitian generations. Article 5 of the Rural Code 
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Dessalines’s “entire social and economic order was based upon the subservience of the many to 
the few.”21 
 His Constitution of 1805 institutionalized the military government, dividing his empire 
into six military districts commanded by a general officer in each.22 Article 19 also proclaimed  
Dessalines, as Emperor, the commander in chief of the Army who retained the sole prerogative 
to declare war or make peace, as well as conduct diplomatic relations including treaties. While 
he created tribunals in Haiti’s major cities, he reserved military crimes for special tribunals 
outside of civilian control. Finally, the Emperor’s council of state was solely composed of those 
general officers commanding divisions and brigades. 
 An additional element of the militarized system also came into play at this time and 
became a mainstay of Haitian regime change: the “dechoukaj” or violent cleansing.23 In 1804, 
Dessalines began his rule with the massacre of those French remaining within the newly minted 
country of Haiti.24 What is significant about the slaughter is that from a geopolitical perspective, 
it can be considered a major error in judgment.25 The killings reinforced the Western narrative 
about the horrors of slave insurrections and were linked to the fear of slave revolution being 
 
specified that children of agricultural workers were not allowed to move into another profession without the express 
permission of a justice of the peace. See The Rural Code of Haiti in French and English (London: McMillan, 1827), 
3-4. https://books.google.ca/books.  
21 Leyburn, The Haitian People, 42. 
22 Interestingly, Dessalines distrusted his divisional commanders as Article 17 stated: “These generals of division 
shall be independent of one another, and shall correspond directly with the Emperor, or with the general in chief 
appointed by his Majesty.”  
23 It could be argued that the dechoukaj which took place with some routine was in fact simply a violent reaction to a 
previous regime’s repressive measures. Either way, the post-regime cleansing was allowed by the militarized state to 
take place without any significant effort being taken to prevent it, making it, after a while, seem to be a customary or 
institutionalized element of the militarized state. The dechoukaj that took place at the end of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s 
regime in 1986 was anticipated as a major cathartic event, but ended up being one which many Haitians complained 
had been cut short and not properly completed. See, for example, Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 222-24. 
24 The motivation for the massacres was explored in Chapter One. 
25 Philippe Girard provides perhaps the most biased and extreme account of the 1804 massacres. He has gone so far 
as to term the killings genocide. Likewise, Adam Jones and Nicholas Robins identify the massacre as “subaltern 
genocide.” See Girard, “Caribbean genocide,” 138-61; and Nicholas Robins and Adam Jones, eds., Genocide by the 
Oppressed: Subaltern Genocide in Theory and Practice (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009). 
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exported abroad. Internally, the massacres created a narrative that linked them to the later use of 
the dechoukaj in the aftermath of any regime change, a phenomenon that would continue to be 
repeated throughout Haitian history. That narrative was used later in the nineteenth century by 
the Great Powers against Haiti for selfish reasons.26 
 The development or growth of militarism in the immediate post-revolutionary period can 
be seen as a result of a number of factors: the exploitation of the population’s perception of the 
Haitian army as savior of the nation; the idea of the military being the only defense of the nation 
against the re-introduction of slavery; the perceived need to re-establish the armed plantation 
system, which led to subsequent entrenchment of the militarized state; and the army as a symbol 
of the nation for the majority of Haitians who fought under its banner. Not surprisingly, given the 
growth of the militarized state, Haiti began to develop what Laguerre has argued was a “military 
caste.”27  
Yet until at least 1825, the Haitian army was both the savior and the key to continued 
freedom. That status allowed the military to move easily into a position of strong involvement in 
national governance, adding another role to the Army in addition to security and ensuring 
economic production.28 In Trouillot’s eyes, “[m]ilitarism reinforced the state’s visibility within 
 
26 The reaction in 1825 of the French Foreign Minister to the massacre was typical. He was quoted as saying: 
“[r]ecognition of a Black Empire founded on Insurrection, and upon the Massacre of the White Population, would 
have a most pernicious moral Effect.” An argument has been advanced that the massacres deprived Haiti of much 
needed expertise for proper governance, but that argument has not been well developed. Further, Dessalines did 
allow some select whites to be protected and unmolested, which further undermines the argument for genocide. 
Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 156. 
27 Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 26. The Haitian Constitution of 1806 alluded to this development 
through the inclusion of Article 48, which restricted the choice of Senators to those “who serve or have served a 
civil or military function with integrity and honour.” Julia Gaffield, “Complexities of Imagining Haiti,”94. 
28 The reality of combining military and political governance under the same individuals, with its foundation in 
Haiti’s colonial past, was institutionalized in Haiti’s early Constitutions. For example, Article 28 of Toussaint 
Louverture’s 1801 Constitution made him both the governor of Saint Domingue and the commander-in-chief of the 
army. Dessalines went further in his Constitution of 1805, combining his position as emperor with that of first 
magistrate and commander-in-chief of the army (Article 19). However, he also gave himself absolute control over 
the military in Article 30, which allowed him the authority to appoint and dismiss any military officer at will. See 
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the nation.” 29 The Haitian Army was the only true transnational state organization and one of the 
few institutions that introduced many Haitians to their national government. At some point, the 
necessity for a strong military became a circular and reinforcing argument. A large standing 
army was necessary based on Haiti’s geopolitical threats, and funding the army required 
Dessalines to return to caporalisme agraire. Yet to maintain that coercive system required a 




Julia Gaffield, “Complexities of Imagining Haiti: A Study of National Constitutions, 1801-1807,” Journal of Social 
History 41, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 81-103. 
29 Trouillot believed this led to the problem whereby the military reinforced the separation of state and nation by 
virtue of the militaristic role it played within Haitian society. What he meant was that, contrary to normative 
development, any response by the state to development issues was all too frequently in the form of “arrests, 
assassinations, rebellions.” Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 88. 
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Chapter Three – Haiti and Land 
Finally, permanent freedom from slavery had been won through independence. But the 
masses had not yet won the freedom to till their own soil. And this, perhaps more than 
anything else, sums up what the peasant masses expected out of freedom. A personal 
claim to the land upon which one labored and from which to derive and express one's 
individuality was, for the black laborers, a necessary and an essential element in their 
vision of freedom. For without this concrete economic and social reality, freedom for the 
ex-slaves was little more than a legal abstraction. To continue to be forced into laboring 
for others, bound by property relations that afforded few benefits and no real alternatives 
for themselves, meant that they were not entirely free.1 
- Professor of History Carolyn Fick 
 
With a dense population and no industry, land is life, and more especially it is freedom.2 
- Professor of Economics and Sociology Emily Greene Balch 
 
 Land ownership and use in an agrarian-based society like Haiti is subject to both 
customary usage and laws which in turn have shaped the ideological development of all groups 
within the civil society. Land ownership and usage rules have influenced the ideological leanings 
of the peasantry more than they have the elite.3 This is not surprising given the vital peasant 
connection to land and the origins of that relationship during the colonial period.4 That 
relationship can be described as deep, visceral, and paradoxical. On the one hand, slavery has 
been described as hell on earth and many slaves were worked to death on the land. On the other 
hand, working the land, when it was to their own benefit on their small garden plots, also became 
 
1 Fick, Making Haiti, 249. 
2 Emily Greene Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti: Being the report of a Committee of Six disinterested American 
representing organizations exclusively American, who, having personally studied conditions in Haiti in 1926, favor 
the restoration of the Independence of the Negro Republic (New York: The Writers Publishing Company, Inc., 
1927), 75. 
3 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 34. 
4 I am using the following definition for the peasantry: “small agricultural producers who, with the help of simple 
equipment and the labour of their families, produce mainly for their own consumption and for the fulfilment of 
obligations to the holders of political and economic power.” Teodor Shanin, “Peasantry as a Political Factor,” cited 
in Ǿyvind Ǿsterud, “The Class Quality of Peasantry: A Conceptual Exploration,” Scandinavian Political Studies 11, 




a means of achieving a degree of independence or freedom from their enslavement, if only 
temporarily.5 
 For the elite, the importance of land would quickly shift from the plantation system to an 
abandonment of that system by landowners in the South during the reign of President Pétion, 
“surrender[ing] land in order to win control of the state.”6 According to Carolyn Fick, by the 
1820s and 1830s, “large landowners began to reconcile themselves to the poor returns from 
large–scale production and of refractory labourers, who spent more time cultivating their own 
crops than those of the owner.”7 Owners shifted to more lucrative commercial activities in urban 
areas, either selling off their land or renting it out as absentee landlords.8 
 Key to that shift away from the armed plantation system was the signing in 1825 of the 
forced indemnity with France, and the ostensible ending of the state of war between the two 
nations. The value of land then shifted away from its initial importance as a national strategy for 
survival, and instead moved to the periphery, becoming important once again when tied, from 
time to time, to various foreign schemes.9 For the peasantry, though, land remained crucial to 
their economic and cultural well-being as it was the pivot around which their subsistence farming 
revolved.10 The lakou system, for example, was based on land and had its roots in African 
practices. It features a common yard around which people built their housing, and was overseen 
 
5 Trouillot, for example, argued that during Toussaint Louverture’s rule, those coerced agriculture workers were 
equating liberty with continued access to Sunday markets and of course, “the right to work on garden plots.” Both 
were colonial practices which carried over into independent Haiti. Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 44. 
6 Trouillot, 48.  
7 Carolyn E. Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti: From plantation labour to peasant proprietorship,” Slavery and Abolition 
2, no. 2 (Aug 2000): 34. 
8 The system that evolved was known as “metayage” or “de moitié” with the peasant retaining 50 percent of the 
crops from their agrarian production. Fick argues that essentially “they had become virtual freeholders.” Ibid., 34. 
9 One such scheme revolved around the 1910 national railway concession granted to the American, James P. 
McDonald, which included a provision granting McDonald a 20-kilometer buffer of unoccupied public land on 
either side of the proposed rail route. That 20-kilometer swath of land was granted to McDonald for the raising of 
bananas. See Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control, 21. 
10 For more information on Vodou and its relationship to peasant land uses, see, for example, Alfred Métraux, 
Voodoo in Haiti (New York: Pantheon, 1989). 
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by village elders or the village priest or priestess.11 It was intended to provide shelter and 
protection from political and/or economic shocks through collective organization.12 Central to 
the lakou system was “a network of thriving and bustling markets” that connected the peasantry 
to an informal nation within the state.13   
 What allowed the system to work was expansion of traditional markets into areas 
excluded from market activity during the colonial and post-colonial period.14 From an economic 
point of view, the local markets and their association with the lakou system allowed the 
development of local or micro-economies that were partially insulated from the vagaries of the 
international markets and international commerce, and permitted a reasonably stable standard of 
living.15 The crops grown locally on those plots of land and available to the members of the 
lakou became the foundation of the Haitian micro-economy. 
 Socially, the lakou and linked market system brought social relations into the local 
economy. Social capital embedded in familial and kinship ties are more important to the local 
 
11 The chef de section is an example of a feature of Haitian rural life that had its roots in the lakou system. An 
excellent overview of the relationship of the chef de section and the local Justice of the Peace in a rural village 
setting is provided by Lahav, “The Division of Legal Labor in Rual [sic] Haiti,” 465-81. 
12 The lakou system in Haiti has been identified, for example, as providing a mother’s support network, whereby 
several mothers provide support to each other and care and supervise the young children within the housing cluster. 
That important lakou function has been disappearing with the modern mass migrations to the urban areas and away 
from the rural villages that supported the lakou system. See Yanique M. Edmond, Suzanne M. Randolph, and 
Guylaine L. Richard, “The Lakou System: A Cultural, Ecological Analysis of Mothering in Rural Haiti,” The 
Journal of Pan African Studies 2, No. 1 (November 2007): 19-32. For more detail on the lakou system, see 
also, Jean-Yves Merilus, “Rural Development: The Economic Potentials of Haiti’s ‘Lakou’ System,” Focus on 
Geography 58., no. 1 (Spring 2015): 36-45. 
13 Merilus, “Rural Development,” 37. 
14 Mats Lundahl wrote: “with the transition from plantations to small farms and the expansion of the latter across 
Haitian territory new market-places were created in rural areas to permit an increasing exchange of goods to take 
place between peasants…Periods of free rural trade alternated with periods of severe restrictions on the functioning 
of the rural market-places, and it was not until 1952 that the survival of the latter was finally legally assured.” See 
Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 124. 
15 By insulation, I am referring to the local monetary values that are assigned to specific crops, independent of 
international pricing. Thus, a fixed amount of coffee will retain, through either local sales or barter, a definite and 
non-changing value to locals that is often less than the international price. This local market price is what allows the 
local citizens to maintain a certain standard of living while earning what are considered to be ridiculously low wages 
from an international point of view. 
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peasant. Intangible social capital from such ties factored into access to land, labour, and local 
loans. They have also given rise to a “sexual division of labour” with the men doing most of the 
farm tasks and the women handling most of the market sales.16 The role of women is central to 
peasant society, notwithstanding the paternalistic nature of Haitian society. That centrality is 
embedded in the Haitian proverb, “Fam se poto mitan [Women are the pillars of society].”17  
 One particularly problematic customary and legal issue that influences decisions 
involving land in Haiti is that of the land registry system. Typically, a land registry system 
provides a record of transactions involving land and confirmation of legal ownership status, 
including, often, customary usage rights. Haiti’s land registry system, to the extent it exists, has a 
long and troubled history, beginning with the colonial practice of providing unregistered and 
unofficial land grants to “les libertés de savanne” [slaves unofficially freed by their masters].18  
 Later land practices would likewise contribute to the problems. President Pétion’s land 
distribution program that began in 1809 led to Haitian landowners breaking up their large estates 
and shifting their attention to urban commercial activities instead. It also began leasing 
arrangements with peasants for small parcels of land, under share-cropper arrangements. Those 
arrangements became the basis for the many and varied customary claims to specific plots of 
land by descendants. Land squatting also became more frequent during this period: it allowed 
 
16 As Lundahl found, “[n]early every peasant woman during the course of her life acquires a considerable amount of 
trading experience…several try their luck as professional tradeswomen.” Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 146. 
17 Cited in Yanique M. Edmond, et al., “The Lakou System” 20.  
18 As Robert Lacerte has pointed out, the plantation owner never actually finalized the severance and transference of 
the land to his informally freed slaves. However, and notwithstanding their official status as slaves, they “came to 
consider it [the parcel of land] theirs and even passed it on to their children….” Carolyn Fick has pointed out the 
number of libertés de savanne would have been difficult to determine as they were not demographically identified as 
such in the official census records. Robert K. Lacerte, “The Evolution of Land and Labor in the Haitian Revolution, 




“over time, [the fixture of] …their family names to the holdings they cultivated.”19 Land 
squatting remains a common practice in Haiti today. 
 Further complicating the orderly registration of land ownership were developments in the 
period from the end of the nineteenth century to the start of the US Marine Occupation. The 
many coups during this period led to the confiscation of land holdings of rival groups and re-
distribution to supporters on the winning side. Not surprisingly, records were often either altered 
or destroyed, leaving a chaotic mess. The land registry system in the rural areas mixed formal 
and customary understandings of land ownership and use.20  
Periodically, the resulting confusion led to conflict. A recent example is the ongoing 
conflict in the Artibonite Valley region. Between 1999 and 2001, President René Préval (1996 to 
2001) undertook what can be termed modest land reform in the Artibonite Valley area, re-
distributing some 5,000 carreaux (over 15, 000 acres) of land to almost 6,000 families. Préval 
took land from both state land holdings and from the holdings of large landowners, and 
distributed it to peasants, resulting in each receiving around a half carreau or 1.6 acres.  
The re-distribution program was undertaken by the National Institute for the Application 
of Agrarian Reform (INARA), part of the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture.21 However, the land 
in question was not then owned by the peasants who received the small individual plots doled out 
by the state. Instead, the land was attached to “a usufruct contract” with the state, meaning the 
 
19 Fick, “Emancipation in Haiti,” 35. 
20 Dr. Emily Greene Balch, a renowned professor of economic and sociology, believed the Haitian attitude to land 
was “non-commercial…[and treated] land…not like other commodities, that the arbiter of claims is custom, and that 
rentals tend to become fixed charges with no relation to changing land values…the mere fact of using a piece of land 
either as a tenant or as occupier, without a legal title, tends to harden into ownership… .” Balch equated that concept 
of ‘ownership’ with “a principle akin to ‘squatter titles’ in the US.” See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 65. 
21 The material presented is drawn from Beverly Bell’s interview with Ronel Thelusmond, Director of the technical 
division of the Haitian Institut National de la Réforme Agraire [National Institute for the Application of Agrarian 
Reform] (INARA). See Beverly Bell, “Redistributing Haiti's highly concentrated land is essential for the sustenance 
of agriculture and of farmers,” World Pulse, 03 March 2011. www.worldpulse.com  
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peasants had “the right to use the land and own all products from it,” but the Haitian state 
retained ownership of the land and the peasants had no legal recourse if there were contractual 
issues.22  
At the same time, complementary planning for other commercial activities intended to 
“decrease the pressure put on the land” did not materialize, and the land re-distribution program 
was eventually ended by Prime Minister Gérard Latortue after he took office in 2004 following 
the coup against President Aristide. Shortly thereafter, major landowners began to seize back 
their lands and started eviction proceedings against the peasant farmers. The attempts at evictions 
would lead to conflict erupting in the area.23 
 Reformation of the land registry system continues to be debated. For example, OXFAM, 
reporting in the wake of the 2010 earthquake, indicated that land reform is required, particularly 
because of the land speculation, forced evictions and land squatting that occurred.24 The 
organization advocated for a rigorous legal system that would facilitate quick resolution of 
disputes.  
Conversely, Smucker et al have argued that land registry reform has no definitive link to 
development. Instead, they argue that peasants “are preoccupied more by political and economic 
insecurity than insecure tenure.”25 What is clear is that customary and formal systems for land 
 
22 See Beverly Bell, Fault Lines: Views across Haiti’s Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
23 As recently as 2013, Haiti saw gunfire break out over a land conflict involving some four acres of land in the 
Artibonite area: over 250 houses were burned out and some 300 families were reported displaced as a result. Details 
on the 2013 conflict are taken from the UN MINUSTA report, “A land conflict in Artibonite mobilizes the 
humanitarian community,” 22 January, 2014. https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/land-conflict-artibonite-mobilizes-
humanitarian-community. 
24 Henry F. Etienne, “Land Rights, Land Tenure, and Urban Recovery: Rebuilding post-earthquake Port-au-Prince 
and Léogâne,” Oxfam America Research Backgrounder series, 2012. www.oxfamamerica.org.  
25 Glenn R. Smucker, T Anderson White and Michael Bannister, “Land tenure and the Adoption of Agricultural 




tenure require harmonization and synchronization to protect peasant rights.26 In my view, 
without reform to the Haitian legal system generally, peasant insecurity is only heightened by 
tampering with land tenure reform.
 
26 One other complication, which will be highlighted later, involves the forced opening of land ownership by the 
Marine authorities during the Occupation, allowing foreign ownership of Haitian land. Professor Emily Balch issued 
this warning in 1926, foreshadowing later land abuses by foreigners: “If no safeguards are evolved a system which 
invites foreign land ownership in Haiti may create evils that ages cannot solve.” See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 73. 
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Chapter Four - Haiti: The State 
The [Haitian] government has never seen its duties as including a responsibility for the 
welfare of its individual subjects in general, and a failure to recognize this fact has been 
one of the reasons why foreign observers frequently misunderstood the nature of 
Duvalier’s administration and its prospects for survival. The fact that his government did 
almost nothing to improve the lot of the average Haitian was irrelevant to his claims of 
legitimacy. No government in the history of Haiti had done anything significant to 
improve the lot of the masses and this is not the criterion by which a regime was judged. 
At least Duvalier usually refrained from interfering with the life of the peasant, and this 
was all they could hope for from a government.1 
- Professor of History and Theology David Nicholls 
 
 
 When discussing the state and its development, we naturally turn towards what we know 
and understand— the liberal democratic state here in the West. When we examine the Haitian 
state, it is, fortunately or not, through a similar lens. We are measuring it using the liberal 
democratic metrics associated with the rule of law, citizen rights, and whether the state meets the 
economic and social needs of its citizenry. A ‘good’ state then is one that is characterized by 
specific values like egalitarianism, individual liberty, and an absence of corruption. It also often 
encompasses moral values such as tolerance and accommodation. 
 The most important elements of a ‘good’ state can be understood to be its governance 
institutions and agencies, which should allow all parts of the society to live together in peace and 
relative harmony. Employing those metrics, the development of the Haitian state has been 
problematic from its inception. Its development has been impaired and limited, and the state 
itself has consequently been described as dysfunctional, predatory, and failed in relation to its 
governance obligations. 
 Understanding how the Haitian state has arrived at this point requires a review of Haitian 
state-building historically. What events precluded Haiti from developing ‘normally’ and instead 
 
1 Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 247. 
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launched it down the long path to its current status as a ‘bad’ or predatory state? This question 
will, in turn, allow the exploration, in later chapters, of the role played by foreign interventions in 




Haiti clearly followed the European, in particular the French model, throughout the 
nineteenth century - during and not after the era of intense nationalism. Haiti was thus a 
new nation amongst the powerful nations of the West - or at least it strove to be accepted 
as such. The Haitian dominant class was oriented towards France and the political and 
cultural processes on the other side of the Atlantic therefore had all the more impact on 
Haiti's national development.2 
- French Studies academic Gérarde Magloire 
 
 Trouillot has argued that the state and the nation are different but related concepts. 
Within Haiti, he claimed the two “were profoundly at odds” to put it mildly.3 By state and nation, 
I defer to the definitions put forward by historian Hugh Seton-Watson for whom a state is “a 
legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its 
citizens” whereas a nation is “a community of people, whose members are bound together by a 
sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness.”4 The former can be understood 
as involving the development of those institutions at the state level that allow a monopoly on the 
use of legitimate force, the control of national territory, and the development of the institutions 
of national power related to governance. The latter involves intangibles like the fostering of 
 
2 Gérarde Magloire, “Haitian-ness, Frenchness and History: Deconstructing the History of the French Component of 
Haitian National Identity,” Journal of Haitian Studies 5, no. 6 (1999-2000): 31. 
3 Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 16. 
4 Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 1. 
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national identity, common or shared cultural heritage and values, and national unity. Those ideas 
manifest themselves in a shared national narrative that becomes a national identifier.5 
 Haiti’s national narrative, at its core, is about independence. Haiti was the only New 
World slave colony to throw off the yoke of slavery through successful revolution.6 David 
Geggus wrote what is perhaps the most commonly accepted national story of Haiti’s origins:  
The Haitian Revolution was never just a slave revolution. Although the destruction of 
slavery constitutes its core, only the simultaneous struggle of free and enslaved 
nonwhites explains its outcome. Despite their antagonism, slaves and free coloreds each 
owe much of their success to the other. Free people of color won the abolition of racial 
discrimination in April 1792 because the French knew they could not defeat the slave 
insurrection without their help. The inability of the French to suppress the slave 
insurrection had much to do with their having to fight the free coloreds at the same time. 
And only when the slaves and free coloreds united in the fall or 1802 could they oust the 
French and preserve their respective gains by ending colonial rule.7 
 
 While that narrative has painted Haiti as a nation that has embraced independence and 
freedom, there are also a number of elements that have been excluded or ignored. Front and 
centre of course is the controversial role undertaken by national leaders and heroes of the 
revolution like Toussaint Louverture, Dessalines, and Christophe, who proved willing to 
reinforce feudalistic practices, in many ways akin to slavery, and sacrifice the personal freedoms 
of the peasantry in order to ensure Haiti’s independence. That willingness to override individual 
 
5 Without digressing into a discussion of the theory behind nation and state-building, suffice it to say that my 
understanding is those shared values and common heritage shape a national unity with a common or shared bond, a 
bond which shapes a commonly accepted and shared national narrative. That narrative in turn is built upon a 
foundation of coherence, unity, and shared interests. State and nation development are best understood as a dual 
track process that typically begins with the development of state institutions necessary for governance, and then 
incorporates at some point the development of the shared, national identity: both goals should be understood and 
undertaken as complementary and may overlap. In the case of Haiti, however, the state “was formed on the back of 
the nation and never fully incorporated the shared values of national identity.” The peasantry had developed their 
understood identity while the elite dominated the state development and warped it towards their own ends, creating a 
radically different national identity and concept of governance. Carolyn Fick to author, 19 June 2019. Personal 
correspondence. 
6 Trouillot argued that the Haitian victory was “the sole empirical reference point of Haitian nationalist discourse” 
prior to the American occupation in 1915 and that the occupation caused many who had embraced that narrative to 
question the claims of links back to their ancestors. See Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 130-1. 
7 David Geggus, ed., Haitian Revolutionary Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 95. 
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liberty in the name of national survival can be understood and celebrated from a Machiavellian 
point of view. 
 Eventually, however, the relationship between state and nation devolved considerably, 
with peasant oppression and the inability of the state to provide social goods undermining the 
credibility and moral authority of the state. What emerged very early in Haiti’s development 
were two competing narratives. One was associated with the former slaves who sought 
development opportunities from the Haitian state; and the other was that of the ruling elites who 
sought to exclude the peasantry from the state arena while simultaneously profiting from their 
labours.8 The ruling elite’s narrative and national consciousness was built on the idea of political 
and social control; whereas the peasantry sought a narrative based on personal freedom and was 
willing to shape it by employing resistance, accommodation and negotiation.9  
Given these competing narratives, the elite often found itself having to compromise in 
order to maintain that control and President Pétion’s system of land redistribution was a prime 
example of such accommodation. Yet compromise to meet peasant demands was tempered. As 
Haitian historian Jean-Alix René argued, Pétion’s land distribution policies legitimized the 
authority of the state as both benefactor and protector of the peasantry at the same time as it 
ensured its domination over it.10 
By the 1820s and 1830s, peasant resistance and rebellion were proving successful. “La 
petite culture” had triumphed over “la grande culture” insofar as the plantation system was 
 
8 The ruling elite is not a monolithic group of unchanging families. My readings suggest that various families 
manoeuvred for power at different times, leading coups when possible. Those coups often led to those in power 
being unseated from power and either forced into exile, or murdered. In either case, their wealth was usually 
confiscated and distributed among the supporters of the winning side. 
9 Steven Mintz, ed., African American Voices: A Documentary Reader, 1619-1877 (Oxford: Brandywine Press, 
2009), 201. 
10 See Jean-Alix René, Haiti après l’esclavage : formation de l’État et culture politique populaire (1804-1846), 
(Port-au-Prince, Imp. Le Natal, 2019). 
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disappearing and instead the peasantry was allowed to spend their time cultivating their own 
crops and looking after their own standard of living.11 In effect, the peasant goal of personal 
freedom was, at least in theory, achieved but, from an exclusively Western perspective, within 
the framework of poverty. Further, repression and oppression of the peasants continued, ensuring 
that any reconciliation of nation and state would remain elusive. 
 Generally speaking, Haitian governance has been identified, rightly or wrongly, with the 
more general theme of Latin American caudillismo.12 The post-revolutionary period saw the 
emergence of a central government that featured state institutions typically headed by military 
officers. With the notable exception of the presidency of Lysius Salomon (1879 to 1888), 
domestic military governments remained in place until the US Marine Occupation when it 
shifted to a foreign military government.13 That merging of political and military functions into 
one role was particularly bad for the development of both arenas. Professionalization of the 
military was severely retarded as was institutional development of proper governance.  In 
addition to military paternalism (the continuation of the militarized plantation system in the 
immediate post-revolutionary period being the best example), corruption also became a dominant 
theme. 
 
11 As noted earlier, the indemnity agreement with France in 1825 also significantly lowered the previous strategic 
threat of invasion that underlay the massive defence spending and the consequent requirement of proceeds from 
caporalisme agraire. James Leyburn cites the historian Romuald Le Pelletier de Saint-Rémy who claims the 
Haitians “when they saw themselves freed, by a solemn treaty, seemed to allow their arms to drop relaxed at their 
sides, saying, Let’s take a rest.” Leyburn believed “the Haitian army as a disciplined force ceased to exist” with the 
removal of the threat to Haiti’s existence. At the same time, he believed with the end to the army’s discipline, Haiti 
“lost its last chance of economic prosperity through a system of forced labour.” See Leyburn, The Haitian People, 
71. 
12 Robert Lacerte has made the argument that the economic decline between 1820 and 1843 “made the first black 
nation virtually ungovernable after 1843 save by the rule of caudillos.” Robert Lacerte, "Xenophobia and Economic 
Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820-1843." The Americas 37, no. 4 (1981): 499-515. 
13 Without delving into political science theory, the argument can be made that the early Haitian governments were 
classified as stratocracies, that is, governments which, constitutionally, saw the melding of the state functions with 
military positions, the result being the dominance of the Haitian government and state apparatus by military officers. 
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 Michel Laguerre detailed the ramifications of the Haitian system that saw cabinet level 
appointments going largely to general officers.14 This allowed those same officers to use their 
influence as cabinet-level appointees to foster their own protégés within the military, promoting 
friends and allies over rivals. Not only did this create specific cliques within the army, it also 
resulted in an army that was quite top heavy, loaded with a large number of colonels and general 
officers. Additionally, many politicians or individuals of social or monetary importance were 
appointed to senior ranks, many of whom were political appointees and not in any sense 
professionally trained in the art of war. Both practices complicated any movement towards 
professionalization of the Haitian Army and created a hopelessly complicated military hierarchy. 
 The system was further dominated and complicated by regionalism. Because Haitian 
governments from the beginning were chronically short of funds, one of the primary means of 
rewarding service and/or loyalty was through an award of land. Land grants not only secured 
loyalty or provided a means of rewarding service, it also tied officers through the land grant to 
specific regions within Haiti. That latter effect meant that often individuals who rose to 
prominence owed their allegiance not to the government but to the region where they had 
developed ties and could exploit them for advancement.  Indeed, prior to the Marine Occupation 
period, rising to power in Haiti was more about raising regional support, including support from 
adjoining regions through their key military leaders. 
 This regionalist dynamic meant that regions became quite powerful in politics and were 
able to counter-balance (or block) the interests of the central government. Presidents were forced 
to either cater to regional interests or develop alternate alliances to remain in power. Too 
frequently, failure to build and maintain a coalition of support led to rivals exploiting regional 
 
14 Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 33-35. 
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discontent to develop and launch revolutionary activity from that base of discontent, building 
support and momentum as it progressed towards the capital. At the same time, achieving success 
meant promising possible future rewards to supporters. Building alliances and manufacturing a 
base of support meant corruption and graft became tools of necessity. Loyalty, through monetary 
compensation or through the provision of positions and advancement, created a system of 
normalized corruption and graft. Further, raising the caco armies meant promising them 
opportunities to loot as they marched towards the capital.15 In short, the predatory system 
became normalized throughout Haiti. 
 Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal identified the predatory nature of the state that 
developed in Haiti as part of the “soft state” that lacked “the social discipline necessary for 
successful economic and social development.”16 Corruption is the key result of that lack of 
mature institutions necessary for proper governance. Mats Lundahl, for his part, has argued that 
corruption, rife during the colonial period, continued in the new state after independence. 
Government service became a lucrative profession for enriching oneself and not surprisingly was 
reserved for the educated elite. The military as a means to advancement would become more 
difficult after 1825 when new rules were introduced for promotion.17
 
15 See Chapter Six of this thesis, “The United States Marine Invasion and Occupation,” for a discussion of cacos. 
16 Cited in Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 327.  
17 Lundahl., 328. 
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Chapter Five – Eighteen and Nineteenth Century Western Intervention in Haiti. 
 
If ever a country had an opportunity to start absolutely fresh in choosing its own social 
institutions, Haiti had that opportunity in 1804. Free at last, with no traditions to uphold, 
the first independent Negro state in the world, owing allegiance to no man or nation, the 
Haitians might (theoretically, at least) have invented an entirely new little world of 
economic, political, religious, and social life. All paths were open to them.1 
- Professor of Sociology James G. Leyburn 
 
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot called Haiti’s revolutionary path to independence “an 
unthinkable history.”2 He argued that because any revolution by black slaves was seen by 
Western thinkers as impossible and therefore ‘unthinkable,’ “explanations [were found by the 
key Western leaders of the day] that forced the rebellion back within their worldview, shoving 
the facts into the proper order of discourse.”3 In the aftermath of the revolution, Haiti was 
isolated and ostracized by the international community because of its temerity in successfully 
defying its white masters and gaining independence.  
Yet a closer reading of the evidence by Julia Gaffield and others demonstrates that, as 
with all things Haitian, a cursory view of the situation is much too simple. While Haiti was 
denied international recognition, the independent state sustained commercial and trade relations 
with a number of nations, including France. This has led Gaffield to conclude that the 
international community pragmatically negotiated its relationship with Haiti through “multiple 
layers of recognition and non-recognition.”4 
 While the root decision to isolate Haiti diplomatically can be found in Trouillot’s 
‘unthinkable history’ and international racism, the international community used two key events 
to justify Haiti’s isolation. The first was the significant impact of the massacres of 1804 directed 
 
1 Leyburn, The Haitian People, 32. 
2 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “An Unthinkable History,” in Sepinwall, Haitian History, 42. 
3 Trouillot. 
4 Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World, 184. 
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by Dessalines. Critically, in 1804, US President Thomas Jefferson elected to embargo US arms 
sales to Haiti at this critical juncture in Haiti’s existence, reportedly in response to French 
diplomatic pressure.5 Tim Matthewson has pointed out that the American decision to embargo 
the exportation of weapons to Haiti represented a significant change in policy for the Jefferson 
administration as US merchants had provided Dessalines arms and ammunition in 1803 and US 
armorers would continue to work in support of his regime as late as 1805.6 
 The second event was the emigration of French planters and other whites fleeing Haiti for 
safer lands during the revolutionary war, starting as early as 1791 and continuing through to 
Haiti’s independence. Most of the émigrés saw their departure as temporary, and fully expected 
to return once order was re-established in the colony. Many settled in Cuba, Louisiana, and the 
United States, while others returned to France; and spread their narrative of terror upon fleeing a 
black uprising and the horrors it encompassed.7 That narrative fed into the paranoia of local slave 
owners and was no doubt reinforced by reports of the 1804 massacre.8 
 
5 Philippe Girard has argued that the massacre was responsible for the replacement of “wariness with outright 
hostility, panic even…” on the part of the Great Powers and that gunboat diplomacy, for example, was merely 
“lasting, and understandable, prudence.” There is little evidence to support this position, but I include it as the case 
of the Devil’s advocate. See Girard, Haiti: The Tumultuous History, 157. 
6 Sparked by fear of slave rebellions and racism, Jefferson justified the US embargo by citing the 1804 massacres as 
its rationale. Secretary of State James Madison declared “it is probably in the interest of all nations that they 
[weapons] should be kept out of the hands likely to make so bad use of them.” Tim Matthewson, “Jefferson and the 
Nonrecognition of Haiti,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 140, no. 1 (Mar 1996): 29. 
7 A number of those who fled the colony were waiting for the conclusion of the fighting (and white success in 
suppressing the revolution) and were actively planning to return to their former homes and lifestyles. The failure to 
suppress the revolution would have been a shock. Matthewson, 59-62. 
8 The argument has been raised that the narrative provided by those whites fleeing revolutionary Saint Domingue 
changed the massacre from French ‘whites’ to whites in general, the aim being to make other slave colonies more 
cognizant and more empathetic to the isolation and eventual invasion of independent Haiti. However, that narrative 
did not resonate with the British. For example, in 1803, British diplomats chose to support the rebelling blacks over 
the French because of “the enmity the French in all their action shew [sic] towards our country [Great Britain].” 
That support was tempered after the 1804 massacre but was continued as commercial interests won out over any 
concerns the British may have had. Moreover, Dessalines had taken pains to protect British merchants in Haiti, 
going so far as to post guards to secure their persons and property, measures which were eventually communicated 
with the Home Office in London. See Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World, 68-9, 85-6. 
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Haiti’s diplomatic ostracism and isolation profoundly impacted its budget and drove 
Haitian militarism. Internally, with the reinstatement of the armed plantation state, the army was 
necessary for ensuring internal dissention was kept under control. Externally, in addition to the 
threat of a direct invasion by France, Haiti also faced active cross-border incursions from the 
eastern end of the island of Hispaniola. The invasion of Santo Domingo in 1805, at the time 
under French control, was precipitated by the French authorities allowing, if not actively 
condoning, the “enslaving of Haitians along the border.”9 Understandably, the security of the 
state became the highest priority for Haitian leaders following the revolution and led to the 
diversion of enormous sums of money and the best people into a powerful standing army and 
defensive fortifications as deterrents against the all too real threat of invasion.10 Further, Haiti 
was largely surrounded by slave colonies, with the United States, in close proximity to the north, 
fanning exaggerated fears of Haiti’s revolutionary message taking root on American soil.11  
Consider the impact of the foreign menace on Haiti’s limited manpower. A post-
independence census carried out in 1805 estimated Haiti’s population at roughly 380,000, with 
women (around 228,000) outnumbering men (152,000) by a factor of three to two.12 The Haitian 
army was believed to have been somewhere between 10 and 15 percent of the total population 
 
9 See Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 2d ed. (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press Inc., 2004), 75. 
10 Haiti also was forced to confront an early civil war (1806-11) which saw the state split into two parts: the north 
under the control of Henri Christophe and the south and west under the control of Alexandre Sabès Pétion. 
11 That proximity was also responsible for Haiti’s regional shunning. Fear of black insurrections and attacks on 
property rights continued to ensure Haiti was excluded from the international and regional communities, both of 
which hoped the new black nation would either founder and collapse, or would eventually submit and become “the 
pawn of a ‘major’ international power.” When it became clear neither scenario would happen, Trouillot argued that 
Western nations sought either to “erase” or “trivialize” the events in Haiti, silencing the revolutionary narrative and 
replacing it with their alternate historical narratives about slavery. See Trouillot, “An Unthinkable History,” in 
Sepinwall, Haitian History, 43; and Sheree Alicia Henlon, “The Black Pariah: Representation of Haiti and Haitians 
in Nineteenth Century Literature of the Hispanic Caribbean.” PhD diss., University of Iowa, 2007. 
12 Leyburn, The Haitian People, 33. Those numbers are very rough. Mats Lundahl, who cites Leyburn, feels the total 
number of Haitians at this time was likely closer to 400,000. By 1824, he believes the number had risen to 600,000 




(38,000 to 57,000). The remainder of the male population capable of work would have been 
required to take up arms to repel invaders when required.13 
 Most of those serving in the standing army were not available to undertake any other 
profession, including farming. This not only represented lost labour and a loss in national 
revenue for the new state, but soldiers also required precious food as well as money for their 
salaries. Added to that massive bill were the enormous and capital-intensive projects undertaken 
to provide Haiti with defensive positions throughout the country, including the famous Citadelle 
Laferrière completed by Christophe in 1820. Haiti also expended precious foreign currencies to 
purchase weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies, none of which was produced 
locally. 
 Not surprisingly, spending for the standing army and the construction programme, as well 
as the cost of imported military supplies, severely curtailed domestic economic initiatives. 
Outside of security and national defense, other development would have to wait for safer times.14 
Defence spending and the 1804 massacre of the French also deprived Haiti of technological and 
bureaucratic expertise. Educated civil servants so necessary for the functioning of the 
government bureaucracy were in short supply, and Haitian leaders would be forced to look 
outside Haiti for expertise and advice.15 
 
13 Heinl and Heinl maintain the army was closer to 15 percent of the total population, citing the figure of 52,000. 
(Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 130) Robert Lacerte, citing Thomas Madiou (Histoire d’Haiti, 1922), claims the 
post-revolutionary army was around 49,400-men strong and a navy existed that numbered an additional 3,000. 
(Lacerte, “The Evolution of Land and Labor in the Haitian Revolution, 455). Prosper Avril identified the original 
army under Dessalines, on paper at least, as being 52,500 all ranks, divided into 29 demi-brigades which in turn 
formed four divisions and a number of other specialized independent units. That figure included a naval strength of 
3,000 as well as cavalry and artillery units. See Prosper Avril, From Glory to Disgrace: The Haitian Army 1804-
1994, 42-3. 
14 Paying for war, which Haiti was required to do in its post-independence re-building phase, would have required 
one of three approaches: raising taxes, which it essentially sought to do through the armed plantation system 
approach; borrowing money from external powers, the approach it would later adopt; or print more currency, which 
encourages inflation, in effect acting as a tax on the national economy. 
15 This should not be seen as suggesting that educated Haitians (mainly mulattoes) were not available and capable of 
providing government service once trained. Boisrond-Tonnerre wrote the Acte de l'Indépendance in 1804. Haiti’s 
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Nevertheless, ending Haiti’s isolation still required reconciliation with France. Between 
1816 and 1825, sporadic negotiations were held between the two nations, the Haitians seeking 
formal recognition and the French offering various relationships which invariably included some 
form of French authority over Haiti (including, for example, France treating Haiti as a 
protectorate).16 That reconciliation came about in April 1825 when France presented President 
Boyer a royal ordinance from King Charles X, demanding Haiti pay 150 million francs as an 
indemnity to compensate former colonists for property loss and allow France to enjoy a 50 
percent reduction in duties on goods entering or leaving Haiti on ships flying the French flag.17 
The indemnity, which provided for French recognition of Haiti’s full independence, was borne 
by a full French naval squadron.18  That squadron would eventually be joined by two others. 
Outgunned, and in spite of vigorous domestic opposition, President Boyer signed the agreement. 
 
first historian was the eminent Baron de Vastey who functioned as Christophe’s secretary. However, Haiti lacked 
sufficient people trained to function as government bureaucrats and, accordingly, the institutions of government 
suffered. Seeking out French assistance was obviously out of the question, and accordingly other avenues were 
explored. One example was that of Henry Christophe, who took advice on education policy for his northern 
kingdom from English abolitionists, including William Wilberforce and Thomas Clarkson. See Conerly, “’Your 
Majesty’s Friend’,” 116; and William Wilberforce, Robert Wilberforce and Samuel Wilberforce, eds. The 
Correspondence of William Wilberforce, Volume 1 (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1840: repr., 
Cambridge University Press edition, 2011). 
16 See Robert K. Lacerte, “Xenophobia and Economic Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820-1843,” The Americas 37, no. 
4 (April 1981): 499-515; and J.N. Léger, Haiti: Her History and Her Detractors (New York: The Neale Publishing 
Company, 1907). For an understanding of the negotiations between the French envoys and Haiti’s leaders 
(Christophe, Pétion and Boyer), see François Blancpain, Un siècle de relations financières entre Haïti et la France: 
1825-1922 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2001). 
17 The French recognized that despite their desire to repossess Haiti and return it to colonial status, that was not 
going to happen. The indemnity was understood as the next best option, particularly given it was designed to be 
quite lucrative. Carolyn Fick to author, 04 July 2019. Personal correspondence. 
18 The value of the indemnity in today’s dollars is difficult to determine because of the damage caused by the tariff 
reductions. The cash payment of 150 million francs initially demanded would be reduced to 90 million. The 
predatory loans required to meet the indemnity payment scheduled have been described as crippling. In 2004,  
President Aristide called on France pay US$22 billion in reparations for the indemnity. Isabel Macdonald, a 
journalist who helped draft the 2010 letter to then French President Nicolas Sarkozy demanding France repay Haiti 
for the ignominious indemnity, placed the value at over US$17 billion, while Ottawa historian Jean St Vil believes 
those valuations are low and has placed a value of US$40 billion. See Isabel Macdonald, “France’s debt of 
dishonour to Haiti,” The Guardian, 16 August 2010,  www.theguardian.com; Westenley Alcenat, “The Case for 
Haitian Reparations,” Jacobin, 14 January 2017, www.jacobinmag.com; and “Haiti France and the $40B Elephant” 
(published 09 April 2010) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SIcJWlcKKEg for the interview with Jean St Vil. 
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 The effects were immediate, dramatic, and long-lasting for Haitian development. Boyer 
was forced to seek a loan from France to pay for the initial installment of the indemnity, an 
amount set at 30 million francs. The loan, floated through Parisian banks, obligated Haiti to 
repay the full 30 million francs, but only provided 24 million francs to Haiti, the banks holding 
back six million francs for fees and interest. Haiti would be forced to use its limited hard foreign 
currency to repay the reduced loan in addition to the initial 6 million francs withheld.   
 Yet that was not the worst result of the indemnity treaty. The 50 percent reduction in 
duties on French goods would have more immediate and long-term effects. At a time when Haiti 
desperately needed foreign currency, the reduced duties meant that fledgling Haitian industry 
could not compete with French goods flowing in at reduced rates. Yet the cheap French 
manufactured goods discouraged Haitian investors from committing their capital to establish 
domestic manufacturing. Further, France demanded the indemnity be paid in hard foreign 
currency, which Haiti obtained solely through the collection of foreign duties at its customs 
houses.19 With no hard currency and limited amounts of gold to back up the Haitian currency, the 
ability to purchase foreign goods dried up. Foreign merchant ships began to avoid Haitian 
ports.20  
 It was not until 1838 and the renegotiation of the indemnity agreement with France that 
Haiti was able to feel secure in its relations with France. The new indemnity ordinance not only 
eliminated the French duty reduction, it also reduced the indemnity to 90 million francs. 
 
19 In 1834, the indemnity agreement was declared unlawful by a law firm engaged by the French government and 
the tariff reduction ended. However, in 1838, the French and Haitians negotiated what became known as “Traité 
d’Amitié” which reduced the indemnity debt but re-instituted the tariff reductions on French goods. The French 
understood the long-term consequences of ensuring Haiti did not compete with foreign imports through the 
development of domestic industry. Not only exclusion but also the tariff and its non-competitive grounding ensured 
Haiti did not develop any domestic industry and instead remained agrarian based, albeit largely sustainment based. 
See Blancpain, Un siècle de relations financières entre Haïti et la France: 1825-1922. 
20 Lacerte, “Xenophobia and Economic Decline,” 499-515. 
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Unfortunately, the damage was already done. Haiti was still obligated to fulfill repayment of the 
initial 30-million-franc bank loan, something often referred to as the ‘double indemnity’. Haiti 
was now heading down the path of dependence upon foreign loans to enable its government 
operations. Foreign loans were not only predatory in nature, but would prove too enticing for 
future leaders, and marked the start of a long history of graft and corruption within Haitian 
political and military circles.  
Ironically, the stability apparently offered through the 1838 revised indemnity would be 
too late for President Boyer. The massive earthquake of May 1842 coupled with discontent over 
a worsening economic situation caused by the indemnity and the rise of an emerging generation 
of young, educated men (the so-called Liberal revolution of 1843), would signal the end of 
Boyer’s regime.21 Further complicating the signing of the revised indemnity agreement was the 
increased presence of French naval forces and merchant ships in Haitian waters, all suggesting 
that Boyer had “sold out to France.”22 Fighting over the Haitian presidency after 1843 became 
 
21 Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers,” 33-56. 
22 Lacerte, “Xenophobia and Economic Decline,” 505. Foreign naval interference in Haiti had already been 
increasing ever since the signing of the initial indemnity with France in 1825. After 1827, Haiti was assaulted by an 
era of gunboat diplomacy. An American presence in the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean had been sporadic 
between 1790 and 1830 and had been largely occupied with fighting piracy and illegal privateering. An American 
presence in the region would not become permanent until the 1820s with the stationing of the West Indies naval 
squadron to focus on anti-piracy operations as a result of the US Congressional decision to pass “An Act to Protect 
the Commerce of the Unites States, and Crime of Piracy” in 1819. The permanent presence of the American 
squadron meant that gunboat diplomacy became the new norm whenever Haiti erupted in conflict. Ironically, the 
American squadron was not particularly effective in anti-piracy operations until it was able to collaborate with 
British anti-piracy protection. Haiti also collaborated with the British in the anti-piracy efforts in the area, but unlike 
the Americans, was much more effective. In 1820, President Boyer had dispatched the Haitian warship, Wilberforce, 
out into the Caribbean to conduct anti-slavery interventions against Spanish slavers. Despite employing a full 
squadron, the British acknowledged that the single Haitian warship outperformed them on anti-slavery operations. 
Ironically, while the Haitian deployment coincided nicely with British anti-slavery efforts ongoing at the time, 
Boyer’s strategy was primarily aimed at interdicting the Spanish ability to resupply Santo Domingo, which was back 
in Spanish hands by this time, his aim being to lower the threat from that side of the island. Boyer also expected the 
British would “retaliate if Spain attacked a ship whose ‘official’ mission was suppression of the international slave 
trade.” Once the American permanent presence was established, Haiti likewise cooperated with them on anti-
slavery, and provided the US squadron with basing permissions at Cap Haïtian. The USS Galatea was the only 
American ship identified as using Cap Haïtian regularly as her base. Her mission was to provide protection to mail 
steamer convoys which plied the route between New York City and Colón, Panama. See Eric Anderson, “Black 
Emigres: The Emergence of Nineteenth-Century United States Black Nationalism in Response to Haitian 
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common, particularly as control of the presidency became more lucrative because of the 
availability of foreign loans.  
Foreign lending opened to the door to more frequent foreign interventions in Haiti. 
Gunboats were initially used to safeguard foreign financial interests in Haiti but soon were 
employed to ensure the ‘right’ faction came to power.23 By the 1860s, Haitian domestic politics 
were regularly subjected to foreign interventionist activities, military and otherwise, with much 
of that activity taking the form of gunboat diplomacy.24 Notable dates for gunboat activity 
included the years 1862 (Spanish); 1868 (US); 1883 (French, Spanish, American, German, 
Swedish, and Norwegian); 1891 (American); and 1897 (German).25 
It is important to emphasize that gunboat diplomacy was not merely geared towards 
protection and advancement of foreign economic interests, commercial or otherwise. Rather, the 
strategy of employing gunboat diplomacy against Haiti should be understood within the West’s 
broader exclusionary strategy begun in response to Haiti’s independence and continued despite 
the signing of the indemnity with France.26 From a foreign relations perspective, gunboat 
 
Emigration and Colonization, 1816-1840,” 49th Parallel 1. https://49thparalleljournal.org/2014/07/12/issue-1. See 
also Charles E. Brodine, Jr., “The Navy’s Campaign against the West Indian Pirates, 1790-1830,” US Navy Naval 
History and Heritage Command, www.history.navy.mil. 
23 There are two schools of thought over gunboat diplomacy as to why it was employed against Haiti. The first is 
based on the idea that it allowed the Western powers to coerce Haiti into behaving in the interests of the West. 
Whether that was the aim or not, that was an effect of the coercion. The second argument is that gunboat diplomacy 
was a rational means of dealing with Haiti in light of its violent past, namely the 1804 massacre and of course the 
not too distant Revolution. This latter argument – that any dealings with Haiti were best accomplished by presenting 
any messaging or demands from a strong and well-armed naval force to preclude Haitian violence – was reinforced 
by the coup activity that became more frequent and would, ironically, spark more foreign interference. Robert Fatton 
provides an excellent summary of the latter school of thought. See Fatton Jr., The Roots of Haitian Despotism. 
24 Tellingly, the first instance of gunboat or coercive diplomacy occurred in 1825 with the arrival of the French 
naval squadron to force Haiti into signing the indemnity agreement. It was likewise the most egregious instance and 
the one which arguably had the greatest destructive impact on Haiti. 
25 Paul Farmer has expanded the list to include the incidents, for example, when American gunboats would show up 
ostensibly to “protect lives and property of US citizens.” Farmer’s list includes the following years: 1849, 1851, 
1857, 1858, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, 1876, 1888, 1891, 1892, 1902, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 
1909, 1911, 1912, 193, 1914 and 1915. See Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 77-8. See also Trouillot, Haiti: State 
against Nation, 57-8. 
26 The argument can be made that the US continued gunboat diplomacy into the modern era, with the dispatch of US 
warships to Haiti in 1971 to ensure the successful transition from Francois Duvalier, to son Jean-Claude; and in 
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diplomacy should be understood as a tool intended to demonstrate to Haitian leaders that Haiti 
was firmly excluded from normative international relations and not protected by international 
law. The events involving Haiti and the Île de la Navasse, or the Navassa Island Affair, 
definitely made this point to Haitians. 
 
The Navassa Affair 
 
[A] riot occurred at Navassa, an island in the Caribbean Sea, in which a number of 
Americans were killed…It is learned at the Navy Department that the US steamer Galena 
is now on her way to Navassa, and will probably arrive there tomorrow. She was at St. 
Nicholas Mole, Hayti, when news of the riot was received…and was at once ordered to 
Navassa. This island is under no particular jurisdiction but is regarded as under the 
protection of the US.27 
- Extract from The New York Times 
 
 
 The Navassa Affair was significant because it represented a complete abrogation of 
Haitian sovereignty.28 In 1857, an American sea captain, Peter Duncan, formally occupied and 
annexed the Île de la Navasse, a small unoccupied island lying between Haiti and Jamaica. 
Previously claimed by Haiti, the island had been included under various Haitian constitutions, 
beginning with the Constitution of 1801, with the phrase “other adjacent islands.” 29 In 1804, 
 
1982, when US Coast Guard cutters were permanently stationed in Haitian waters to stem Haitian migration by 
those fleeing the Duvalier regime, in addition to conducting drug interdiction operations. In December 1982, the 
Coast Guard also played a role in the attempted invasion by several Haitian émigrés. The invasion force, numbering 
no more than 40 persons, became divided, with some landing on Île de la Tortue, while the rest landed on the 
northern shores of the mainland. The Coast Guard became involved once the invasion was defeated and 26 survivors 
from the Tortue landing were rescued at sea. See Jean Métellus, “Haïti: Perspectives,” Journal of Haitian Studies 2, 
No. 1 (Spring 1996): 23-37, www.jstor.org/stable/41715009; and “Around the Nation: Haitians Given Probation For 
Invasion Attempt,” The New York Times August 31, 1982, 10, www.nytimes.com. 
27 The New York Times, September 20, 1889, 5. www.nytimes.com. 
28 Sovereignty has two components. The first is freedom from outside interference and the second is the freedom for 
a state to act as it sees fit within its internationally agreed upon boundaries. It is unfortunately a relative and not 
absolute idea, subject, as Haiti has experienced over and over again, to external influences. 
29 Note that the Constitution of 1874 specifically included Navasse for the first time, within Article 2: “These 
adjacent islands are: La Tortue, La Gonâve, l’Ile-à-Vaches, les Cayemittes, La Navase, la Grosse-Caye and all the 
others which are located within the limits prescribed by the rights of the people.” Serge Bellegarde has put together 
a paper that outlines Haiti’s claim to the island. See Serge Bellegarde, “Navassa Island: Haiti and the US, A Matter 
of History and Geography,” (Oct 1998), http://windowsonhaiti.com/windowsonhaiti/navassa.shtml. See also 
Michaelle Pierre, “Haiti’s claim over Navassa Island: a case study,” World Maritime University Dissertation 474, 
2014. https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/474.  
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when Haiti became independent, all the territories which had previously belonged to France and 
were considered to be part of the entire island, Saint Domingue, became Haitian property, 
including Île de la Navasse.30 
 Duncan, however, made his legal claim to the island based on the US Guano Islands Act 
of 1856. The Act allowed any American citizen to claim on behalf of the United States any 
unclaimed and unoccupied islands which contained bird guano.31 The government of Haiti 
protested the annexation but was unable to enforce its counterclaims. The American 
administration of President James Buchanan eventually issued an executive order claiming 
sovereignty over the island and ignored the Haitian claims. In time, Captain Edward O. Cooper 
bought out Duncan’s interests in the island and began mining operations in 1857. In 1858, when 
Haitian Emperor Faustin Soulouque found out that mining was taking place, he dispatched two 
warships to order the Americans to halt their mining operations.32 Cooper appealed for help from 
his government, which led the United States to dispatch a diplomatic note claiming a right to 
mine the island for its guano: the note also stated a cruiser would be sent to the area to ensure 
American rights were respected.  
 
30 Under the treaty of Ryswick in 1697, the Spanish had recognized French claims over the western third of 
Hispaniola who in turn were able to legally establish the colony of Saint Domingue. In 1795, the Treaty of Basle 
extended French sovereignty over the eastern (Spanish) side of Hispaniola and allowed Toussaint, in his 
Constitution of 1801, to make the claim that the entire island of Hispaniola as well as all the adjacent islands were 
under his jurisdiction. Île de la Navasse had specifically been a Spanish discovery and under the Treaty of Basle, 
became a French possession. The indemnity agreement of 1825 removed Haiti from its status as a ‘colony in revolt’ 
and extended recognition of Haitian sovereignty, including adjacent islands as outlined in the 1795 Treaty of Basle. 
See Pierre, “Haiti’s claim over Navassa Island.”  
31 Bird guano was required for the production of agricultural fertilizer. It also contained saltpeter (the mineral form 
of potassium nitrate), a key ingredient for gunpowder manufacture. Guano’s strategic value led to the adoption by 
the United States of Title 48, Chapter 8 of the US Code which specifically stated: “Whenever any citizen of the 
United States discovers a deposit of guano on any island, rock, or key, not within the lawful jurisdiction of any other 
government, and not occupied by the citizens of any other government, and takes peaceable possession thereof, and 
occupies the same, such island, rock, or key may, at the discretion of the President, be considered as appertaining to 
the United States.” See www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text. 
32 Pierre, “Haiti’s claim over Navassa Island,” 11.  
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 In 1858, Soulouque was overthrown by General Fabre Geffrard and Haiti’s strong foreign 
policy position on Île de la Navasse shifted. While still a point of contention between the two 
powers, Haiti was content to pursue its claim through diplomatic channels. American mining 
operations on the island continued as the American Navassa Phosphate Company began 
operations in the 1860s and built a significant amount of mining infrastructure on the island. In 
1865, the company brought in a number of black workers under contract from the United 
States.33 The working conditions on the island reportedly deteriorated quite quickly, and by 
1889, the black workers described them as inhumane and verging on slavery. Not surprisingly, 
the workers decided enough was enough and rebelled against their treatment, killing a number of 
the company’s overseers. 
 The US government response was swift. A Navy gunship was dispatched to the island 
and the workers were taken into custody. They were then transported back to the US mainland 
and brought to trial for murder, eventually being found guilty.34 Haiti launched a protest over the 
trial, arguing that the island was under Haitian sovereignty and therefore the rebelling workers 
 
33 Cooper’s American Navassa Phosphate Company had originally relied on white convict labour but with the end of 
the American Civil War and the large numbers of African Americans available and looking for work, the company 
shifted its recruiting to blacks. Despite being illiterate, they were signed to a three-year contract and ended up on the 
island, working under conditions described as akin to slavery. Their confrontation with the white overseers ended in 
five white deaths. The National Order of Gallilean Fisherman (Baltimore, Maryland) published short biographies of 
the 18 men charged as a result of the revolt as well as the argument presented for their trial defense. See Jennifer C. 
James, “’Buried in Guano’: Race, Labor, and Sustainability,” American Literary History 24, no.1 (2012): 115-42; 
Alonzo P.B. Holly, “Our Future Relations with Haiti,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 156, no. 110 (1931): 112; and Thomas I. Hall and Columbus Gordon, The Navassa Island Plot: Illustrated, 
1st ed. (Baltimore: The American Job Office, 1889). 
34 President Benjamin Harrison later commuted their death sentences to “life with hard labour.” During his State of 
the Union message, Harrison commented on the Navassa Affair, stating “[i]t is inexcusable that American laborers 
should be left within our own jurisdiction without access to any Government officer or tribunal for their protection 
and the redress of their wrongs.” Cited in James, “’Buried in Guano,” 130-31. 
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should have been tried in Haiti. Haiti’s arguments would make it to the US Supreme Court, 
which “ignored the claims of Haiti, and gave the United States legal jurisdiction over Navassa.”35  
 Central to the Navassa Affair was the suspension of international law as it related to 
Haitian sovereignty when it did not suit the United States government. A dubious claim to the 
island was made by the US and sustained when it was clear, from a geographic and legal point of 
view, that the island should have been recognized as under Haitian sovereignty. The island 
remains in dispute between the two nations, the United States having designated it a wildlife 
refuge in 1999 and retaining its claim to sovereignty. 
Not only did gunboat diplomacy highlight the disregard the international community had 
for international legal norms when it concerned Haiti, it also placed the spotlight very firmly on 
the disruptive effects of gunboat diplomacy on Haitian governance. Because gunboat diplomacy 
was conducted by independent naval captains often operating with little to no supervision from 
their governments, the naval forces would decide upon their own humiliations to be visited upon 
Haiti. Often, in addition to demanding indemnities, they would include demands for public 
apologies and, often, some acknowledgement of Haiti’s surrender to the foreign demands. Not 
surprisingly, the Haitian government in power, by acquiescing to foreign demands, would 
become the focal point for Haitian anger and frustration, leading to insurrections against the 
government upon which the humiliations were inflicted.  
  
 
35 The island, which remains in American hands today, was eventually turned into what was termed “a National 
Wildlife Refuge” under the jurisdiction of the US Fish and Wildlife Service. Holly, “Our Future Relations with 
Haiti,” 112. See also the US Geological Survey, http://coastal.er.usgs.gov/navassa. 
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The Bulldog Affair 
 
I have no right to protect you, but I will try to bluff these fellows this time. But you must 
not come here under a charter for the [Geffrard] government again…flying our [British] 
flag…if you do, I will not protect you.36 
- British Sea Captain Charles Wake 
 
An excellent example of the role played by gunboat diplomacy was the Bulldog Affair 
which grew out of an earlier 1862 incident involving the Spanish and the government of 
President Geffrard (1859-1867).37 When Santo Domingo President, Pedro Santana, reconciled 
with Spain and made arrangement to return Santo Domingo to its old status as a Spanish colony, 
President Geffrard was alarmed and reacted quickly. He committed units from his trusted 
Tirailleurs presidential guard to the Dominican insurgency which opposed Santana’s plans. The 
Haitian troops allowed the Dominican insurgency some initial success but sparked a quick and 
overwhelming Spanish response. In July 1861, a Spanish naval squadron arrived in Haitian 
territorial waters outside Port-au-Prince and, under threat of a naval bombardment, demanded 
Geffrard close the Haitian-Dominican border and tender an apology to Spain for his conduct. 
The apology was to be accompanied by a 21-gun salute and an indemnity in the amount of 
US$200,000. Geffrard would eventually negotiate a reduction in the indemnity to US$25,000 but 
the apology and the salute were still provided as demanded by the Spanish. 
A number of groups in Haiti saw the results as a humiliating surrender to the Spanish, 
and a betrayal of Haitian honour by the government. The groups began actively working to 
 
36 Quote by British Captain Charles Wake of the Bulldog, speaking to the Captain of the British-flagged packet ship, 
Jamaica, running supplies for the Geffrard government. “Mr. Peck [Haitian Legation of the USA] to Hon. William 
H. Steward [US Secretary of State],” 11 December 1865, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Papers 
Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the 
Thirty-ninth Congress, Document 410. 
37 The material for the 1862 incident is drawn from Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 221-2. 
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overthrow Geffrard’s regime.38 One of leading insurrectionists against Geffrard was General 
Sylvain Salnave. By September 1864, Salnave had raised sufficient rebel forces to capture Cap 
Haïtien. One of the prizes seized was a government steamer named the Voldrogue, which 
Salnave promptly rechristened the Providence. The Providence was quickly put into action, and 
set off, with a suitable escort of ships, for the area of l’Acul.  
Once in the area, the commander of the flotilla, Captain Villaneuava, began a blockade of 
the harbour, the intent being to prevent reinforcement and resupply of government forces from 
the sea. One of those intercepted by the Voldrogue was a British-flagged packet ship named the 
RMS Jamaica Packet, carrying war supplies destined for troops supporting the president.39 
Attempting to dock on 19 October, the Jamaica Packet was forced to flee Haitian naval gunfire. 
A British warship, HMS Bulldog, which happened to be in the area, interceded on behalf 
of the Jamaica Packet. Despite the intervention of the Bulldog, the Haitian rebels demanded the 
right to board and inspect the Jamaica. Captain Wake refused their request and instead 
threatened to punish Captain Villaneuava for what Wake termed “his insufferable impudence.” 
The rebel “Committee of Public Safety” in Cap Haïtien then decreed that none of the Bulldog 
crew would be allowed to land and that government refugees then taking shelter in the British 
consulate in the town were to be turned over to the rebels. When that decree was ignored, a rebel 
force “menaced” the British consulate and forced the refugees to be given into their custody. 
 Captain Wake, at that point, demanded satisfaction for what was termed “singular and 
outrageous conduct.” When negotiations failed, on 23 October, Captain Wake and the Bulldog 
 
38 Material dealing with the Bulldog Affair is drawn from FRUS, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, Accompanying 
the Annual Message of the President to the Second Session of the Thirty-ninth Congress (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1867), Document. 410. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1866p2/d410. 
39 Warships of the line in the British Royal Navy were given the prefix of ‘His (or Her) Majesty’s Ship’ (HMS) 
whereas British mail ships were given the prefix ‘Royal Mail Steamer/Ship’ or RMS. 
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were observed approaching the harbour at high speed and, upon making it into the harbour, 
began to bombard the fort’s defences. The steamer Providence was eventually sunk by the 
Bulldog, but Wake was unfortunate in that his ship ran aground.  
 While Wake was undertaking his attack on the fort, the USS De Soto under command of 
Captain William Walker was in the process of evacuating foreigners from Cap Haïtien which, at 
the time, was under fire.40 Walker confronted Captain Wake over his surprise attack on the town, 
pointing out that his attack had placed foreigners in the town in considerable danger. Not only 
did the American ship have to contend with naval gunfire from the Bulldog, they were also in 
danger of attack by enraged townsfolk who were cowering under the British fire. Fortunately, 
General Salnave was able to calm the townsfolk’s anger, for which the US Legation would later 
commend him.  
 Captain Wake was not able to free his ship from the sandbar and elected to blow it up 
rather than allow it to be captured. He then made his way to Jamaica aboard a US ship and 
reported what had happened. The result was that British officials in Jamaica dispatched a fresh 
and larger British flotilla to the area. Once they arrived, the flotilla commander sent the rebels a 
communique which stated that the town defenses would be attacked the next day in retaliation 
for the consulate attack, unless the rebel leaders left the country aboard any ship in the area. The 
rebels did not depart and on 8 November, the British opened fire, having previously coordinated 
their gunfire with the government forces in the area. By evening, Geffrard’s forces had 
reportedly taken the town and placed the rebel leaders including General Salnave in custody. 
They were taken aboard USS De Soto and would eventually be taken to the Dominican Republic 
and placed in custody there. 
 
40 The American naval prefix ’USS’ stands for United States Ship and was used for US Navy warships. 
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In addition to its significance in highlighting the disregard for international legal norms 
when it concerned Haiti as well as spotlighting the disruptive effects of gunboat diplomacy on 
Haitian governance, the Bulldog affair has a third critical element. It would be the first time a 
foreign power employed violence in support of, and with the complicity of, a Haitian 
government against other Haitians. 
 
Germany and Haiti 
 
It was the [American] occupation as well which forced Haiti to take action against 
Germany and to sequester German property. That there was some reason for this action is 
clear when we remember that the Germans had large control over the business interests of 
the country. The point I wish to make is that such action would probably not have been 
taken by the Haitians, into whose prominent families many of the Germans had 
married.41 
- Extract from Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo by 
the United States Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo 
 
Returning to Gaffield’s thesis regarding multiple layers of ‘recognition and non-
recognition,’ Haiti’s relationship with Germans and Germany has been very useful for study. It 
also provides a useful understanding of the shifting nature of the relationship and the Germans 
embracing of gunboat diplomacy. It also highlights the degree of independent action accorded to 
the naval authorities in their ‘diplomatic’ missions. 
Germans had been present in Haiti since independence, and even before that.42 Not 
surprisingly, the German government was involved in Haitian affairs since that time, the period 
 
41 Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo by the United States Senate Select 
Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 1300. 
42 In 1764, the first Germans arrived as migrants to Saint Domingue, displaced from Louisiana. The Germans had 
left Louisiana when Spain re-acquired the territory from France under the Treaty of Fontainebleau (1762) which was 
announced in 1764. A contingent of French Acadians also departed Louisiana at the same time and headed to Saint 
Domingue, but were directed to settle away from the Germans, local Saint Domingue authorities believing they 
could not peacefully co-exist. The new arrivals, around a thousand in number, were directed to settle in a new 
commune known as Bombardopolis, within the arrondissement of Môle Saint-Nicolas in the Nord-Ouest 
department. The colony of Germans became coffee producers and survived the revolutionary war. The colony 
members were not only spared from the massacre of the whites as ordered by Dessalines, they were also granted 
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from the later nineteenth century until the US Occupation of 1915 witnessing the most 
significant impact of Germany and Germans on Haitian affairs, including some responsibility, as 
will be shown, for prompting the US invasion and Occupation in 1915. By the 1860s, German 
presence in Haiti had increased considerably. Brenda Plummer identifies Germans from 
Hanseatic cities migrating to Haiti “as employees of French mercantile houses.”43  
By the turn of the century, German Haitians, despite their numbers having dwindled 
down to roughly one-fifth of their original numbers, were nonetheless reported to have 
significant commercial interests within Haiti, out of proportion to the size of their community, 
and including control of the utilities in both Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien, plus the port 
facilities in the capital.44 At the same time, Brenda Plummer points out that the geopolitical 
implications of German economic activities within Haiti were “greatly exaggerated” and 
 
citizenship in the new nation. A second group of Germans, soldiers from German units which had been employed by 
Napoleon in his attempt at re-conquering the rebellious colony, became upset with the conduct of the campaign in 
Saint Domingue. Some of those soldiers deserted the French forces and joined up with the Haitian forces working 
for independence, although there is no doubt that the popular myth of entire units deserting to fight for the Haitians 
has been grossly inflated (see, for example, Jan Pachoński, and Reuel K. Wilson, Poland's Caribbean Tragedy). 
Although this work only tackles the issue of Polish deserters, it can be considered representative of the German 
soldiers’ condition as well. After the revolution, Dessalines’s secretary, Louis Félix Mathurin Boisrond-Tonnerre, 
suggested to Dessalines that the Poles who deserted and served with the revolutionary forces be retained for their 
expertise and service to Haiti. Dessalines approved his recommendation and extended Haitian citizenship to the 
Poles, which saved them from the post-conflict killings and from expulsion. Finally, based on the presence of 
German military engineers in Haiti following the declaration of independence, I conclude Boisrond-Tonnerre was 
also able to ensure that some German soldiers were granted citizenship and spared killing or expulsion as well. 
German military engineers planned and supervised the construction of the great Haitian citadel fortress, Citadelle 
Laferrière, during the period of 1804-1820. Although it is unclear whether they were part of Napoleon’s 
expeditionary troops, their presence nonetheless strongly adds weight to Germans having also joined the exodus 
from the French colonial forces. See de Saint-Méry, Description topographique, physique, civile, politique et 
historique de la partie française de l’Isle Saint-Domingue, 227, 265; Article 13 of Dessalines’s 1805 Constitution ; 
and also Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 127. 
43 Plummer, “The Metropolitan Connection,” 125.  
44 For example, while Melvin Small shows that Germany’s share of the Haitian commercial market remained low, 
having increased from two percent in the 1903-4 period, to five percent in 1911-12, Germany was estimated to have 
“gained an extremely large proportion of the internal trade, perhaps as much as 90 percent…” See Melvin Small, 




reflected Germany’s “aggressive economic imperialism” rather than a desire to take control of 
Haiti from a formal colonial political perspective.45 
 The key to the commercial success of Germans within the region, and in Haiti 
specifically, appears to have been their strong links to the home country and their regional 
networks.46  Through marriage to Haitian nationals, Germans were able to successfully 
circumvent the prohibition on foreign ownership of land in Haiti while maintaining a strong 
loyalty to Germany.47 Brenda Plumber points out that Germany encouraged such loyalty by 
organizing “patriotic societies” which conducted fundraising events for the German military.48  
Commercial influence and success was also linked to German control of shipping to and from 
Haiti.49  The German-owned Hamburg-America Lines generated considerable profit by 
providing most of the shipping to and from Haiti.50 At one point, over three-quarters of all trade 
to and from the island nation was being carried by the German company.51 
 
45 The American historian and Woodrow Wilson scholar, Professor Arthur Link, likewise felt that the danger of a 
European, and especially a German, intervention in Haiti was “une grande exagération et même une fausseté.” See 
Arthur Link, La polltica de los Estados Unidos en América Latina, 1913-1916 (México : Fondo de Cultura 
Economica, 1960), cited in Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 46. See also Brenda Gayle Plummer, Haiti and 
the Great Powers, 12-3; and Small, 258.  
46 See, for example, the report by the American military attaché to Peru on the migration of Germans to Latin 
America in 1912. Cited in Small, “The United States and the German ‘Threat’ to the Hemisphere, 1905-1914,” 253. 
47 Dessalines’ 1805 Constitution was the last to prohibit ‘whites’ from owning Haitian land. Subsequent 
constitutions included a prohibition against foreigners owning land, a legal constitutional statute which continued 
until the US Marines rewrote the Haitian Constitution in 1918 to include Article 5: “Le droit de propriété 
immobilière est accordé à l'étranger résidant en Haïti et aux sociétés formées par des étrangers pour les besoins de 
leurs demeures, de leurs entreprises agricoles, commerciales, industrielles ou d'enseignement. Ce droit prendra fin 
dans une période de cinq années, après que l'étranger aura cessé de résider dans le pays ou qu'auront cessé les 
opérations de ces compagnies. See Digitheque MJP [Jean-Pierre Maury], online at 
https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/ht1918.htm#Titre_premier._Du_territoire_de_la.  
48 Plummer points out that the society began as early as 1897. During a 1901 fundraising drive, the society raised 
over DM 800,000 for German naval procurement. See Plummer, “The Metropolitan Connection,” 134. 
49 Plummer, 121-2. 
50 Albert Ballin, the owner of the Hamburg-America Lines, was “initially an avid supporter of [Grand Admiral 
Alfred von] Tirpitz’s naval plans” and was willing to use his fortune and company to further German aims in Latin 
America, which at the time were believed to involve the development of German basing options in the region. See 
Chapter Three of Holger H. Herwig, Politics of Frustration: The United States in German Naval Planning, 1889-
1941 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976). 
51 Suzy Castor also points out that Germans had control of over 80 percent of the commercial houses within Haitian 




 German military involvement in Haiti lay in two areas. Prior to 1850, German military 
activity in Haiti was largely confined to defense construction activities, the largest being the 
design and building of Henri Christophe’s Citadelle Laferrière by German military engineers. By 
the 1870s, and like most European powers, Germany was employing gunboat diplomacy to 
coerce settlements from the Haitian government to pay for alleged damage to German citizens 
and their commercial interests.52 Two of the most egregious examples were the Batsch Affair of 
1872 and Lüders Affair of 1897. 
 
The Batsch Affair 
 
The mission of this squadron here was, it is believed, entirely friendly. But a remarkable 
feature of this visit was the presence in these waters once more of Captain Batsch, still in 
command of the same corvette, Vineta, with which, in connection with the Gazelle, he 
seized the Haytien fleet in this harbor in June last. This fact caused some discussion in 
Haytien circles, and seems to be, for the time being at least, something of the refutation 
of the pretences alluded to in my No. 171, of the 6th instant, and given out by General 
Brice, the Haytien envoy, who claimed to have received assurances at Berlin that Captain 
Batsch’s conduct here in June last would be disowned by his government.53 
- US Ambassador to Haiti, Ebenezer Don Carlos Bassett 
 
In 1865, the British bombardment in support of Haitian government forces operating 
against insurgents in the Cap Haïtien region resulted in considerable damage to the city core.54 
The British squadron coordinated their gunfire with President Geffrard’s troops and were 
successful in reducing the rebel strongpoints within the harbour forts. As noted previously, this 
was the first instance of Western support for a Haitian president. It was also the first instance of a 
Western nation being offered a Haitian base of operations in return for support. The rebel leader, 
 
52 The definition of who was provided with German diplomatic or military protection was controversial, and ranged 
from expatriate Germans to the children from unions between Haitian women and German men. 
53 FRUS, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 1, 1873 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1873), Document 209. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1873p1v1. 
54 The American Civil War concluded in April 1865 and the American West Indies squadron was involved in 
wrapping up blockade duties. The squadron had been headquartered at Cap Haïtian but was involved throughout the 
civil war in maintaining the Union blockade of Florida. 
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General Salnave, offered the US Navy a coaling base station in Haiti in return for supporting his 
rebellion but the offer was refused. However, as Heinl and Heinl have pointed out, “the tactic of 
dangling or proffering a base…to foreign powers was to become a stock item of Haitian 
diplomacy.”55 
 Despite the initial positive outcome from the British naval support provided to the 
government forces of President Geffrard, the support caused considerable repercussions. For 
Geffrard, the use of the British stirred up considerable rancor against his presidency, as well as 
costing his government over 100 million gourdes [around US$20 million] to suppress the 
uprising in Cap Haïtian. Further, in 1872, the Haitian government of Jean-Nicolas Nissage Saget 
(1869 to 1874) found itself on the receiving end of a bill from the German government.56  The 
bill, presented from the decks of two German warships, demanded US$15,000 for damage 
suffered by two German commercial enterprises during the 1865 British attack.57 Acting on his 
own initiative, the German commander decided to seize two Haitian warships in the harbour, 
ostensibly as leverage to force payment.58 Haiti’s payment of the indemnity demanded by the 
Germans saw them depart the area, allowing the Haitian navy to regain control of its ships. 
However, the Germans left a calling card. The scene encountered once the Haitian ships were re-
crewed is described by Heinl and Heinl as follows: 
With the special finesse Hohenzollern diplomacy reserved for lesser breeds, the German 
boarding parties left calling cards. When the Haitians were allowed back, they found their 
 
55 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 230-1. 
56 Geffrard’s expenses included contracting British packet ships like RMS Jamaica Packet to carry war supplies and 
personnel to the Cap Haïtian area in support of his operations. Geffrard, however, was heavily indebted at this point 
in his presidency and the additional expenses in suppressing the rebellion meant his government was bankrupt. Mats 
Lundahl argues that “Geffrard’s [larcenous] behaviour was a signal for completely unchecked robbery by 
subsequent administrations.” See Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 329-30; and Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 
228. 
57 Ironically, the British consul in Port-au-Prince was involved as the intermediary and negotiated the eventual 
settlement. Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 75-6. 
58 Alternately, the seizure could have been done to ensure the Haitians were not able to counter-attack and drive the 
Germans out of the area. 
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cherished flag spread out on the bridge of each ship, smeared with shit. It was, remarked 




The Lüders Affair 
 
I have received no official instructions from my Government on the subject yet. The case 
has assumed in the press proportions far greater than it deserves. It is simply a question of 
collecting an indemnity for an offence against a German citizen residing in Haiti. Beyond 
this all is conjecture and there is no basis of fact whatsoever for the reports as to what 
might ultimately occur. The demand is similar, I am told, to many in which the United 
States has demanded indemnity from South American republics….in any event, the case 
is of too little importance to attract serious consideration, and it is needless to conjecture 
on future probabilities or possibilities.60 
- German Ambassador to the US, Theodor von Holleben 
 
 Like the Batsch Affair, the Lüders Affair was a second example of gunboat coercion 
seeking economic restitution. Unlike the Batsch Affair, the Germans demanded a much more 
public humiliation to resolve the ‘diplomatic’ issue. In 1897, while in the process of arresting a 
Haitian national for theft, Haitian police in Port-au-Prince were assaulted by Emile Lüders, a 
German national who came to the defence of the accused thief. Lüders, the son of a Haitian 
mother and a German father, was previously convicted of assaulting a Haitian police officer. 
That assault conviction, coupled to the new charges, were judged by Haitian authorities as 
enough to result in Lüders being sentenced to a year’s imprisonment, followed by deportation 
back to Germany.61 
 When informed of the sentencing, the German Chargé d’Affaires, Count Ulrich Graf von 
Schwerin, became quite enraged. Upset with the verdict, he “bypassed the usual diplomatic 
channels and demanded a personal audience with [Haitian] President Simon Sam [1896-
 
59 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 256. 
60 Theodor von Holleben, German Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the United States, speaking to 
New York Times reporter about the Lüders Affair. The New York Times, December 02 1897, 3. www.nytimes.com.  
See also The Indianapolis News, Vol. XXVIII, Fourth ed., 1 December 1897, 1. www.newspapers.library.in.gov.  
61 Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 76-7. See also Fatton Jr., The Roots of Haitian Despotism, 139. 
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1902].”62  Initially, von Schwerin demanded the release of Lüders, and the firing of the police 
officers involved in the arrest. President Sam agreed to both conditions and Lüders left Haiti in 
October of 1897. 
 Despite that quick victory, von Schwerin did not let the affair die. Instead he requested 
that Germany dispatch warships to Haiti to back up his next set of demands. When two warships 
arrived in December 1897, the commander of the flotilla rowed ashore and presented Germany’s 
demands for the attention of President Sam. They included the payment of a US$20,000 
indemnity; a formal apology to Lüders and Germany; a salute to the German navy; and the flying 
of a white flag by Haiti to signal Haitian surrender to German demands.63  
In addition to the German naval presence, there was significant American diplomatic 
pressure on the Haitians to comply with the German demands, in part because the Americans 
feared their own commercial interests in Port-au-Prince being damaged in the threatened German 
bombardment. Not seeing any means of resisting the German demands without considerable 
bloodshed, and in the face of considerable foreign pressure, President Sam acquiesced to the 
German demands in full. Unfortunately for him, a Haitian newspaper editor, upon learning of the 
German demands, published a satirical editorial, announcing: 
 You are invited to the funeral of young Haiti, cruelly assassinated by President Tiresias 
Augustin Simon Sam. The funeral procession will leave the mortuary, located at the 
National Palace, to give itself to the court of Berlin….64 
 
 Gunboat diplomacy not only had an impact on the national psyche of Haiti beyond the 
indemnity payments extorted, it also had a significant impact on Haiti’s economy. By 1898, Haiti 
 
62 Michael Largey, Vodou Nation: Haitian Art, Music and Cultural Nationalism (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2006), 80. 
63 Largey.  
64 Largey, Vodou Nation, 80.. 
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was paying France about 50 percent of its government revenue to service the 1825 indemnity. 
What little remained was being siphoned off to pay the extortion on claims of men like Lüders 
and Batsch, perhaps the most prominent of a number of similar legal demands made against the 
Haitian government.  
Such indemnity payments meant money badly needed for Haitian development work was 
not available. It was an additional burden for the Haitian masses who saw their taxes increased to 
pay these unjust foreign demands. Support for the government was undermined, not only 
because of the higher taxes, but also because Haitians faulted the government for not standing up 
for Haiti against foreign powers and allowing the looting of Haiti’s treasury. Haitian politician, 
Jacques Nicolas Léger, best summed up their sentiments when he bitterly stated: 
The peaceful Haitian who, never having filled public office and deriving from work only 
his means of existence, sees his painfully acquired property disappear in flames, and 
loses in several hours the fruit of several years labor, cannot fail to have bitter reflections 
when the State, after a civil war, is generous only to foreigners whose very nationality is 
often doubtful.65 
 
 The Lüders affair highlighted the ugly nature of the German-Haitian relationship. At its 
core, it reflected a willingness on the part of Germany specifically, and foreign powers generally, 
to employ military power to shape economic and diplomatic dealings with Haiti. Further, it 
exposed the overt racist attitudes towards Haiti on the part of other nations as Haiti was seen as 
the unnatural result of a successful black revolution against the white-imposed status quo. That 
the revolutionary struggle was against the evil of slavery was immaterial to many. For German 
leaders, racism was further influenced by Germany’s colonial experiences, the most egregious 
example of that colonial racism manifesting itself from 1904 to 1907 in genocidal massacres 
 
65 Plummer, "The Metropolitan Connection,” 128. 
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undertaken by the German Army in German South West Africa against the Herero, Nama and 
San peoples.66 
 This is not to say that German military activity regarding Haiti began and ended with 
gunboat diplomacy. Germans, likely with guidance or permission from the motherland, were also 
actively engaged in subversion. Payments flowed through local German contacts in Haiti to 
revolutionary groups when their revolutionary aims and activities coincided with German mainly 
economic interests.67 Much of that money probably originated in continental Germany.  
Hans Schmidt has argued that the financing by Germans and Germany of the opposition 
groups was strictly because of the lucrative nature of the loans made to the Haitian government 
when dominated by those groups. In the event of success, government re-payment of the loans 
could yield as much as 40 percent interest to the lenders. In addition to supplying money, the 
German consulate was often a refuge for those political revolutionaries whom the Germans 
viewed as having future value for promoting their interests as noted by a 1910 US Legation 
report which included the following observation: 
It is now easy to cause trouble as there is always a safe place to run to. The German 
Consulates have always taken refugees, as they are always mixed up in the revolutionary 
movement.68 
 
 Interestingly, German subversive behaviour backfired in 1907 when Germans “backed 
the wrong horse,” which eventually led to the overthrow of the pro-German clique in 1912.69 In 
response, the US had hammered out an agreement with Haitian authorities, getting them to agree 
 
66 Off topic, but for an excellent recent account of the genocide, see David Olusoga and Casper W. Erichsen, The 
Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s Forgotten Genocide (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 2010). 
67 For example, Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal claimed Germans were quite active in paying the rebel forces who 
eventually overthrew President Simon Sam in 1902. Weinstein and Segal, Haiti: Political Failures, Cultural 
Successes, 23. 
68 See Small, “The United States and the German ‘Threat’ to the Hemisphere, 1905-1914,” 257; and Heinl and 
Heinl, Written in Blood, 359. 
69 Small, 258. 
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to not lease out the Môle St. Nicholas coaling station to anyone. While ostensibly generic in 
nature, the agreement was clearly intended as a reaction to the US recognition of the burgeoning 
expansionist interests of Germany in the Latin American and Caribbean region.70  Recognizing 
the danger, the administration of US President Woodrow Wilson began planning contingencies 
for the invasion and occupation of Haiti. 
 With the American Occupation of Haiti in 1915, German activity was severely curtailed. 
The 1917 declaration of war against Germany by the United States led US Marine Corps 
Occupation leaders to persuade Haitian leaders to evict German nationals from Haiti and 
confiscate their lands and commercial holdings. The Haitian declaration of war against Germany 
in July 1918 was also prompted by American interests, although the Haitians were already 
uneasy due to German submarine activity in the region. With the end of the war, evicted 
Germans were allowed to return and were given back their business and property possessions, 
along with some compensation.71 
 German subversive behaviour in Haiti was one of the factors behind the US invasion and 
eventual Occupation of Haiti. Its significance was two-fold. First, it was responsible for the 
acceleration of regime change that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
 
70 While there is debate over how serious the Germans were about acquiring the Môle Saint-Nicholas location, they 
were clearly interested in acquiring coal refuelling sites within the region. Plummer claims that Germany “badly 
wanted a Caribbean base, which would give it some control over and access to the proposed isthmian canal.”  
They were reported to put together a loan package for the Haitians which included them leasing Môle Saint-
Nicholas for a coal fuelling site and Germany taking control of the Haitian customs houses, in return for a badly 
needed loan of two million deutschmarks. The proposal was turned down. See Small, 258. See also Plummer, Haiti 
and the Great Powers, 1902-1915, 89; and Herwig, Politics of Frustration, 69-70. 
71 US Marine Corps General John H. Russell wrote in his June 1921 diary entry the Germans “are doing all in their 
power to have the sequestered goods returned to them and it is even said that the Haitien Government, or at least one 
or two prominent members of it are working very hard to that end with the ultimate view of re-establishing the 
Germans in their former almost impregnable commercial position in Haiti.” In August, he wrote “There is a 
rumour…that members of the Council of State received $500.00 a piece for voting for the passage of the law 
relating to the return of German property and that members of the Council of the Secretaries of State received 
$1,000.00 a piece for promoting said law.” The German compensation for their confiscated property would have 
been quite a significant amount for the government of Haiti to afford. Papers of John H. Russell, “Daily Diary 
Report,” PC 114 box 2, folder 9, United States Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, D.C. 
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in Haiti. German money funnelled into Haiti allowed regional leaders to provide wages to their 
own armies for revolutionary activities, including the fomentation of coups. Second, German 
activity in Haiti challenged the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which asserted that the United States 
would not tolerate interference with any of the newly independent nations within the Americas 
and any European interference within the region generally.72 It also clearly formed part of the 
impetus for the adoption of the Roosevelt Corollary.73 While the American public narrative may 
have emphasized fear of a German military takeover of Haiti, the trigger for US concern was 
increasing German influence within the commercial and banking sectors of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
Despite the use of legal means to restrict the infiltration of foreign commercial 
competition into Haiti by employing restrictions on foreign land ownership enshrined in Haiti’s 
constitutions, by the turn of the century, Haiti had largely lost the battle. Brenda Plummer 
identified a number of factors that weighed against Haiti in this fight. The first was the growing 
importance of steamships in maritime commerce. Previously, sea transport in sailing ships meant 
that cargoes tended to be large for efficiency, and thus travelled in slow moving ships at 
 
72 The Monroe Doctrine, authored by US President James Monroe, established de facto the Western hemisphere as 
an American sphere of influence and shaped its foreign policy to discourage the development of European 
colonialism within the Americas. Any attempt to establish a new colony in the Americas was understood as a direct 
challenge to the US. See US Office of the Historian, Department of State, “Monroe Doctrine, 1823.” 
www.history.state.gov.  
73 The 1904 Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was in large part the result of the 1902 crisis over 
Venezuela which involved British, German, and Italian naval forces seeking to enforce payment of foreign debts 
incurred by previous Venezuelan regimes. US President Theodore Roosevelt, to ensure that the Caribbean remained 
firmly under American control, identified the foreign policy of the US as involving intervention in those states 
which had “chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized 
society” and would “ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation.” To prevent European intervention in 
the region, Roosevelt instead claimed the right of American intervention. He claimed the US would “interfere… 
only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home 
and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the 
entire body of American nations.” He also stated that freedom and “the right of such independence cannot be 





relatively greater expense. That expense meant that those involved in the import-export business 
required either great wealth or access to significant credit. This explains, for example, the 
Haitian measures taken to restrict foreign commercial interests by limiting aliens to trading only 
along coastlines or, alternately, requiring any sales they arranged for cash crops like coffee to be 
handled by a Haitian broker as intermediary.74 
 The move to steamships broke that protective system. Steam ships made more frequent 
trips and were faster, making the reliance on large cargoes obsolete. Instead, smaller shipments 
of goods were possible and economical, opening the import-export field to traders outside Haiti’s 
elite. Instead of relying on access to large amounts of capital to finance large cargoes, 
[d]irect importation [became]…easiest for those who could engage in high-volume 
trading and establish[ed] links with overseas companies and manufacturers. Foreigners 
thus had an important advantage, especially as aggressive and often patriotic promoters 
of a particular nation’s wares.75 
 
 The second factor was the significant decline of worldwide agricultural prices in the 
1890s which reduced Haiti’s buying power and undermined its ability to compete internationally. 
As Plummer notes, with falling prices, many of the elite Haitian trading houses lost their access 
to the credit essential for operations and were forced to move into other fields.76  Nature abhors a 
vacuum, and foreign players were quick to enter the field. The third factor cited by Plummer was 
persistent “civil strife.”77 The ‘revolution of 1902’, which resulted in the burning of Petit-Goâve, 
exemplified such strife and had a major disruptive effect on Haitian trade. What was significant 
 
74 Plummer, “The Metropolitan Connection,” Latin American Research Review, 123. 
75 Plummer, 122. 




about civil strife was that it was encouraged, underwritten, and exploited by foreign competitors 
to Haitian commercial interests.78  
These three factors – frequent insurrectionist activity, the shift to steamships, and the 
waning agricultural prices – contributed to a disastrous outcome for Haiti, namely an increase in 
foreign competition within Haiti leading in turn to “reduced Haitian trade.”79 Foreign 
competition was aided by foreign control over Haiti’s banking system and by the frequent use of 
gunboat diplomacy in support of foreign commercial ventures by the various major powers––
France, Britain, the US, and Germany in the main––which benefited  the foreign commercial 
interests in Haiti out of proportion to their size to the detriment of their Haitian competitors.  
 
Syrians and Haiti 
 
Up to a few years ago one could see on the country roads hundreds of country merchants 
or peddlers with their donkeys loaded with all classes of merchandise leaving the cities 
by the several roads, going into the interior to trade with the country people and with 
those who live in the interior towns or cities. To-day their places are supplied by these 
people [Syrians], who, instead of the donkey to carry their merchandise, employ one of 
the natives to be guide and porter for them through the country. He continues his journey 
from place to place until his goods are sold, when he returns for a fresh supply. There is 
no road anywhere in the Republic where one of these people can not be found. In doing 
so they obtain the right to travel when and where they please…I may also add…that all 
the money they make, above their immediate wants, is sent to Syria, to which place they 
eventually return when they secure sufficient wealth.80 
-  William F. Powell, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Haiti 
 
 
 By 1900, the Haitian merchant group which had operated in the port cities had largely 
been displaced by foreign interests. European and US firms were able to convert diplomatic and 
military advantage into economic advantage.  This section will explore one such foreign 
 
78 Plummer also points out the widespread use of smuggling and the fabrication of revolution rumours to avoid 
paying customs duties as other examples of foreign exploitation. See Plummer, 125-6. 
79 Plummer, 124. 
80 FRUS, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903, (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1904), Document 570. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1903/d570.  
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merchant group that supplanted Haitian merchants, the ‘so-called’ Syrians, as they have come to 
epitomize foreign advantage as it was wielded in Haiti. 
The Syrians came to Haiti in the late nineteenth century and were largely Christian 
Lebanese, rather than Syrians.81 Fleeing religious persecution, the Syrians as they came to be 
known, quickly established themselves as traders.  Plummer points out that Syrian migration to 
the Americas peaked between 1880 and 1914. They created their trading companies in Haiti 
initially by selling their wares in the less well served interior areas of Haiti.  
Employing rustic means of travel, and offering a wide-range of “inexpensive goods” 
formerly unavailable to the peasants, they extended credit which allowed indigent peasants to 
enjoy some of the benefits of their urban cousins.82  Aided by pooled capital “and the habit of co-
operation within their community,” the Syrian merchants soon came to dominate “the middle 
sector of the trading economy.”83 In effect, the Syrians chose the road less travelled and supplied 
a missing service - the sale of low-cost dry goods to the peasant masses. 
 The Syrians soon forged a strong and profitable relationship with US manufacturers who, 
early in the twentieth century, were providing some 60 percent of all imported goods sold to the 
peasantry.84  The Syrians turned to US exporters because of their profit margin, and the rapidity 
by which they would receive the American merchandise compared to goods imported from 
Europe. They also provided a wider market for American manufacturers, who, for a variety of 
reasons including overt racism, had avoided setting up storefront facilities in Haiti like those 
 
81 Brenda Gayle Plummer, “Race, Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean: The Syrians in Haiti, 1903-1934,” The 
International History Review 3, no. 4 (October 1981): 517-18. 
82 Plummer, “Race, Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean,” 519. 
83 Plummer, 519-20. 
84 Plummer, 521. 
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swiftly opened by the Syrians. This suited both groups. In exchange, the United States 
government provided the Syrians with a degree of protection. 85 
 In 1903, the Haitian government began a campaign against foreign merchants, hoping to 
revitalize the Haitian merchant sector. As Plummer points out, the Syrians, because they did not 
conform to the normal behaviour exhibited by other ‘whites,’ quickly became “suspect and 
despised.” 86 They also showed up in Haiti when Haiti was suffering from economic stagnation 
and was beginning to decline quite dramatically. Syrians thus presented an excellent target to 
blame for Haitian woes.  
Plummer points out that their diverse nationalities further reduced their influence as many 
of their countries of citizenship lacked clout within the international community. Few Syrians 
were reported to have taken Haitian citizenship. At the same time, the diversity of citizenship 
meant that the community “could cloak itself in a remarkable array of foreign flags, making 
foreign identification and regulation…difficult.” 87 
Initially, the government campaign focussed on enforcement of old laws which had 
restricted foreign aliens’ commercial activity. The new campaign coupled stricter enforcement 
with a public narrative that voiced strong criticisms of foreigners and the Syrian community in 
particular. A typical circular offered this lengthy diatribe aimed at the Syrians:  
Death to the invasion.  
Such is the heartrending cry that comes from the bosoms of all Haitians; the foreigners 
[sic] friends of Haiti bewail the unfortunate fate of the national commerce on account of 
the invasion of the Syrians.  
The people, fatigued with a rivalry as disloyal as monstrous, seeing the ruin of all the 
hard-working families of the country, come to ask of the paternal government of General 
Nord to disentangle them from the claws of these birds of prey that are named Syrians. 
The cry of women, of widows, of unfortunate young girls, of orphans, of old men, finally, 
 
85 Plummer argues that the US used the Syrians as a litmus test for the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary. 
Plummer, 522. 
86 Plummer, 519-20. 
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of all those who suffer. 
We beg the chief of state, in the name of the glorious martyrs of the independence, of 
those who have spilled their precious blood to league [sic] to us this little corner of land, 
to lend an attentive ear to these complaints, to all these cries and groans, coming from all 
parts to claim a sacred right. 
It is the voice of a whole nation that makes itself heard, asking the expulsion of the 
Syrians from the territory of Haiti, as the Venezuelans asked a year ago. President Castro, 
taking in serious consideration the solicitations of the people, decided to dismiss all the 
orientals residing on the territory of Venezuela. 
The president of the great starry Republic has not spared the Chinese to satisfy the desire 
of his people reclaiming their rights. 
The honorable old man who directs the destinies of Haiti will reply, we are sure, to the 
complaint of the population whose sufferings reach up to the presidential palace. 
The expulsion of the Syrians, after the formation of the administrative inquiry 
commission, will be one of the most beautiful acts that the chief of state could 
accomplish. 
VOS POPULI VOX DEI [The voice of the people is the voice of God].88 
 
The result was a significant and violent campaign against the Syrian community which 
eventually spurred US authorities in Haiti to advocate for intervention on behalf of the Syrians.89 
That intervention was both diplomatic and military in nature. Despite US intervention, by 1905 
many of the Syrian traders had left Haiti. Reportedly, they not only took most of their stock, they 
also flooded the local real estate market by dumping their properties en masse, resulting in a 
significant devaluation of local real estate prices.90 With the regime change to General Antoine 
 
88 The circular was translated from French by the American legation in Port-au-Prince. See FRUS, With the Annual 
Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 7, 1903, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1904), Document 571. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1903/d571. 
89 Plummer identified an incident in which the US Minister to Haiti, William F Powell, patrolled the Syrian area of 
Port-au-Prince during the worst of the violence with the US military commander in Haiti and the US Vice-Consul. 
Plummer argues that such an “extraordinary and improper action not only illustrated the crude power the US could 
exercise in Haiti, but also attests to the strength of the American commitment to the Syrians.”  Plummer, “Race, 
Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean,” 525. 
90 In March 1905, Syrians were under threat of expulsion and began dumping their inventories onto the Haitian 
market. Early expulsions included “those without valid papers, Franco-Syrians abandoned by the French Minister, 
Syrians with Turkish passports, and Dominican Syrians.” By the summer of 1905, Plummer notes that “fewer than 
thirty legitimately naturalized Syrian-Americans” were still in Haiti but were having problems. Throughout this 
period, the Haitian government was approaching the Syrian expulsion with kid gloves, seeking to avoid giving 
offense that could lead to US intervention. Consequently, Plummer notes that the commercial activities of the 
remaining Syrian traders, while subject to sanction, was still continuing. By 1906, US pressure had restored the 
Syrian traders still in Haiti to their former status. In 1908, in the aftermath of the coup against President Nord 
Alexis, Haitian policy towards the US and Syrian traders shifted dramatically. The regime of General Antoine 
Simon dropped the anti-Syrian campaign and Syrian commerce picked up again. Plummer, 528-32. 
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Simon in 1908, the Haitian government “abandoned his predecessor’s Syrian policy” leading to 
many of the Syrian traders deciding to return to Haiti and re-establish their commercial 
operations. President Simon’s decision to “unabashedly open the country to unregulated foreign 
capital penetration” allowed US banking initiatives in Haiti to create an atmosphere conducive 
for the resumption of their trading.91 The result saw Haitian consumption of US goods sold 
through Syrian traders grow dramatically, as it “doubled between 1903 and 1911.”92   
 At the same time, that unregulated trade quickly aroused the ire of the masses, who 
rebelled against the Sam government in 1911. Insurrectionary activity, some of which was 
probably underwritten by German money, led to the overthrow of the Sam regime and brought 
the Cincinnatus Leconte military faction to power.93 Leconte’s platform was based on promises 
to deal with the Syrian problem yet again.  By 1912, and despite US activity working to prevent 
it, including “making representations for the protection of American citizens of Syrian origin,” 
most Syrians were forced to leave Haiti, not to return until the US Occupation of Haiti was well 
underway.94  
In February 1913, the American Legation in Port-au-Prince reported the newly appointed 
president, Jean-Antoine Tancrède Auguste, was claiming the expelled Syrians, who were now 
settled mainly in Jamaica, were raising money to support a revolution against Auguste’s 
government. The American consul investigated but was convinced that the accusations were 
baseless.95 Nonetheless, Auguste continued to believe the rumours and maintained a crack-down 
 
91 Plummer, 532. 
92 Plummer, 531-2. 
93 The rumours that the violence of 1911 was underwritten by German monies appears highly probable given that 
German commercial interests were the most likely at the time to benefit from Syrian expulsions. 
94 FRUS, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 3, 1912 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1919), Document 718. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1912/d718.  
95 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 2, 1913, (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1920), Document 656. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1913/d656.  
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on the Syrian community. His modus operandi, according to the Americans, was “to harass and 
annoy them [Syrians] so that they, too, will leave of their own will, or the Government pretends 
to have evidence implicating them in revolutionary movements and expel them.”96 
 Brenda Plummer identified two especially useful lessons from the Syrian experience in 
Haiti. The first was the refusal of the international community, including the US, to grant Haiti 
the right to enforce the same protectionist policies which they themselves claimed and enjoyed. 
The second was that “the old Haitian habit of relying on imports for the most fundamental 
commodities…continued…[and] engineered a woeful dependency from which Haiti has not yet 
emerged.”97 
 
Anatomy of a Coup: Understanding the Transition to Power in Haiti 
 
The Republic of Haiti, which gave itself the trouble of founding a State Bank, confided in 
it the service of the Treasury and endowed it with the considerable privilege of the issue 
of notes, cannot but find the loyal cooperation of this Bank at the difficult hour where 
outside circumstances, that we have not created, bind painfully the nation.98 
- Telegram from US Minister Blanchard to the US Secretary of State 
 
 Before leaving this period, an overview of foreign influence and interference in the 
transition of power in Haiti through the coup process is required. This section will outline the 
Haitian experience during the 1914 coup which overthrew President Michel Oreste Lafontant 
(1913-14). In 1913, the Oreste government had lost popularity amongst the elite due to attempts 
at reform. The Zamor brothers, Charles and Oreste, emerged as the leading revolutionary chiefs 
 
96 FRUS, Document 656. 
97 Plummer, “Race, Nationality, and Trade in the Caribbean,” 538. 
98 This extract from a 15 December 1914 diplomatic note passed from the Haitian Department of Foreign Affairs to 
the US Legation was part of a series of notes protesting the American decision to spirit Haitian gold held in the Bank 
out of Haiti and into holdings in New York. The gold was reportedly returned a number of years later, with interest.  
FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1922), Document 577. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d577.  
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seeking to overthrow the government, and began their separate advances on Port-au-Prince with 
the intent of wresting the presidency from Michel Oreste.99 
The volatile situation immediately attracted the attention of the US Legation in Port-au-
Prince. In January 1914, a diplomatic cable describing the situation was sent to the State 
Department and included a request for a US naval presence to protect against threats “made 
against the property of foreigners.”100 Clearly, the US eschewed neutrality in this revolution and 
came down firmly on the side of the Oreste government, which it saw as representing American 
interests best.101 By late January, the USS Nashville had been dispatched to Haiti, and was 
quickly followed by the cruiser USS Montana. 
The Nashville was ordered to proceed to Fort Liberty with orders to pick up Haitian 
Interior Minister Pradel, seen at that time as the Oreste government’s most capable minister and 
likely to resolve the crisis. American embassy staff in Port-au-Prince identified Pradel as 
“urgently need[ed] here [in Port-au-Prince] as the strongest man to preserve order.”102  The 
Montana, at the same time, was sent to Port-au-Prince to support the US Legation, with orders 
for the American ambassador to seek out and advise President Oreste that the captain of the 
Montana was “ordered to act as [President Oreste] and his Cabinet requested. [The State] 
 
99 Heinl and Heinl point out that Charlemagne Péralte was Charles Zamor’s brother-in-law as well as a “general de 
place at Port-de-Paix” at this time and a key military leader in the Zamors’ campaign for president. See Heinl and 
Heinl, Written in Blood, 384, 387-88. 
100 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1922), Document 487. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d487.  
101 One of the chief issues of concern to the US government at the time was having the Oreste government rescind 
the Syrian Exclusion Law which called for the expulsion of those persons of Syrian origins (targeting mainly the 
Syrian merchants). The law had been put in place by the previous administrations (Leconte and Auguste), and was 
not supported by Oreste. FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 2, 1913, ed. Joseph V. 
Fuller(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), Document 655.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1913/d655.  
102 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 




Department is disposed to do anything proper to support [the] constituted government.”103 Yet by 
27 January 1914, with the approach of the armies under the control of the Zamor brothers, and 
despite American support, President Oreste made the decision to resign and subsequently took 
refuge aboard the German war ship Vineta.104 The approach of the Zamor brothers in command 
of two revolutionary armies clearly demonstrated their ability to overmatch any forces available 
to Oreste.  
 The Zamor brothers’ march on the capital, however, did raise the alarm among the 
foreign legations, many of which had already called for their own troops and ships to be 
dispatched to Haitian waters. A number began to land those troops in anticipation of defending 
their national interests. The Americans, for example, had a Marine company ashore by the end of 
January, while the Germans landed 70 of their soldiers. The French and British would quickly 
follow suit.105 Oreste Zamor entered Port-au-Prince on 7 February, at the head of a 4,000-man 
army. The Haitian National Assembly promptly voted him into the presidency. The American 
ambassador reported that Zamor’s accession to the presidency was peacefully effected and 
offered up the comment that “he has preserved order since coming in.”106 
 The failure of American interventionist activities to halt the successful coup by Oreste 
Zamor led the US to undertake damage control. The State Department directed the Legation to 
ensure the new regime was aware of the strong American interest “in the proper administration 
and collection of customs,” the revenues from which were the means by which Haiti was 
 
103 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 489. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d489.  
104 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 495. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d495. 
105 The French likewise dispatched a war ship to the area from Mexico where it had visiting. FRUS, With the 
Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Publishing 
Office, 1922), Document 496. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d496.  
106 FRUS, Document 496. 
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servicing various foreign loans.107 The Legation also undertook to clarify the fate of Môle Saint-
Nicholas, a potential site for a naval coal refuelling station. While the US was not interested in 
leasing the station, it was nonetheless quite adamant about making clear to the Haitian leadership 
that it would not look favourably upon the station being made available to any other nation.  
In a telegram dated February 26, 1914, the Secretary of State directed the ambassador to 
ensure Zamor stood by the previous “understanding” reached with President Oreste and that it 
“remain undisturbed.” The gist of that gentlemen’s agreement included the promise “that no 
other power other than the US should gain a foothold in that section of the Republic.”108 Thus, 
despite American reservations, Oreste Zamor was confirmed as president by March 1914 and 
duly recognized by the US  
 By mid-March, the Zamor regime was itself facing fresh opposition. While the Zamor 
brothers had been the main revolutionary chiefs arrayed against the Oreste government, they 
were not the only ones. General Joseph Davilmar Théodore had also been building support in the 
Gonaïves area, but had suffered from a number of problems including financing for his army.109 
However, while Zamor was being confirmed in the presidency, Théodore was reported to have 
secured financial assistance for his military campaign from the Dominican Republic and was 
renewing his march on Port-au-Prince.110  
 
107 The Americans had been pushing for control over the Haitian customs houses, but were constantly rebuffed on 
that point, and would not achieve control until the Marine Occupation. 
108 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 506. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d506. 
109 On February 1, 1914, the Zamor brothers’ combined armies had been reported by the US Embassy as having 
defeated General Joseph Davilmar Théodore in a battle at Gonaïves. By the end of February, the Embassy reported 
that Théodore had been unable to pay his army and his revolutionary quest was in danger of total collapse.  
FRUS, Document 506. 
110 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 511. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d511. 
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That additional funding bolstered his forces significantly and led to a reversal of the 
previous analysis sent by the US Legation in which they had dismissed his chances of success. 
The Legation was now recommending sending ships and men into Haitian waters as Théodore 
was seen as a strong threat to Haitian peace and stability, as well as to American interests. At the 
same time, the USS Nashville was ordered to proceed to Cap Haïtien and begin negotiations with 
Théodore for a cessation of hostilities while the USS Montana was stationed in the Gonaïves area 
in support of the negotiations. Nonetheless, despite the American support, the negotiations would 
fail.111 
 Meanwhile, the Zamor regime was in trouble financially. A June 1914 internal 
subscription had raised just over US$300,000 mainly from small German merchants.112 It is 
unclear whether the monies raised were voluntary contributions paid through increased taxes or 
were coerced contributions to the government’s coffers. Reports by the American Legation 
indicated the money was raised through “subscriptions…to an internal loan” which suggested the 
loans would be paid off with interest, a dubious proposition given Théodore’s revolutionary 
activity and progress.113  
Based on the uncertainty generated by Théodore, the Banque Nationale de la République 
d'Haïti or BNRH, then under foreign ownership and control, refused to provide the Zamor 
government with funding necessary for the “convention budgétaire,” the funds being essential 
for daily government operations.114 The tactic of refusing to release convention budgétaire funds, 
 
111 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 513. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d513.  
112 FRUS, Document 513. 
113 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 519. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d519.  
114 The “convention budgétaire” was an agreement between the Haitian government and the BNRH, whereby the 
bank, then under the control of French, American, and German interests, provided the government with its operating 
funds. Without those funds, the government could not pay its civil service and would cease to function. Walter H 
Posner, “American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,” The Americas 20, no. 3 (Jan 1964): 235-6.  
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which did lead to a halt in Haitian government operations, was a deliberate US tactic employed 
to gain American control over the Haitian customs houses. American Legation officials expected 
that “the [Zamor] Government when confronted by such a crisis, would be forced to ask the 
assistance of the US in adjusting its financial tangle and that American supervision of the 
customs would result.”115 
 Recognizing the government could not operate without funds, the US presented the 
Zamor government with its conditions for further loans. These included a proposed convention 
that allowed for the appointment of an American Receiver General to Haiti who would receive 
all payments of customs duties and would make all decisions on disbursements of that revenue 
based on American-established priorities. Those prioritized disbursements were, first, to pay the 
salaries and expenses of the Receiver General and his assistants and employees; second, to retire 
the public debt of Haiti; and third, to cover the day-to-day costs of government operations.116 
 Foreign influence over revolutionary activities continued and sparked complaints from 
the Zamor government to the US Legation regarding the harbouring by various legations of 
revolutionary leaders. The German Legation was the main culprit in many of the US telegrams 
on the subject.117 Yet it was on the economic front that most of the damage was done to the 
Zamor government and led directly to its overthrow. The Zamor regime’s attempts to obtain 
international loans required to pay for government operations were deliberately foiled by the 
international community. German consular officials, for example, let their American 
counterparts know that the German government had informed the German Haitian community 
 
115 Cited from a June 9, 1914, message from Minister Smith to the US Secretary of State. Posner, “American 
Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,” 235-236. 
116 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 525. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d525.  
117 See, for example, FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller 




they “would not support any claims based upon subscriptions to the proposed loan.”118 It is very 
likely that other nations provided similar notices to their own national communities. 
 By the end of July, and despite having received some funding of the convention 
budgétaire, the inevitable occurred and the Zamor government found itself without operating 
cash. Desperation led it to offer up a novel guarantee for loans in the form of a “guaranty [of] 
revenue from stamp taxes… valued at $100,000 a year” in exchange for US$300,000. The funds 
raised were to be used to pay for operational expenses in the fight against the Théodore 
revolutionary movement.119 Interestingly, while the BNRH had refused to provide the loan 
requested, it “admitted that the guaranty offered [was] worth the amount sought.”120 
Meanwhile, the US resumed loan negotiations with the government, offering the Zamor 
regime a loan while renewing its demand, as a key condition, for the appointment of an 
American Receiver-General to oversee Haiti’s budget.121 Once again, the Americans included 
the ability to oversee how Haitian revenues were employed, including an insistence that foreign 
loans and American loans to Haiti in particular, be the first items serviced by Haiti’s revenue.  
By September, the Zamor government had some success in operations against Théodore 
and was able to seize the arrondissement of Ouanaminthe in the northeast. Once again, though, 
Haiti’s economic situation undid the regime. Zamor’s government was only successful in 
receiving half the monies it required for continued operations since the BNRH, acting in 
accordance with US interests, had refused to provide further funds, and the international 
 
118 FRUS, Document 528. 
119 FRUS, Document 528. 
120 FRUS, Document 528. 
121 Haiti’s only other option for funding at this point would have been with other entities who were able to thwart the 
US interests by making the loan but would have demanded exorbitant interest rates in compensation. 
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community had likewise turned its collective back on Haiti. Other funding sources had failed to 
materialize, and consequently, the government found itself in a critical financial situation.122  
 One final remedy was planned. The government proposed a bill allowing for the issuance 
of an additional 12 million gourdes [US$2.4 million] of paper money. This immediately alarmed 
foreign investors including the US government as it would have seriously diluted Haiti’s 
monetary supply and driven the value of foreign investments down significantly. The planned 
remedy, though, became moot by the end of October as the Théodore offensive against Port-au-
Prince succeeded and President Zamor was forced to flee the capital into exile aboard a Dutch 
vessel. 
 As was the usual modus operandi in the case of a Haitian coup, many of the major 
foreign powers dispatched war ships and marines to Haitian waters, ostensibly to protect 
foreigners and their commercial interests. For example, the USS Hancock, a transport ship 
carrying 800 Marines, was ordered to Haiti to join the warship USS Kansas already on station in 
the area. Interestingly, the Hancock was ordered to “take charge of Port-au-Prince and…restore 
Charles Zamor [the former President’s brother] to his Cabinet functions.”123  That would prove 
to be unachievable. 
 The new regime led by Joseph Davilmar Théodore (1914-15) took power in Haiti on 13 
November and immediately sought formal recognition from the United States. The US, however, 
decided to play hardball and refused recognition until Théodore agreed to sign a convention 
settling five key issues: the signing of the proposed customs convention; confirmation of 
American railway interests in Haiti; the re-establishment of normal relations between the BNRH 
 
122 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 529. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d529. 
123 Both Zamor brothers in fact eventually fled Haiti. 
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and the Haitian government; the protection of foreign interests; and the renewal of the agreement 
over the Môle Saint-Nicholas station.124  
  The Théodore administration refused the American demands, but still took the time to 
provide a counterproposal, as it remained extremely interested in American recognition because 
of the benefits that carried. Once again, however, as with the Zamor regime, monetary concerns 
of the new government took centre stage as the new regime found the government financial 
cupboards bare. Copying the Zamor regime’s planning, Théodore also initiated the issuance of 
additional paper money, in the amount of almost 16 million gourdes. Repeating its previous 
stance on the issue, the US immediately condemned the plan, and this time used its influence 
with Haitian BNRH’s authorities to make them refuse to recognize any new issue of money as 
legal tender.125 
 That objection notwithstanding, the Théodore regime, like others, was forced to push 
ahead with printing more money, the alternative being to accept American sovereignty in the five 
areas noted above. The US State Department response was to telegram the diplomatic staff in 
Port-au-Prince and order them to “inform Théodore that the US will refuse to regard as legal any 
such issue of paper money as he proposes. French and German Ambassadors in Washington 
have been advised in this sense, in order that their nationals in Haiti may be informed.”126 The 
US went further in its planning and began operations aimed at spiriting some US$500,000 worth 
 
124 The Môle Saint-Nicholas station agreement only allowed the station to be leased by the United States. A sixth 
priority, added later on November 16, 1914, called for US citizen claims against Haiti to be decided through 
arbitration. FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller 
(Washington: Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 546. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d546.  
125 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 552. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d552. 
126 Clearly, the American refusal to regard the Haitian issuance of additional currency as legal undermined Haitian 
sovereignty, essentially declaring the Haitians did not have the right to determine their own fiscal policy. FRUS, 
With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government 
Publishing Office, 1922), Document 558. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d558. 
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of gold bullion out of the BNRH, despite a counter-proposal from the Théodore regime which 
refused American control over Haiti’s custom houses, but did offer significant economic 
concessions to American interests and agents in Haiti.127 
 The decision to evacuate the Haitian gold from the BNRH was intended to force Haiti, 
once again, into reliance on foreign loans, all of which came with significant American 
conditions attached. To attach an air of legitimacy to what the Haitian government felt was theft, 
the first request for a transfer of the gold came from the BNRH vice- president, Henry H. 
Wehrhane. His December 8, 1914, telegram requested a US warship provide the secure 
transportation of the gold to safeguard it from revolutionary activity. Initially, the plan was to 
transfer about US$110,000 of gold but the amount demanded would be revised and increased to 
US$500,000 on 14 December.128 The gold would eventually be taken aboard the USS Machias 
without incident, the shipment guarded by unarmed Marines.129 
 The Haitian response to what they termed a theft was communicated diplomatically on 22 
December and stated that Haiti “deeply deplores an arbitrary and offensive intervention, which 
carries a flagrant invasion of the sovereignty and independence of…Haiti.”130 The Haitians also 
 
127 The Haitian counterproposal included provisions for 20 years of US exclusivity within the then-developing 
mining industry in Haiti. The Haitian government was to receive one-third of the stock in the new endeavour. 
Further, the US was to assist Haiti in obtaining loans which would allow for debt consolidation including the 
consolidation of its past fiscal obligations. The US refused the counterproposal, claiming that it did “not give any 
assurance that the Government of Haiti is stable or any promise of a reign of peace and prosperity.” FRUS, With the 
Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Publishing 
Office, 1922), Document 568. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d568. 
128 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 




129 FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: 
Government Publishing Office, 1922), Document 575. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d575. 
130 Haitian Minister Solon Menos, who signed off the protest to the US over its invasion and seizure of the gold, 
claimed that the gold in question was being held to retire currency issued and related to an earlier 1910 French loan 
to Haiti, and was not in fact related to any US monetary agreements or loans. The US responded on 31 December 
and stated that the removal of the gold was for reasons of security; the fear being that had the revolutionary forces 
seized the gold, bank officials believed they would have been held liable. The US government stated further that 
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protested that the American position on Haiti’s economic problems was hypocritical. On the one 
hand, the Americans made the decision to assist in the withdrawal of Haitian gold, claiming that 
Haiti had violated the Haitian BNRH’s constitution by seeking to issue more paper money. On 
the other hand, the same constitution specifically states that “[a]ll diplomatic intervention [in 
BNRH affairs] is formally prohibited.”131  
In the case of the latter, Haiti protested that the continued US insistence that any currency 
issue by Haiti would be regarded as illegal, was such an intervention. The result was that 
Théodore’s government issued a diplomatic note on 15 December which stated that the regime 
considered itself free of the conventions related to the BNRH and was free to seek out new 
relationships which would benefit the regime and its monetary requirements.132 
 Despite that decision, Théodore was unable to find the funding necessary to support his 
regime and was forced to resign from office in February 1915 when confronted by General Jean 
Vilbrun Guillaume Sam (president from 4 March to 27 July 1915) and his forces. Ironically, 
whereas Sam came to power by ousting the bankrupt Théodore government that had been 
financially starved by the international community, the Sam regime would likewise be subject to 
rebellions, but this time over claims his regime had given too much away to the international 
community to obtain the financing necessary for Haitian government operations. 
 
 
both the gold within the National Bank vaults and that removed to New York would be released to the Haitian 
government for the retirement of currency “when the conditions in Haiti render the resumption of this procedure 
advisable.” FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller 




131 The Haitian argument over the illegality of US actions regarding the National Bank is best summed up in the 
Haitian Foreign Office note passed through the US Legation on 15 December 1914. FRUS, With the Address of the 
President to Congress December 8, 1914, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Publishing Office, 1922), 
Document 577. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1914/d577. 
132 Government activity took on a more active approach with the report from the US Legation in late December 1914 





While Haiti’s economic dependency and poverty are shared by other Caribbean nations, 
its history of underdevelopment serves as a prototype for them. Haiti’s political 
independence, achieved in 1804, set the stage for an increasingly difficult struggle to 
survive among imperialist states. Haiti prefigured the modern Latin American experience 
and thus provides a classic example of how national aspirations in the hemisphere were 
derailed. Equally significant, it illustrates the manner in which commerce, rather than 
plantation enterprise or extensive capital investment, could foster socioeconomic 
decline.133 
- Professor of History Brenda G. Plummer 
 
  Haiti was beset by foreign interference almost immediately after independence. Despite 
diplomatic isolation which saw Haiti being precluded from international recognition as a 
sovereign state, Haiti was nevertheless subject to predatory economic relations. Initially, the 
fledgling nation sought out trading opportunities to generate the hard currency so necessary for 
the purchase of arms and ammunition to defend the nation against lethal adversaries who had 
demonstrated through act and word their interests in subjugating Haiti and re-establishing 
slavery. Not surprising, Haitian leaders found themselves hard pressed to adopt policies that 
would have allowed Haiti to implement sorely needed social and economic improvements. 
 For Haiti, the forced French indemnity was quite literally a game changer. First, it pushed 
Haiti into the world of predatory international loans. The first instalment of the indemnity 
required Haiti to obtain a French loan to meet the demand! That ongoing requirement of 
obtaining foreign loans made Haiti vulnerable to fiscal policy manipulation. One such example 
was the American threat of refusal to recognize Haiti’s additional paper currency in 1914, a 
threat which clearly infringed on Haitian sovereignty. In the end, Haiti would be forced to 
manage as best it could, all the while watching as development opportunities, including those 
brought about by the industrial revolution, pass it by without so much as a brief touch. 
 
133 Plummer, “The Metropolitan Connection,” 119. 
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 The indemnity also significantly impacted on commercial development in Haiti. As 
pointed out earlier, the reduced tariffs provided to the French under the indemnity agreement was 
a contributing factor to Haitian domestic businesses not being able to compete with cheaper 
imported goods from France, as well as stifling the development of any commercial activity 
within fields dominated by France. That retardation of commercial development in Haiti had 
perhaps as great an impact on Haiti, if not greater, as the monetary demand and the follow-on 
predatory loans required to pay the indemnity.  
Even with diplomatic recognition, manipulation and exploitation of Haiti would continue, 
especially during the period of gunboat diplomacy. Political turmoil during this period saw 
foreign naval forces being employed to extort money from the Haitian government for real or 
alleged damages to foreign citizens and their businesses. Ironically, foreign money was often 
behind the political turmoil, particularly that of Germany at least until the American Occupation 
in 1915. Germany has been frequently cited as the main culprit in fomenting revolutionary 
activity.  
That activity, especially gunboat diplomacy, would continue right up to the Marine 
invasion and constituted a form of economic warfare. While the Germans employed economic 
tactics in and against Haiti, they were largely seeking to develop economic markets for their own 
goods and services. The Americans, on the other hand, waged economic warfare against Haiti 
through a strategy known as “dollar diplomacy” or “financial imperialism.” Before turning to the 
Marine Occupation, dollar diplomacy first needs to be explained and understood within the 
context of American foreign policy interests within the region. 
Dollar diplomacy as defined by the American politician, writer and lawyer, Frederic C. 
Howe, is the “right of a lending nation to interfere with the internal affairs of the borrowing 
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nation.”134 Howe summarized US foreign policy in the employment of gunboat diplomacy in 
support of national commercial interests operating abroad: 
[Dollar diplomacy] means that the American banker, concession seeker and exploiter 
shall be permitted to negotiate any kind of a contract and once the contract is secured it 
shall have back of it the strong arm of the government to enforce its terms. If revolutions 
break out that threaten the investment, if the interest is too heavy to be paid, the army and 
navy shall be dispatched to suppress the revolution or bring about a government selected 
by the financiers to ensure their investments; for foreign loans and concessions are 
accompanied by treaties. Treaties are part of the contract of borrowing. And under the 
treaties the borrowing power guarantees the investments and by implication authorizes 
intervention by force, if necessary, to validate contracts, if it is unable to insure them 
itself.135 
 
Dollar diplomacy is generally understood as a foreign policy tool first employed by 
Théodore Roosevelt and further refined and changed by both the Taft and Wilson governments. 
Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine allowed the US to intervene in any Latin American 
nation that engaged in “chronic wrongdoing” to restore order, stability and prosperity. Chronic 
wrongdoing included taking on too much debt. William Walker, writing on American foreign 
policy, provided an excellent summary of the American stratagem for Latin American region, 
including Haiti: 
the advent of North American financial domination in the 1910s offered the prospect of 
fiscal stability while simultaneously favoring the emplacement of ruling oligarchies, 
which in each case were ushered into the 1920s by US armed forces. The United States 
 
134 Frederic C. Howe, “Dollar Diplomacy and Financial Imperialism under the Wilson Administration,” The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 68 (November 1916), 315. Howe argues that right 
originated with the British in 1850, when they employed gunboat diplomacy against Greece during what is known as 
the Don Pacifico affair. British by birth, Don Pacifico was the former Portuguese consul-general to Greece until 
relieved from this post for overstepping his authority. Pacifico was also Jewish and was attacked in his home by an 
anti-Semitic mob of Greeks who damaged his residence and damaged his furniture and effects. Pacifico 
subsequently submitted a claim for damages against the Greek crown, but the amount claimed was disputed by the 
Greek government as being unreasonably large. When they refused to pay the demanded compensation, Pacifico 
appealed to British Lord Palmerston for assistance. Britain imposed a blockade on Greece, which was under the 
protection of France, Great Britain, and Russia. The blockade caused a diplomatic row between the two sides 
(Britain against France and Russia) and would be ended within two months but only after compensation was finally 
paid to Pacifico. See also Dolphus Whitten, Jr., “The Don Pacifico Affair,” The Historian 48, no. 2 (February 1986): 
255-67. 
135 Howe, “Dollar Diplomacy,” 314. 
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followed a pattern that included the collection of customs revenues, control of national 
banks, refunding public debts, and training local security forces.”136 
 
As Emily S. Rosenberg has pointed out, Roosevelt’s administration worked with private 
banks to extend “controlled loans…to countries that…needed to be subject to US administration 
in a time when Congress would never have approved the overt seizure of colonies.”137 The 
controlled loans under the guise of dollar diplomacy were secretive in nature and lacked 
transparency as Roosevelt sought to shield them from Congressional oversight. That practice 
would continue and intensify under presidents Taft and Wilson and would extend to the various 
military, largely counterinsurgency, campaigns undertaken in target countries including Haiti. 
Frederic Howe condemned the practice as harmful to American interests. He identified 
the adoption and practice of dollar diplomacy as leading to an  
ending of the splendid isolation of the US from questionable relations with other peoples; 
it involves the conversion of the state department and the army and navy into collection 
and insurance agencies for Wall Street interests, concession seekers, munition makers, 
and those who will exploit weaker peoples under the philanthropic assurance of 
promoting their development.138  
 
Similarly, political scientist Suzanne Mettler has pointed out that the controlled loan 
process, lacking transparency and openness, would shift into a program that became coercive and 
self-perpetuating. It forced nations like Haiti to take out new loans through American officials, 
and created what Mettler termed a “submerged state.”139 Dollar diplomacy should be understood 
 
136 William O. Walker, III, “Crucible for Peace: Herbert Hoover, Modernization, and Economic Growth in Latin 
America,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 1, (January 2006): 83–117. 
137 Emily S. Rosenberg, “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to US Empire,” Diplomatic History 38, no.4 
(2014): 856. 
138 Howe, “Dollar Diplomacy,” 312. 
139 Suzanne Mettler, The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American Democracy 
(Chicago: 2011). Cited in Rosenberg, “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to US Empire,” 856. 
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as not only predatory in nature, but also as a deliberate and key element of the economic war 




Chapter Six - The United States Marine Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 
The government of the United States has no ambitions to gratify at your expense, no 
policy which runs counter to your national aspirations, and no purpose save to promote 
the interests of peace and assist you, in such manner as you may welcome, to solve your 
problems to your own proper advantage.1 
- US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes 
 
[I]t will be very hard for Hayti ever again to emerge as an independent state…[Yet] Hayti 
must become a very different country to that which is at present breaking the heart of all 
those who really love her, shocking and disgusting the sensibility of the civilized world.2 
- 1915 Jamaica Times editorial 
 
In 1888, US Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A. Adee called Haiti “a public nuisance at 
our doors.”3  That statement of exasperation came as civil war broke out once again in 1888 
within Haiti, this time involving the United States directly in the conflict.4 By July 1915, the 
Haitian nuisance had become sufficiently critical that US President Woodrow Wilson launched 
what became the 19-year long occupation of Haiti by the US military.5 The invasion and 
occupation was directed by the US State Department and sanctioned by President Wilson. The 
 
1 Quote by US Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes from December 1922 speech to the Conference of Central 
American Republics. From Davis, Black Democracy, 296. 
2 “Hayti," Jamaica Times, August 14, 1915, cited in Matthew J. Smith, “Capture Land: Jamaica, Haiti, and the 
United States Occupation,” Journal of Haitian Studies 21, No. 2, Special Issue on the US Occupation of 
Haiti, 1915–1934 (Fall 2015), 183. 
3 Cited in Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 1995), 31. 
4 In October 1888, the Haitian naval man-of-war, the Dessalines, seized the American steamship, the S.S. Haytian 
Republic, an American transport ship which had been transporting rebel troops and supplies (arms and ammunition) 
between the Cape, Port-de-Paix and Gonaïves, supplying the rebel army under General Hyppolite. In response, the 
Americans dispatched two warships, the USS Yantic and Galena to Port-au-Prince. Their arrival prompted the 
government to return the now stripped ship back to the US Navy in December, ending the episode peacefully. Heinl 
and Heinl, Written in Blood, 304. 
5 US plans to invade Haiti included, as early as 1911, instructions to military attaché staff in Haiti to map out the 
countryside. That led to the New York Times reporting on US Army Captain Young, the sole coloured officer on the 
attaché’s staff, “pacing his way through the mountainous countryside.” At the same time, the US Navy was 
conducting and recording depth soundings in Haitian waters. Cited in Alonzo P.B. Holly, “Our Future Relations 
with Haiti,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 156, No. 110 (1931), 111-12.  
The telegram which launched the invasion of Haiti was sent to Admiral Caperton over the US Navy radio system, 
and stated “STATE DEPARTMENT DESIRES AMERICAN FORCES BE LANDED PORT-AU-PRINCE AND 
AMERICAN AND FOREIGN INTERESTS PROTECTED…” The interests to be protected included both US 




US strategic plan pursued three key outcomes: to gain control over the customs houses in Haiti, 
to ensure that Haitian revenues were not being seized as plunder and instead serviced Haitian 
loans; to settle all outstanding issues regarding the national railway and bank, both of which 
represented significant American commercial interests; and to protect Haiti from the influence 
and control of foreign governments, especially Germany.6 
Wilson’s motivation for invading and occupying Haiti continues to be debated, but it is 
generally accepted by historians such as Suzy Castor, Hans Schmidt and Mary Renda that it 
involved several factors.7 First, the Haitian political climate was seen by American policy 
makers as chaotic and out of control, posing a danger to regional stability.8 Often cited were the 
frequent coups that took place within Haiti. James McCrocklin, for example, points out that 
before the Marine Occupation Haiti had seven presidents in seven years.9 More telling, though. 
was a quote from Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing (1915 to 1920), which provides an 
understanding of the racism endemic within the American foreign policy towards Haiti: 
"The experience of Liberia and Haiti show that the African race are devoid of any 
capacity for political organization and lack genius for government. Unquestionably there 
is an inherent tendency to revert to savagery and to cast aside the shackles of civilization 
which are irksome to their physical nature. Of course, there are many exceptions to this 
 
6 McCrocklin, Garde d’Haiti, 1915-1934, 9-10. 
7 Part One of Suzy Castor’s L’occupation américaine d’Haïti lays out the “antecedents et causes” of the eventual 
American occupation. She also makes it clear that many Haitian professionals and intellectuals recognized that the 
American geopolitical interests in the region, coupled to Haiti’s own internal political instability, made an American 
intervention increasingly likely. See Chapters I through III of Castor, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti. See also 
Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934; and Renda, Taking Haiti. 
8 William Alexander MacCorkle began his presentation with a consideration of “the governmental and social 
condition of the Republic of Haiti…and the probability of it becoming a menace to the fundamental principles of the 
Monroe Doctrine.” While claiming not to be interested in “indicting an entire people,” MacCorkle made the 
extraordinary statement that “[s]ince the evacuation by the French, Haiti has been a land of seething revolution, 
despotism and crime against religious and governmental law.” He then included the following shocking quote from 
a colleague in his presentation, appearing to obliquely advocate genocide as a solution to Haiti’s chronic instability: 
“Nothing short of extermination, some aver, could effect a reform in the Haitian body politic; but as this age does 
not tolerate the radical measures of the olden time it is not probable that the present generation will experience a 
reformation.” See William A. MacCorkle, “The Monroe Doctrine and its Application to Haiti,” Annals of American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 54, (July 1914): 28-56. 
9 McCrocklin pointed to the seven-year period from 17 December 1908-17 December 1915 and argued, as have 
others, that the “principal occupation of the chief executive… [was the] …raising of money to maintain an army and 
thus remain in office.” See McCrocklin, Garde d’Haiti, 1915-1934, 6. 
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racial weakness, but it is true of the mass, as we know from experience in this country. It 
is that which makes the negro problem practically unsolvable."10 
 
A second factor was Haiti’s strategic position adjoining the region’s sea lanes and its 
proximity to the Panama Canal.  With the acquisition of the Panama Canal in 1904, the United 
States could not tolerate foreign powers exercising influence over Haiti.11 Former West Virginia 
Governor William A. MacCorkle, in an influential presentation to the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science in 1914, made the case, stating simply that: 
Next to Cuba, it [Haiti] is the most important strategic point in the Gulf of Mexico and 
the Caribbean Sea. It is directly on and commands the two great passages of the Atlantic 
Ocean…It thus practically controls the great bulk of the commerce of the United States to 
the East and the Pacific Ocean.12 
 
European influence in the Caribbean region, and in Haiti specifically, posed a challenge 
to US aspirations to enforce the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and establish the 
United States as a hegemonic power in the Caribbean.13 Germany, having clashed with the US 
over other possible territorial acquisitions, was aware of the US desire to reform Haiti and 
convert it into a stable, pacified trading partner. 14 Challenging those ambitions directly, 
Germany, proclaimed in a 1914 communique that: 
 
10 Cited in Schmidt, The US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 62-3. Lansing included this in a January 1918 
communique to Rear Admiral James Oliver, the First Governor of the American Virgin Islands and former head of 
US Naval Intelligence (1914 to 1917). Lansing was not the only official in Wilson’s cabinet who felt this way. 
Schmidt quotes the Assistant Secretary of State, William Phillips, who likewise spoke about Haitian “complete 
political incompetence” in failing to “maintain the degree of civilization left them by the French…” Schmidt, 63.  
11 John W. Blassingame, "The Press and American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 1904-
1920," Caribbean Studies9, no. 2 (1969): 31-32. 
12 MacCorkle, “The Monroe Doctrine and its Application to Haiti,” 31-2. 
13 Blassingame explains in detail how the idea of Manifest Destiny was promulgated by the press between 1904 to 
1920, including the idea that “Haitians and Dominicans needed “energetic Anglo-Saxon influence.” The 
Independent wrote: “It would plant another star in the blue sky of the flag and plant the flag prophetically in the 
waters of the Caribbean.... If the United States has one 'mission' it is to propagate liberty under the direction of 
education and morality... But it is said that annexation would be the ruin of a negro state. If so, so be it.... And if the 
Negroes or the white men of Santo Domingo, or of the South, under fair laws, cannot swim, they must sink, call it 
fate or law or what we will. It is best that the best should survive.” (March 3, 1904). Blassingame, 32-34. 
14 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 31-4, 43. 
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[T]he German Government has joined with other European governments in representing 
to Washington that the interests of European countries in Haiti are so large that no 
scheme of reorganization or control can be regarded as acceptable unless it is undertaken 
under international auspices.15 
 
A key element to the Roosevelt Corollary and the establishment of the US as a 
hegemonic power in the Caribbean was the most favoured nation principle for foreign trade in 
the Caribbean. The US administration was desirous that Haiti should sign on for the status but 
was thwarted initially by Haiti’s strong cultural and financial ties to France. France owned the 
Banque Nationale d’Haïti or BNH, from 1880 until 1910, was one of Haiti’s main trading 
partners, had preferred trading status with a fifty percent reduction in tariffs, and Haitians 
preferred French goods. The Haitian elite, educated in France, spoke Parisian French, and 
followed French rather than American customs. Finally, Haitian elites interacted in French (and 
German) society as equals, while the Americans culturally showed little respect to Haitians, in 
large measure due to racial prejudice conditioned and typified by widespread Jim Crow laws.16 
The US quickly formulated a plan to undermine European financial interests in Haiti, and 
were able to acquire a fifty percent ownership stake in the newly created BNRH from Germany 
and France in 1910-1911.17 American bankers joined European bankers in implementing 
schemes that virtually invited European and US military intervention in Latin America and the 
Caribbean as part of their routine loan practice: 
 
15 Carl Kelsey, The American Intervention in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (Philadelphia, 1922), 135. 
http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00001149/00001.  
16 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 31-5. 
17 Schmidt, 38. The consortium led by the US was quickly able to exploit the contractual obligations under which 
the new Haitian bank, BNRH, was created in October 1910. Loans made by the international community through the 
new bank carried horrendous terms for Haiti. A new Haitian government loan of 65 million francs carried an 
incredible 72.3 percent interest rate per annum, with some eight million francs withheld initially for the first 
repayment. An additional ten million francs were held back by the new bank’s interests to allow for the retirement of 
excess paper monies. As if that was not enough, the Haitian government was charged an additional one percent 
interest on the monies held on deposit with the new bank, rather than receiving interest on those deposits. 
Coincidentally, American invasion plans for Haiti were drawn up in 1911. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 355-6. 
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[F]oreign financial interests would float loans at exorbitant rates to an unstable and often 
corrupt Latin-American government… [Once the government defaulted on the loans, the 
foreign powers would intervene] …If diplomatic pressure and intervention succeeded in 
forcing a settlement of the debt, the foreign investors would enjoy high-risk rates of 
return on their loans where there was actually no risk involved at all….18 
 
That exploitation of a mal-credit paradigm in Haiti allowed US and European bankers to 
create a self-sustaining system within which Haitian regimes had to seek additional international 
funding to service previous loans, leading Haiti down the path to over-extending its public 
borrowing, and falling into extreme credit dependency. The chronic predatory loan system 
created a vicious cycle of the worst kind. Haitian instability generated high profits for foreign 
banks and investment houses with no checks and balances.19 In April 1914, for example, 
Madison Smith, the US Minister to Haiti, outlined just one means by which American interests 
were manipulating Haiti:  
The suspension of the ‘convention budgétaire’ most likely would bring the Government 
to a condition where it could not operate. It is just this condition that the bank [BNRH] 
desires, for it is the belief of the bank that the Government when confronted by such a 
crisis, would be forced to ask the assistance of the United States in adjusting its financial 
tangle and that American supervision of the customs would result.20 
 
 What is clear was that the United States was seeking to manipulate Haitian leaders into a 
position where they would be forced into requesting American assistance, assistance that would 
come with strings attached. Thus, while President Wilson would state that the US was 
intervening in Haiti for the “protection of foreign lives and property…and to preserve order,” in 
reality, planning for the intervention had been underway since mid-1911 and was principally 
 
18 Note the relationship between foreign economic investment in Haiti through arms and monies transferred to rival 
factions, and Haiti’s increasingly frequent changes of government due to military coup. This is not to suggest that 
arguments about ideological basis for a quasi-civil war are wrong: indeed, the frequency of coups may be related to 
such ideological struggles, but they were clearly made more likely and more lucrative through the infusion of 
foreign capital and equipment. Schmidt, 43-4. 
19 This highlights the vicious cycle in Haiti whereby manipulation and instability go hand-in-hand. 
20 Cited in Posner, “American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,” 235-6. 
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aimed at securing US economic and financial interests.21 Indeed, the first article in the 
Occupation convention quite clearly identified the aim of putting Haiti’s finances “on a firm and 
solid basis” as a priority of the invading force.22  
The critical nature of Haiti’s strategic position within the region was more economic than 
geographic. David Nicholls points, paradoxically, to the creation of the national bank during the 
presidency of Louis Étienne Félicité Lysius Salomon (1879 to 1888) as contributing to the 
eventual invasion and occupation: “the take-over of the Banque [BNRH] by US interests in 1911 
was a decisive step towards the occupation of the country.” Nicholls also cites Haitian politician 
and academic Edmond Paul who “likened the bank to a Trojan horse which would introduce into 
our country foreigners bent on annexation.”23 
The United States Government’s emphasis on protecting loans from American banks to 
Haiti was not surprising. American Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan took advice on 
Haiti from Roger L. Farnham, an executive with the National City Bank of New York, which 
owned a significant share of the BNRP.24 Farnham not only retained his position as vice-
president within the National City Bank of New York, he also became vice-president of the 
 
21 Haitian historian, Suzy Castor, points out that Haitian writers and intellectuals were well aware of the likelihood 
of a US intervention from the end of the nineteenth century onwards. In 1903, Sténio Vincent, then a prominent 
Haitian lawyer and later Haitian president (1930-1941), wrote that "l'hypothèse d'une intervention nord-américaine 
est indiscutable, c'est presque une certitude." See Castor, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 61. 
22 That the intervention was primarily to secure economic and financial interests is bolstered by the earlier December 
1914 intervention when US Marines landed in Haiti and seized the Haitian national bank’s holdings of gold bullion 
(some US$1 million worth) which they promptly transported to New York. Further, the US had been negotiating for 
some time, often with the threat of force, for control over Haiti’s customs houses. See Leon D. Pamphile, Haitians 
and African Americans: A Heritage of Tragedy and Hope (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 103; 
James Weldon Johnson, Self-Determining Haiti: Four articles reprinted from The Nation embodying a report of an 
investigation made for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (New York: University of 
Miami’s The Nation, 1920; Project Gutenberg, 2011), 10; and Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 383-90. 
23 Nicholls, Haiti in Caribbean Context, 44. 
24 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 48. See also Renda, Taking Haiti, 99. 
112 
 
BNRP. Further, he would later assume the presidency of Haiti’s national railway, because of 
National City Bank’s controlling shares in the railway company.25 
For US political leaders, control over the Haitian customs houses became an important 
policy goal after Farnham advised the State Department it was necessary.26 The customs houses 
were part of the national network responsible for collecting all import and export taxes on behalf 
of the Haitian government. The Haitian government continually resisted the request of the BNRP 
to be the receiver of their import and export taxes. Control of the customs houses network 
allowed the US to collect customs and excise taxes and ensure that all American loans to Haiti 
were paid.27 Once US Marines invaded Haiti, one of the chief functions of the BNRP was to act 
as “sole depository of all revenues collected in the name of the Haitian government by the 
American Occupation, receiving in addition to the interest rate a commission on all funds 
deposited.…” That function meant that control over the bank, now firmly in American hands, 
conveyed control of Haiti’s economic and monetary policy.28 
 
The Effects of the Occupation 
God is too far, and the United States is too close.29 
- Haitian Historian and Diplomat Dantès Bellegarde 
 
 
25 In 1920, James Weldon Johnson wrote a series of four articles for The Nation entitled “Self-Determining Haiti,” 
which comprised an investigation by the US National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) into the Marine Occupation. The reporting pointed out that Roger Farnham has just been made the 
receiver of the National Railroad of Haiti and provided detail on the bond manipulations which had allowed 
Farnham, through his bank, to gain control over the Railroad and its “valuable territorial concessions.” See James 
Weldon Johnson, Self-Determining Haiti. 
26 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 53. By 1915, Farnham was threatening Bryan with 
the removal of American financial interests from Haiti if the US government did not intervene. See also Renda, 
Taking Haiti, 99. 
27 Schmidt, 48-50. 
28 Johnson, Self-Determining Haiti, 21. 
29 Quoted in Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, In the Shadow of Powers: Dantès Bellegarde in Haitian Social Thought, 2nd 
ed. (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2019), 30. 
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It is the Nemesis of governments that do not rest on the consent of the governed that what 
they do with the best of intentions may be as harmful as bad actions.30 
- Professor of Economics and Sociology Emily Greene Balch 
 
Because past negotiations had not produced any Haitian interest in yielding sovereignty 
over domestic economic and fiscal policy, the United States decided to use force to achieve their 
aims.31 The effects of the Occupation should be understood within a framework of violence 
employed against Haiti. Despite James McCrocklin’s argument that intervention in Haiti was 
“not a ‘Marine show” but rather a closely controlled State Department operation, the reality was 
quite different.32  
The US employed the Marines in Haiti as the instrument of its military solution to ending 
that “public nuisance at our doors.”33 Employing the military to solve problems usually results in 
a military solution, one based on violence. This is particularly true when the US Marines are 
employed.34 The downside of making the Marines central to American policy in Haiti was that 
 
30 Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 81. 
31 The Americans had already put the Roosevelt Corollary into action in Cuba, Venezuela, and the Dominican 
Republic. “This policy of guaranteeing foreign financial investments by American police action served as a 
precedent for subsequent interventions.” Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 44. 
32 Historian Suzy Castor identifies two components contributing to the success of the American occupation. The first 
was a strong Marine presence coupled to the later development of the Haitian Constabulary to deter opposition; and 
the second, “une équipe ‘d'experts’ qui se confondaient presque avec la force armée. Cet appareil civil imposait les 
ordres du Département d'État.” However, because all State and War Department communiques flowed through the 
office of the military commander, Admiral Caperton, the US civil service team took its day-to-day direction from 
the military. See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 79. 
33 Quoted in Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 31. 
34 Interestingly, as far as senior military and diplomatic Occupation officials were concerned, the Marines in Haiti 
were not understood as US Marines per se but rather were seen as members of the Haitian Gendarmerie and 
therefore Haitian government tools, albeit serving American interests. This ‘distancing’ from responsibility was 
made particularly clear in 1917, when Occupation officials sought to have a new constitution approved by the 
Haitians, but that the Haitian politicians refused. Major Smedley Butler was called upon to confer with Colonel 
Cole, his Regimental Commanding Officer, as well as other senior American officials, including the American 
Ambassador to Haiti, Mr. Arthur Bailly-Blanchard (1914 to 1921). Butler recounted being told by Colonel Cole that 
“la constitution proposée était inamicale aux Américains et que notre gouvernement ne l'approuverait pas. Le 
ministre était requis de prendre des mesures pour empêcher le vote de cette Constitution. — « Quelque chose doit 
être fait immédiatement à ce sujet, observa Cole. Mais Anderson est un amiral de la flotte et je suis moi-même un 
officier de l'infanterie de marine au service des États Unis. Nous ne pouvons faire le coup nous-mêmes. Vous êtes le 
seul qui puissiez agir, Butler. Vous êtes un officier haïtien.” Lowell Thomas, Old Gimlet Eye: Adventures of 
Smedley Butler, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1933, in Dantès Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne: (L'occupation 
américaine d'Haïti): Recit d'histoire contemporaine, (Montréal: Les Éditions Beauchemin, 1937), 45-6. 
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many of the accomplishments of the occupying force -- the road network, for example, and the 
redesigned education system -- were later erased by Haitians or abandoned because of their 
association with the Occupation.  
One example of an area of violence committed against Haiti during the Occupation was 
the increase in, and apparent tolerance of, prostitution.35 In 1926, Mr. Perceval Thoby, a Haitian 
lawyer based in Port-au-Prince, spoke to the visiting Women’s International League for Peace 
and Freedom (WILPF) team, stating 
A great moral wrong is also done to Haiti. It is the rapid spreading of prostitution with its 
venereal diseases, inseparable from any military occupation. From the neighboring 
islands and across the Dominican border, girls invade Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, 
lured by the dollars of the marines. All the dancing places are places of open prostitution. 
Before the American Occupation, such things did not exist.36 
 
Three key areas of the Occupation had long-term effects on Haiti. The first was the 
counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign conducted by the US Marines against any and all Haitian 
opposition to the invasion and occupation, under the guise of fighting the insurgent cacos who 
opposed to the US presence in Haiti. That COIN campaign would have significant long-term 
effects on Haitian governance, including the eventual rise of Duvalier’s authoritarianism. The 
second was infrastructure development undertaken by the Marines and its contribution to 
centralizing military and political power in the capital, Port-au-Prince, at the expense of Haiti’s 
 
35 In addition to an increase in prostitution, the Occupation also saw an increase in illegitimate children, the majority 
of whom were abandoned by their American fathers, downloading the social and financial costs onto Haitians. See 
Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 135. 
36 Balch, 119. Thoby later wrote to W.E.B. Du Bois, claiming that the Marines were covering up various rapes 
committed by Marines, the most flagrant being a rape committed by American Marine Lieutenant O’Donnell, who 
assaulted an 11-year old child. Thoby claimed O’Donnell was promoted and moved from the area when the rape was 
made known to the Marine authorities. A local newspaper editor was dismissed from his position as head of the 
passport division within the Department of the Interior. See letter from Perceval Thoby to W.E.B. Du Bois, 
September 22, 1926, https://credo.library.umass.edu/view/pageturn/mums312-b036-i079/#page/1/mode/1up.  
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regional power centers. Third, the Occupation produced serious long-term effects on the 
economic and commercial relationship between Haiti and the international community. 
 
Opposition to the Occupation: Ethnic Cleansing? 
On our approach to Fort Bertol it was observed that the fort was garrisoned by about ten 
to fifteen Cacos, all of whom evacuated the place on our approach…we occupied the fort 
without opposition…it appears evident that the Cacos in the vicinity are ready to quit. 
Through their women, I have tried to communicate to the Cacos the fact that, if in the 
future a single shot is fired by them, or if they blow any more conches, or otherwise 
create any disturbance, we would return and burn all their houses and completely destroy 
their crops37 
- US Marine Captain Chandler Campbell’s diary extract, 8 November 1915 
  
Historians in the US in particular, have not been kind when discussing the active and 
armed Haitian resistance to the US invasion and occupation, in part because of limited 
accessibility to historical sources.38 It is worth tracing how the American mindset came to label 
the cacos initially, and subsequently any later opposition, as bandits. The Marine hierarchy 
lacked any understanding of how Haitian society functioned, and the different roles played by 
the elite. Marines perceived Haitian professional politicians, consisting of French educated 
Haitian elites, as “hav[ing] always set themselves against good government. It is an historical 
 
37 Diary extract by USMC Captain Chandler Campbell, Commander 13th Marine Company, First Marine Regiment, 
First Marine Brigade, 08 November 1915. From “Diary 13th Company,” Folder 1 (“Diary of Activities, Haiti, 
1915”), Alex O. Campbell papers, PC 55, Personal Papers Collection (PPC), USMC Research Center Archives, 
Quantico, VA. 
38 Non-US sources, including many Haitian historians of considerable merit, have often not been considered or 
included in such discussions. That exclusion, whether because of language issues or inherent bias or simply 
ignorance about the existence of such sources, has left an largely one-sided discussion when speaking about the US 
invasion and COIN campaign. One such source, largely overlooked or ignored, is Dantès Bellegarde’s L’occupation 
américaine d’Haïti: Ses conséquences morales et économiques (Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 1929. Reprint, Les Editions 
Fardin, 2019), offering a compelling narrative from a key historian who experienced first-hand the Occupation and 
observed the COIN campaign from a Haitian perspective. Haitian historian Roger Gaillard has also compiled a 
multi-volume history on the Occupation, although distribution was limited, especially outside of Haiti proper. More 
recently, Haitian historian Suzy Castor produced the excellent L’occupation américaine d’Haïti (3e éd. Port-au-
Prince, Haïti: CRESFED, 1988).  
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fact and needs no proof at this time.”39 The evidence that Haiti’s government was predatory and 
guilty of massive graft and corruption was a compelling and widely accepted fact. The Marine 
command decided those members of the elite who opposed the occupation were in fact opposed 
to proper American-style governance and thus were treated as members of the resistance. 
 
Understanding Grassroots Democratic Movements: the Piquettistes and the Cacos 
 
Arising out of the ashes of self-liberation from slavery, peasant democratic republicanism 
lived on in a popular vision of national liberty, civic fraternity, and racial equality, 
expressed through the Piquet Rebellion and other instances of popular mobilization in 
defense of democratic citizenship.40 
- Professor of Sociology Mimi Sheller 
 
Initially, the main instrument of that resistance were the cacos and piquets, whom the 
Marines believed were controlled by the elite in their quest for the presidency. Breaking that 
instrument became the immediate task of the Marines. The piquettistes should be understood as 
forming a grassroots movement that sought “black civil and political rights and demand[ed] a 
more democratic constitutional government.41  
In the 1820s, a generation of young (largely light-skinned) educated members of the 
Haitian elite who were born after the revolution were coming of age in a new era where the 
requirements of national defense were not well understood nor viewed as particularly critical.42 
 
39 "Excerpts from Report of Court of Inquiry into Haitien Matters, 1920: Summing up of Judge Advocate; and 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions," Papers of John H. Russell, PC 114 box 2, folder 9, United States Marine Corps 
Historical Center (MCHC), Washington, D.C., 8-9. 
40 Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers,” 36.  
41 Sheller. 
42 Trouillot quotes Haitian Senator Beaubrun Ardouin who, as a landowner, ran a coffee plantation and saw his 
cultivators diminish in numbers as the years passed. He lamented that he had no means by which to force them to 
remain on the land and instead has been forced to watch them install themselves on their own plots of land and 
produce for themselves. Trouillot called this period “The Defeat of the Landlords” many of whom were military 
officers. He also points out that this portended the end of rent as the main “mode of extraction of peasant surplus,” 
leaving the elite to find new methods, with taxation on products produced for export eventually becoming the most 
common mode. Leyburn also points out that this period saw a shift away from serfdom and towards the development 
of a genuine peasantry, as Boyer’s attempts to re-implement forced labour failed. See Trouillot, Haiti: State Against 
Nation, 74; and Leyburn, The Haitian People, 86. 
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Instead, this young cohort saw the need to wrest control of the government away from the 
military and turn it towards a more participatory form. They viewed President Boyer as 
representing the old order and began a vocal public campaign for social and political reforms. 
Boyer, however, implemented repressive measures that included press censorship accompanied 
by violence against his critics.43 
 By the 1830s, opposition to Boyer had exploded and began to include the military.44 As 
Mimi Sheller pointed out, the indemnity agreement with France caused Boyer’s opposition to 
begin questioning the military footing maintained by Boyer, and how the military, and in 
particular the spending required to maintain it, was “impeding the civil practices of 
democracy.”45 The indemnity was also creating economic problems for Boyer which he had 
attempted to resolve by implementing measures tying peasants to the land and enforcing 
production quotas to generate more government revenue.46 That discontent with Boyer on the 
part of the peasant farmers was exploited by the young elite who sought to mobilize them as a 
counter to the military, still largely under Boyer’s control, using visions of a more inclusive 
education system and better prices for their produce.47 
 
43 Historian Sheller identifies the Darfour affair as the catalyst that solidified opposition to Boyer and shifted 
opposition behaviour towards revolution. Felix Darfour published a number of articles detailing black grievances at 
the hands of the mulatto elite which Boyer found seditious and for which he subsequently had him shot in 
September 1822. He also expelled a number of senators from the legislature. It is unclear which action garnered 
more anger. Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 114. 
44 Sheller points out the army garrison in Saint Marc revolting in 1839. The military was dominated at this time by 
old military generals who had participated in the revolutionary war and remained committed to military-dominated 
government. Sheller, 116. 
45 Boyer attempted to bribe the military with money and land to ensure its loyalty, which in turn furthered the 
economic problems created by his fiscal policy of printing money when his regime felt they required it. Sheller, 38. 
46 Boyer’s 1826 rural code was basically unenforceable by this time as many of the large landholdings had already 
been broken up and distributed out in small parcels. Worse, his military rapidly declined in quality once the French 
threat was removed, in their minds leaving him without an effective means of enforcing his rural code provisions. 
History professor Bob Corbett makes it clear that Boyer also committed a major strategic error with his rural code. 
By exempting the towns from the Code, Boyer “gave implicit recognition of the two Haitis, “[a] rural Haiti of black 
subsistence farmers ruled by a mainly black army… [and a] “mulatto urban life ruled by the official government of 
Haiti, a mulatto government.” See Bob Corbett, “1820-1843: The rule of Jean-Pierre Boyer,” July 1995, 
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/history/earlyhaiti/boyer.htm.  
47 Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 122. 
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 The Liberal Revolution began in January 1843, and quickly gained momentum as well as 
new adherents, including whole military units which refused to fire on the revolutionaries and 
instead deserted en masse.48  Citing Madiou, Mimi Sheller also points to women as “central 
protagonists” and playing a key role during “several key events of 1843.”49 On 12 March, 1843, 
the massing of the city women in opposition to Boyer’s troops “led him [Boyer] to desist” in a 
key attack and “probably conclude that all was lost.”50 His reign over, Boyer fled to Jamaica in 
exile aboard a British ship. 
Despite the success of the revolution, competing elite ideas on the direction and amount 
of democratic reform quickly began to undermine the fragile revolutionary alliance. Regional 
divisions based on colour and class issues began to resurface. Further, General Charles Rivière-
Hérard, a key military leader who had conspired against Boyer, began manoeuvring for power by 
rewarding key military supporters with “military offices” rather than reducing the military as had 
been expected.51 
 The provisional government in place was almost immediately confronted by an uprising 
of black landowners in the south under the leadership of the Salomon family, claiming to 
champion the elimination of colour as a discriminator.52 By August 1843, the Salomons had 
rallied their peasant supporters to take up arms, including wooden pikes, leading to what became 
 
48 Sheller, 124.  
49 Sheller, 125. 
50 Quote from British missionary Mark Bird, cited in Sheller, 125. 
51 Sheller, 128. 
52 Sheller points out that the Salomon family turned against the provisional government when results of “the primary 
electoral assembly” went against them and the mulatto clique which had defeated them “excluded many black men.” 
(Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers,” 44.). David Nicholls likewise has challenged the idea of Salomon as a 
“proletarian class leader” and argued instead that while his National Party was largely black, his success in 
mobilizing peasant support was “only because he was marginally less arrogant and exclusive than were his mulatto 
opponents.” Louis Étienne Félicité Lysius Salomon would go on to become president of Haiti from October 26, 
1879 to August 10, 1888 and was known for his efforts at modernizing Haiti. For an excellent perspective on his 
presidency and more generally, his beliefs, see David Nicholls, “The Wisdom of Salomon: Myth or Reality?” 
Journal of Intramerican Studies and World Affairs 20, no. 4 (November 1978): 389-90. 
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known  as the first piquettiste uprising.53 President Hérard defeated them and ensured the 
Salomons were quickly exiled. Mimi Sheller termed this second revolutionary phase “the 
revolution within the revolution, when an influential black landholding family mobilized the 
smaller landholders and farmers of the south to challenge racial inequality and the continuing 
‘aristocracy of the skin.’”54  
The third phase developed once again in the south, this time in 1844. The uprising was 
led by a political-religious leader known as Jean-Jacques Acaau, who was able to mobilize the 
black peasants under the banner of reform and popular democracy. He emphasized access to 
education as the route to upward social mobility and called for the Salomons to be returned from 
exile, to carry on the democratic revolution started earlier. The uprising, led by Acaau’s Armée 
de l’Égalité in the name of the ‘peuple souffrant’, was initially successful against the government 
forces as it  controlled large portions of the South for over three years until, ultimately, it was 
dispersed and defeated in 1847.  
Sheller points out that Acaau would ultimately be betrayed by the Salomons who “used 
their influence in the South to contribute to the neutralization of the Acaau movement in 1844.” 
Lysius Salomon – the younger of the two – would win election as a senator and then sign the less 
than democratic Constitution of 1846 against which Acaau’s piquettistes had fought. Sheller 
notes that “[t]he democratic window of opportunity was slammed shut” at this point, 
representing “the triumph of statist autocracy over the potentially democratic alliance of radical 
segments of the bourgeoisie with peasants and cultivators.”55  
 
53 The Salomons agreed to go into exile in return for their supporters being pardoned and allowed to disperse, which 
Hérard allowed. Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 130. 
54 Sheller, “The Army of Sufferers, 37. 
55 Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 138. 
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Acaau would continue his struggle until his defeat following a battle at Fort Saint-
Laurent at l'Anse-a-Veau against the government forces of President Jean-Baptiste Riché when 
he took his own life rather than risk capture.56 Sheller points to an additional series of 
“piquettiste (s) movements” breaking out in January 1865, in 1866-67 and in 1868, but the 
piquettiste grassroots movement seeking democratic reforms would be suppressed.57 
By contrast, the caco or kako movement was first mentioned in written records of 1867 as 
originating in the north but is believed to have appeared earlier.58 Unfortunately, caco would 
become a catch-all phrase, encompassing insurgents, mercenaries and bandits alike and, like 
piquettistes, has been applied to members of Haiti’s nascent democratic movements but 
emerging mainly from the north. Hans Schmidt identified cacos as “consist[ing] of part-time 
military adventurers and conscripts recruited and loosely organized by local military 
strongmen.”59 Philippe Girard echoes this idea, but is much less flattering, pointing out that prior 
to the 1915 US invasion, cacos in particular were understood as armed men who sold their 
services to a presidential candidate, and while acting as the candidate’s private army, would 
often resort to looting of rival businesses and dwellings for pillage and profit.60 
 
56 Jacques N. Léger, Haiti: Her History and Her Detractors (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1907), 
198, https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Haiti:_Her_History_and_Her_Detractors.  
57 Sheller, Democracy After Slavery, 138. 
58 The Haitian historian H. Pauléus Sannon, writing in 1933, claimed the term caco was derived from a colloquial 
term for Haiti’s national bird, the red-plumed Hispaniolan trogon and that after Dessalines had dealt with peasants 
agitating for civil and political rights, they were given the term cacos because “ils se cachaient, comme l’oiseau de 
ce nom [the trogon, a.k.a. le caco], sous feillée pour surprendre et attaquer l’ennemi.” The phrase translates roughly 
to say that the cacos hid under cover, much like the trogon, until they were able to emerge, surprise and attack their 
enemy. See Horace Pauléus Sannon, Histoire de Toussaint Louverture, Tome III, Port-au-Prince: A.A. Héraux, 
1933, 142. University of Florida Digital Collections, http://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00008866/00003.  
59 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 82-86. 
60 Harold Davis, made the same point, stating they were understood “as peasants from the hills who sold their 
services to presidential aspirants and made up the chief personnel of the revolutionary armies. See Philippe Girard, 
Haiti: The Tumultuous, 59-62; and Harold P. Davis, Black Democracy: The Story of Haiti (New York: Lincoln 
MacVeigh – The Dial Press, 1928), 145. 
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This understanding of cacos as rogue elements within society, willing to sell their 
services to the highest bidders, came to preoccupy the American occupation leaders. Eschewing 
an alternate understanding of cacos, including the idea of movements embodying rural peasant 
unrest, US Admiral William B. Caperton imposed a racist and nasty martial law regime on the 
newly occupied nation. Indeed, Caperton made it clear that he considered one of the first and 
perhaps most important task of the Marines was to destroy the power of the cacos. He embarked 
on this task by denying the leader of the cacos at the time, Dr. Pierre François Joseph Benoit 
Rosalvo Bobo, the presidency.61  
Opposition to the US invasion was immediate.62 Upon landing in Haiti, the Marines 
reported “slight casualties” on their march into the capital.63 Historian Walter Posner wrote the 
Marines “marched into the capital…with only scattered opposition from snipers.”64 They also 
 
61 Dr. Rosalvo Bobo was a Haitian nationalist who opposed the American intervention. Described as “une figure 
politique atypique … qui n‘était pas un militaire et qui jouissait d‘une grande popularité auprès de divers secteurs de 
la population. Il était aussi d’un patriotisme irréprochable: il s’opposa toujours à l’ingérence des Nord-Américains 
dans la vie nationale.” Jean-Baptiste Chenet, ʺMouvements populaires et Partis politiques (1986-1996) : la 
restructuration manquée de l'ordre politique agonisant.ʺ (PhD diss., Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, 
2011), 250. 
62 While much of the focus when discussing Haitian opposition to the invasion has traditionally centered on the 
violence and insurgency that developed, there were two different forms of opposition. Suzy Castor categorized the 
two as, first, “la forme politique et journalistique dirigée par la fraction nationaliste de l'élite urbaine” led by Jean-
Baptiste Pétion and d'Antoine Morency; and the second, “la résistance armée, manifestation essentielle du 
nationalisme de souche paysanne” led by Charlemagne Péralte and Benoît Batraville. See Castor, L'occupation 
américaine d'Haïti, 150. 
63 The initial landing party on 28 July 1915 consisted of 340 sailors and Marines including the Marine detachment 
from the USS Washington, the 12th Expeditionary Marine Company, and three companies of sailors, under 
command of Captain George van Orden, who normally commanded the Washington detachment. Interestingly, 
Admiral Caperton’s Chief of Staff, Captain Edward L. Beach was sent ashore prior to the landing taking place, to 
notify the Haitian leaders in Port-au-Prince of the planned landing. See US Naval History and Heritage Command, 
“US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934,” https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-
alphabetically/u/us-occupation-of-haiti-1915-1934.html. See also John F. Schmitt, “Peacetime landing operations: 
Lessons from Haiti, 1915,” Marine Corps Gazette 78, no. 3 (March 1994): 71. 
64 While Posner claims Haitian casualties the first day numbered 20 in total, the US chargé in Port-au-Prince 
identified “[t]wo bluejackets [sailors as opposed to Marines] killed by snipers last night” in his 30 July 1915 cable to 
the Secretary of State. However, reporting suggests confusion over the source of the fire which killed the two 
sailors, with fratricide or friendly fire being a possibility. See FRUS, With the Address of the President to Congress 
December 7, 1915, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), Document 545 
(https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1915/d545); Posner, “American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,” 
246; and Schmitt, “Peacetime landing operations,” 74-5. 
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disarmed any Haitians they encountered along their route, at one point collecting over five 
wagonloads of confiscated arms and ammunition.65 They did encounter an angry mob at one 
point, but firing over the heads of the Haitians quickly dispersed them. 
 Despite that slight resistance, Marines returned fire with considerable vigour, killing or 
wounding over 20 Haitians on their short journey. Within a couple of days, a number of key 
Haitian leaders including Charles Zamor, Rosalvo Bobo and Charlemagne Péralte, had come 
together to form a “Revolutionary Committee” which would issue a call for the Marines to 
withdraw and allow for the restoration of “la liberté…l’ordre…et…le progrès” in Haiti.66  These 
signs of opposition led Caperton to order all former Haitian soldiers and cacos who did not 
reside in the capital to leave. He required those who lived in Port-au-Prince to disarm. Anyone 
who refused was arrested.  
At least two Haitians were killed during the confrontations with the Marines. The order to 
leave the capital was followed up with a general curfew which targeted those persons Caperton 
thought to be “hostile” to the occupying forces; specifically, “any Negro or dark person out of 
doors after 9 o’clock, whose behavior makes him seem like a sympathizer with Caco rebels. 
[Such ‘hostiles’ were] to be shot on sight by the [Marine] patrol if they did not surrender 
immediately.”67 Soon the Marines attacked not only those identified as caco but those seen to be 
caco supporters. And all “Negros and dark people” were suspects. 
 The initial campaign against the cacos was dramatic and began with skirmishing in the 
Gonaïves area on 7 September 1915.68 It devolved into the Marines firing upon anyone they 
 
65 Schmitt, “Peacetime landing operations,” 74-5. 
66 Yveline Alexis, “Nationalism and the Politics of Historical Memory: Charlemagne Pératle’s Rebellion against US 
Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1986,” (PhD diss., University of Massachusetts Amherst, May 2011), 43-5. 
67 Renda, Taking Haiti, 141. 
68 The cacos received international support during their insurrection, with British and Germans “dont les intérêts 
économiques avaient été lésés.” Their assistance came in the form of “une aide économique, des vivres, des 
munitions, des informations de caractère militaire parfois inestimables, comme la disposition des troupes dans la 
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encountered when out in the field, anyone with the demeanor of a caco and any person carrying a 
weapon. These encounters quickly spiraled into a scorched earth policy that saw the Marines 
indiscriminately destroy houses and cultivated fields in the remote areas of Haiti. This policy is 
illustrated in the diary extracts written by USMC Captain Chandler Campbell between 30 
October and 14 November 1915: 
…few Cacos were reported seen, one of whom was killed. 
…five Cacos were seen, fired upon and it is believed one was hit; burned all shacks in 
this vicinity. 
Fort Capois…was observed to have a garrison of 150 to 200 Cacos… 
Fired at a few Cacos enroute…proceeded to north-eastward burning all shacks… 
…several shots fired at Cacos enroute…burned about 100 shacks… 
some women…told me that the Cacos had gone to their homes and quit. 
Small engagement with a band of Cacos at long range. This band was between our 
column and Capt Low’s column. They retreated to northward. Burned many shacks along 
the trail in this section.  
We burned some shacks in this section and destroyed what trenches time permitted us to 
stop for. Some Cacos were seen going up the slopes of the mountain in the direction of 
our abandoned base.69 
 
 By November 1915, the ‘First Caco War’, as it was labelled in Marine Corps 
publications, was drawing to a close. After sealing off the porous Haitian-Dominican Republic 
border, the Marines drove the cacos into a kill zone in the area of Fort Rivière (an old French 
built fort in the northern Haitian interior), and ended the uprising with a notorious massacre.70 
 
capitale, etc.” At some point during his campaign, Charlemagne Péralte reportedly placed an order for weapons and 
ammunition through one of his British contacts. It is not clear whether the requested munitions were ever recieved. 
See Jean Désinor, Tragédies américaines (Port-au-Prince, Imprimerie de l'État, 1950), cited in Castor, L'occupation 
américaine d'Haïti, 159. See also McCrocklin, Garde d’Haiti, 113. 
69 USMC Archives, Quantico, VA, USMC Records of Haiti, 1914-1935. Entries for 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 12 and 13 
November 1915, from Campbell, Chandler O. Record: Coll/3135. Home: A/14/H/2/5. 
70 For accounts of the battle, see Major Thomas E. Thrasher Jr., “The Taking of Fort Riviere,” Marine Corps 
Gazette 15, no. 4 (February 1931): 31-33, 64; and H.W. Snyder, “Butler at Fort Riviere,” Marine Corps Gazette 64, 
no. 11 (November 1980): 83-7. The former is a firsthand account written by Major Thrasher who was involved in 
the assault on the fort. Major Butler Smedley received his second Medal of Honour for his role in the assault. 
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The ‘First Caco War’ ended with over 250 Haitians dead and just two American casualties, the 
sailors killed early in the campaign, possibly by friendly fire.71 
 By 1916, the Marines had determined the need for a local military force and created a 
paramilitary, the Gendarmerie d’Haiti.72 The new force consisted of Haitian enlisted soldiers led 
by US Marine officers. Most of the Marines who filled the officer billets were sergeants. The 
Gendarmerie initially was configured to fulfil a policing function in Haiti, although it would 
shift its focus to counterinsurgency quite quickly. For the first few years, the Gendarmerie 
required US Marine occupying forces to fight alongside it to ensure success and provide 
command and control.  
The Gendarmerie shifted to counterinsurgency with the beginning of the second caco 
uprising in the fall of 1918. Part of the provocation for the uprising was a backlash against the 
Marine implementation of the infamous corvée system.73 The corvée system, a holdover from 
colonial Saint Domingue, was a system of unpaid labour employed by French colonial 
authorities to build civil works projects.74 The system initially allowed for the provision of 
 
71 The number of Haitians killed were based on Marine estimates and were not independently confirmed. They were 
in fact significantly higher as the Marines under-reported the number killed. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, noted 
that the Marines killed around 200 Haitians during the attack at Fort Rivière, but only identified 51 cacos killed in 
the official battle record, a significant discrepancy. See Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 
84n. 
72 Interestingly, Suzy Castor points out that one of the first acts undertaken by Admiral Caperton was to 
decommission four Haitian warships and sell them off to an American company for US$14,000. The company in 
turn sold the four ships in New York for US$500 thousand. “Le bénéfice fut réparti entre les intéressés et il n'y a 
aucune évidence que les 14.000 dollars aient été versés au trésor haïtien.” Castor points out that this was an early 
example of the embezzlement carried out by Occupation forces. See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 132.  
73 The corvée system was re-introduced into Haiti in August 1916. Initially, it was more nuisance than irritant, but it 
would quickly be abused. In some areas, the Marines would find it hard to generate the numbers required for road 
and other construction and began instead to ensnare peasants for weeks and later months at a time. The human rights 
abuse eventually escalated and was partially responsible for the second caco uprising. By 1918, the corvée was 
identified with “les plus mauvais souvenirs du régime colonial” because of the Marine practices. See United States 
Senate Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and 
Santo Domingo: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 112, 67th Congress, First and Second Sessions Vols. 1 and 2, 
(Washington, 1922): 114-15; and Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 66. See also Paul H. Douglas, “The American 
Occupation of Haiti II,” Political Science Quarterly 42, no. 3 (September 1927): 376.  
74 The French corvée system, which targeted almost exclusively the peasant population, has been identified as one of 
the key factors behind peasant support for the French Revolution. 
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unpaid labour in lieu of paying taxes but later evolved into a yearly obligation of labour. During 
the Marine Occupation, the system would be further bastardized and exploited, leading mainly to 
the servicing of public works created by unpaid, forced labour, eventually including, ironically, 
the jails that served to house Haitians labelled and arrested as cacos or bandits for opposing the 
re-introduction of the corvée system.  
The Marine abuse took a particularly heavy toll on those Haitians too poor to bribe their 
way out of service.75 Haitian historian Roger Gaillard interviewed a Haitian survivor of the 
Marine occupation specifically about his experience with the corvée and asked him why he 
considered the practice to be slavery. His experience with the corvée continues to resonate: 
[T]he work is not paid. Second, you work with your back to the sun…. Third, this work 
does not have an end; you can only leave if you are sick. Fourth, you ate badly, mayi 
moulin and poi congo. Fifth, you sleep in prison or at the work site. Six, if you try to save 
yourself the gendarmes shoot you. So, what is that? Is it not slavery?76 
 
The Marines also instituted prison camps for the insurgents which became infamous for 
their harsh conditions and chronic abuses including murder. During the US Senate Inquiry into 
Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, also known as the 
McCormick Committee, the prisons were described in quasi-bucolic terms: 
At the larger prisons, Port au Prince and Cape Haitien, the prisoners are taught a trade, 
and when their product is marketable they are given a percentage on their work. The 
money derived in this manner is given to them on release or may be allotted by them to 
their families if the term of confinement is for a long period. All the gendarme uniforms 
 
75 Although pre-Occupation, the 1907 case of Mr. David Backer provides a useful understanding of the corvée 
mechanism and its past history of unorthodoxy in obtaining unwilling workers. Backer, an American citizen, was 
travelling on horse and headed towards a field to allow the horse to graze. He was approached by a Haitian senior 
officer whom the US Embassy later identified as a general officer. The Haitian was accompanied by a number of 
Haitian soldiers on foot. The officer questioned Mr. Backer and then decided to pressgang him onto a local road 
work gang. Backer refused, indicating he was not only a foreigner, but was not resident in that region either. Backer 
was then attacked and beaten by the Haitian soldiers. The beating ceased only after other people in the area came 
forward and identified him as a foreigner. FRUS, With the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to 
Congress December 3, 1907, (In two parts), Part II, (Washington: Government Publishing Office, 1910), Documents 
162 and 163. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p2/d162 and 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1907p2/d163. 
76 See Roger Gaillard, Hinche mise en croix, 1982. From Kate Ramsey, The Spirits and the Law: Vodou and Power 
in Haiti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 143. 
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and the clothing for prisoners are manufactured by prison labor. A garden is required for 
prisons for the betterment of the gendarme and prison rations. At Post Chabert, near Cape 
Haitien, a prison farm is in operation, giving healthy, open-air work to over 300 
prisoners. The idea of this farm is in addition to aiding the ration in cost, to experiment as 
to the methods of cultivation, mostly in native products, and to give the benefit of better 
methods to the Haitian general public, letting them graphically see the results. Gardens 
are also in operation at all posts.77 
 
The Haitian perspective on the prisons was quite different. In December 1920, Le 
Courrier haïtien included the following editorial: 
A Chabert…c'est I'esclavage organisé. Sous le plus petit prétexte de cacoïsme, on arrête 
des Haïtiens, puis on les envoie à Chabert pour la culture de la pomme de terre, etc. Ces 
pommes de terre, patates et autres sont vendus au profit de I'occupant. Les prisonniers 
meurent à Chabert sous le coup de toutes sortes de tortures, quand ils ne sont pas fusillés. 
II y a un cimetière à cette fin. D'ailleurs personne n'entre à Chabert que les Américains, et 
parfois des gendarmes dont la criminalité est éprouvée.78 
 
Once again, former general Charlemagne Péralte emerged as one of the key insurrection 
leaders, this time supported by Benoît Batraville. Haitian folklore identified Péralte’s motivation 
for becoming involved in the caco rebellion as his mother, Madame Masséna Péralte. Madame 
Peralte, as folklore goes, was rounded up by Marines as part of a larger group of Haitians who 
were then forced to work, as part of the corvée, on a local construction project. The treatment of 
Péralte’s mother at the hands of the Marines sparked his decision to lead the resistance to the 
American occupation.79 
 
77 Each major town in Haiti had a Marine element responsible for leading the local gendarmerie unit. Each of the 
town had a district headquarters and each HQ included a prison. Official Marine reports maintained prisoners were 
opponents to the occupation, largely either captured cacos or bandits. However, the prisons were also employed to 
jail Haitians being held for corvée work. The most infamous of the camps was at Chabert. US Senate, Inquiry into 
Occupation and Administration of Haiti and the Saint Domingo (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1921), 80-1. 
78 Le Courrier haïtien, 21 décembre 1920. Cited in Roger Gaillard, Les Blancs débarquent tome VI: 1918-1919: 
Charlemagne Péralte, le Caco (éditions Roger Gaillard, 1930), 320. 
79 See the ‘Haitian History Blog,’ www.haitainhistory.tumblr.com. Laurent Dubois highlighted other incidents that 
involved Peralte including, in October 1917, his residence having been burned to the ground by Marines and he and 
his brother arrested and imprisoned in retaliation for a caco raid on the Marine detachment in Hinche; and the later 
retaliatory killing of his three brothers, then in prison in Hinche, for his COIN activities in October 1918. See 
Dubois, Haiti, 243-9. 
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Unfortunately for the cacos, they were no more successful the second time than the first. 
A premature assault on Port-au-Prince in October 1919 allowed the Marines to defeat the 
resistance and end any hope of forcing the occupying forces to withdraw.80 In 1919, US forces 
abandoned the term caco and instead Admiral Caperton ordered all Marine reports to use the 
term ‘bandit’.81 Indeed, the US Marine reports classified resistance under the heading of 
banditry, an effective method of marginalizing and demonizing opponents to the American 
administration in Haiti. A post-invasion review by US Marine General Merwin Silverthorn was 
quite typical, proclaiming explicitly: 
They [cacos] were called bandits…any group of dissenters who weren’t for the 
government were called bandits. They may be very honorable people with a different 
political feeling. Nevertheless, they were bandits, and they were chased around the hills 
and shot at and killed whenever you could catch them.82 
 
 The use of the term bandit allowed the criminalization of those who acted in opposition 
to the Marine-sponsored regime, whether their behaviour involved violence or not.83 In addition 
 
80 The US Naval History and Heritage Command official history states “This insurrection [the second caco uprising] 
quickly outran the ability of the Gendarmerie to contain it. Consequently, a large part of the counter-guerrilla war 
was conducted by the First Marine Brigade, reinforced by additional marines from outside the country.” See US 
Naval History and Heritage Command, “US Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934,” 
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/u/us-occupation-of-haiti-
1915-1934.html. 
81 Toni Pressley-Sanon, “Haitian (Pre)Occupations: Ideological and Discursive Repetitions: 1915-1934 and 2004 to 
Present,” Caribbean Studies 42, no. 2 (July-December 2014): 127. 
82 Cited in Renda, Taking Haiti, 144. 
83 The Marine experience in Santo Domingo provides an excellent understanding of the effects of this policy. USMC 
Lieutenant Colonel (Lt. Col) Charles Miller wrote about his experiences on the other side of the island, seeking to 
implement Marine Corps General Order #1 in that theatre, which required the use of the term bandit. In that 
instance, the breakdown of who was considered a bandit was identified by Miller: this rough categorization can be 
understood to have been similar to that used in Haiti: 
“The individuals who composed the groups were not motivated by the same influences or stress of circumstances 
that led to their entrance into banditry. A rough classification would include the following:  
a. Real bandits or gavilleros, who may be termed professional highwaymen. 
b. Revolting politicians, instrumental in organizing banditry for the purpose of furthering their own political 
aspirations or of their more influential friends. 
c. The vagrant or less scrupulous laboring class forced to accept banditry for want of legitimate employment, 
frequently excreted from the industrial conditions of the sugar producing areas. 
d. Those who under duress or fear of the bandit leader, were compelled to join bandit groups. 
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to the corvée, chain gangs consisting of so-called bandits became more common throughout 
Haiti to support the road construction programs and other public works. The term “bandit” 
created the idea of a class of habitual criminals within Haitian society. This in turn reinforced the 
idea of areas infested by bandits and requiring aggressive military action to cleanse them. The 
Marines situated bandits as deviants outside the boundaries of normal society and beyond the 
protection of the laws of war.84 
 This stigmatization of government opponents was allowed and encouraged by US 
leaders. The testimony of US Marine witnesses at Congressional inquires held to investigate US 
behaviour in Haiti revealed that such lethal labelling was used to justify extrajudicial killings 
which had become a normal part of violent counter-insurgency campaigns reeking of 
exterminatory intent. Indeed, a June 1926 article on the history of Haitian Gendarmerie, 
published in the Marine Corps Gazette, rationalized the early campaign: 
the frequent revolutions had developed a number of bands of outlaws who roamed the 
interior at will, pillaging the gardens of the small farmers and killing and driving off their 
cattle. Consequently, the first problem that confronted the Gendarmerie was the 
suppression of banditry and the creation of a feeling of security…so as…to encourage the 




e. Roving criminals, who preyed on the population committing depredations singly or in small groups, but not 
belonging to the organized groups. 
All five of these individual groups conduct or participate in armed opposition against the Military Government.” 
See LtCol Charles J. Miller, USMC "Diplomatic Spurs: Our Experience in Santo Domingo, part 1,” Marine Corps 
Gazette 19, no. 1 (Feb 1935): 49. 
84 British historian Eric Hobsbawm wrote the seminal work on bandits. He identified lords and states as being unable 
to exert constant control over their citizens all the time; and noted that there “was usually room for evasion.” That 
meant the “very institution of formalized outlawry, from which bandits take their name, indicates the shallowness of 
the power system. Everybody was entitled to kill the outlaw [or bandit], because no authority was in a position to 
apply their law to him.” Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1969), 14. 
85 Note the identification of the threat posed by banditry to Haiti’s survival in a way that deftly ignored the Marine’s 
interest in the proper servicing of loans. Anonymous, "The Haitien Gendarmerie,” Marine Corps Gazette 11, no. 2 
(June 1926): 75-6. 
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 In November 1919, the Marines successfully infiltrated Péralte’s fortress hideaway and 
assassinated him, effectively destroying any hopes for the creation of a provisional government 
in the north of the country capable of mounting a challenge to US rule.86 In 1920, a combined 
Marine-Gendarmerie force would destroy what little fighting opposition remained and killed off 
most if not all of the remaining influential resistance leaders.  
This did not end Haitian resistance to the occupation.87 Rather, the Marine campaign was 
able to destroy all remaining Haitian armed opposition, and then employed the Occupation 
military forces to successfully suppress any other resistance.88 The results of the Marine 
campaign, for the period 1918 through to 1920, was over 2,000 Haitians killed.89 The 1915 
campaign by comparison had resulted 250 Haitian deaths. 
 
86 The Americans recruited the Catholic Archbishop in Haiti, Monseigneur Conan, to bribe Charlemagne into ending 
his command of the insurgency, but “le leader ne se prêta à aucun compromise.” When bribery failed, the Americans 
then turned to plotting assassination. The first attempt failed. The second did not. See Castor, L'occupation 
américaine d'Haïti, 171. 
87 Suzy Castor points out that opposition to the Occupation varied based on societal position. Initially, for example, 
much of Haiti’s ruling elite saw the Occupation as a means of suppressing the peasantry and “les aideraient à 
amasser des fortunes stables dans un climat de paix.” As the occupation progressed, however, attitudes changed. 
Much of the commercial sector became disenchanted with the occupation as early as 1917 as the legislation put in 
place disadvantaged Haitian traders in relation to those of foreign birth, the Syrian-Palestinians and Italians in 
particular “jouissaient de tous les privilèges des conquérants.” For the clergy, support for the Occupation was a 
given and actively preached from the pulpits, something Castor points out should have been expected given the 
priests were all French in origins and did not share Haitian nationalist sentiment. See Castor, L'occupation 
américaine d'Haïti, 88-92. 
88 Haitian historian, Michel Hector, provides an excellent outline of the domestic opposition which continued during 
the 1920s in the aftermath of the defeat of the insurgency. In particular, he highlights how Haitians including Sténio 
Vincent, working through the new protest committee, “l’Union Patriotique,” actively courted international support 
to end the occupation through “une campagne de dénonciation des méfaits de la domination étran-gère.” As Hector 
points out, their activities were only partially successful as the occupation authorities were able to maintain an 
opaqueness to their activities. See Michel Hector, Crises et mouvements populaires en Haïti (Montréal: Les Éditions 
du CIDIHCA, 2000), 164-5. 
89 Once again, the reporting on the numbers of Haitians killed are suspect and clearly under-reported. While 
officially, Occupation officials claimed to have only killed around 2,000 Haitians during COIN operations, a 1920 
US Secretary of the Navy report identified over 1800 Haitians having killed in 1919 alone. Both the high number of 
killings and the obscured reporting were partially explained by the findings of the McCormick Committee which 
noted “[t]here was a period of about six months at the beginning of the outbreak [of the second caco insurgency] 
when the Gendarmerie lost control of the situation, and was not itself sufficiently controlled by the higher powers, 
with the result that subordinate officers in the field were left with too much discretion as to methods of patrol and 
local administration…” In addition, Bellegarde cites l’Union Patriotique d’Haiti claims that over 4,000 prisoners 
died while held in the infamous Cap-Haitien prison, and an additional 5,475 died in the Chabert “concentration 
camp.” See Balch, Occupied Haiti, 126-7; and Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 57.  
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Organized Haitian resistance to the Occupation would not re-emerge until 1920 and 
largely took the form of protests and demonstrations in addition to strong oppositional 
journalism, rather than armed resistance.90 As a result of the change in tactics, the Occupation 
authorities were likewise forced to shift their focus away from the use of COIN engagements to 
information operations.91 By 1921, the US pacification of Haiti entailed a stronger campaign of 
increased suppression of the press, a recognition of the press’s increasingly virulent opposition to 
the Occupation.92 An August 1922, proclamation by the American High Commissioner to Haiti, 
Brigadier General John A. Russell, stated: 
It has been brought to my notice that a very active campaign has been inaugurated by 
certain persons directed against the officials of the Haitian Government and the 
development work being undertaken by said Government. Such agitation is a menace to 
the condition of law and order that now prevails, tends to undermine the authority of the 
officials of the Haitian Government, and look[s] to the destruction of the constitutional 
government, leading to anarchy with the possible consequent destruction of property and 
life and prolonged misery for the Haitian People…Your attention is therefore directed to 
the proclamation of May 26, 1921, and especially that portion of it which refers to 
 
90 Suzy Castor points to a factor that worked against the Haitian insurgency: “la faiblesse de la propagande qui priva 
le mouvement d'un appui national et continental.” As she points out, the lack of an international appeal did not 
attract either regional or international attention to, and support of, the insurgency. She points to Charlemagne’s 
exploits having been ignored in neighbouring Dominican Republic. See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 
183-4. 
91 Information operations in this context refers to the actions taken to influence Haitians to actively resist the 
Occupation. The actions in this case refer to the dissemination of media articles and opinion pieces that critiqued the 
Occupation and exposed its violent behaviour. 
92 This should not be construed as suggesting the Haitian press was not actively voicing opposition to the 
Occupation prior to the 1920s. Anti-occupation press editorials began prior to the 1915 invasion. Haitian newspapers 
“hosted protest events or subvert[ed] official [Occupation] events” throughout the Occupation period. However, in 
the 1920s, Haiti’s media became more strident in their opposition, with a number of “traditional [pro-Occupation] 
newspapers abandon[ing] pro-occupation editorials outright” as it became clear the Occupation was neither ending 
quickly nor providing the promised benefits to Haiti. Hans Schmidt has identified the 1920 release of Marine 
Commandant Barnett’s report on “indiscriminate killings” during the closing stages of the 1920 election campaign 
as the key event precipitating media intensification in anti-Occupation sentiment (see Schmidt, The United States 
Occupation of Haiti, 119). Further, the emergence of Jean Price-Mars and his colleagues in the mid-1920s, and 
publication of their influential writings, represented a new high point in Haitian resistance. Shearon Roberts, "Then 
and Now: Haitian Journalism as Resistance to US Occupation and US-Led Reconstruction," Journal of Haitian 
Studies 21, no. 2 (2015): 241-68. http://www.jstor.org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/stable/43741129. See also John H. 
Russell, Brigade Commander to Chief of Naval Operations (18 January 1921), Box 1, Folder 13, John H. Russell 
Collection, COLL/158, [Special Correspondence with Higher Headquarters], Archives Branch, Marine Corps 
History Division, Quantico, VA. 
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propaganda of an incendiary nature attacking the President of Haiti or officials of the 
Haitian Government.93 
 
 Resistance to the Occupation did not die, despite the suppression of the press.94 With 
declining world coffee prices due to the beginning of the Depression and a poor coffee harvest, 
riots and physical conflicts with the Marines became more frequent in 1929.95 Armed resistance 
to the Marine occupation flared up in April and May 1930, hastening the planned departure of 
the Marines. The Port-au-Prince fire department was forced to deal with what it termed “a period 
of terrorism” typified by an arson campaign mounted mainly against Marine and Gendarmerie 
targets, including burning the home of the Marine Brigade Commander, Colonel Richard Cutts.96 
The press reported that the arson campaign lasted fifteen days. 97 
Haitian jurist, historian and diplomat, Dantès Bellegarde, identified the most dangerous 
and long-lasting effect of the COIN campaign undertaken by the Marines as “le mépris général 
de la loi qu’elle a fait naître.”98 He argued the Occupation taught Haitians that the ‘law’ as 
practiced and implemented by the US regime was something to be obeyed in order to escape “ses 
sévères sanctions…appliquées par la force brutale.” The Occupation authorities manipulated and 
applied the law as it suited them, creating a situation where the law of the land no longer 
emanated from “l’authorité supérieure qui représente la conscience de la nation….”99 Further, he 
 
93 Anonymous, “The Chronicle of the Marines,” Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 3 (Sep 1922): 315. 
94 For an excellent account of the Marine campaign against the Haitian press, see Chapter XIV, The Press and the 
Prison,” from Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 143-48. 
95 The riots began in 1929 as student protests but escalated into larger riots across the country. It culminated into the 
Cayes Massacre. 1500 Haitians marched on 20 Marines. One Haitian leader made a suspicious move and the 
Marines assaulted him. The Marines opened fire on the crowd, killing and wounding at least 50 people. Schmidt, 
The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 196-200. 
96 Fred Belton, “History and Development of Haitian Fire Department,” The Leatherneck 14, no. 7 (July 1931): 9-
11. 
97 See Roberts, “Then and Now,” 241-68. 
98 Dantès Louis Bellegarde, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti: Ses conséquences morales et économiques (Port-au-
Prince, Haiti, 1929. Reprint, Les Editions Fardin, 2019): 19. 
99 Bellegarde, 25. Bellegarde elaborates further, pointing out, presciently when examining the emergence of 
François Duvalier, that “Nous leur enseignons à accepter le contrôle militaire comme la loi suprême et à acquiescer 
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believed “cette œuvre de domestication menace plus gravement son existence que les massacres 
et tueries des premières années de l’Occuaption militaire.”100 In other words, Haitians were 
taught that their sovereignty was conditional and something to be negotiated with those 
exercising superior power. The corollary to this lesson is, in essence, captured in the Haitian 
practice of marronage, which Professor Bellegarde-Smith defined as “the refusal to accept defeat 
even in the face of defeat.”101 
 
Centralizing Power in Port-au-Prince 
We were all embued (sic) with the fact that we were trustees of a huge estate that 
belonged to minors. That was my viewpoint; that was the viewpoint I personally took, 
that the Haitians were our wards and that we were endeavouring to develop and make for 
them a rich and productive property.”102 
- US Marine Major Smedley Butler 
 
“The peasants who form the mass (85 percent) of the population and who have so long 
been held by their literate brothers in a backward state, have the mentality of a child of 
not more than seven years of age reared under advantageous conditions.103 
- High Commissioner to Haiti and Marine General John H Russell, Jr. 
 
 The Marine occupation’s second long-term effect was the destruction of Haiti’s system of 
regionalism, since regional centers had the means and the military power necessary to counter 
the domination of Port-au-Prince. A number of policies implemented by the Marine 
 
à l’usage arbitraire de l’autorité.” Historian Kate Ramsey highlights the abuse of the rule of law, stating “U.S. 
control in Haiti was guaranteed by the imposition of martial law, press censorship, and efforts to alter the country’s 
legal apparatus[;] it was perhaps even more pervasively effected through the enforcement of selected Haitian laws, 
with opportunistic disregard for customary legal practice.” See Kate Ramsey, The Spirits and the Law: Vodou and 
Power in Haiti (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), cited in Matthew Casey, “’Haitian Habits’ or 
Occupation Policies? Harris Lifschitz and the unevenness of State Building in Haiti, 1898-1921,” Journal of Haitian 
Studies 21, no. 2 (Fall 2015), 123. 
100 Bellegarde, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 26. 
101 Comment from Professor Patrick Bellegarde-Smith during my December 2019 thesis defense. 
102 Testimony by USMC Major Smedley Butler at the US Senate Hearings – Inquiry into Occupation and 
Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo, 67th 
US Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 1922. Cited in Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 89. 
103 Quote from Marine General John H Russell, Jr., High Commissioner to Haiti, 1919-22. Cited in Pamphile, Clash 
of Cultures, 42. 
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administration resulted in the centralization of power, military and political, in the capital. First, 
the counterinsurgency campaign waged by the Marines and its success in eliminating political 
opposition to the Occupation, made community leaders like Charlemagne Péralte vulnerable to 
deliberate targeting and targeted reduced the number of community leaders willing to step 
forward and assume leadership positions within the beleaguered communities. 
 The elimination of the national army, an army tracing its heritage back to the ex-slave 
army responsible for Haiti’s freedom, and the US substitution of the newly created Gendarmerie 
d’Haiti, also shifted power away from the regions. In theory, the mission of the national army 
was to operate as a national instrument of power “to fight foreigners and in defense of the 
national community.”104 Instead, the new Gendarmerie was “specifically designed to fight 
against other Haitians.”105 It carried on the tradition of repressing political opposition already 
embedded in Haitian election practices but with far more violence. 
 Michel Laguerre outlined the means by which power was centralized in occupied 
Haiti.106 The headquarters of the Gendarmerie, located in Port-au-Prince, was linked throughout 
the country by the telephone and telegraph system introduced by the Marines. Those two 
systems, coupled to the road building that took place, allowed more centralized military 
command and control from the capital. This in turn diminished the ability of regional strongmen 
to build up power and then launching coup activities against Port-au-Prince and the Marines. At 
the same time, having the ability to quickly communicate throughout Haiti allowed the central 
government to have more direct control over regional bureaucratic administration, further 
 
104 Trouillot also points out the new Gendarmerie (and later Garde) quite explicitly sought to attract those Haitians 
who understood its new role in suppressing Haitian voices and did indeed attract those “who had a taste for violent 
solutions…”. Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 105-6. 
105 Trouillot, 105-6. 
106 Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 69-77. 
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undermining the power of local regional leaders. Laguerre argued that the centralization of 
power in Port-au-Prince also ensured that the political interests of the residents of the capital 
were favoured over the regions in the new power structure.107 
 
Understanding the Role of the Rural Police System as a Centralizing Agent 
The army and the sheriffs are the king makers in the countryside… the result of the fact 
that they play multiple roles in the rural areas such as: army representative, judge, public 
notary, surveyor, civil clerk, fiscal agent, information and propaganda officer, forest 
agent, development promoter, landowner, etc., and even at times religious teacher and 
preacher...Thus, regardless of a peasant's decision to stay out of trouble by keeping a low 
profile, he is very likely to have problems nonetheless because he always runs into the 
sheriff in the course of his activities. The system interferes with the private as well as the 
public lives of small peasants.108 
- Professor of French Bryant Freeman 
 
 A particularly significant measure taken by the Marines during their Occupation was the 
decision to transform the rural police organization from a civilian to a military organization, and 
place it under the control of the Gendarmerie.109 As Professor Freeman’s quote above illustrates, 
the rural police system provided a variety of local, social functions that would otherwise be 
missing in most rural areas of Haiti. By moving the organization into the military chain of 
 
107 Laguerre, 72. 
108 Bryant Freeman, ed., “Dosye Chèf Seksyon,” University of Kansas Occasional Paper No. 10, 1995, 17-8. 
Freeman’s Occasional Paper, which provides the material for this section, is drawn from a March 1991 report issued 
by the collective organization, Tet Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen [Heads Together Small Producers of Haiti]. That report 
was edited by Professor Bryant C. Freeman of the University of Kansas and issued as an occasional paper in 1995 
entitled “Dosye Chèf Seksyon.” That occasional paper was in turn translated into English and re-issued in 1998. 
109 Rural policing traces its roots back to colonial slave plantation practices including the development and 
employment of the maréchaussée. Haiti’s early leaders, as outlined in Chapter Two, re-instituted the militarized 
plantation system and left the army to police the peasantry and ensure agricultural workers stayed in their regions 
and worked on the state-controlled farms. “La police rurale a pour object la sûreté des personnes la protection des 
propriétiés la surveillance des cultures le maintien de l'ordre et de la tranquilité publique la répression du 
vagabondage et l'exécution des lois et actes du gouvernement.”  Rural police were used as well in France at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. See Fabien Gaveau, “De la sûreté des campagnes. Police rurale et demandes 
d'ordre en France dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle,” Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies 
4, no. 2 (2000): 53-76. http://journals.openedition.org/chs/824. 
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command, the Marines not only removed local accountability with the system, they also failed to 
recognize the important social functions provided.110 
 Traditionally, the chefs de section had multi-roles in Haiti’s rural areas, functioning as 
local judicial officials, notary publics, and gendarmerie/army representatives. They made, 
interpreted, and enforced the law in their role as chefs de section. Yet at the same time, they 
represented the government and were the only form of Haitian governmental authority in many 
rural areas. Chefs de section were held to some measure of civilian accountability, albeit in a 
system that reeked of corruption and exploitation.111 
Operationally, each rural chief controlled a small army of rural guards, often no more 
than an armed gang.112 These armies were frequently subsumed under the title caco or piquet. 
They were routinely employed in support of politicians seeking the presidency and received as 
payment, the right to loot along the route to the capital or to collect bribes once the new 
administration secured foreign loans. Typically, the local chiefs were related to the candidate 
they supported. 
 In 1922, the US Marines altered the sheriff’s program and placed it under the command 
structure of the Gendarmerie d’Haiti. The program’s focus changed. Marines employed the rural 
 
110 In 1863, President Geffrard (1859-67) issued a revised Rural Code which re-introduced the corvée system of 
mandatory labour, which had been allowed to lapse. He also created district rural police or sheriffs and farm guard 
positions. The new rural police had control of the regional farm guards, public and private roads, and guarding 
against vagrancy, codifying the practice of restricting farm workers’ mobility. This hierarchical system remained in 
place under local regional politicians, most of whom were general officers, until changed during the Marine 
occupation. See Article 66 of the Code Rural d’Haiti. 1863, 27, https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00004195/00001/38j.  
111 The Marines took over many of these duties, being made “communal advisers…[as well as] representatives of the 
[Occupation government’s] Department of Public Works, Public Health, and the General Receiver of Customs…” in 
many of the more remote posts. In 1925, they were also appointed “ministères publiques,” providing them with a 
judicial role “in order that police cases might be properly prosecuted.” See Balch, Occupied Haiti, 132. 
112 When not dealing with support to coups, the rural chief held the positions of chief of police, the local magistrate 
in his region, and often in some capacity like that of a mayor. In that last role, the chefs de sections would make 
decisions based upon development funds which flowed into their areas, often pocketing much of the monies and 
funneling the rest into either pet projects or projects which offered bribes. This allowed them to subvert both the 




sheriffs as a repressive tool against any political dissent that emerged. More significantly, the 
centralization of command and control of the rural police and the sheriff system under the 
military structure further eroded the regional power bases.113 
Later, in 1952, the rural sheriff program again changed. The sheriffs now belonged to a 
specialized corps within the Gendarmerie d’Haiti, but one with its own command and control 
hierarchy. It would remain unchanged until 1962, when President François Duvalier announced 
the rural sheriff program would be placed under the control of rural administrative councils 
(RACs). The RACs were to provide local control of the sheriff’s activities, but according to the 
Tet Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen [Heads Together Small Producers of Haiti] peasant collective, the 
councils were never formed.114 In spring 1991, as one of his first acts, President Aristide 
abolished the institution of the rural sheriff.115 
 
Long-term Effects on Haiti’s Economic and Commercial relationships 
Haiti cannot progress without foreign assistance.116 
- American Financial Adviser-General Receiver Sidney de la Rue 
 
 The third long-term effect resulting from the occupation was the domination of Haitian 
land by foreign commercial interests, made possible when the occupiers rewrote the Haitian 
 
113 Professor Balch also noted that local governance suffered under the Occupation and the changes to the sheriff 
program. Her interviews found Haitians were “irked” because of local Marine commanders sitting in on local 
communal meeting, invited or not, and dominating the local decision-making process. Because the Marines 
controlled the purse strings, local decisions on improvements were heavily influenced by Marine preferences, 
whether they reflected local interests or not. Balch, Occupied Haiti, 132. 
114 Freeman, “Dosye Chèf Seksyon,” 7. The translation of the national peasant farmer movement is taken from “The 
Canada-Haiti Information Project,” www.canada-haiti.ca. Father Jean Marie Vincent, the Catholic priest who 
founded the organization, was assassinated on 28 August 1994 by the military regime. The organization dates to the 
regime of François Duvalier, having been founded in 1970. 
115 While the coup leadership under the direction of General Raoul Cedras would re-institute the program, Aristide 
would abolish it again when he returned to power in 1994. It has since been replaced by a system of local councils 
providing input to the Haitian National Police which have responsibility for all policing within Haiti. 
116 Statement by Sidney de la Rue, Financial Adviser-General Receiver. Sidney de la Rue, Haiti: Annual Report of 
the Financial Adviser-General Receiver for the Fiscal Year October 1930 – September 1931, Port-au-Prince: 
Service National de l‘Enseignement Professional, 1931, 48. http://ufdc.ufl.edu. 
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constitution in 1918 and opened land ownership to foreigners. Other laws furthered foreign 
financial manipulation, opening new opportunities for foreign investors to run amuck in Haiti. 
Foreign ownership was not compatible with Haiti’s haphazard land registry system and allowed 
the exploitation of the Haitian legal system by foreigners, often to the financial detriment of the 
Haitian state.117 That exploitation has continued in various forms through to the present. 
 Dantès Bellegarde, having served as Minister of Agriculture from 1915 until 1921 within 
President Philippe Dartiguenave’s administration, was quite critical of the US Occupation’s 
effects on the Haitian economy, pointing out that the American claims to have helped 
dramatically improve the Haitian economy were false. Instead, for the period 1918 to 1922, 
Bellegarde identified “les bienfaits de l’Occuaption Américaine pour le commerce haïtien…n’a 
eu aucune influence sur l’exportation de pays” and instead, Haiti’s economic situation remained 
quite unstable.118 
Exploitation: The Case of the Haytian American Sugar Company (HASCO) 
[S]ugar is so expensive in Haiti that peasants cannot afford to buy it. In Milot, in the 
north of Haiti, peasants report that this has destroyed much of the local market for 
oranges and grapefruits, which traditionally are made into a heavily sugared juice. 
Without the sugar, people aren’t drinking juice and the fruit is left to rot.119 
- Economist Lisa McGowan 
 
 
117 See, for example, Matthew Casey, “’Haitian Habits’ or Occupation Policies? Harris Lifschitz and the unevenness 
of State Building in Haiti, 1898-1921,” Journal of Haitian Studies 21, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 121-51.  
118 Bellegarde, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 29. Bellegarde further noted that the American Occupation 
officials resisted any attempts at accountability, meaning Haitians had no idea of the actual state of their economy. 
Rather, with the American emphasis on paying down Haitian debt, Haitians were expected to be satisfied with 
seeing their increasing taxes allocated towards that end. Bellegarde, 36-7.  
119 This statement was made in reference to conditions after the HASCO facilities had ceased operations in 1987 and 
domestic sugar production from cane had effectively ended and illustrates the knock-on effects of that cessation. See 
Lisa McGowan, Democracy Undermines, Economic Justice Denied: Structural Adjustment and the Aid Juggernaut 




 Created in 1912, the Haytian American Sugar Company (HASCO) was a cooperative 
commercial venture, largely funded by European and US businessmen, and intended to provide 
both sugar refining facilities and to act as a brokerage through which Haitian sugar would be sold 
on the world market. By 1917, the US government was actively working to exclude German 
commercial interests from operating in Haiti. Cooperating in that endeavour, HASCO moved its 
financial operations from a German bank to a US bank.120 
 In 1920, HASCO took over the railway between Cul-de-Sac and Léogane to the Port-au-
Prince wharf. It also built a sugar mill on the north side of the capital with access to the wharf.121 
The mill was supported by the construction of a sugar cane plantation constructed on some 2600 
carreaux purchased by HASCO in the Cul-de-Sac area, purchases made possible because of the 
constitutional changes during the Occupation that permitted foreign (i.e. white) land 
ownership.122 Those same land purchases led to the eviction of scores of local sharecropping 
peasants who were forced to find alternative lodgings and sources of revenue. Many ended up 
moving into the city, further aggravating the squalid conditions therein. Employment on the 
HASCO lands meanwhile turned largely into manual labour, including the digging of irrigation 
ditches and the cutting of sugar cane and associated agricultural tasks.123 
 
120 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 95. In addition to taking over a plantation owned by 
Germans, HASCO would later purchase “wharfage rights, the electric light plant, and the street railway, which had 
previously been owned by German interests.” See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 55. 
121 No land purchases in Léogâne area were made other than railway and depot sites. See Karen E. Richman, 
“Peasants, Migrants and the Discovery of African Traditions: Ritual and Social Change in Lowland Haiti,” Journal 
of Religion in Africa 37, no. 3 (2007): 371-97. 
122 Volume VII of The London Encyclopedia (Thomas Tegg, ed., London, 1829) provides the following statement: 
“2,290,000 English acres, or 771,275 carreaux of French measurement, 350 feet on every side of the carreau.” 
Those figures result in approximately 2.97 English acres per French carreau. If we instead work with an area of 
122,500 square feet per carreau (using the ‘350 feet per side’), the result is approximately three acres per carreau. 
123 For an interesting discussion regarding the failure to develop local technical expertise in support of the sugar cane 
industry, see Humberto García-Muñiz, Sugar and Power in the Caribbean: The South Porto Rico Sugar Company in 
Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, 1900-1921 (San Juan, PR: La Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
2010). Specifically, the chapter on the so-called sugar tramps operating out of Louisiana during this period provides 
an excellent example of the maintenance of a technical monopoly within the sugar trade and a failure to develop 
local talent until well into the twentieth century.  
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 Land appropriations by absentee landowners to profit from the potential of sugar 
production, at least as claimed by HASCO officials, became more common.124 The result, 
according to anthropologist Karen Richman, was the creation of “a regional and mobile work 
force which was forced to depend upon slave wages on resurrected sugar plantations.”125 Indeed, 
this was recognized officially by the US. In his 1930 report on Haiti, Sidney de la Rue, the US 
Receiver General in Haiti, stated, in an argument against raising the Haitian minimum wage, that 
“[t]he greatest asset Haiti has is its cheap labor – labor whose daily cost to an employer does not 
exceed the labor of other lands whose products are similar. Should labor costs here be increased 
artificially, that capital will go where conditions are more favorable.”126 
By the 1920s, that mobile labour force was declining as over 20,000 Haitians annually 
were migrating to Cuba for seasonal work within the agricultural sector, where most of them 
were employed by the US-owned United Fruit and General Sugar companies.127 Yet even with 
the land appropriations and other measures accorded HASCO, the company declined financially 
and was soon in trouble.128 By 1922, HASCO entered receivership and required US intervention 
to eventually recover by 1929.129  
 
124 For example, Karen Richman identified Joseph Lacombe, the largest landowner in the Léogane area and CEO of 
West India Management and Consultation Company, as having signed over 40-year leases on his lands with 
HASCO in 1920. See Richman, “Peasants, Migrants and the Discovery of African Traditions,” 375. 
125 Richman, 371-97. García-Muñiz (Sugar and Power in the Caribbean) points out that as of 1920, Dominican 
sugar plantations were benefiting from the regional mobile work force, with official records showing Haitian 
workers on said plantations had reached parity with West Indians, the more traditional source to that point in time of 
migrant sugar workers. 
126 De la Rue, Haiti: Annual Report, 117. See also Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 170. 
127 Schmidt, 171. 
128 Haitian historian Guy Pierre argues that HASCO’s financial situation was complicated and needed to be 
understood as having both a domestic and international component. Internationally, HASCO had not obtained a 
written agreement with the United States to sell it sugar and remained a bit player in the world market. 
Domestically, though, HASCO had been helped by the Haitian state to become a “monopsony” and as a result, 
Pierre terms domestic sales as “very ‘juicy’ for HASCO.” To ensure the HASCO products remained alone in the 
domestic market, the Haitian government imposed an eight cents per kilo duty on imported refined sugar, marking 
foreign products uncompetitive. See Guy Pierre, “The Frustrated Development of the Haitian Sugar Industry 
between 1915/18 and 1938/39: International Financial and Commercial Rivalries,” in Bill Albert and Adrian Graves, 
eds., The World Sugar Economy in War and Depression 1914-40 (London: Routledge, 1988), 121-30. 
129 Renda, Taking Haiti, 212. 
140 
 
Hans Schmidt makes it clear that one of the reasons for that financial trouble was the 
somewhat dysfunctional US approach to Haiti: “Occupation officials were constantly faced with 
the dilemma of trying to encourage American investments while simultaneously protecting Haiti 
against blatant despoliation.” The end result was that many of the practices and concessions 
enjoyed by firms like HASCO prior to the Occupation were discontinued afterwards, resulting in 
a considerable degree of consternation on the part of HASCO officials.130 
 To deal with the financial limitations of sugar production, HASCO officials decided to 
diversify and moved into sisal production, in part because of the emphasis placed upon its 
production by US Occupation officials.131  By 1930, HASCO had managed to acquire some 630 
acres of land leased directly from the state, in addition to acreage it had previously purchased, 
much of which went into sisal production.132 Its sisal activities quickly came under scrutiny, 
attracting a denouncement by the Union nationale, “a pro-independence organization,” which 
claimed in a published pamphlet that the sisal producing companies had burned out peasant 
homes and destroyed local crops when “sisal competed with subsistence crops for acreage.”133  
Interestingly, Schmidt notes that HASCO, had emerged from receivership by this point, 
had tripled its 1918 sugar production levels, and was now profitable.134  However, that 
profitability came at a cost. By the time Duvalier came to power in 1957, HASCO had remained 
in business and profitable by maintaining an artificially low wage and discouraging trade unions. 
One such practice, for example, saw HASCO resorting to “sub hiring [workers] through native 
 
130 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 168-69. 
131 Renda, Taking Haiti, 212. 
132 Sisal or Agave sisalana is a plant used mainly for rope and twine, but can be made into paper, clothes, footwear, 
carpeting and other fibre-based goods. It tends to be resistant to saltwater, making it particularly valuable to the 
nautical trade. 
133 Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902-1915, 239. 
134 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 171. 
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[Haitian] gang bosses,” removing HASCO’s obligation to pay a living wage and foreshadowing 
similar labour practices undertaken by the Duvalier regimes.135 
 By 1985, the government of Francois Duvalier had put laws in place which prevented 
HASCO from refining sugar at its facilities.136 Instead, the government began to import refined 
sugar at world prices and then sold it at a profit. That quickly resulted in a spike in smuggling of 
basic foodstuffs including sugar.  Sugar exports from Haiti in 1988 had dropped to zero and, by 
1995, Haiti had become an importer of sugar to the tune of some 25,000 tonnes per year.137  The 
HASCO sugar mill was privatized in 1987 (purchased by the wealthy Haitian Mevs family) and 
promptly closed, putting some 3,500 employees out of work and reportedly affecting an 
estimated 30 to 40,000 “small sugar-cane planters in regions around the capital.”138  The 
company cited smuggling, largely across the Dominican border, as making domestically refined 
sugar uncompetitive.139 
 
The Primacy of Foreign Obligations:  
Understanding the Role and Power of the Financial Adviser –General Receiver 
 
Mr. White [US Assistant Secretary of State] says that, under the terms of the Treaty 
between the US and Hayti of 1915, the Financial Adviser is vested with full authority to 
levy fines of this character and his position cannot be challenged or over-ruled…140 
- Canadian Legation in Washington, D.C. 
 
 
135 Schmidt, 178. 
136 The HASCO mill closed in Spring 1987. 
137 Because of the age of much of the sugar refining machinery, the costs of refining Haitian sugar was believed to 
be at least double the costs of other international sugar production. Haitian sugar was also undercut by sugar 
smuggling that was taking place across the Dominican Republic border. See Richard A. Haggerty, ed., Haiti: A 
Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989); and Peter Hallward, Damning the Flood: 
Haiti and the Politics of Containment (London: Verso, 2007), 58-9. http://countrystudies.us/haiti/ 
138 “Another Blow for Haiti: A Sugar Mill Closes,” The New York Times, April 12, 1987. www.nytimes.com.  
139 Note that the HASCO closure came days within that of the Usine Sucriere des Cayes (USC), which affected a 
similar number of workers and dependent industries. See Jean-Pierre Cloutier, “HASCO Closes its Doors,” The 
Haitian Times, May 1987. http://www.cyberie.qc.ca/jpc/haiti/hasco.html. 
140 Library and Archives Canada, RG 25, G1, Vol. 1609, Folder 836, Canadian Legation to Washington Letter No. 
1074, 26 October 1932. Accessed May 2015. 
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To understand the power and role of the American financial adviser during the Marine 
Occupation requires a grounding in the US strategy employed in the region: “dollar diplomacy.” 
Emily Rosenberg points out that the American strategy of “dollar diplomacy” initially involved 
American administration officials using private loans from American banks as leverage to force 
unstable nations like Haiti to accept control of their fiscal policy by an embedded foreign (US) 
financial adviser.141 While the State Department had been quite content to relinquish control over 
Haiti on a day-to-day basis to the US Marine leadership in country, the Marines had no interest 
or expertise in financial policy and were quite happy to have the State Department look after that 
aspect of the mission. The Americans soon seized control over the Haitian customs system, the 
BNRH, and the printing of Haitian currency.142 
Exercising control over the customs houses and Haitian fiscal policy by virtue of control 
over Haitian currency, the US State Department next imposed on Haiti the appointment of an 
American Financial Adviser–General Receiver, a shadowy figure who shared power with the 
military leaders.143 The financial adviser was an integral part of the dollar diplomacy strategy as 
he was expected to ensure that the unstable nation, in this case Haiti, directed its revenues 
towards the servicing of its foreign (primarily US) debts.144 Yet once the power of the financial 
 
141 Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, Introduction 1-3. 
142 Dantès Bellegarde related the relentless pursuit of total control over Haitian affairs by the Occupation authorities. 
In August 1918, Mr. Louis Borno, the Haitian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had made a “gentlemen’s agreement” 
with the American authorities, advising them that “tout projet de loi portant sur l'un des objets du traité serait, avant 
d'être présenté au pouvoir législatif d'Haïti, communiqué à la Légation des États-Unis pour l'information de son 
gouvernement et, s'il était nécessaire, pour une discussion entre les deux gouvernements.” Bellegarde points out the 
American Legation “étendit jusqu'aux extrêmes limites le sens de ce « gentlemen's agreement » en prétendant que 
tout projet de loi, quelle qu'en fût la nature, devait être soumis à son approbation ou à sa censure : elle s'attribuait 
ainsi un droit de veto dont elle se servit pour bloquer toute l'activité gouvernementale.” Requests from the Haitians 
for clarification from Washington were met with silence. See Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 83. 
143 Note that the American fiscal position continued until 1941, well after the Marines had been withdrawn in 1934. 
Indeed, Hans Schmidt noted that the position’s functions were incorporated into the “fiscal department of the 
Banque Nationale [BNRH], which remained under US supervision until full redemption of the 1922 [US] loan [to 
Haiti] was completed in 1947.” See Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 229. 
144 The credentials and expertise of the US- appointed financial advisors were suspect for the entirety of their 
history, save, perhaps, Sidney de la Rue, who had previously served in that capacity in Liberia. As an example of the 
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adviser was understood, and the coercive power of controlling a nation’s fiscal policy was 
recognized, American officials identified other areas of the unstable nations that would benefit 
from “modernization” and the application of “science.”145 
Because American strategic objectives in Haiti were focussed mainly on ensuring Haiti 
met its (i.e., US) foreign debt obligations, almost all the essential state-building required to 
provide for stability and security within Haiti was abandoned. This effect was acknowledged by 
the Financial Adviser-General Receiver, Sidney de la Rue, in his 1930-31 fiscal year report: 
[T]he treasury surplus which had been carefully accumulated over the years of relative 
prosperity made it possible to meet all obligations of the State with no strain upon the 
treasury or additional borrowing…the ambitious development program of recent years 
largely has been given up. Funds have been insufficient to extend the system of 
vocational education, to strengthen the police and constabulary, or to construct many 
badly needed improvements.146 
 
An excellent example of this policy was highlighted by United States professor of 
industrial relations, Paul H. Douglas, who deployed to Haiti as a member of the six-person team 
dispatched by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to study the 
effects of the Marine Occupation.147 Douglas pointed out that the Protocol of 1919 between the 
 
lack of expertise or credentials, and demonstrating that the financial adviser was concerned only with ensuring 
Haiti’s foreign debts to the US were serviced properly, consider the case of Mr. Addison T. Ruan, appointed as 
financial adviser to the Haitian government in 1917. In testimony provided before the US Senate Finance Committee 
on February 10, 1932, Haitian lawyer Georges N. Léger pointed out that Mr. Ruan had been a clerk in the US Navy 
Department before being sent to Haiti. Léger called Ruan “a dictator” and regularly fought with the Haitian 
government, going so far as to cease payment of government expenses over loan negotiations. Léger also claimed 
that, in 1918, when a local Haitian newspaper published information indicating Ruan was to be recalled by 
Washington, the Marine authorities promptly arrested the paper’s editor, fined him US$300 and sentenced him to 
three months in jail. The paper was likewise closed for three months. Ruan was recalled in large part because of his 
involvement in extorting the Government of Haiti into extending the mandate of the Haitian-American Treaty in 
return for a desperately required loan. Ruan was replaced in 1919 by Mr. John MacIlhenny who had been president 
of the US Civil Service Commission. See US Senate Committee on Finance: Sale of Foreign Bonds or Securities in 
the US, 72nd Cong, Part 4 (January 27 and February 10, 1932). See also “Charges We Forced Loan to Hold Haiti,” 
The New York Times, 11 February 1932. www.nytimes.com. See also Bellegarde, L’occupation américaine d’Haïti, 
74-81, 119-22. 
145 Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, Introduction 2-3. 
146 De la Rue, Haiti: Annual Report, 2. 
147 Paul Douglas, an economist, was also a Quaker and a Marine in the Second World War, and was later elected to 
the US Senate in 1948.  
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US and Haiti was largely concerned with monetary reform and retroactively included a 
requirement for Haiti to pay the outstanding interest on over US$3 million worth of National 
Railway of Haiti bonds, rather than allowing the dispute over the railway to be settled first. As 
Douglas pointed out, the accrued interest was not paid until 1922. However, between 1919 and 
1922, the price of the outstanding railway bonds fell quite dramatically at which point  
it might have been possible for the then Financial Advisor [John Avery McIlhenny] to 
have purchased a considerable amount of the bonds…thus have saved the interest and 
principal which the Haitian government would otherwise have been compelled to 
pay…the value of the entire bond issue…was little, if any, under [US]$800,000.148 
 
The one area where the US attempted to implement long-term and lasting social 
engineering in Haiti, unsuccessfully as it turned out, was in the field of education. Dollar 
diplomacy as it related to Haiti, beyond assuring loan repayments, was focussed on Haitian 
education in the 1920s.149 Initially, occupation officials pursued minor changes to the Haitian 
education system, without much success, and without any support from the 1915 Haitian-
American Treaty.150 Indeed, historian Rayford Logan, who visited Haiti for field work, notes that 
the coerced treaty had “an almost inexplicable omission” on the matter of education.151 By the 
early 1920s, occupation leaders had decided that political stability and economic development in 
 
148 Instead of making the US$800,000 bond buyout, McIlhenny eventually paid out over US$2 million in 1922 to 
meet the accrued interest payment debt. Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 42-3. 
149 Education was the one area that had ostensibly remained outside of American control when the US occupied 
Haiti. See A.J. Angulo, “Education during the American Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934,” Historical Studies in 
Education 22, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 1-17. www.historicalstudiesineducation.ca.  
150 Dantès Bellegarde, the Minister of Education during the early period of the Occupation, demonstrated that the 
Dartiguenave government had a proposed plan for overhauling the education system, but that Occupation authorities 
refused to fund, thereby killing off the initiatives. Key is that the Haitian proposal for education reform was Haitian 
generated but was rejected without reason. For Bellegarde’s account of his dealings with the American Occupation 
authorities while serving as Haitian Minister of Education, see Chapter V, “La lute pour l’École,” in Bellegarde, 
L’occupation américaine d’Haïti.  
151 He claims the original pretext for the American occupation included “the necessity for training the natives in self-
government” and that the school system to accomplish that aim was not planned for nor organized until quite late in 




Haiti required dramatic improvements to the education system. As Emily Rosenberg notes, white 
American experts thought that “industrial education” was the most appropriate form of education 
for non-whites, which meant vocational schools focused on manual labour rather than a literary 
education in the liberal arts or engineering and science that they favoured for white students.152 
In Haiti, the occupation officials identified vocational education with agriculture and not 
surprisingly, in 1924 created the Service Technique de l'Agriculture et de l'Enseignement 
Professionnel.153 More importantly, the Service Technique represented a new element of dollar 
diplomacy. Up to this point, American efforts at shaping Haitian education had been limited, 
stymied by Haitian politicians understandably reluctant to give up sovereignty over such an 
important sector of Haitian society.154 US High Commissioner John Russell embraced a new 
strategy, one that involved “bypass[ing] the traditional Haitian school system and create[ing] 
beside it a vocational school system aimed at increasing productivity.”155  
 
152 Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, 14-26. Suzy Castor points out that in 1920, President 
Dartiguenave, whose government had been fighting quite vigorously against American attempts to encroach in 
education, was on the verge of appealing to the League of Nations against the US and their attempts to control 
Haitian education. See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 102. 
153 Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 78-9. Rayford Logan claims that the Service Technique was laughed at by the 
Haitians and called it “a sewer into which is thrown Haitian money without any control.” Logan, “Education in 
Haiti,” 447. 
154 Dantès Bellegarde believed the American authorities in Haiti were pursuing a deliberate economic policy of 
“affamement [starvation]” to allow them to seize control and shape Haitian education. This policy manifested itself 
early in 1918 with the American financial advisor refusing to allocate monies to Haitian-generated education 
policies. As he points out, Arthur C. Millspaugh, the US Financial Advisor, would concur with Bellegard’s 
assessment when in 1928, following an examination of American behaviour, Millspaugh wrote: “Aux écoles 
haïtiennes étaient refusés tous moyens financiers pour leur propre développement jusqu'à ce qu'elles fussent 
absorbées.” Bellegarde identified the first tangible attempt to seize control of Haitian education came about shortly 
after the US Marines Commandant, Major-General John A. Lejeune, made known, in December 1920, his desire to 
establish an effective education system in Haiti. Professor Emily Balch likewise echoed the same perception of the 
American strategy towards Haitian education. See Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 105; and Balch, ed., 
Occupied Haiti, 116. 
155 Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 79. 
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The new school system was identified as “a fact of the economic development program 
rather than as an attempt to increase literacy or promote general education.”156 General Russell, 
in his last report as High Commissioner, identified the basis for his new strategy: 
Up to the time of the American intervention, the entire school system of Haiti, from the 
primary grades up, emphasized classical studies, almost to the complete exclusion of 
industrial education. As a consequence, the children and young men of Haiti have been 
guided from, rather than toward, productive industry….This emphasis of classical studies 
and practical exclusion of agricultural and industrial education has necessarily led to the 
creation of a class of young men who desire to take up professions and occupations such 
as law, medicine, commerce and clerical; a great proportion of the latter seeking 
governmental positions. The members of this class do not know how to use their hands 
and have no idea of the dignity of labor. As a result there is a regrettable shortage of 
agriculturalists and skilled workers. It is among such a class that revolutions are bred.157 
 
A number of problems beset the education system as established by the American 
authorities. One aspect was the racial bias that Rayford Logan noted in 1930. Logan was certain 
Haitians would probably be “best served” by emphasizing vocational training, but he believed 
the American position was based on the “crude implication that vocational training is the only 
kind to which Haitians are suited.”158 A second was the lack of consultation with the Haitians 
and the failure to shape education reform based on Haitian values.159 Third, the American system 
involved the use of white teachers, from the American South, none of whom spoke Creole  or 
French. Logan complained that the attitude “of these States towards Negro education is too well 
known to need any comment.”160 One last problem worth identifying was raised by Logan: the 
American system made no provisions for training “young Haitians with a view to supplanting 
 
156 Pamphile. 
157 American High Commissioner in Haiti, General Russell. Cited in Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 94. 
158 Logan, “Education in Haiti,” 442. 
159 Pamphile identifies an apparent ‘dread’ expressed by Haitians regarding the “Anglo-Saxoniz[ation]” of their 
education system and an elimination of the French cultural aspects. Clearly, those objecting were among Haiti’s elite 
and not the peasants for whom education was largely absent. Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 85, 87. 
160 Logan, “Education in Haiti,” 447. 
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eventually the American instructors.”161 As will be seen, the lack of planning for the 
Haitianization of social services in post-Occupation Haiti was not limited to the education sector. 
 
Case Study: The Financial Advisor-General and the Royal Bank of Canada 
It will be seen from this memorandum that the Financial Advisor’s office last year 
exercised the power if not the right to dishonour an award of the Haytian Courts. I have 
always refused to allow the British Legation to become involved in that case for the 
reasons set forth in the memorandum, and I have repeatedly told my American colleagues 
that so long as I had faith in the equity of the financial Advisor and American Treaty 
authorities generally I would be loth [sic] to press any matter which would embarrass 
them. As I saw things, the situation now was that for their own reasons the Financial 
Advisor and his staff had veered round from a dictatorial attitude to one of feigned 
complete helplessness with regards to Haytian law, and the change was being 
accomplished in part at the expense of the most important British Empire interest in the 
Republic.162 
- British Legation in Haiti 
 
This case study provides a better understanding of the role of the Financial Advisor-
General in Haiti during the Marine occupation. Sidney de la Rue, the US Financial Adviser – 
General Receiver, has been identified by Emily Rosenberg as having “a fairly good record for 
honest, modest, competent, and culturally sensitive service” while he filled the role of financial 
adviser in Liberia.163 At the same time, because he was white, like all the other advisers 
appointed world-wide under the strategy of dollar diplomacy, he “looked and acted like a 
colonial ruling elite.” Those complaints aside, de la Rue believed in the requirement for the 
 
161 Logan, 448. 
162 Library and Archives Canada, RG 25, Vol. 1609, Folder 836, British Legation Letter to British Foreign Office 
(Marquess of Reading), 14 September 1931. Accessed May 2015. 
163 Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, The Questionable Impact of Supervisory Missions 2/35. That 
assessment of Sidney de la Rue should be balanced against his manipulations of the Liberian government and the 
Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, while involved in the 1927 loan negotiations between Firestone and Liberia. 
De la Rue sought to gain Harvey Firestone’s acceptance of a loan proposal that would have endowed him, as 
General Receiver, with “dictatorial powers.” Unfortunately for de la Rue, Firestone rejected his power play and his 
scheming nearly resulted in him losing his position. It certainly poisoned his relationship with the Liberian 
government. See Frank Chalk, “The Anatomy of an Investment: Firestone’s 1927 Loan to Liberia,” Canadian 
Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines 1, no. 1 (March 1967), 12-32. See also Frank 
Chalk, "Du Bois and Garvey Confront Liberia: Two Incidents of the Coolidge Years," Canadian Journal of African 
Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines 1, no. 2 (1967) : 135-42. doi:10.2307/483527. 
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financial adviser to have full administrative power over the national financial matters of Haiti.164 
The case studies below demonstrate the extent of that power. 
The manoeuvrings of Canadian and American interests during the occupation period is of 
particular interest as it illustrates the manipulations of the Haitian government by both parties. Of 
particular interest were the activities of the Royal Bank of Canada as it sought to extend its 
influence within Haiti. Indeed, the Royal Bank of Canada was in competition with the BNRH 
and was considered by some to have worked to “undermine the standing of the latter bank.”165  
Two such clashes between the two North American neighbours are detailed below.166 
During the occupation, the only real rival to the BNRH was the Royal Bank of Canada.167 In 
1920, the civilian Financial Advisor-General Receiver of Haiti, John A. McIlhenny (1919-1922), 
put forward a recommendation that his office control the import and export of foreign currency 
into Haiti.168 The Royal Bank, which did not have the right to issue Haitian currency, was only 
able to make loans by importing foreign (mainly US) currency and then buying up Haitian 
gourdes through its tellers. McIlhenny’s proposal would have forced the bank to halt operations 
in Haiti. Naturally the Royal Bank protested and was able to convince the Haitian government to 
refuse the recommendation by pointing out it would likely have given the US-controlled BNRH 
 
164 Rosenberg points out that, following his tour in Liberia as financial adviser, de la Rue was offered the adviser 
position with the Turkish government. However, the Turks refused to grant him the powers requested, so he turned 
the position down, claiming his office would quickly become “a scapegoat” for any financial problems that he felt 
were sure to arise. Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, 2-4/35. 
165 Posner, “American Marines in Haiti, 1915-1922,” 255.  
166 Material in this section is taken from Library and Archives Canada, RG 25, G1, Vol. 1609, Folder 836, Canadian 
Legation in Haiti to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Letter, 26 October 1932. Accessed May 
2015. All amounts are in Canadian dollars. 
167 Paul Douglas makes this argument regarding the Royal Bank’s status in Haiti. See Douglas, “The American 
Occupation of Haiti II,” 388. 
168 Suzy Castor points out the Royal Bank was not the only opponent to this measure which also gave the National 
City Bank of New York a monopoly over the importation of gold into Haiti. “Les légations française, anglaise, 
italienne, la Banque Royale du Canada (récemment établie) et même une institution américaine, l'American Foreign 
Banking Co., protestèrent.” See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 99. 
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a monopoly.169 Such a monopoly would have forced the Haitian government to pay significantly 
higher interest payments on loans. 
 In May 1931, then-Financial Advisor to Haiti, Sidney de la Rue, undertook an inspection 
of the financial records of the BNRH, at the time, in all but name, a branch of the National City 
Bank of New York. He determined that the BNRH had contravened the stamp tax act that 
governed the taxation amounts to be paid for bank transfers and documents shipped into and out 
of Haiti. The bank had not “affixed and cancelled” the stamps required and was in default of 
“some $150 for taxes…”. In addition to the taxes, the BNRH was also subject to a fine. Bank 
officials naturally sought to appeal the ruling within the Haitian courts. 
 While awaiting their appeal, the Port-au-Prince branch manager of the Royal Bank of 
Canada was contacted by the Director General (DG) of the Internal Revenue Department of Haiti 
(a US national operating under the auspices of de la Rue’s office). The DG announced that a 
June 1931 audit of the Royal Bank’s financial records determined it had, like the BNRH, failed 
to properly abide by the provisions of the August 1903 Haitian stamp law. The Royal Bank 
mistake, the DG explained, was that it had stamped mail transfers in and out of Haiti at the rate 
of one cent per US$40, rather than the correct rate of two cents. The audit also pointed out that 
the discrepancy spanned a number of years, an error which resulted in the Royal Bank being 
assessed a delinquency tax of US$500 (the actual difference between the one cent levied and two 
cents required). In addition, however, the Royal Bank was hit with an additional penalty per the 
 
169 Dantès Bellegarde wrote that the Haitian administration resisted US pressure to pass the proposed legislation, 
resulting in McIlhenny resorting to coercion, by “confisqua[nt] les indemnités du Président de la République, des 
ministres et des conseillers d'État.” Despite withholding their salaries, President Dartiguenave refused to cave in to 
the American demands. Further, “[Haitian] opposition to the proposal was so strong that the bill was killed.” See 
Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 81-2; and Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 54. 
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stamp act amounting to “20 percent of the face amount of the items with a minimum of US$80 
per item.” That amount came to a staggering US$304,842.48! 
 The Royal Bank was quick to react, arguing that the stamp act was ambiguous and that its 
use of the wrong stamp was “a mistake and unintentional….” Further, Royal Bank officials 
stated, “according to English law and the law of most civilized countries a fine for non-payment 
of a tax is leviable only in cases of wilful evasion.” Finally, they pointed out “the law had not 
previously been strictly applied… [and] the law was regarded as inoperative.” 
 The Royal Bank worked through the British legation in Haiti and argued if the onerous 
fines were enforced, “it would necessitate the withdrawal of the Royal Bank from Haiti.” The 
British representatives pointed out to Haitian authorities that “it was deemed highly desirable to 
maintain cordial relation existing between the Haitian and British Governments and the foreign 
credit of Haiti…”, which translated into an indirect threat against Haiti obtaining further credit 
assistance within the international community. Initially, Haitian government officials, reacting to 
British pressure, “exonerated the [Royal] Bank and cancelled the fine.” The British chargé 
d’affaires declared “the question…settled” in December 1931.  
 However, in February 1932, Sidney de la Rue became involved and took exception to the 
cancellation of the fines, writing: 
In view of the fact that the Haitian Government is opposed to the action of the 
administration of contribution in the present case, I have no other alternative but to 
submit officially the question to the American Legation in order to receive the 
instructions of the American Government. 
 
 The Haitian government, seeking to avoid a showdown with the American Financial 
Advisor, quickly passed through legislation in September 1932 which backtracked on the 
exoneration promised the Royal Bank: they instead legislated fines in such matters that 
amounted to “ten times the amount by which the amount of the stamp tax has been less than the 
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legal requirement.” That lesser fine worked out to US$5,000 rather than the original 
US$340K.170 
 This left the Royal Bank with three options. First, pay the lesser fine; second, continue 
legal action based on the earlier exoneration and closure which risked the larger fine being held 
extant; or third, appeal to Washington, something which was not expected to yield support. 
Indeed, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Francis White, was of the 
opinion that: 
there is no chance that the [US] Department of State can be persuaded to intervene in 
order to secure the withdrawal of the claim…it seems highly probable that the United 
States authorities will fully support the Financial Adviser in seeking to collect the fine in 
its reduced amount. 
 
In the end, the Royal Bank took the prudent course and paid the reduced fines: with 
payment, the matter was considered closed. The Royal Bank affair highlights the power wielded 
by US officials operating in Haiti, particularly that of the Receiver-General, who was ostensibly 
acting in Haiti’s interests. Foreign loan operations in Haiti were quite lucrative and entities like 
the Royal Bank were not willing to risk being forced out of that market, a power which the 
Receiver-General had. At the same time, the Haitian government was not above pushing back 
against US officials; the reduced fine was a way for the Haitian Government to push back and 
allow it to save face during this affair. 
The two episodes demonstrated a key lesson to be learned. Challenging the American 
Financial Advisor was ill-advised and potentially dangerous as his arsenal included possible 
shutting off of Haitian access to critical foreign (i.e., US) credit sources. At the same time, the 
 
170 The Haitian government backtracking on this issue was likely the result of behind the scenes blackmail. Because 
the US controlled Haiti’s customs houses and therefore the monies available for Haitian government operations 
(including salaries), the Haitian government was quite vulnerable. 
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Financial Advisor demonstrated some flexibility on economic issues, reflecting the reality of 
dealing with multinational interests and proved willing to accept a reasonable solution to the 
stamp tax error that allowed all parties to save face. 
 
Withdrawal from Haiti 
Within six days, the last Marine will be leaving Haitian soil. August 15, 1934 should be 
recorded in golden letters within the Marine Corps annals as marking the termination of a 
glorious and humanitarian task which has been achieved by your fellow countrymen. I 
wish it known throughout the Americas…all have accomplished meritorious works, and 
are deserving of commendation and thanks for the services which they have lent to a 
young sister republic which has been striving against all manner of vicissitudes since the 
early times when she emerged from slavery and became independent.171 
- Haitian Paul C. Toussaint 
 
 
 The US withdrawal from Haiti was intended to be sequential: it was planned to begin 
with the departure of the Marines; was to be followed by the civilian members of the US-Haitian 
treaty’s “Service Technique de l'Agriculture et de 1'Enseignement Professionnel” [Technical 
Service for Agriculture and Professional Education], the Public Health Service and various other 
public services including public works; and, lastly, by the Financial Advisor and his staff who 
were intending to stay in Haiti until Haiti’s debt obligations to the US were discharged under the 
terms of the 1922 loan consolidation plan.172 The 1915 Treaty was set to expire in 1936, which 
became the target date for the completion of the US withdrawal.  
 
171 Paul C. Toussaint, “Haiti Speaks,” Letter to the editor, Leatherneck 17, no. 10 (October 1934): 33. This excerpt 
from a ‘Letter to the Editor’ identified Paul Toussaint as a Haitian from Port-au-Prince who claimed to be “stating 
the matter from the Haitian viewpoint.” 
172 Dana G. Munro, prior to becoming a Latin American history professor, joined the US State Department from 
1920 until 1930 before becoming the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Haiti from 1930 to 1932. 
He was involved in the withdrawal planning and negotiations with the Haitian government. Dana G. Munro, “The 




 That orderly plan was tossed out the window with the escalation of protests and rioting 
against the Haitian government and the Marine presence. The protests reached their zenith in 
1929, following the October announcement by Haitian President Louis Borno (1922 to 1930) to 
cancel the scheduled presidential elections for that year.173 Tragically, that decision, later 
rescinded, coincided with the start of the Great Depression. Not only did the international coffee 
market collapse, the international migratory labour market was largely closed to Haitian workers, 
and the Occupation authority, to make up for the lost export revenues, announced an increase in 
taxes as well as “pressing new tax collections.”174  Following the government scholarship 
funding cuts, students joined the general strike action. By November 1929, discontent was 
widespread and involved large segments of Haitian society. 
 A factor which contributed to discontent was the increasing accumulation of land under 
foreign commercial control during the Occupation. Haitian historian Suzy Castor points out that, 
by 1929, Arthur Millspaugh had estimated seven key American companies as controlling almost 
100,000 acres of prime Haitian land, “[l]a majorité des terres accordées…situées dans les riches 
plaines du nord de la vallée de l'Artibonite." As the land was accumulated, Haitians were 
likewise being evicted from the areas, often forced as a result to migrate in search of 
 
173 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1929-1934, 194. 
174 Schmidt, 196-7. One of the less well publicized aspects of the Marine Occupation was the continuous stream of 
Haitians forced to migrate outside Haiti in search of jobs, often because of Occupation policies which 
disenfranchised peasants from the land. Citing Mr. Séjourné, the “Inspecteur Général des Douanes,” Suzy Castor 
points to “plus de 300.000 Haïtiens [qui] abandonnèrent le pays durant les 19 ans de l'occupation et aucun ne revint 
à sa terre natale.” The majority ended up either in Cuba or the Dominican Republic in search of employment. “Cette 
émigration constituait un apport de main-d'œuvre presque servile aux raffineries de sucre cubaines et dominicaines, 
propriétés de capitalistes américains. La United Fruit, par exemple, employa 8.000 de ces émigrés en 1926 et 12.000 
en 1927.” Citing Millspaugh, Castor believes that Occupation officials encouraged the migration, identifying it as 
“une solution au problème démographique, puisque la population de la République était au-dessus de sa capacité 
productive.” Castor points out that “l'émigration massive était devenue une soupape de sûreté pour les crises agraires 
suscitées par les dépossessions [américaines].” See Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 114-17. 
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employment.175 Castor believed the annual reports from the American Financial Advisor 
deliberately and substantially underreported the amount of Haitian land under American 
commercial control. 
Despite American moves to quell the strikes by identifying Borno as a “non-candidate” in 
the upcoming and reinstated elections, the protests continued and became more widespread.  By 
December, fearing a complete loss of control, High Commissioner John Russell responded by 
declaring martial law including a national curfew; he began a crackdown on the press and 
dispatched Garde troops to key towns in a vain attempt to quell the uprisings.176 Those measures 
appalled the US State Department, but before the State Department rescinded his orders, the 
popular discontent came to a head on December 6th with what became known as the les Cayes 
massacre committed by Marines.177 
 The tragic events began when Haitian longshoremen and customs workers halted the 
unloading of docked ships and went on strike on 4 December 1929.178 The local Garde 
commander, US Lieutenant Fitzgerald Brown, requested reinforcements from the capital, his 
intent being to use force to get the striking workers back to work. The reinforcements proved 
insufficient to the task, however, as the striking workers became violent. In response, Brown 
requested and received Marine air support which conducted a series of limited strafing runs on 
the workers, leading to their dispersal and an end to the impasse and violence. 
 
175 Castor identified most of the over 50,000 Haitians evicted from land in the Artibonite Valley area as settling in 
the Dominican-Haitian borderlands. Tragically, many were caught up in the Parsley Massacre, becoming “victime 
des vêpres trujillistes d'octobre 1937.” Castor, 109-10. 
176 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1929-1934, 198-200.   
177 About the massacre, Munro writes “…popular demonstrations against [Haitian President] Borno and against the 
American occupation became so violent that for the first time in several years the American marines had to 
intervene to restore order.” Munro, 5-6. For an account of the massacre, see Castor, L'occupation américaine 
d'Haïti, 204-6. 
178 This particular account of the massacre is drawn from Benjamin Beede, ed., The War of 1898 and US 
Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), 96. 
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 Two days later, however, a crowd of 1500 gathered and marched on the town. They were 
under the mistaken belief that the striking longshoremen and customs workers has been able, 
through their previous strike action, to obtain tax relief, something the new crowd of protesters 
likewise wanted. However, the tax relief protesters found their way barred by armed Marines and 
a stand-off developed. 
At some point, the Marines are believed to have become threatened by the size and 
demeanour of the crowd, and opened fire with their heavy machine guns and rifles. The results 
were tragic. Twenty-four Haitians were killed and another 51 were wounded.179 Ironically, the 
patrol commander responsible for opening fire, Marine Second Lieutenant John D. Blanchard, 
was rewarded for his “laudable presence of mind and leadership in promptly taking effective 
measures to quell the up-rising and save the lives of his patrol,” and was awarded the Navy 
Cross, the third highest award for combat heroism and other distinguished service.180 
 Although a presidential commission to Haiti had been planned prior to the uprisings, the 
Forbes Commission dispatched in 1930 was charged with a different mission, to extricate the US 
from Haiti as quickly and painlessly as possible.181 Despite success in ridding themselves of 
Borno as president and the appointment of a provisional president to oversee the transition to 
Haitian rule, uprisings in Haiti did not stop. If anything, opposition to the Marines intensified and 
included the previously mentioned arson campaign in 1930 targeting Marine housing.  
The election of nationalist president, Sténio Vincent in November, 1930 increased 
pressure on the US administration to accelerate the Haitianization of government agencies 
including the leadership of the Garde. That acceleration resulted in a less than orderly handover 
 
179 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 200. 
180 Blanchard’s full citation is available at www.homeofheroes.com. 
181 Schmidt identified the Commission as intending to “accommodate Haitian nationalists in order to avoid further 
bloodshed and embarrassment to the US.” Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 208. 
156 
 
of government responsibilities: instead, Haitians often had their new positions and 
responsibilities dumped on them without any further guidance. The goal became a rapid and 
complete disengagement on the part of the Americans. The exception, of course, were those 
fiscal/financial responsibilities related to ensuring payment of the Haitian foreign debt. To ensure 
it was properly serviced, the US maintained the position of the Financial Advisor. Other than that 
office, the end of the US Occupation of Haiti was punctuated by the withdrawal of the last 
Marine company in August 1934.  
 
Summary 
The intervention in Haiti seemed for a time the most successful of the American efforts 
during the first decades of the century to impose political stability and promote economic 
and social progress in several of the Caribbean states. The United States exercised more 
effective control over a wider range of government activities for a longer period than in 
any of the other countries. The majority of the treaty officials in Haiti were competent 
and enthusiastic, and in most of the services they were able to build up efficient, well-
trained native staffs.182 
- Professor of History and US Special Envoy to Haiti Dana G. Munro 
 
 As a student of Central American interventionist history, Dana Munro sought to transfer 
his understanding of that area and its relationship with the US, to Haiti.183 His thesis would 
foreshadow not only the American occupation and its effects in Haiti, but also correctly forecast 
the impact of gunboat diplomacy, to which he was a witness, when he wrote:  
Even an intervention to protect foreign life and property often determines, as a matter of 
fact, the outcome of a civil war, and the influence upon internal politics is still greater 
 
182 Munro, “The American Withdrawal from Haiti, 1929-1934,” 26. 
183 Dana G Munro wrote and published his doctoral thesis, entitled The five republics of Central America: their 
political and economic development and their relations to the US.  Published in 1918, he believed that the five 
republics studied had made considerable strides forward since the end of Spanish colonial domination and that they 
would be capable of self-rule within a democratic framework. See Dana G. Munro, The five republics of Central 




when the US used diplomatic pressure or force to prevent revolution…the US practically 
imposes upon the country affected the rule of one or the other political group.184 
 
 Interestingly, he also spoke about the need to seize the customs houses in Santo 
Domingo, for example, to not only ensure the servicing of foreign debt in a timely manner, but 
also to “prevent that portion of the [customs house] receipts which are not used for the service of 
foreign debt from being misspent.”185 For Haiti, that advice would prove prescient with the US-
appointed Receiver-General staying until 1941. Yet despite his extolling the success of the 
American intervention and his perception that the US had left Haiti with ‘efficient, well-trained 
native [Haitian] staffs,’ that was not the case when the US departed. Rather, the Haitianization of 
the public service had been ignored by Russell for much of his tenure and only became a priority 
late in his term of office. That ‘realization’ emerged in the 1930 U. S. Commission for the Study 
and Review of Conditions in Haiti and Its Relationship to President Hoover's Latin American 
Policy which identified the need for a long-term plan to build the middle class from which 
qualified Haitians could emerge to begin the process of creating an effective civil service. The 
Commission believed, based on interviews and observations, that the process could not be 
realized earlier than 1936. Sadly, the events of 1929 meant that planning was never begun.186 
 Beyond the failure to develop a domestic Haitian bureaucracy so necessary for 
governance, the Occupation would have two other lasting effects on Haitian society, both of 
which have remained unresolved up to the present time. The first was the disarmament of Haitian 
society generally through the Marines’ COIN campaign and its lasting impact (not least of which 
was a suspicion and anger by the masses of Haitians at any future US military involvement in 
 
184 Munro, 309. 
185 Munro, 312. 
186 Henry Prather Fletcher, “Quo Vadis, Haiti?” Foreign Affairs 8, no. 4 (Jul. 1930): 533-548. 
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Haiti). The violence of the campaign by the US, which saw an incredible number of extra-
judicial killings in the name of ridding the countryside of ‘bandits,’ eliminated the ability of 
peasants to settle their grievances with the political elite in the capital by mobilizing and joining 
the caco movements. Regional power bases had been empowered by a large and armed peasant 
population. That option disappeared dramatically as a consequence of the COIN campaign and 
related Marines disarmament operations. The result: 
la paysannerie haïtienne demeura plongée dans une profonde apathie qui l'a transformée 




The second related effect, partially intended, was the centralization of power in the 
capital and the de-construction of regional power bases throughout Haiti, both militarily and 
economically. Locations like Cap Haïtien, Gonaïves and others once represented regional power 
bases, capable of mounting challenges to the capital. However, disarmament of the peasants, the 
destruction of their regional leaders, many of whom opposed the occupation and were killed like 
Charlemagne Péralte as bandits, and the centralization and professionalization of the Haitian 
Garde in Port-au-Prince, all allowed the capital to become “an instrument of political 
domination.”188 At the same time, Port-au-Prince’s rise as the beneficiary of the limited 
development funds dispersed by the American occupation forces made it the central economic 
hub that Port-au-Prince would become for Haiti at the expense of regional ports like Cap 
Haïtien.189 
 
187 Castor, L'occupation américaine d'Haïti, 127. 
188 Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934, 235. 
189 Haitian sociologist Jean Rénol Elie has worked with a number of academics to create a plan for reversing the 
centralization effected by the Marine Occupation with an aim to provide voice to disenfranchised rural areas of 




The American occupation created a military force that was, once again, lean, efficient, 
and trained to a fairly high standard.190 Unfortunately for Haitians, its proficiency had come 
about at the expense of those seeking independence. Its COIN capabilities were easily applied to 
the repression of Haiti’s own citizenry. Haiti’s military forces, despite trying to remain 
‘professional’ and depoliticized, quickly became a political weapon, conducting coups when its 
leaders determined it was necessary. From an occupation point of view, the most lasting of 
effects of the Marine Occupation were not tangible items like road construction, but intangibles 
like the effective repression of democratic expression. 
  
 
190 The Marine Corps used the mission, as well as other Latin American operations including the one in Santo 
Domingo, to begin its work on the integration of air power into ground operations. In Haiti specifically, Marine 
Lieutenant L.H.M Sanderson was credited with developing the use of dive bombing in support of Marine 
counterinsurgency operations, although his technique is now more accurately known as glide bombing. The Marine 
Corps deployed Air Squadron E to Port-au-Prince, Haiti on March 31, 1919, in support of the 1st Marine Brigade 
operations against the cacos. Initially, aircraft were used for bombing runs in support of ground campaigns but 
would be expanded by the 1920s to include use for the evacuation of Marine and Gendarmerie wounded. Squadron 
E consisted of six HS-2 flying boats and six JN-4 Jennies. The Squadron would remain in Haiti until 1934. See 
Marine Lieutenant Colonel Edward C. Johnson, Marine Corps Aviation: The Early Years, 1912-1940 (Washington, 
D.C.: HQ USMC, 1977), 53; and John C. Fredriksen, The United States Marine Corps: A Chronology, 1775 to the 
Present (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 85-6. Laurent Dubois also provides a short summary of the effects 
of the Marine air campaign against the cacos: see Dubois, Haiti, 258-60. 
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Chapter Seven - Post-Occupation to the 1957 election of François Duvalier. 
When the last Marine unit departed from Haiti 20 years later, it left behind a country 
which had once again resumed its place in the community of nations as a solvent, 
responsible democracy, a bulwark to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere.1 
- US Marine Corps Commandant General Lemuel C Shepherd, Jr. 
 
…[O]ne unintended but significant outcome of the U.S. occupation was the newfound 
pride among Haitian intellectuals in the nation’s African origins. This emergence of black 
consciousness among Haitian intellectuals, combined with their sharpened understanding 
of class antagonism, ensured the situation would become increasingly volatile. New 
scholarship by disaffected middle-class intellectuals continued to alienate the Haitian 
intelligentsia from the status quo.2 
- Haitian historian and Professor Emeritus Patrick Bellegarde-Smith 
 
The withdrawal of the US Marines in 1934 has been heralded, prematurely, as Haiti’s 
second independence, or désoccupation.3 Yet, American control over Haiti continued until 1941 
through the powers exercised by the US-appointed Financial Adviser-General Receiver.4 The 
withdrawal of the US Marines might have heralded a new period of independence for Haiti 
rather than the continuation of American domination in Haitian internal affairs. Examining the 
immediate post-occupation period raises several questions about the contributions of the US role 
in Haiti and its continued problems. While the period has been characterized by historian 
Matthew Smith as sparking “the establishment of a popular labor movement; the rise of political 
parties; a bitter and vibrant ideological struggle; and a shift toward an assertive brand of Haitian 
 
1 Quote from USMC Commandant, General Lemuel C Shepherd, Jr., 15 December 1955. Cited in James H. 
McCrocklin, Garde d’Haiti, 1915-1934: Twenty Years of Organization and Training by the United States Marine 
Corps, (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Company Inc.1956), v. 
2 Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 115. 
3 The term ‘Second Independence’ or Seconde Indépendance, appears to have been coined by President Sténio 
Vincent and exploited to solidify his 1930 election to the presidency. See Sténio Vincent, Sur La Route de la 
Seconde Independence: En Compagnie du Soldat et du Citoyen Haïtiens (Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie de l’État, 
1934), http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UF00081277/00001. 
4 Those powers were largely exercised over Haitian finances and fiscal policy to ensure Haiti continued to meet its 
foreign debt obligations. Indeed, as late as 1937, the US identified its desire to cease infringing on Haitian “financial 
sovereignty” save when necessary to protect “the holders of bonds of the 1922 Haitian loan.” FRUS, Diplomatic 
Papers, 1937, The American Republics, Volume V, eds. Matilda F. Axton, Rogers P. Churchill, N. O. Sappington, 
John G. Reid, Francis C. Prescott, Louis E. Gates and Shirley L. Phillips (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1954), Document 458. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1937v05/d458. 
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black nationalism, noirisme…,” it would also see the Haitian military become more professional 
and hence a less political organization.5  
At the same time, the “semi-professional Haitian Garde” was in a poor state of affairs: 
Jean Price-Mars, for example, describes the post-occupation Garde in quite scathing terms: 
At the end of the occupation, the military equipment left to this force [the Haitian Garde] 
was obsolete and clearly insufficient and inadequate. On the other hand, public finances 
were still handicapped by contractual obligations that did not allow the government to 
incur any expenses beyond those of a skimpy budget.6 
 
 Further, the nation’s infrastructure was in disrepair. Roads, constructed to allow access to 
the interior in support of the Marine counter-insurgency operations, were difficult to maintain by 
the cash strapped Haitian government. Consequently, the roads disintegrated once the Marines 
departed. The leadership of the Garde also lacked professional qualifications. Allowing Haitians 
to assume leadership roles, particularly as commissioned officers, was resisted by the Marines 
for the entirety of their involvement with the Garde. That policy was reversed by the Haitian 
government after the American withdrawal from Haiti. By then, it was far too late to properly 
train the leaders required. Instead, the majority of the Garde’s post-Marine leadership found 
itself ill-prepared for command and under-trained for the responsibilities they inherited. 
 
5 Matthew Smith defines noirisme as an ideology which “advocated total control of the state apparatus by black 
representatives of the popular classes.” While noirisme is related to indigénisme as expressed by Jean Price-Mars 
(Ainsi parla l’oncle [Thus Spoke the Uncle]), it is more radical in its expression. While it emphasized Haiti’s 
African past, it also offered a more radical view of power in Haiti, viewing it as a constant struggle for supremacy 
between the mulatto elite and the black masses, and that the emerging black middle class was the best suited to 
exercise power on behalf of blacks generally. David Nicholls argued noiriste leaders like Duvalier “believed that 
power should be in the hands of an authoritarian government acting on behalf of the masses whose basic interests 
they were said to share.” Two events contributed to its emergence: the Marine Occupation, which gave rise to its 
foundation through indigénisme; and later, the 1937 Dominican massacre of Haitians along the Haitian-Dominican 
border, linked to President Vincent’s deliberate lack of response. See Matthew J. Smith, Red and Black in Haiti: 
Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 1934-1957 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 
2-32; and Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 168. See also Jean Price-Mars, Ainsi Parla l’Oncle: Essais 
d’Ethnographie New York: Parapsychology Foundation, Inc., 1928. Nouvelle édition, 1954. 
6 Cited in Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 88. 
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That lack of readiness would become all too clear in October 1937 with the Dominican 
Republic’s genocidal attack on Haitians in the shared border region. Known as the Parsley 
Massacre, Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo Molina ordered Dominican soldiers to kill any 
Haitians found in the northeastern border region. The week-long slaughter resulted in the murder 
of an estimated 20,000 Haitians.7 The motives behind the sudden slaughter, coming seemingly 
without warning or provocation, have been difficult to explain.  
Historian Richard Turits has, however, provided an understanding that focusses on the 
liminality of the border between the two nations having spawned a population independent of 
either nation. That “bicultural and transnational frontier world collectively made by ethnic 
Dominicans and ethnic Haitians” became an immediate threat to “the dominant, essentialized 
construction of Dominican nationality as founded on a putatively transhistorical anti-
Haitianism.”8 Turits’s thesis gains support when examining the timing of the demarcation 
investigations which preceded the massacre. A 1929 treaty between the two nations, with the US 
Marines representing Haiti, established the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 
However, that description remained on paper until 1935 when the border was demarcated by a 
joint commission with US assistance and oversight, which completed the physical survey work 
and on-the-ground markings of the border.  
Crucially, that 1935 work drew attention to the border region, and its “unmoored” 
society. The border society that developed was based on a high rate of intermarriage between 
Dominicans and Haitians. For Dominican elites, this undermined an historical founding 
 
7 Richard Turits provides an excellent analysis of the numbers of Haitian lives lost in the massacres. Richard Turits, 
“A World Destroyed, A Nation Imposed: The 1937 Haitian Massacre in the Dominican Republic,” Hispanic 
American Historical Review 82, no. 3 (2002): 589-635. See also Edward Paulino, Dividing Hispaniola: The 
Dominican Republic’s Border Campaign Against Haiti, 1930-1961 (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2016). 
8 Turits, 593-4. 
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narrative, especially because of blended “black” Haitian and “white” Dominican families. 
Dominican myths of white “Spanishness” mixed with whipped up fears of a “pacific invasion” of 
the Dominican Republic by Haitians formed a volatile brew ready to explode whenever 
Dominican President Rafael Trujillo gave the command to his soldiers. For added measure, 
Trujillo claimed that Haiti harboured his political enemies and therefore deserved punishment.9 
 Matters in Haiti would worsen after the massacres. Not only had the international coffee 
market begun its crash, leading to lowered prices and consequently much lower revenue flowing 
into Haiti’s treasury, but an infestation of the Mexican boll-weevil struck the cotton industry 
cutting cotton production for export purposes almost completely.10 Infestations also decimated 
Haitian cocoa plantations. The cumulative effect was a collapse in Haiti’s exports. In 1936, 
France struck an additional blow to the Haitian economy by declining to renew the favourable 
tariff policy Haitian exports had enjoyed, subjecting them instead to the same general tariff rates 
that other nations paid.11 All these blows added up to an economic catastrophe for Haiti.12  
Not surprisingly, by 1937, Haiti had defaulted on its 1922 loan payments and was once 
again negotiating new financing, beginning again the spiral into dependency on foreign lending 
for operating funds. Initially, the US government resisted helping Haiti garner the necessary 
 
9 Turits points out that prior to the Parsley Massacre, Haitian authorities had complained to Dominican and 
American leaders about Dominican soldiers forcing Haitians out of disputed border areas. Further, Dominican 
authorities sought to colonize those disputed border areas with Dominicans in order to ensure border negotiations 
were favourable to Dominican interests. When Spain began its ascendency in Europe, northern Europeans began a 
campaign to discredit the Spanish using race as one of its key justifications for supremacy. Spain, and those of 
Spanish extraction, have zealously guarded their right to belong as ‘white” Europeans. Turits, “A World Destroyed, 
A Nation Imposed,” 599. See also Baltasar Fra-Molinero, “The suspect whiteness of Spain,” in At Home and 
Abroad: Historicizing Twentieth-Century Whiteness in Literature and Performance, ed. La Vinia Delois Jennings 
(University of Tennessee Press: 2010) 147-169. 
10 Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 67. 
11 Lundahl, 303. 
12 The only success story during the 1930s in Haitian agriculture was, ironically, the Standard Fruit Company’s 
monopoly in banana production which “launched a veritable boom in the country.” That was undermined between 
1945 and 1947 when President Vincent broke up the Standard Fruit Company and Steamship Company’s monopoly 
by granting “lucrative regional monopoly concessions” to political cronies. That cronyism resulted in policies which 
saw Haiti’s banana exports undermined and eventually destroyed. Lundahl, 303, 307. 
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funding, but when the German government of Adolf Hitler showed renewed interest in Haiti, the 
State Department swiftly stepped in and encouraged Wall Street firms to open their vaults. After 
American bankers demurred, however, the State Department called upon the Export-Import 
Bank. 
 The Export-Import Bank tied its funding to very closely supervised infrastructure 
projects. Not only did they insist upon US expertise supervising all the proposed Haitian 
projects, they also demanded that Haiti break the projects into smaller parcels with a value of no 
more than US$5 million each. Two of the projects funded by the Export- Import Bank are worth 
exploring: the Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (or SHADA); and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Marbial Valley 
project. Both were funded under the Bank’s auspices and within the US$5 million funding 
envelopes. 
 
Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (SHADA) 
 
The Shada project has stimulated a considerable amount of ill feeling among the 
Haitians…they have objected also to the manner in which the program has been 
administered, to its waste, to its cost, to the large number of Americans it has employed. 
They have tried to escape responsibility themselves by claiming the whole idea was 
thought up by Americans, and that Americans maintained control of the organization’s 
policy thru…their control of the common stock…While there is some truth in all this, the 
fact remains that the Haitian Government entered into the agreement freely.13 
- US Diplomat Willian B. Connett, Jr. 
 
 The outbreak of the Second World War saw the withdrawal of German and Italian money 
forcing Haiti to rely almost exclusively on the US for trade. As a result, American companies 
 
13 FRUS, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV, eds. N. Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr. 




bought all of Haiti’s cotton and sisal crops.14 Despite the revenue from the sales, Haiti found 
itself again in dire economic straits. By 1938, Haiti was again seeking loans from the US 
government, this time to fund ongoing development projects. The US Export-Import Bank would 
eventually disperse some US$24 million for infrastructure work such as roads, schools, and 
irrigation work, but President Vincent and his supporters siphoned away most of the money from 
the projects to line their own pockets. 
 Fortunately for Vincent, US Second World War strategic raw materials requirements 
included natural rubber. The American government prevailed upon Vincent to accept US 
assistance for rubber plantations in Haiti. Vincent’s request was quickly approved and in 1939, 
the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) dispatched Thomas Fennell, a tropical agriculture 
engineer, to Haiti. Fennell had previous rubber growing experience and favoured starting rubber 
production in Haiti.15  
 In 1941, the USDA and the Haitian Ministry of Agriculture (HMA) concluded an 
agreement for the creation of an experimental plantation near Jérémie at Marfranc. That April, 
work began to plant 4,800 heavea rubber trees.16 By August, the two parties had concluded an 
agreement to establish the Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement Agricole (or 
 
14 An exception to the American purchase monopolization of Haitian products was sparked by the British decision to 
end its purchases of Haitian sugar and cotton during the immediate pre-war period. Rather than the Americans 
stepping in, the Japanese government surprisingly stepped in and bought up the “British share and more.” Heinl and 
Heinl, Written in Blood, 534, 539. 
15 Fennell was eventually made President and General Manager of Société Haitiano-Américaine de Développement 
Agricole or SHADA. See Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.” 
http://www2.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti/misctopic/leftover/rubber.htm. 
16 The rubber plants were introduced into Haiti by University of Michigan Professor H.H. Bartlett who had been sent 
to the Philippines by the US Department of Agriculture in 1940 to procure large quantities of rubber seeds and 
plants. A second University of Michigan colleague, Arthur W Bechtel, was sent to assist him in Haiti in 1942. The 
University of Michigan ended up supplying many of the botanists and agronomists involved in the rubber trade, 
including a number who worked for the US Rubber Company and the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, as well 
as Goodyear. See Carl D. LaRue, “Michigan Botanists Play Important Role,” The Michigan Alumnus 49, no. 1 (2 
October 1943): 57-8. 
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SHADA) and finance it with a US$5 million loan from the US Export-Import Bank.17 In 1942, 
SHADA added sisal production to its mandate. The US / Haiti agreement led SHADA to 
purchase an additional 24,000 acres of land with the prior approval of the Vincent government.18 
The agreement allowed SHADA to expropriate whatever land it needed: 
The Haitian Government agrees to grant every facility to the SHADA and to the private 
interests concerned in order that they may obtain possession of the necessary lands, 
whether government or privately owned, and to facilitate the employment of such United 
States technical personnel as may be necessary.19 
 
 
SHADA soon decided to base latex production on the faster growing cryptostegia bush 
which produced a high-quality latex rubber over heavea trees, which take seven years to produce 
latex for commercial production.20 By June 1943, it had six divisions and eleven plantations 
growing cryptostegia.21 Over 75,000 acres had been acquired by SHADA with about one-third 
planted: Haitian employees numbered over 77,000. By November 1943, SHADA had obtained a 
“cost-plus” contract from the USDA for the harvest of natural rubber from some 100,000 acres 
of cryptostegia plants.22 Notwithstanding the acreage under control of SHADA, rubber 
production was low, with the 1944 forecasts topping out at only 3,000 “long tons.”23  
 
17 In exchange for the loan, SHADA was granted a 50-year lease over some 150,000 acres of pine forest and a 50-
year monopoly on the production and export of natural rubber from Haiti. SHADA was also reportedly extended an 
additional US$7 million line of credit in 1942. See Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 542; and Corbett, “Haitian 
Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.” 
18 FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1942, The American Republics, Volume VI, eds. William M. Franklin and E.R. 
Perkins (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), Document 481. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v06/d481. 
19 FRUS, Document 481. The land agreement, tendered through the US Rubber Reserve Company, also examined 
potential new sources of rubber cultivation; it had also been responsible for rubber recycling and conservation 
efforts. The Rubber Reserve Company, established in 1940 by the US government, existed to deal with US 
vulnerabilities to its supplies of natural rubber.  
20 Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.” 
21 Corbett. 
22 Thomas A. Fennell, “Rubber from Haiti: A Battle against Time,” Journal of Geography 43, no. 4 (Jan 1944): 153-
158. 
23 Fennell, 154. 
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Nonetheless, the US desperately needed all the natural rubber it could get in 1944 and 
1945.24 US investment and interest in rubber production remained in place and ambitious as 
reflected by continued growth in land acquisitions.25 US Embassy cables from Port-au-Prince in 
1944 reported about US6.5M spent on cryptostegia development with 50,000 Haitians enjoying 
employment paying “better than average wages.”26 That success was not to last. “An unusual 
drought” dragged on well into 1944 and was coupled to a decreased requirement for natural 
rubber. In February 1944, the Rubber Development Corporation gave SHADA the bad news: it 
was recommending termination of the USDA contract with SHADA, citing “poor production”, 
waning demand for natural rubber and successful synthetic rubber production in the US.27 
Haiti’s appeal of the decision was unsuccessful and SHADA was forced to begin 
preparations for the return of rubber plantation land to thousands of displaced former owners: 
clearing the land was accomplished by burning the cryptostegia plants.28  SHADA’s rubber 
 
24 Frank R. Chalk, “The US and the International Struggle for Rubber, 1914-1941,” PhD diss. (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin, 1970), 273-4. When the US fought the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, it was virtually out of 
natural rubber, still essential to the manufacture of truck tires. 
25 In a 1944 article published on SHADA, Fennell claimed less than two percent of the total area of Haiti was under 
sisal and cryptostegia production. Robert and Nancy Heinl, though, have claimed that while that figure may be 
correct in terms of total acreage, the reality was that the two percent really represented “more than 5 percent of 
Haiti’s best land…”. See Fennell, “Rubber from Haiti – A Battle against Time,” 158; and Heinl and Heinl, Written 
in Blood, 542. 
26 FRUS, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The American Republics, Volume VII, eds. E. Ralph Perkins, Almon R. Wright, 
David H. Stauffer and Velma Hastings Cassidy (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1967), Document 1166 
(footnote 21). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1944v07/d1166. 
27 The US Rubber Development Corporation was “a wholly owned subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation,” itself a US government owned entity. US Comptroller General of the United States, “Letter from 
Lindsay C Warren to Robert J Albers (B-39199),” 19 Jan 1944.  http://www.gao.gov/assets/390/386430.pdf. Email 
from Frank Chalk to author, 04 July 2019. See also Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945. 
28 This included an agreement to compensate former landowners to the paltry tune of about US$175000 in total. The 
number of affected owners was estimated in the neighbourhood of 35000 to 40000 which meant each was receiving 
between $5 and $25 per carreaux. See Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945.” See also Haiti Liberté, 




experiment would end in 1944.29 For Haiti, however the experiment would have long term and 
disastrous consequences: 
…Fennell and SHADA ran roughshod over peasant proprietors, condemning choice 
agricultural plots, bulldozing cailles [houses], even sacred houmforts [Vodou temples], 
standing crops, coffee bushes, cashew, avocado, and banana tress (an estimated million 
fruit-bearing trees and shrubs in all), paying in pittances, and rehiring as day laborers 
expropriated peasants who had been subsistence farmers. Everything Fennell touched 
went badly.”30  
 
In the end, not only was the abrupt termination of SHADA’s rubber cultivation 
operations a significant blow to Haiti’s economy, leaving it with an additional US$5 million in 
debt, it was also an environmental disaster. The sisal and cryptostegia operations led to the clear-
cutting of significant portions of Haiti’s precious pine forest as well as over one million fruit 
trees which were reportedly cleared from prime agricultural land in the Grand’Anse region.31 
When the lands were given back, they were found to have been contaminated by acidic 
wastewater from rubber processing. On top of that contamination, the land transformation carried 
out by SHADA not only made identification of individual owner’s plots very problematic, it also 
changed for the worse the drainage patterns of the area. 
 
29 Paul Wendt identified the improving state of the West’s natural rubber requirements in 1944-45 which led to the 
termination of the Haitian experiment: “Stocks of natural rubber and latex declined rapidly during 1943-44 and in 
October 1944 reached a low point of 90,590 long tons, below the Baruch Committee recommended minimum of 
100,000 long tons. By this time monthly synthetic rubber production of 66,000 long tons exceeded current monthly 
consumption and synthetic stocks were being built up rapidly. Delays in military conversion to synthetics and a 
large increase in stated military requirements for 1945 gave new importance to increasing natural rubber supplies. 
To meet this need, increased quantities of Ceylon, Indian, and African rubber were allocated to the United States by 
CRMB. (United States natural rubber imports from November 1944-February 1945 totaled 60,364 long tons as 
compared with 35,691 long tons during the previous four months.) The reduction in stated military requirements 
with the changing course of the war early in 1945 and an accelerated rate of conversion to synthetics removed this 
new threat to exhaustion of natural rubber supplies and by December 1945 natural rubber stocks had increased to 
118,715 long tons.” Paul Wendt, “The Control of Rubber in World War II,” Southern Economic Journal 13, no.3 
(January 1947): 206. 
30 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 542. 
31 Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History. See also Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 542-3. 
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SHADA continued forestry and sisal operations, but on a much-reduced experimental 
scale. Ironically, at the end of 1944, SHADA reported a profitable year with employment at 
“4,080 labourers and 488 salaried personnel.” The yearly production of cryptostegia rubber 
amounted to 8,000 pounds, while heavea rubber was around 6,500 pounds.32 Despite a lowered 
operational capacity, SHADA operations continued to draw rebukes. In 1952, for example, the 
American ambassador to Haiti raised concern over SHADA having ventured into plantation-
level development and abandoning its original mandate, that being to aid peasant agricultural 
development.33 He expressed astonishment regarding the level of incompetence on the part of the 
American decision-makers, writing that “the present situation [September 1952] is so disastrous 
that it is inconceivable that it was not foreseen at least five years ago.”34 
Perhaps the most frightening aspect of the SHADA experiment was that it foreshadowed 
a casual disregard for Haitian food production requirements in favour of experimentation 
intended to further US commercial and strategic interests. That attitude would raise its ugly head 
time and again in Haiti, as will be shown in later chapters. As Haitian professor Myrtha Gilbert 
has noted: 
Parce que, la vision de la paysannerie haïtienne, c’est de cultiver la terre et d’échanger 
ses produits contre ceux dont elle a besoin par le commerce, alors que l’autre vision, c’est 
’je me fiche que tu aies besoin de manger, parce que, moi, j’ai besoin de caoutchouc, de 
pite et d’autres choses. Et, c’est ce que tu vas produire sur tes terres’, même si ce sont les 




32 Bob Corbett, “Haitian Rubber Timeline, 1903-1945. 
33 Ambassador Folsom also raised concerns about sisal production in Haiti. He pointed out US experts had failed to 
establish a rotational plantation cycle for planting of sisal in Haiti. Instead, the sisal was planted at one time, leading 
to its harvesting likewise occurring at the same time. His diplomatic traffic alluded to other crop errors but did not 
specify the mistakes. See FRUS, 1952-54, Volume IV, The American Republics, eds. N. Stephen Kane and William 
F. Sanford, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 522.  
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/d522.  
34 FRUS, Document 522 
35 See Myrtha Gilbert, cited in Karenine Francesca Théosmy, “Haïti / États-Unis : L’histoire de Shada, reflet d’une 
réalité immédiate de dépendance,” AlterPresse, 27 April 2012. http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article12767.  
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Enter the United Nations… UNESCO and the Marbial Valley project 
 
The name of Marbial is little known, even in the Caribbean area. It is a forgotten valley. 
It has neither villages nor hamlets, and its people, living in their scattered wooden huts, 
are no part of any community: They are merely the folk of Marbial. They have to work 
hard to keep alive. A few decades ago, as the older ones still remember, life was much 
easier. Since then tropical disease, soil erosion and over-population have combined to 
spread ignorance and misery…In this picture of desolation, the practices of Christianity 
are but a thin veneer over the old African traditions. The terrors of the supernatural 
world, of voodoo and magic, are still important in the lives of the people of Marbial. But 
none of these practices helps to provide what is so deeply needed in this atmosphere of 
deterioration - hope.36 
- French journalist Tibor Mende 
 
 In addition to SHADA, the years from 1947 to 1949 were noteworthy as it marked the 
first engagement of the fledgling United Nations organization in Haiti. In December 1946, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution calling upon member nations to 
provide assistance and advice to underdeveloped nations.37 In 1947, Haitian educator and United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) staff member, Emmanuel 
Gabriel, pressured his organization from within to help his homeland. Thanks to Gabriel’s 
lobbying campaign, 
UNESCO would place at the disposal of the Haitian Government an expert on 
Fundamental Education [FE], who would visit the area to study local conditions and 
advise the Haitian Government during the initial stage of the Project.38 
 
 
36 Tibor Mende, “Marbial Valley Project,” Caribbean Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1951/52): 18-19. 
37 US support for the provision of technical support to underdeveloped nations was firmly entrenched in US foreign 
policy by President Harry Truman, in his 1949 inaugural address, when he pledged to “embark on a bold new 
program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement 
and growth of underdeveloped areas.  US President Harry Truman’s Inaugural Address, 20 January 1949. 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm. 
38 The project has been described by UNESCO as combining, for the first time, the work of three UN agencies: 
UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The 
UNESCO report suggests that it would be seeking the participation of the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
once the small business side of the project was up and running. UNESCO Paper entitled “Fundamental Education 
Project in Haiti: Working Plan,” Paris, 26 Feb 1948, 1. See also Glenda Sluga, "UNESCO and the (One) World of 
Julian Huxley." Journal of World History 21, no. 3 (2010): 393-418.  
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 Working with the Haitian government of President Dumarsais Estimé (1946-1950), the 
decision was made to begin the FE project within the parish of Marbial (in the Jacmel area).39 
For UNESCO, the location was controversial and not initially well supported at headquarters. It 
was a region troubled by some significant issues including “poverty, over-population, 
superstition, tropical diseases, impoverished agriculture, and major land issues from erosion”; 
and was, to boot, “fairly remote…but not impossibly inaccessible.”40 What UNESCO claimed 
tipped the scales in favour of employing the site for the project was the demonstration of what 
the organization termed “a tremendous spontaneous enthusiasm among the local peasants” 
towards any education opportunity.41 
 The aim of the project was “to help men and women live fuller and happier lives in 
adjustment with their changing environment, to develop the best elements in their own culture, 
and to achieve the social and economic progress which will enable them to take their place in the 
modern world.”42  To accomplish this aim, the project aimed to employ what they termed 
“improved text books and visual and oral aids…to demonstrate how educational methods can be 
effectively used to raise the social and economic levels of an under-developed community.”43 
 
39 ‘Fundamental Education’ was identified by UNESCO as “that kind of education which aims to help children and 
adults who do not have the advantage of formal schooling, to understand the problems of their environment and their 
rights and duties as citizens and individuals, to acquire essential knowledge and skill for the progressive 
improvement of their living conditions and to participate effectively in the economic and social development of their 
community, making full use of facilities and techniques brought to the community from outside.” UNESCO 
Working Paper on the Definition of Fundamental Education, UNESCO/2, Paris, 15 June 1956. 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001797/179727eb.pdf. 
40 UNESCO, 3. Concerns over the choice of the Marbial site led UNESCO to delay finalizing the agreement with 
Haiti until September 1949. Indeed, the UN FAO had reported the site was not suitable, an assessment that was 
backed up by Alfred Métraux, a noted Swiss anthropologist, ethnologist, and human rights advocate.  He was also  
leader of the 1948-50 UNESCO Marbial Valley anthropological survey. See Chantalle Verna, “Haiti, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO’s Pilot Project in Fundamental Education, 1948-1953,” Diplomatic History, 
9. Advance Access published 27 February 2015, doi:10.1093/dh/dhu075. See also Alfred Métraux, E. Berrouet and 
Dr. and Mrs. Jean Comhaire-Sylvain, Making a Living in the Marbial Valley (Haiti), UNESCO Occasional Papers in 
Education #l0, Paris, 1951; and UNESCO Monograph on Fundamental Education, The Haiti Pilot Project (Phase 
One), Paris, 1951.  





This in fact is what differentiated the UNESCO initiative: the deliberate decision to conduct the 
education project within the local social and cultural milieu. In the case of Haiti and the Marbial 
Valley, for example, this meant that education was conducted in the local Creole or kreyòl 
language rather than French.44 
 The project’s education plan was fairly comprehensive, and included not only primary 
classes for children along with adult literacy classes, but also health and medical education, 
agricultural and basic veterinary education, community cultural activities, and basic commercial 
training like that required to run a small business.45 UNESCO planned the Marbial project to last 
at least five years, and aspired to build domestic expertise by training the Haitian trainers to 
implement the project’s aims in other parts of Haiti.46 
  The initial plan of action included a six-month period in which to conduct what was 
termed the initial survey; that baseline survey was intended to provide the yardstick against 
which future development and progress within the community would be measured. It recognized 
the importance of understanding the local culture and societal conditions before measuring the 
progress of the educational and social development plans. It also recognized that education 
required opportunities for graduates of the program and that opportunity in a remote area like the 
Marbial valley was provided through the development of local skilled jobs. Accordingly, the 
project sought to introduce small, sustainable industries into the valley area, largely those 
associated with peasant crafts such as basket weaving, and projects based on woodworking. 
 
44 Verna, “Haiti, the Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO’s Pilot Project in Fundamental Education, 1948-1953.” 
45 UNESCO, “Fundamental Education Project in Haiti,” 3. 
46 The UNESCO report identified the objective as “to raise the social and economic level of the community and to 
train up Haitian staff so that it may become self-sustaining as rapidly as possible by the withdrawal of non-Haitian 
personnel.” It also identified that the so-called final objective of the project was to “satisfy the needs…of the 
Marbial area and in some degree the rest of…Haiti, for teachers and workers trained in the most advanced ideas and 
methods of Fundamental Education.” UNESCO, 5, 7. 
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 In April 1948, UNESCO published a report which spoke about shifting the Marbial area 
into a co-operative organization for farming based on the traditional coumbite working 
association.47 In September 1949, Haiti and UNESCO reached a formal agreement to launch the 
pilot project. By 1950, according to UNESCO experts, the project was beginning to show 
positive results. A small co-operative funded by UNESCO was launched that year and had over 
one hundred members. The adult literacy program was attended by some 800 adults and 
supervised by some 20 student-teachers. Classes were programmed around the daily routine of 
rural Haitians. A primary school was also constructed and had at the time over 100 students. 
UNESCO sanitation education was introduced into the area and included several practical 
public health applications for the community such as a DDT spray program to combat malaria 
and other insect borne diseases, the construction of pit latrines and an abattoir, and the 
introduction of sanitary standards to regulate the local markets. UNESCO also established a local 
clinic with a doctor visiting the valley four times a week and a dentist coming into the area once 
a week.48 
 From an economic development point of view, the Marbial Valley project was also 
beginning to show progress. The journalist Tibor Mende reported in 1951 that at least two 
merchants from Jacmel were beginning to trade in the valley and were in the process of 
establishing offices.49 The UNESCO Courier indicated that “[a]t the end of the first [year], it 
looked impossible. Now by the end of the second year, its achievements and future possibilities 
 
47 La coumbite or la koumbite is best understood as a form of collectivized work and is identified by a number of 
sources as a Kreyòl term. It was and is a small socialized working gang which moves around members’ farms on a 
regular rotation, providing labour contribution in return for a like contribution on their own farms. 
48 Mende, “Marbial Valley Project,” 18-21. 
49 Mende, 21. 
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have been dramatically recognized. The success is a tribute to the peasants of the Valley of 
Marbial.”50  
Summarizing, the report claimed the project had “proved the basic principle of 
fundamental education – that progress must be made not FOR the people, but BY the people 
themselves.”51 Despite that apparent success, in 1953, UNESCO funding hit the five-year mark 
and stopped in accordance with UNESCO guidelines. Those guidelines spelled out that the host 
country, Haiti, was now expected to take the bulk of the responsibility for continued funding of 
the Marbial project. Along with that funding expectation came a project status downgrade to 
“associated project.”52 Ironically, despite the five-year window on funding, UNESCO itself 
advocated a slow, steady program towards change. Indeed, the scale of the project would have 
mandated a slow progression towards the project’s goals. 
Yet without consideration for the inability of the Haitian government to begin funding the 
project, UNESCO stepped away and then appeared surprised when it failed. In 1954, the 
UNESCO team revised its thoughts on the Marbial project, which it now termed “an experiment” 
that yielded a number of useful lessons.53 UNESCO recast the project retroactively; its new aim 
was “to establish contact with the people and to help them to understand and solve their 
problems.”54 From an evaluation perspective, the provision of education became the yardstick for 
measuring success. Gone was the earlier project aim, to “achieve the social and economic 
progress which will enable them [Haitian peasants] to take their place in the modern world.”  By 
1956, Swiss anthropologist Alfred Métraux reported back to UNESCO that the project “had 
 
50 Supplement to UNESCO Courier, Vol. II, No. 5 (June 1949), 8. 
51 Supplement to UNESCO Courier. 
52 Verna, “Haiti, the Rockefeller Foundation, and UNESCO’s Pilot Project in Fundamental Education, 1948-1953.” 
53 UNESCO, The Courier, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1954), 13. 
54 UNESCO, The Courier. 
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virtually no effect” on conditions within the Marbial Valley and “the project is virtually 
defunct.”55  
 
The UN Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti 
 
The technical assistance furnished shall (i) not be a means of foreign economic and 
political interference in the internal affairs of the country concerned and shall not be 
accompanied by any consideration of a political nature; (ii) be given only to or through 
Governments; (iii) be designed to meet the needs of the country concerned; (iv) be 
provided, as far as possible, in the form which that country desires; (v) be of high quality 
and technical competence…56 
- UN General Assembly Resolution 200 (III)(1948) 
 
 The UNESCO project on fundamental education would lead, a year later, to a more 
comprehensive approach to engagement in Haiti. In July 1948, the Haitian government, 
prompted by the US in particular, formally requested that the UN organize a mission to Haiti to 
“examine the problems of and the conditions affecting the economic development of Haiti 
primarily in the field of agriculture, industry and related activities” with the aim to producing an 
economic plan that included the provision of technical assistance.57 Inasmuch as the mission to 
Haiti was a pilot and became the template for other missions within Latin American, it is likely 
that the Haitians were convinced it would be to their benefit to make the request.  
In response, the UN organized what it termed the UN Mission of Technical Assistance to 
the Republic of Haiti, a fact-finding and analytical mission based on a team of experts from the 
UN’s Division of Economic Affairs, the International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture 
 
55 UNESCO, The Courier. 
56 The General Resolution outlines the terms under which technical assistance was to be rendered to developing 
states like Haiti. UN General Assembly Resolution 200 (III), “Technical assistance for economic development,” 
Para. 4.(d), A/RES/200(III), 04 December 1948. 
57 UN Mission to Haiti: Report of the UN Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti (New York, July 
1949), xiii. http://ufdc.ufl.edu. 
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Organization (FAO), UNESCO and the World Health Organization (WHO).58 The Mission was 
described very broadly as: 
a practical, businesslike way of preparing the ground for great projects of capital 
development which will be necessary in the future if the standards of life of the 
underdeveloped countries are to be raised. It is a scheme which will teach people at a low 
level of technical culture some of the elements which have to be mastered if great 
economic problems are to be solved. It is a means of educating the people of the world 
regarding some of the hard realities which must be faced and overcome if their standards 
of life the elements which have to be mastered are to be sensibly raised.59 
 
 The Mission team spent two months on the ground in Haiti, compiling a comprehensive 
development plan intended to be multi-disciplinary but with a primary focus on Haiti’s economic 
development. At the heart of the plan lay two critical factors. First, Haiti would be expected to 
provide the bulk of the resources required to implement the Mission’s recommendations for 
development: “we [the UN through the Technical Mission] stress the necessity for the 
development effort, if it is to be lastingly successful, to rely in the first instance on the efficient 
utilization of the nation’s own means.”60 Second, how Haiti’s resources were employed would be 
overseen and guided by UN experts: the Mission visit report clearly identified “a desirability, not 
to say the necessity, of Haiti’s having recourse to continued expert assistance.”61 
 Unfortunately, the development plan suffered from several deficiencies.  Astonishingly, 
the Mission neglected to provide cost projections for the development work that would permit 
the creation of a realistic budget. It foresaw that planning would be based on sequential 
development intended “to allow the economy-strengthening results of first priority projects to 
 
58 Rayford W Logan claimed in his review of the UN mission report that a representative from the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) was not included in the mission because the ILO had previously conducted its own 
survey of Haiti. See Rayford W. Logan, review of “Mission to Haiti: Report of the UN Mission of Technical 
Assistance to the Republic of Haiti,” The Hispanic American Historical Review 30, no. 2 (May 1950): 242. 
59 David Owen, “The United Nations Program of Technical Assistance,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 270, (Jul 1950): 116-7. 
60 UN Mission to Haiti: Report of the UN Mission of Technical Assistance to the Republic of Haiti, xvii.  
61 UN Mission to Haiti. 
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take effect before adding new foreign debt commitments.”62 It assumed that while the program 
would be implemented slowly and take some time to achieve momentum, it would eventually 
become self-sustaining. One of the first recommendations implemented in Haiti was the 
appointment of a UN economic advisor to serve as the governor of the Haitian BNRH, a revival 
of a post like that of the US Financial Advisor, a position that ended finally in 1941. 
Additionally, one of the more controversial recommendations of the Mission encouraged Haitian 
emigration, a recommendation based upon the fear that a steadily increasing population plagued 
by scarce natural resources, especially food, would starve. The Mission urged entire families to 
move to those nations within the Caribbean area that were under-populated, willing to receive 
Haitians and, in the words of the Mission, “whose population is largely of the same stock as that 
of Haiti….”63 
 Despite the deficiencies of the Mission plan, it did create a template for the international 
coordination and integration of social and economic development. Given that this was the first 
time a number of the UN agencies had worked together on a project this massive and 
complicated, the Mission came quite close to what US President Harry Truman advocated under 
his “Point Four” concept of a “co-operative enterprise in which all nations work together through 
the United Nations and its specialized Agencies wherever practicable.”64 That alone should have 
sparked a fair degree of optimism for the future. Unfortunately, and because of the political 
instability that followed François Duvalier’s assumption of the presidency, the Mission achieved 
only limited results in Haiti, and most of these were quickly reversed or abandoned. The 
Mission’s recommendations would quickly fade into the realm of what might have been and 
 
62 UN Mission to Haiti. 
63 UN Mission to Haiti, 12. 
64 Craig N. Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 54. 
178 
 





The United States had hoped to stabilize Haiti and strengthen oligarchic control, but the 
U.S. occupation had failed to change political norms appreciably, having been itself a 
brutal dictatorship. In a sense, postponed by the U.S. occupation, the crisis of the 
‘traditional’ political system and political culture recurred, since none of the underlying 
causes for mass nonparticipation had been resolved.65 
- Haitian historian and Professor Emeritus Patrick Bellegarde-Smith 
 
 
 Key to this period was that the American presence in Haiti did not end until 1941 with 
the departure of the American Financial Advisor-General Receiver. Despite the appearance of 
having achieved fiscal sovereignty, Haiti would continue to be subject to US oversight and 
interference on projects funded through the American Export-Import Bank. That continued 
control foreshadowed the eventual substitution of NGOs as the means by which the US 
continued to control Haitian development activities. Further, projects like SHADA demonstrated 
the priority of US interests over Haitian. Not only was the project pushed through regardless of 
the damage done to peasant-controlled lands, it would eventually be abandoned when the 
requirement for natural rubber was reduced by new means of synthetic production.  
For promising projects like the fundamental education project in the Marbial Valley, 
there was a significant lack of cultural understanding of the relationship dynamic between the 
capital, Port-au-Prince, and outlying rural areas like the Marbial Valley. The will on the part of 
the Haitian national government to continue funding the project beyond the five-year mark was 
clearly absent. The international community through UNESCO showed no interest in forcing 
compliance with the agreement to provide that funding, nor was there any real ability to adjust to 
 
65 Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 124. 
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the shifting commitment. Instead, the project was allowed to flounder and eventually fail despite 
its early promise. It, too, highlighted an issue plaguing the international community and 
development in Haiti, that is, recognizing that for stable and lasting development, the 




Chapter Eight - The Duvalier Era 
 
His [Duvalier’s] aim was to placate the US government by presenting himself as a 
peaceful candidate who would establish a government of national unity, which would 
cooperate with all sectors of Haitian society. This neutralist strategy was especially 
designed for the American ambassador who had unequivocably (sic) shown pro-Déjoie 
sentiments.1 
- Professor of Anthropology Remy Anselme 
 
 At the time of François Duvalier’s election in 1957, American foreign policy in the 
Americas was obsessed with preventing the spread of communism. That preoccupation led to the 
US decision to refuse recognition to the short-lived provisional government of Pierre Eustache 
Daniel Fignolé (25 May to 14 June 1957) because of his socialist leanings.2 Earlier 
demonstrations led by Fignolé against Paul Eugène Magloire’s pro-US regime (1950 to 1956) 
led American officials to label him “a rabble-rouser” who appealed to the “masses and the rank 
and file of the Army….”3 None of that was surprising considering Fignolé’s leadership of the 
labour movement, Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan (MOP). 
 By undermining Fignolé’s mandate, the US began a cascade of events which were 
disastrous for Haiti. Because of his broad support and his personal appeal, Fignolé was “the only 
candidate with enough influence to stabilize the worsening situation” in Haiti, a situation which 
was spiraling out of control not in terms of violence, but more so from an economic point of 
 
1 Remy Anselme, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” Caribbean Studies 14, no. 2 (Jul. 1974): 55. 
2 Fignolé was profiled in The New York Times as “making no secret” of his socialist leanings, while denying being a 
communist. He was accused of making use of “an aroused populace” as a political weapon to spread “terror and 
destruction.” Matthew Smith also points out that traditional support from the US African American Congress 
members and from the African American leaders generally was missing largely because of their own preoccupations 
with the civil rights movement underway in the US. The African American press in the US was likewise missing in 
action as far as Haiti was concerned at this time, largely because of problems understanding the complex political 
and cultural shifts occurring in Haiti. See Smith, Red and Black in Haiti, 179-181. 
3 Magloire would flee the country in December 1956 when his attempt to prolong his presidency sparked strikes and 
demonstrations. Fignolé would become the fourth in a line of interim presidents that had been installed since the 
departure of Magloire. He had scheduled new elections within a month of his interim appointment. FRUS, 1955–
1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, Joan M. Lee, Delia 




view.4 Yet that refusal was not the worst of American interference. As Matthew Smith has 
pointed out, the US was already aware of a Haitian military plot to overthrow the new president!5 
The Eisenhower administration also questioned Fignolé’s willingness to provide “assurances 
regarding international obligations” to continue servicing Haiti’s foreign debt obligations.6 Those 
assurances, as Fignolé’s case showed, overrode those instances where the government was under 
threat of a coup. While anti-communism was understood as an important strategic consideration 
to secure the US Government’s acceptance of a Haitian government, a Haitian government’s 
enthusiasm towards its foreign obligations was as important and possibly more so.7 
As feared, Haitian Army commander, General Antonio Thrasybule Kébreau, quickly 
overthrew the Fignolé administration.8 Fignolé supporters, however, did not roll over following 
the coup. Instead, they took to the streets, staging widespread protests throughout Port-au-Prince. 
The Army’s response was swift and brutal. General Kébreau, a known Duvalier supporter, 
ordered the Army into the La Saline and Bel Air districts of Port-au-Prince. Once inside, the 
Army sprayed the neighborhoods indiscriminately with machine gun fire, killing an estimated 
300 Haitians.9 Making matters worse, not only did the US State Department not acknowledge the 
 
4 Smith, Red and Black in Haiti, 179. 
5 Smith, 181. 
6 FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, Joan 
M. Lee, Delia Pitts and Sherrill B. Wells (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 349. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d349. 
7 American government internal communications about Haitian regimes during this period recognized the significant 
role the US played in propping up infamous regimes through aid monies and foreign loans. Embassy staff, for 
example, pointed out in February 1955 that the Magloire presidency’s survival was directly tied to the loans and aid 
the US provided, going so far as to write “[i]n so far as the political picture is concerned the Embassy and the 
Department are of the opinion that the failure to receive adequate aid in the immediate future will leave Haiti in such 
a weakened economic situation that the stability of the Magloire regime will be threatened.” FRUS, 1955–1957, 
American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, Joan M. Lee, Delia Pitts 
and Sherrill B. Wells (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 339. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d339.  
8 Kébreau, a seminary student before switching careers and enlisting in the Army, was trained in the US at the US 
Army’s Infantry School as well as spending time at Fort Leavenworth. “Haiti’s Soldier Chief: Antonio Thrasybule 
Kebreau,” The New York Times, September 28, 1957. 
9 Sources for the number slaughtered during the two-day killing spree by the Army vary considerably; estimates 
from the opposition leaders, including Louis Déjoie differ. The New York Times places the number of dead at around 
182 
 
slaughter, the Eisenhower administration quickly extended formal recognition to the military 
junta led by General Kébreau within the week!10 
With the orchestrated removal of Fignolé from contention for the presidency, the contest 
in the upcoming elections boiled down to Louis Déjoie, a mulatto agricultural businessman and 
senator epitomizing the mulatto bourgeoisie versus the middle-class professional Dr. François 
Duvalier, a black physician and former Minister of Health and Labour under noiriste President 
Dumarsais Estimé (1946 to 1950), and Clément Jumelle, a less prominent independent 
moderate.11 Déjoie campaigned on a platform that “pledged rehabilitation” of Haiti’s weak 
economy and “intensive development” of Haiti’s agricultural sector.12 His own businesses 
including Établissements Agricoles et Industriels, employed several thousand Haitians. Déjoie 
was also involved in the HASCO project and credited with introducing the essential oils industry 
into southern Haiti.13  
 
300 whereas Matthew Smith quotes Carleton Beals, a reporter for The Nation, identifying the murdered at 476. See 
“Haiti’s Soldier Chief: Antonio Thrasybule Kebreau,” The New York Times, Sep 28 1957; and Smith, Red and Black 
in Haiti, 182.  
10 The quick recognition was identified in a July 1957 telegram from the Secretary of State to the US Ambassador in 
Haiti, stating the “Department concerned over continuing deterioration Haitian political and economic situation… 
While fully appreciating significance of fair and free elections Department would prefer recognition independent of 
election pledge from Junta. It is assumed that Junta if recognized would accept friendly advice on the subject as well 
as be prepared to cooperate in an aid and stabilization program of the nature clearly indicated. We cannot very well 
install an aid program without a recognized government to deal with and furthermore our recognition might 
conceivably strengthen the Junta’s position politically just enough to see it through into a calmer period when 
further progress could be expected [emphasis added].” FRUS, 1955–1957, American Republics: Multilateral; 
Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, Joan M. Lee, Delia Pitts and Sherrill B. Wells (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 354. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d354. 
11 Jumelle, a US trained economist, was the Secretary of State for Public Health and Public Works in the Magloire 
administration. He withdrew from the elections, claiming the vote had been rigged by Duvalier and went into hiding 
at the Cuban Embassy, fearing reprisals for his protests. Jumelle died of kidney failure on 11 April 1959, a few 
months after Duvalier’s Makoutes had assassinated his brothers. See Wien Weibert Arthus, “De l'affrontement à la 
reconciliation: François Duvalier et l'Église catholique (1957-1971),” Histoire, monde et cultures religieuses 1, no. 
29 (2014) : 61-82; Albin Krebs, « Papa Doc, a Ruthless Dictator, Kept the Haitians in Illiteracy and Dire Poverty,” 
The New York Times, 25 April 1971, www.nytimes.com; and “Former Haitian President Dead at 73,” Associated 
Press, 28 August 1986, www.apnews.com.  
12 Paul Kennedy, “Freed Politician to run in Haiti,” New York Times, Dec 17, 1956. 
13 Déjoie began vetiver production in the area of les Cayes. Pierre-Raymond Dumas, “Il y a 57 ans, Louis Déjoie 
…,” Le Nouvelliste, 26 Dec 2014. www.lenouvelliste.com.  
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In addition to business dealings, Déjoie had been quite active in Haitian politics. Just 
prior to the 1957 elections, he was released from prison after serving just under six months for 
his vocal criticisms of President Paul Magloire’s abysmal economic and agricultural 
development record. His criticism had culminated in the organization of worker strikes intended 
to paralyze Magloire’s government, tactics which echoed similar strike actions organized against 
the Élie Lescot regime late in 1946 and that of Dumarsais Estimé in 1950.  
Déjoie also led similar actions against interim leaders, Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis, in 
February 1957 and Franck Sylvain in March 1957, likewise targeting their unwillingness to 
undertake development work which Déjoie saw as obvious and essential to Haiti’s well-being. 
Those bona fides notwithstanding, Déjoie did not enjoy meaningful support outside Port-au-
Prince.14 Consequently, and despite his political action résumé, the peasantry saw Déjoie as a 
member of the mulatto elite who had cultivated American business partnerships in connection 
with his agri-businesses.15 The business connection with the Americans shaped his appearance as 
the presidential candidate with US support and approval, an image Duvalier exploited throughout 
the electoral campaign.  
Ironically, US support for Déjoie’s candidacy evaporated about a month prior to the 
elections.16 Unfortunately for Déjoie, his supporters were implicated in the 1957 bombing of the 
Casernes Dessalines in Port-au-Prince, an event which came close to driving Haiti over the brink 
 
14 Opposition to Déjoie came when he announced his bid for the presidency, “an act seen as an ominous return to 
‘mulatto rule’ that had dominated the presidencies under, and throughout the decade after the US occupation.” 
Carolyn Fick to author, 20 June 2019. Personal correspondence. 
15 Note that while Duvalier had likewise dealt with Americans, his dealings were on the humanitarian side of the 
house, through various US-sponsored health group who were active in the Caribbean. Notwithstanding the 
humanitarian nature of their business, such NGOs were often viewed with some suspicion. 
16 Matthew Smith points out that American support for Duvalier was important but came late in the election 
campaign and was the result of Duvalier and his Army supporters blackmailing the Americans into supporting his 
candidacy by threatening to torch the embassy. By contrast, Heinl and Heinl claimed that both the US AID director 
in Haiti and the American Episcopal bishop gave “ostentatious support” to Duvalier, which they claim helped 
Duvalier get elected. See Smith, Red and Black in Haiti, 183; and Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 582.  
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into civil war.17 This got the Americans’ dander up. Civil war was the nightmare which 
communist elements in Haiti might exploit to seize control of Haiti.18  
To reduce the likelihood of that scenario, the US shifted its support away from Déjoie 
and behind his rival, Duvalier, instead. Within Haiti, the September 1957 election of François 
Duvalier was seen as the “logical end-result of a power struggle between…the mulatto 
bourgeoisie and the emerging westernized black middle class.”19 Duvalier played up his noiriste 
background, and identified himself as “heir apparent” to the post-Estimé noiriste movement. At 
the same time, he found time to assuage American concerns over the likelihood of “radical 
reformism.”20 With Déjoie’s fall from grace, Duvalier came to represent for the Americans what 
Patrick Bellegarde-Smith has termed the “political maturity” of the Haitian middle class. That 




The Start of the Duvalier Era 
 
A more fundamental source of public apprehension stems from the increasingly obvious 
domination of the civil Government by the Army under Chief of Staff General 
Kebreau…General Kebreau seems satisfied to exercise rule through personal domination 
of the President and his Ministers. It is generally conceded that President Duvalier would 
not long stay in office without Army support and that on the other hand the Army could 
not long rule without the reasonably popular President as its front man. The uneasy 
 
17 The Caserne Dessalines was an army barracks built in 1921 and located in the capital, next to, and behind, the 
National Palace. Under Duvalier, the Caserne housed the Volontaires de Sécurité Nationale (VSN) with part of it 
used as a prison and interrogation centre. 
18 See Smith, Red and Black in Haiti, 178. 
19 Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 41. 
20 Remy, 161, 183. Note that Marvin Chochotte has made a convincing argument that while Duvalier was a noiriste 
in his ideology, he nonetheless shifted towards a class-based populism during the presidential campaign which 
manifested itself in his justice sociale framework of public works built around peasant requirements. See Marvin 
Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in Haiti,” 
(PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2017), 87. 
21 Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, ''Class Struggle in Contemporary Haitian Politics: An Interpretive Study of the 
Campaign of 1957,'' Journal of Caribbean Studies 2, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 122-23. 
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alliance between the two does not add to the public’s estimation of the permanence or 
objectivity of the present regime.22 
- US Ambassador to Haiti Gerald A. Drew 
 
 Barely a week into his presidency, Duvalier was forced to deal with a crisis involving the 
death of Mr. Shibley Jean Talamas, a Haitian-born member of a prominent Syrian family in Haiti 
who also enjoyed US citizenship. Talamas was killed by the Haitian police while in their 
custody. He was suspected of involvement in the deadly Kenscoff police station attack, which 
resulted in the killing of four police officers.23 His death from beating during his interrogation 
was horrific enough, but what made this murder particularly problematic from the perspective of 
American-Haitian foreign relations was that Talamas had taken refuge with US consulate 
authorities and had been convinced by consular officials to surrender for questioning by the 
police after the consular officials had received assurances from the Haitian government that he 
would not be mistreated.24  
While the killing of Talamas occurred prior to Duvalier assuming office, and despite 
Duvalier not being responsible for the killing, the attempted cover-up of the death did fall within 
Duvalier’s term as president. American officials, already outraged by the death, were furious 
over the pressure brought against the Haitian medical coroner who subsequently issued a death 
certificate, claiming Talamas died of natural causes (heart attack) despite incontrovertible 
 
22 FRUS, 1955-1957, American Republics: Multilateral; Mexico; Caribbean, Volume VI, eds. N. Stephen Kane, 
Joan M. Lee, Delia Pitts and Sherrill B. Wells (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1987), Document 359. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v06/d359. 
23 The Kenscoff police station attackers showed up at the station and asked for assistance from the officers on duty. 
They claimed they had been enroute to the hospital with a woman about to give birth, when their car broke down. 
The duty officer unlocked the station to allow them to access the station’s phone at which point they pushed their 
way inside and opened fire on the officers, killing four before fleeing. Tragically for Talamas, his wife had gone into 
labour the same night and Talamas had rushed her to the hospital. However, he was found to have been outside his 
residence without approved documentation during the hours of the military-mandated curfew then in effect. See the 
Haitian Sun, October 6, 1957, 1,12. www.ufdc.ufl.edu. 
24 See Elizabeth Abbott, Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988), 
76-7; and FRUS, Document 359. 
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evidence of a savage beating.25 The Eisenhower administration was quick to respond, launching 
an official protest over the beating death and attempted cover-up, as well as suspending three 
major technical aid programs and recalling Ambassador Gerald Drew in protest. They demanded 
immediate action by Duvalier to resolve the Talamas case quickly and satisfactorily. 
 Despite American indignation, and fortuitously for Duvalier, a determined US focus on 
the importance of supporting regimes believed to be anti-communist and more so those capable 
of ensuring that foreign debt obligations were met, almost immediately triumphed over 
humanitarian principles related to life and liberty. In February 1958, the Talamas case was 
considered resolved as far as American officials were concerned, with an apology from Duvalier 
for the death of Talamas, as well as the courts martial of two of the Haitian police officers 
involved in his death and a one-time payment of US$100,000 to Talamas’ widow and infant son, 
who had fled Haiti to Ohio following his death. The widow pointedly termed the payment 
“completely inadequate.” Nonetheless, and not without considerable unease, the Eisenhower 
administration re-established relations with Duvalier shortly thereafter, and dispatched 
Ambassador Drew back to Haiti.26 
American aid continued to roll into Duvalier’s Haiti, including the resumption in 1958 of 
several technical aid programs for the Haitian Army. Likewise, the US Navy put Haiti back on 
its approved list for naval port calls for recreational purposes. Yet despite restarting aid, the US 
Embassy was already voicing concerns over human rights and the Duvalier regime. Ambassador 
 
25 Time magazine reported that Washington sent Haiti a diplomatic note charging Haitian authorities with covering 
up Talamas’s death: the note read “murder by beating . . . particularly repugnant because repeated assurances were 
given that Talamas would not be mistreated.” “Haiti: Murder by Beating,” Time, October 14, 1957. 




Drew wrote the State Department in June 1958, not long into Duvalier’s rule, expressing his 
frustration through a frank and unreserved condemnation of Duvalier:  
I find myself becoming increasingly repelled by the thought of a mission here when the 
jails are crammed with political prisoners . . .; when defeated candidates . . . are beaten, 
tortured and hounded into exile; when a restrained opposition press has been ruthlessly 
snuffed out of existence; and when masked night riders . . . operate from their 
headquarters in the National Palace.27 
 
Unfortunately, and despite continuing to raise concerns about Duvalier throughout his 
residency, Drew’s pronouncements did not receive much attention. A month after Drew’s 
condemnation, a coup attempt would lead to even more American military support.28 An 
unsuccessful July 1958 coup would lead to the Eisenhower administration apologising for the US 
adventurists who formed part of the coup party. That apology would signal confirmation of the 
importance of Duvalier as a source of stability and strength vis-à-vis Eisenhower’s foreign policy 
and trumped those in the US administration like Drew who had voiced their opposition to 
Duvalier because of his horrendous human rights violations.29  
In addition to Eisenhower’s apology for what Duvalier termed “an act of international 
brigandage,” the US administration decided to establish a US Marine training mission.30 The 
 
27 US Ambassador to Haiti, Ambassador Drew, cited in FRUS, 1958–1960, American Republics, Volume V, eds. N. 
Stephen Kane and Paul Claussen (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1991), Document 309. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v05/d309. 
28 The July 1958, coup attempt, led by then-exiled Captain Alix Pasquet, a Haitian member of the famous Tuskegee 
Airmen and a Haitian Second World War hero, featured an aircraft, loaded with guns, ammunition and men, 
departing Miami enroute to Haiti. On board was a party consisting of Pasquet, two other former Haitian Army 
Lieutenants, two ex-Dade County (Florida) deputy sheriffs and three other Americans. The group failed to lay any 
groundwork for support from opposition in Haiti and was quickly put down by the Haitian Army which killed seven 
of the coup members including Pasquet. Life magazine reported on the abortive coup in its 11 August 1958 issue: a 
Haitian government minister was anonymously quoted in the article having stated in the coup’s aftermath that 
Ambassador Drew should be recalled because “he is going too far in our internal affairs.”  See New York Times, 29-
30 July 1958. Cited in Wien Weibert Arthus, “The Omnipresence of Communism in the US-Haitian Relations under 
Eisenhower and Duvalier” (George Washington University.edu, 23 April 2010), 3. 
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/Arthus_cwc.pdf; and Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 
1959-1963, 20. 
29 Arthus, “The Omnipresence of Communism,” 3. 
30 The initial approval as of 23 September 1958 by US Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy was for a 
temporary Marine training mission. That temporary mission was contingent upon later approval of a permanent 
Marine training mission which was eventually approved as 24 December 1958. See Louis Galambos and Daun Van 
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mission was established as a US Naval Mission and was charged with the mission of de-
politicizing the Forces Armées d’Haiti (FAd’H).31 While Duvalier wanted the Mission to train 
his Makoutes, US Marine Colonel Robert Heinl, the Mission’s commander, argued instead that 
his mission to “revitalize” the FAd’H was more akin to state-building: 
Haiti's armed forces are not only the fulcrum of the country's internal stability but also an 
important agency for progress. Besides police work, they deal with communications, 
rural medicine service, immigrations, prisons, lighthouse service, the national airline, 
coast guard, and commercial ship-repair. My job was to help the Haitian military to do 
these jobs better and at the same time get them back into trim as a fighting force capable 
of holding off coups at home as well as adventures by Fidel Castro.32 
 
The 69-man strong Navy/Marine mission was not novel nor was it planned solely as a 
result of the coup.33 As mission commander until declared persona non grata and expelled in 
1963, Colonel Heinl pointed to several similar missions having been established throughout the 
1940s and 1950s. He saw them as the “sleepy predecessor[s] to that [Naval Mission] established 
in [Haiti] in 1959.”34  
Yet Duvalier did not stop with the Naval Mission. He very cannily linked the attempted 
coup with an international community conspiracy he argued was aimed at Haiti and other nations 
 
Ee, eds., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: Keeping the Peace, Vol 19 (The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001), 811; and Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 23. 
31 The US Marines at this time were a service under the command and control of the US Navy, which meant the 
training mission, given its international nature, was a Navy Mission despite being manned and run by Marines. 
32 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 619. Heinl’s ‘dream’ of the FAdH being involved in his vision of development 
and being an agent for progress would not come to pass. The Haitian Army continued to be employed as an agency 
countering Haitian democratic development. 
33 The mission had been identified at least a month prior to the coup attempt and had drawn considerable opposition 
from US Ambassador Drew who was not enamoured with Duvalier and his ruthless methods. Heinl and Heinl, 606. 
34 Heinl and Heinl, 602, 620. The Naval mission, although overwhelming manned by Marines, remained a Naval 
mission because of the earlier presence of the senior service (the US Navy) which had been providing military 
assistance to the Haitian Coast Guard. When the Marines arrived, the two missions were rolled into one under 
Marine command. There was an Air Force mission as well, commanded by an Air Force colonel. It, like the other 
missions, was rolled under the overall command of the new American Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG 
– stood up and commanded by Heinl upon his arrival) which was given responsibility for coordinating all the service 
missions into “a coherent military assistance plan for Haiti within the framework of the Haitian-American Common 
Defense Plan of January 1955.” See Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 61-2. 
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in the region, and requested assistance in combatting communist “henchmen.”35 In addition to 
the Marine training mission, Duvalier was able to convince the American officials to release 
US$3.5 million in economic and development aid monies to Haiti that had been frozen prior to 
the coup attempt.36 The funds were rumoured to have subsequently disappeared into the 
president’s accounts.37 
Duvalier was able to further bolster his anti-communist position when Fidel Castro and 
his communist government took control of Cuba and promptly began a radio campaign against 
the Duvalier regime, calling for “all revolutionary sectors and citizens to unite in opposition to 
the Government of Haiti.” That early radio campaign would eventually be followed up by an 
attempted invasion of Cuban revolutionaries, launched from Cuba in August 1959. The Cuban 
invasion of Haiti on 12 August surprised both the Haitians and the US Marines then deployed as 
part of the training mission.38 The Marines were quick to respond. Colonel Robert Heinl, 
accompanied by key staff, met with the Haitian Army Commander and his staff. At the same 
time, the US Marine junior leaders headed to the main Haitian Army caserne in Port-au-Prince to 
organize the soldiers for an armed response.39 
 
35 US Naval mission planners determined that a potential roadblock to the mission was funding. As a Military 
Assistance Program (MAP), legislation did not allow the mission to be funded because the Haitian Armed Forces’ 
“main function” was internal security. However, a loophole did allow funding of a MAP mission if communism was 
threatening the country. Fortunately for the US, Arthus points out that Duvalier saw the Cold War as “a window of 
opportunity” and not as requiring a commitment on his part within the larger US Soviet ideological conflict, 
meaning he was not above exploiting communism for the desired Naval mission. See Williamson, 21; and Arthus, 
“The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 504. 
36 Louis Galambos, ed., The Paper of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol 19 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2001), 1048f4 
37 Mats Lundahl, “Papa Doc: Innovator in the Predatory State,” Scandia 50 (1989), 56-7. 
38 In hindsight, the invasion could be traced to several events including the June 1959 assassination attempt on the 
Cuban Ambassador in Port-au-Prince by forces traced back to Clément Barbot, Duvalier’s head of the Tonton 
Makoutes.  Additionally, Duvalier appeared friendly with Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo who had 
already been the target of one invasion attempt by Castro. 
39 At the time of the Cuban invasion, Captain Charles Williamson was an Advisor-Instructor under Heinl’s 
command. He was directly involved in the Marine response. The material in this section draw from his account. His 
account is found in Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 69-73. 
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Marine involvement in the counter-invasion activities were restricted to organization of 
the Haitian Army response and the provision of intelligence from at least one aerial (helicopter) 
reconnaissance made of the landing zone and the areas into which the Cuban landing party had 
ventured. That limited assistance proved to be valuable as did the reconnaissance flights as they 
guided the response, allowing the manhunt for the invasion party to succeed, albeit requiring ten 
days to eventually hunt down and kill all the Cuban invaders.40 At the same time, the American 
refusal to become directly involved in combatting the Cuban invasion would sour relations with 
Duvalier and his supporters. Williamson wrote that the Naval Mission was “damned if we do and 
damned if we don’t.” Colonel Heinl’s refusal to allow the Mission members to become involved 
in more than aerial reconnaissance, and of course readying the FAdH to deal with the 
emergency, would undermine the Mission’s credibility, something that quickly became apparent 
to the Mission members. The backlash, which came quite quickly, manifested itself in the overt 
animosity of Haitian soldiers as well as Haitian government obstruction as the Americans sought 
to fulfill their mission mandate. 
  Duvalier would continue to manipulate the US, employing the threat of communism 
when needed, and for quite some time, emphasizing that narrative resonated with the 
Americans.41 Between 1957 and 1963, Haiti received over US$60 million in the form of grants 
and loans from the United States.42 That compared very favourably to the US$40 million Haiti 
 
40 Williamson’s account differed from that of Colonel Heinl, the Mission Commander. Heinl stated in his account 
that the Mission Marines were involved in combat. Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 71. 
41 The June 1960 speech given by Duvalier in Jacmel, known as the ‘Cri de Jacmel,’ became the best example of 
Duvalier’s naked campaigning for additional aid money. The speech at the dedication, ironically, of a new wharf 
paid for with US aid funds, has been described as Duvalier straddling the fence between maintaining Marxist 
support while demanding American assistance without imposed conditions or without Duvalier extorting American 
aid in return for not embracing either non-aligned status or the far left socialist/communist camp. See, for example, 
Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier, 220-21; or Arthus, “The Omnipresence of Communism.” 
42 Terry Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state building in Haiti under the Duvaliers, Aristide, Préval, and 
Martelly,” United Nations University, WIDER Working Paper No. 2013/104, October 2013, 11; and Jean-Claude 
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received between the end of the Second World War in 1945 and Duvalier’s election in 1957.43 
The aid allowed Haiti to weather the fallout from the collapse of the international coffee market 
in 1959.44 Yet it is important to understand that Duvalier had structured and run his regime in 
such a manner that he could survive with or without foreign aid. Foreign aid was not critical to 
his hold on power. 
 To understand the nuances of Duvalier’s use of foreign aid, an examination of his 
embezzlement techniques is warranted. Much of the military aid that flowed into Haiti paid the 
salaries of American servicemen and arrived in the form of equipment transfers, neither of which 
allowed the Duvalier regime to embezzle the payments. In addition, foreign aid was usually 
handled by outside agencies – now by NGOs – and not directly by the Haitian government, 
further blocking embezzlement opportunities. Embezzlement and graft occurred in those spheres 
but was usually difficult to arrange and required considerable planning to effect. 
 Instead, Duvalier’s embezzlement techniques were accomplished by inflating the number 
of workers employed on an aid project, with the extra funds siphoned into Duvalier-controlled 
bank accounts. Alternately, the price of supplies would be inflated in terms of price or quality, 
with the proceeds pocketed. Duvalier employed traditional means of graft many having already 
been employed by previous Haitian presidents (plus he invented a few of his own). President 
Salomon, for example, was implicated in the Afffaire des mandats, which involved BNRH debt 
markers being presented to the bank for payment twice and, when caught, claimed innocent 
 
Gerlus, “The Effects of the Cold War on US-Haiti's Relations,” Journal of Haitian Studies 1, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 
36. 
43 Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 614n 28. The total World Bank investment during the Duvalier era (1956 to 
1986) has been set at US$489 million. Terry Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state building in Haiti under the 
Duvaliers, Aristide, Préval, and Martelly,” United Nations University, WIDER Working Paper No. 2013/104, 
October 2013, 12. 
44 FRUS, Document 309. 
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mistakes in accounting had caused the gaffe.45 That creativity notwithstanding, Duvalier took 
embezzlement and swindling to a new level, and built theft into a government industry. 
 The centrepiece of Duvalier’s economic strategy became the government tobacco 
monopoly, the Régie du Tabac et des Allumettes, originally created by President Dumarsais 
Estimé (1946-1950) as an unregulated and off-the-books taxation agency. Duvalier expanded the 
role of the Régie to collect national taxes on everything from cigarettes and matches, to sugar, 
cement, flour, soap and beer along with a host of other consumer products.46 Duvalier then used 
the misappropriated funds to pay for, among other items, the Tonton Makoutes. The stolen tax 
monies were deposited in the Banque Commerciale d’Haïti, a private concern owned by a 
Duvalier supporter, Clémard Joseph Charles, later arrested by Duvalier and exiled.47 The Régie 
du Tabac allowed Duvalier freedom of movement by freeing him from dependency on foreign 
aid, but transferred the regime’s dependency onto the backs of his citizens. 
Duvalier also developed other mechanisms and schemes. For example, he struck deals 
with the Dominican Republic and other nations to supply an annual migration of Haitian workers 
(mainly sugar cane cutters) for plantation work, collecting a fee for each worker that likewise 
found its way into his Banque Commerciale accounts.48 A host of additional involuntary taxes 
became the law of the land, again with proceeds flowing into Duvalier’s coffers. In 1961, 
Duvalier authorized a state lottery requiring participation – the lottery never publicized the grand 
 
45 Hans C. Blomqvist and Mats Lundahl, The Distorted Economy (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), 240-1. 
46 Claire A Payton., “Building Corruption in Haiti,” NACLA Report on the Americas 51, no. 2, (2019): 184-187. 
Haitians were identified as the most heavily taxed people in the Americas. 
47 See Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 588, 645, 654; and Prosper Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 176. 
In 1980, after release from jail, Charles was granted asylum by the US and settled in New York City. In 1989, he 
was arrested, along with three others, on charges of embezzlement of tens of millions of dollars through a bank 
mortgage fraud he ran out of his luxury apartment. 
48 By 1982, the contracts with the Dominican Republic set up by François Duvalier were netting around US$2 
million for Jean-Claude Duvalier. See Richard J. Meislin, “Haitian Labor: Dominicans Rely on it,” The New York 
Times, August 30, 1982. 
193 
 
prize winners. Despite flowing into the family coffers, Duvalier used most of this graft and 
corruption to buy the loyalty of his Tonton Makoutes.49 
The Nexus between the Tonton Makoutes and American Aid Money 
 
Yon ti bonnonm k ap jwe  
Grenpe sou yon branch bwa  
Manman I di I pitit desann la a  
Yon tonton makout ki t ap pase mande I  
Ou vle m fè I desann pou ou  
li rale revòlvè I ti touye ti nèg la. 
 
A boy was going to play  
He climbed out on a tree branch  
His mama told him to come down  
A passing tonton makout asked her  
"Do you want me to bring him down for you"  
He drew his pistol and killed the boy.50 
- Haitian poet René Philoctète 
 Two factors played a role in the 1962 US suspension of the majority of its aid to the 
Duvalier regime.51 First, Duvalier’s exiled opponents directed attention in Washington to the 
connection between Duvalier’s justice sociale program and its role in land grants and land 
redistribution program to peasants, tying the redistribution to socialism, a grave sin at the time 
because of American concerns about Cuba and Castro. Second, they also underscored the 
regime’s lack of economic expertise.52 The development of Duvalier’s justice sociale strategy -- 
 
49 Claire A. Payton, “Building Corruption in Haiti,” NACLA Report on the Americas 51, no. 2, (2019): 182-187. 
Trouillot points out that after Duvalier had eliminated the many possible leaders within society like military officers, 
professionals and others, “the number of pretenders to political leadership” was considerably reduced. The 
organization of the Makoutes then “neutralized the potential for mass revolt” by creating a hierarchical system based 
upon “divide and conquer.” Much like the colonial slave system, Duvalier corrupted those towards the bottom of the 
social hierarchy by offering them status at the expense of becoming informers on peers, friends, and family. 
Trouillot terms the system invoked by Duvalier as “auto-neutralization” because threats were quickly defused by 
opponents seeking greater status within the dog-eat-dog system. Yet “auto-neutralization” was even more sinister. 
It was not just that threats from within could be defused through betrayals, etc. of individuals seeking greater status. 
Duvalier’s systematized reign of terror and fear became so generalized throughout the population that ordinary 
Haitians, ostensibly or even falsely claiming duvalierist links, could terrorize their fellow Haitians.  In this way 
“auto-neutralization” engulfed the entire society. See Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, 155-56. 
50 “Tonton Makout/Tonton Makout” Callaloo 15, no. 3 (Haitian Literature and Culture, Part 2, Summer, 1992): 673-
4.  
51 Some aid was continued, including US$1.5 million for the UN malaria program then ongoing in Haiti. See Albin 
Krebs, “Papa Doc, a Ruthless Dictator, Kept the Haitians in Illiteracy and Dire Poverty,” The New York Times, April 
23, 1971, www.nytimes.com.  
52 The US was also concerned about Duvalier’s human rights abuses, but it is unclear if those played a factor in the 
aid suspension debate. 
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largely a blueprint for public works within the agricultural sector -- generated peasant support for 
Duvalier. It also served to “augment the national economy that relied heavily on peasant 
production” by targeting rural infrastructure for improvement to “augment state revenue and 
strengthen [state] control over the peasant economy.”53 The example of the construction of the 
Artibonite Valley dam and a connected irrigation system upgrade and expansion offers a good 
example of one such project which required significant foreign aid to complete.54 
That strategy was thrown into disarray by the Kennedy administration’s October 1961 
decision to cut American aid suspension, which forced Duvalier to develop an alternative if he 
was to remain in power. That alternative took the form of a peasant-manned milice civile [civil 
militia].55 The milice had been created in the aftermath of the doomed July, 1958, coup attempt 
as a security service loyal and responsive only to Duvalier.56 Marvin Chochotte argues that the 
militia was created then “as a way to institutionalize popular support in the countryside before 
withering away along with US aid.”57 The militia not only empowered Haitian peasants 
 
53 Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in 
Haiti,” 94-5. 
54 Chochotte outlines in detail the program and its goals, as well as the means by which it was undermined, noting 
that much of US foreign aid during this period was going towards development projects which formed the heart of 
Duvalier’s program. Chochotte, 85-107. 
55 Prosper Avril identified Pasquet’s coup attempt as the moment when Duvalier created the milice. He witnessed 
the spontaneous response by “Duvalierist militants” who raced to the National Palace to respond and protect their 
president and decided to operationalize that type of response nationwide instead of “setting-up the independent 
police force foreseen by the 1957 Constitution.” (Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 135.)  The creation of a popular 
militia in support of an authoritarian regime has been a long-established tactic for maintaining power used by 
various groups including the Chinese Communists under Mao, and of course, Castro in Cuba. See Chochotte, “The 
History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in Haiti,” 104, 109-10. 
56 Trouillot points out that Duvalier, as Chief of State, had created a flat hierarchy in which power was enjoyed only 
by those with a direct connection to the Chief of State. In his creation, Duvalier was “the only actor. One spoke 
either in his name or against him.” That binary was intended to prevent the creation of hierarchies and with them, 
challengers to the authority of the Chief of State. See Chapter 6 of Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation. 




individually through membership and responsibilities, it also made them loyal to Duvalier as 
president.58 
 The foundations of the milice civile lay within les cagoulards, who were a group of 
armed thugs working for Duvalier during his election campaign. In addition to personal security, 
Duvalier used them surreptitiously to intimidate Haitians during the election campaign. They had 
also functioned as spies for Duvalier to gather information on opponents and others who were 
viewed as obstacles to his election.59 They became an auxiliary force to the Haitian army, called 
out to support the army in case of an emergency like the July 1958 coup.60 
The Cuban landing in Haiti on August 13, 1959, provided the first test for the new 
organization. The 30-man Cuban armed party of barbudos [bearded revolutionaries] were all 
killed or captured by the army and assisted by milice members.61 Following that success, 
Duvalier implemented the next stage in the transformation of the milice. He directed the milice to 
present a select few members, in their old police or army uniforms, as part of the Army cohort to 
undergo training conducted by the Marine mission. Not surprising, most of the milice members 
who showed up for the Marine training were indistinguishable from the Army members. Butch 
Ashton, an American in Haiti at the time, claimed that the Marines conducting the military 
assistance training saw through the deception but could not do anything about it.62  
In August 1960, Duvalier displayed the milice as a formed, trained unit for the first time 
in a public parade. Marvin Chochotte called the decision “an audacious response to the 
 
58 Chochotte notes that Duvalier “portrayed the creation of the militia as an act to restore the militarized political 
order which previously provided peasants with the means to defend their interests.” Chochotte, 108. 
59 Patrick Sylvain has identified the cagoulards as having become Duvalier’s “Detective Services (SD).” That 
designation would be consistent with reports of an espionage function during Duvalier’s first election campaign. See 
Patrick Sylvain, “The Macoutization of Haitian Politics.” From Kate Quinn and Paul Sutton, eds., Politics and 
Power in Haiti (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 73-4. 
60 Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 114-15.  
61 Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 136. 
62 Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 30-1.  
196 
 
temporary suspension of US aid and mounting opposition by exiled political groups.”63 
Interestingly, while the Duvalier regime claimed the parade honoured the second anniversary of 
the milice, Chochotte argues no one had heard of the organization prior to that point, leading to 
one of two possibilities. Either the second anniversary announcement was misleading, and the 
milice was new, which was unlikely; or, more likely, the parade “marked a new phase in the 
militia’s buildup from an urban to a rural-based militia,” a scenario which also explained the 
transition from the cagoulards (mainly urban-based) to the milice (country-wide).64 
John F. Kennedy’s election to the US presidency and move into the White House in 
January 1961, signalled the adoption of a new strategy towards Duvalier, one that would prove to 
be contradictory. While Kennedy’s policy was, like Eisenhower’s, oriented towards preventing 
communism from gaining a foothold in Latin America and the Caribbean, he disagreed with 
Eisenhower’s pragmatic approach to dictators like Duvalier.  
Eisenhower’s foreign policy towards Latin America recognized that “[t]here is a trend 
towards nationalist regimes…” within the region and that: 
“[a] realistic and constructive approach to this need which recognizes the importance of 
bettering conditions for the general population, is essential to arrest the drift in the area 
toward radical and nationalistic regimes. The growth of nationalism is facilitated by 
historic anti-US prejudices and exploited by Communists.”65   
 
Eisenhower built his ‘realistic and constructive’ approach around the dollar diplomacy 
strategy, seeking to build dependence in dictatorial regimes like Duvalier’s by fostering 
economic development through loan programs from the Export-Import Bank, “accelerating and 
 
63 See Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in 
Haiti,” 104. 
64 Chochotte.  
65 FRUS, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV, eds. N. Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr. 




increasing…as a necessary supplement to foreign private investment.”66 At the same time, 
Eisenhower made it clear that dollar diplomacy did not include either development aid or the 
promotion of political democracy. 
Kennedy shifted away from Eisenhower’s approach and sought to balance, 
unsuccessfully, anti-communism with an emphasis on long-term economic development linked 
to social progress.67 The centrepiece of Kennedy’s new foreign policy was the “Alliance for 
Progress” economic assistance program which he announced on March 13, 1961. The program 
linked economic assistance to political democracy, economic growth, and social justice and was 
also referred to as the Marshall Plan for Latin America. The program presented a dilemma as far 
as Haiti was concerned. On the one hand, some Kennedy advisors advocated for continued 
support to Duvalier as his dictatorship was understood not to be harming the United States 
directly and his removal from power might open the door to a Castro-style communist takeover 
of the nation. They believed that foreign aid through the Alliance for Progress would be the most 
likely means by which to control Duvalier. Their opponents, however, pushed an agenda which 
called for Duvalier to be further isolated and removed from power.68  
Kennedy quickly made it clear that he did not support Duvalier because of his human 
rights record and would not provide foreign aid if that helped his regime hold onto power. At the 
same time, he held onto the more pragmatic view that actively working to remove Duvalier from 
power was dangerous because of the communist threat of a takeover. In the end, Kennedy 
 
66 Key to Eisenhower’s approach to Latin America and the Caribbean was to work through the OAS in order to 
avoid direct confrontation or violence. See FRUS, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV, eds. N. 
Stephen Kane and William F. Sanford, Jr. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), Document 1-13. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v04/ch1. 
67 While Kennedy was able to rationalize foreign aid by centralizing it through one agency, the newly created 
Agency for Aid Development or US AID, and created the new Peace Corps initiative worldwide, he offset that 
progress with the Bay of Pigs fiasco, sending a contradictory message within the region. 
68 Arthus, “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 506-7. 
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elected to issue strategic guidance that straddled the fence. His administration would “continue to 
live with the Duvalier regime so long as there is no acceptable alternative” while, at the same 
time, he would “[c]onsciously direct US policy toward the development of a better alternative; to 
this end increase the flow of intelligence information and identify elements and individuals 
acceptable to the US as the nucleus of a successor government.”69 Kennedy’s strategists quickly 
focussed on the Haitian Army as that viable alternative.70 Discovering the means by which it was 
to be controlled and readied for its revolutionary role became a task of the US Naval Mission.71 
Yet, Duvalier foresaw the use of the Army as a revolutionary force against his regime and 
began measures to marginalize the military as soon as he took office. He forced the retirement of 
key senior leaders and re-assigned others to positions from which they could not influence 
Haitian politics.72 Further, over the years, Duvalier purged the Army of any officers trained by 
 
69 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor 
Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 370. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d370.  
70 American policy stated that the US sought the “[d]evelopment of a more reliable, constructive and respected 
military establishment to fulfill its constitutional role,” which translated into: “[c]ontinue to provide Haiti with the 
type and quantities of military assistance believed to be required in order to maintain constitutional law and order, 
giving consideration to the recommendations developed by the country team in consultation with the special inter-
departmental team which was recently sent to Central America to assess the internal security situation of each 
country.” FRUS, Document 370. 
71 The US Naval Mission, discussed earlier in the chapter, operated from 1959 to 1963, when Duvalier demanded it 
withdraw from Haiti. During its time in Haiti, the mission statement included the task of providing the Haitian Army 
with “mobile tactical units capable of being integrated, if necessary, with the units called upon to provide for the 
defense of the Western Hemisphere…[and] trained in the tactical employment of light modern weapons.” Charles T. 
Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 14. 
72 For example, General Kébreau, fired by Duvalier in 1958 for failing to transfer several Army officers, would later 
be effectively exiled from Haiti when Duvalier appointed him Ambassador to Italy and the Vatican in 1961. Even in 
that role Kébreau was considered too great a threat and Duvalier reportedly had him poisoned in 1963. Harris M. 
Lentz, Heads of States and Governments since 1945 (London: Routledge, 1996), 356. 
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the Marines during the US occupation.73 Those who replaced them were younger, inexperienced, 
and “not readily inclined to listen to a Marine Corps Mission.”74 
 By March 1961, the Kennedy government was willing to lift the aid suspension and 
offered an “integrated aid program,” subject to Duvalier restoring a “satisfactory” relationship 
with the United States.75 Washington offered the aid package despite Duvalier’s “heavy-handed 
suppression of a student strike” and expulsion of several Catholic priests.76 Kennedy’s 
 
73 While Duvalier’s purge of the Army, as horrific as it was, sounds logically based, there were instances of 
grotesque absurdities. The Affair des 19 stands out as perhaps the worst instance. In 1966, Duvalier’s daughters were 
married, one to Max Dominique whom Duvalier subsequently promoted to Colonel, and the other to Luc-Albert 
Foucard. Foucard’s sister, Francesca Foucard Saint-Victor was Duvalier’s private secretary and, according to 
Elizabeth Abbott, his mistress. The two families became bitter rivals, with each side seeking to vilify the other in the 
eyes of Duvalier. A series of bombs in 1967 during Duvalier’s birthday celebrations provided the Foucard faction 
with the means to destroy Dominique and his supporters. Those officers stationed in the capital who were friends 
and supporters of Colonel Dominique were demoted and transferred out of the city. Three weeks after their transfers 
out of the city, Duvalier ordered them back to the capital. Once back, they were tried for treason and mutiny and, on 
June 7, 1967, were found guilty by a military tribunal. They were sentenced to death by firing squad. The following 
day, the 19 were taken to Fort Dimanche and tied to stakes at the Army’s rifle range. Dominique and a number of 
other members of the Haitian Army general staff had been ordered to the range, in the apparent belief that they were 
expected to witness the gruesome event. Once at the range, however, Duvalier ordered Dominique and the other 
general staff officers to take the loaded rifles offered and, on his command, they shot the condemned men. Prosper 
Avril, a witness to the execution, later wrote, “It was one of the harshest lessons that the political power ever 
inflicted on the Haitian military. Francois Duvalier had succeeded in enslaving the Haitian Army to the point of 
making it its own torturer.” The execution was not the end of the affair, however. Duvalier also ordered a purge of 
potential Dominique supporters from Dominique’s hometown of Cap Haïtien, as well as a partial purge of the 
Makoutes in Port-au-Prince. The executions and the purges served to shake the more progressive elements of Haitian 
society and instilled a great deal of fear amongst the Haitian population. Abbott points to over 100 Makoutes and 
Duvalierists sought asylum in the wake of the horrifying events. See Abbott, Haiti, 142-46; and Avril, From Glory 
to Disgrace, 150-173. For a graphic account including the firsthand account of a firefighter called in to clean up the 
blood and remains following the execution, see Bernard Diderich, Le prix du sang. La réistance du peuple haïtien à 
la tyrannie. Tome 1 : Duvalier (1957-1971), (Éditions H. Deschamps : Port-au-Prince, 2005), 26-31. 
74 Years later, former President Prosper Avril claimed Duvalier’s purge of the Army in the wake of Pasquet’s failed 
coup led to the loss of more than 80 percent of its superior officers, many of whom were forcibly exiled. See Avril, 
From Glory to Disgrace, 131; and Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 19. 
75 FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor 
Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 365. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d365.  
76 The expulsion of the Catholic priests took place between 1959 and 1961 and was part of the Duvalier war on the 
Church and its position within Haitian society, particularly its control over education. Duvalier attempted to replace 
those expelled with Haitian replacements of his choosing to further his noiriste ideology, but the Church refused to 
allow the positions to be filled with Duvalier’s choices. The Church stated the positions were considered “seda [sic] 
plena” or full. The Church would sign a revision to the concordat with Duvalier in 1966, allowing him to name 
archbishops and bishops subject to the approval of the Holy See. In 1959, Haiti had 110 Haitian priests versus 180 
Frenchmen, 40 Canadians and Americans, and 20 Belgians. Greene, 111-114, 126nn.292, 295. For an excellent 
overview of the war between Duvalier and the Catholic church, see Greene, The Catholic Church in Haiti, 111-17; 
and Nicholls, “Politics and Religion in Haiti,” 400-414. 
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willingness to work with Duvalier despite his horrendous human rights record arose from 
Duvalier’s anti-communism and Kennedy’s realization that the problem of containing Cuba was 
far more onerous a task without Haiti and other nations in the region making “our general 
Caribbean situation more difficult.”77 
 In September 1961, American policy guidance towards Duvalier shifted again while 
retaining the core of the administration’s original strategy. In the short-term, the Kennedy 
government remained pragmatic and sought to “keep Haiti on our side and to prevent further 
economic and social deterioration and political chaos.” For the long-term, Kennedy was still 
hopeful an acceptable alternative would become available but retained the idea of co-existing 
with Duvalier until that occurred. What was new was Kennedy’s decision to pressure Duvalier to 
reduce dishonesty and corruption in his regime, as well as putting an emphasis on human rights. 
State Department policy, for example, stated diplomatic staff were to “urge Haitian officials to 
avoid excesses and brutality and respect human rights.”78 
Despite the State Department guidance avoiding mention of human rights development, 
Kennedy’s policy was nonetheless quickly under attack, albeit for an unexpected reason. In 
October 1961, the Dirksen Act was passed by the US Congress, amending the Mutual Security 
Act and making it illegal for the US to provide foreign aid to nations that owed money to private 
US citizens.79 Those nations owing money to American citizens had their aid restricted. Not 
 
77 FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. 
Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Document 367. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d367.  
78 FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. 
Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Document 370. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d370. 
79 The Mutual Security Act governed both military and non-military foreign aid but was not linked to human rights. 
During an interview, US Ambassador Raymond Thurston claimed the amendment “was deliberately aimed at Haiti 
by [Illinois] Senator Everett M. Dirksen, because his brother-in-law was a contractor, had built some housing for the 
pre-Duvalier Haitian government, and it involved a debt of three hundred thousand dollars and had never been 
paid.” Cited in Arthus, “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 511. 
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surprisingly, Haiti’s foreign aid dropped considerably and with that drop Kennedy’s influence 
over the Duvalier regime, limited as it was, declined as well. 
 Meanwhile, Duvalier began implementing the next stage in his strategy. Not only did he 
seek to undermine Kennedy’s foreign policy, he also sought to minimize the Haitian Army as a 
revolutionary threat to his regime. To achieve the latter, Duvalier chose the milice civile as the 
means to his end. Up to this point, the milice civile was primarily a national peasant-based early 
warning mechanism, activated in case of a coup attempt, and given the mission of reinforcing the 
Army. Now, Duvalier intended to turn the organization into a structured and trained paramilitary 
organization. Toward that end, in 1962, the milice was named the Volontaires de la sécurité 
nationale (VSN) and given a broader mandate for internal security, moving it out of the Army’s 
shadow and making it a serious power rival.80 
While the VSN continued its role of spying on and suppressing real and potential 
opposition to Duvalier, including student groups, the Catholic Church, political opponents and 
the business community among others, it was given an active internal security role that included 
making threats to the Duvalier regime ‘disappear.’ Even while allowing gross human rights 
violations to occur, Duvalier twisted them to fit into his anti-communism narrative spun to solicit 
 
80 Trouillot states that the milice members adopted a ‘uniform’ in 1958-59 – “replacing their ski masks with dark 
glasses” – and were more frequently seen in the daytime. Their new appearance also marked the widespread use of 
their infamous nickname, the “tonton-makout.” In 1962, Duvalier created “the Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale” 
or VSN, “explicitly presented” by Duvalier as “an officialization of the dreaded tonton-makout.” However, Trouillot 
makes it clear that not all Makoutes became VSN, suggesting a two-tiered paramilitary organization. Trouillot points 
out that a number of Makoutes refused to “enroll or wear the VSN uniform simply because the militia [VSN] was a 
lower-class organization.” Trouillot identified those who remained Makouotes, and refused to become VSN as well, 
were “the middle-class members of the secret police…the men and women who did the real work.” The implications 
are that while Duvalier established the VSN and sought to “equate” the VSN and Makoutes as the same 
organization, Trouillot believes the VSN was more so intended to provide “local proof of state power” through 
“reinforced coercion.” Thus, ambiguity and uncertainty was deliberately built into the system by Duvalier not only 
to mask the secret services’ real organization and power, but perhaps more importantly, to make it next to 
impossible for a rival power to emerge from either the Makoutes or VSN simply because none of their members 
would have been sufficiently confident of their understanding of the VSN-Makoute power structure to gamble on a 
coup. See Trouillot, Haiti: State Against Nation, 189-191. 
202 
 
American support. For example, the arrest and killings of left wing leaders was heralded as part 
of his war to stop the spread of communism, with Duvalier speaking publicly about his “war 
trophies” from the conflict.81 Duvalier also employed the VSN to target the Army and minimize 
its role and importance, and therefore its potential strength. VSN members were encouraged to 
transfer into the Army, and report from the inside, facilitating the targeting of Army officers and 
soldiers who were considered threats.82 Once removed they would be replaced with Makoutes.83  
Duvalier recognized that the VSN required training for its new missions and if it was to 
have the capabilities necessary to overmatch the Army. That training was obtained from the US 
Naval Mission by deception. The VSN quickly became an organization to be feared. Their 
successful infiltration of the Army, coupled with the American Marine training, allowed the 
VSN to become powerful and influential. Their new status also brought them into more frequent 
conflict with the Army, particularly as Duvalier increasingly marginalized the Army.  
Duvalier also began diverting aid money earmarked for the Army, to the VSN instead, 
allowing the purchase of equipment and weaponry. The powerful chefs de sections were quickly 
brought into the VSN organization, allowing Duvalier to shift the VSN from its urban 
orientation, and set it on the path to becoming a powerful country-wide paramilitary force of 
influence.84 And, to bolster his anti-communist image and curry favour with the US, Duvalier 
 
81 Arthus, “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 510. 
82 Laguerre states that denouncements by a Makoute led to dismissal or forced retirement. Laguerre, The Military 
and Society in Haiti,115. 
83 One of the effects of the Makoute infiltration was to undermine the professionalization of the Army by turning it 
into an organization in which careers were made or broken through denunciations. Further, Laguerre points out that 
military salaries were not based on the rank held but whether the soldier or officer was a Makoute. Laguerre writes 
extensively on the effects of the Makoutes on the Army and this process of Duvalierization. See Laguerre, 114-123. 
84 Sprague points out the 1962 Rural Code put in place by Duvalier placed the chefs de sections under the command 
of the Army. It is likely he made this move to ‘legalize’ them for training and/or military assistance under the 




offered Kennedy land for American bases, including the Môle Saint-Nicolas site, as well as 
basing options for punitive operations against Cuba.85 
In January 1962, Duvalier mounted a major information operation against the US, 
seeking to have the Dirksen Act reversed and foreign aid money flow back into Haiti. Duvalier 
decided to launch his operation at the January 1962 Punta del Este (Uruguay) Organization of 
American States (OAS) meeting where the US delegation planned to lobby the OAS for 
immediate sanctions against Cuba and Castro. The US had left an earlier OAS preliminary 
meeting, believing they had enough votes for sanctions. Duvalier’s vote was considered as 
“being particularly determinant.”86 Prior to the meeting, Duvalier launched his campaign by 
speaking to two Eastern European communist regimes, the Polish and Hungarian governments, 
ostensibly to discuss how the two communist nations could help Haiti with foreign aid. Once at 
the OAS main meeting, the Haitian delegation abandoned the pro-American group and instead 
joined a group of six neutral or pro-Cuban Latin American countries.87  
 Duvalier’s manipulations worked. The night before the critical OAS vote, US Secretary 
of State Dean Rusk met the Haitian delegation and promised to resume aid for Haiti through the 
new US Agency for International Development (USAID).88 His aim achieved, Duvalier returned 
to the American fold and voted for sanctions against Cuba.89 Yet despite Duvalier’s successful 
 
85 Arthus, “The Challenge of Democratizing the Caribbean during the Cold War,” 510-11.  
86 Arthus, 509. 
87 The new group became known as the “outer seven.” Arthus, 512. 
88 The USAID was created through the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which replaced the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951. It amalgamated three different foreign assistance agencies – the Mutual Security Agency, the 
Foreign Operations Administration and International Cooperation Administration – under the AID umbrella. The 
Foreign Assistance Act differentiated between military and non-military aid, something that the Mutual Security Act 
did not, and made the USAID responsible for administering all US non-military economic assistance. Further, the 
new Act specifically prohibited the provision of any of that aid being directed to a communist nation, subject to a 
presidential waiver. 
89 The US promised not only the funding necessary for a jet-capable airport and new hospital, they also pledged 
US$10 million, to be administered through USAID. See Gilburt Loescher and John Scanlan, “Human Rights, US 




manoeuvrings, good relations with the US were doomed. With Cuba expelled from the OAS and 
effectively contained, the US was no longer occupied with Castro and could instead turn its 
attention on Duvalier the dictator and human rights embarrassment.  
Kennedy’s policy experts had also revised their position on Haiti. Whereas previously 
Duvalier’s departure was feared as a potential catalyst for a communist takeover of Haiti, the 
American experience with Cuba instead showed that the authoritarian rule of Fulgencio Batista 
had set the conditions that facilitated the Cuban Revolution. The US now saw Duvalier in the 
same light, believing a similar outcome was tied to how much longer he remained in power.90 By 
June, 1962, Kennedy decided to actively work towards Duvalier’s removal from power by 
supporting any viable opposition alternative available. Ironically, American funding of the jet-
capable airport in Port-au-Prince would continue despite the concerns over Duvalier.91 
Unfortunately for Kennedy, Duvalier was quite effective at ensuring his own internal 
security. Opponents, while not hard to find, were not able or willing to work collaboratively 
together.92 Further, American investigations of their plans led to the conclusion that “insofar as 
 
90 Williamson, The US Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 515. A memorandum between the State Department and 
the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, concluded that the development 
of the Tonton Makoutes was the most likely avenue for such a communist takeover: “A partisan civil militia has 
been developed from among the poorest, and in some cases, worst elements of the population. This militia, which is 
highly susceptible to political manipulation, may eventually become powerful enough to neutralize the US-trained 
and oriented regular armed forces, a circumstance which would open the way to a takeover by unscrupulous activists 
and extremists, including Communist or pro-Communist elements. A small group of ultra-nationalistic and racist 
advisers, all opportunistic and some receptive to strong Marxist if not Communist influence and some with 
Communist backgrounds, has gradually consolidated its position within the regime and is exercising a dangerously 
increasing influence. This group is believed to be trying to expand its authority within the Government and militia, 
in the hope of taking over when Duvalier goes.” FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. Edward 
C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), 
Document 372. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d372.  
91 The funding for the airport was the quid pro quo Duvalier obtained for his OAS vote. It would be cancelled in 
1963 as a “consequence of Haitian defaults on previous US loans.” FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican 
Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, eds. Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
2005), Document 327. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d327.  
92 An American intelligence report, “Haitians who Might Contribute Effectively to a Post-Duvalier Regime,” dated 
July 1962, provided short biographies on Haitian opposition figures. On April 12, 1963, McGeorge Bundy, Special 
Assistant to the President, was provided with a memorandum on the anti-Duvalier activities of Louis Déjoie. Both 
were declassified and are available on WikiLeaks. 
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they had plans of action, these were on the whole fairly childish in concept…”and that most 
groups were not suited for support.93 By 1963, and despite the use of “persuasion, aid, pressure 
and all techniques short of the landing of outside forces,” Duvalier solidly remained in power.94 
His hold over Haiti was secure, the VSN organization had achieved his intended national 
presence and control, and the military was rendered impotent as a revolutionary tool.95 Planning 
on the part of the US now shifted towards contingency planning for an intervention to secure 
American non-combatants.  
 April 1963 presented just such an opportunity for regime change. The attempted 
kidnapping of Duvalier’s children led to the Haitian police storming the Dominican Republic’s 
embassy in Port-au-Prince, in turn sparking an international incident which escalated into the 
Dominican Republic readying to invade.96 A US carrier naval force deployed into international 
 
93 US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin M. Marti, writing to the US Ambassador to 
Haiti, Ray Thruston, also wrote: “I have had some feeling that the step up of unrest in Haiti was due as much to the 
increased awareness of the military that time was against them in their competition with the militia as to any actions 
we have taken to show disapproval of Duvalier.” He did indicate the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince would be 
augmented with additional staff to “keep in touch more closely with various groups and individuals and know more 
about their plans, to serve as a better basis for United States policy and action decisions here.” He reiterated that 
official policy did not sanction working towards regime change, stating: “we had never, in considering 
implementation of the basic objective, gone beyond authority to collect intelligence. We still have not done so. Any 
action by us, covert or overt, can thus only take place as a result of a new decision at the highest level.” FRUS, 
1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain 
III (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Document 373. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d373. 
94 Arthus, 516. 
95 The 1963 coup attempts (three different attempts were made at various times) by a group headed by former 
Haitian General Leon Cantave, demonstrated the effectiveness of Duvalier’s VSN organization and its network. In 
all cases, the coup attempts were based in, and launched from, the Dominican Republic. In each instance, the coup 
attempt alerted the VSN network, allowing them to communicate the attack up the chain while preparing to repel the 
invasion and assault into Haiti. See FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, 
eds. Daniel Lawler and Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 342. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d342. 
96 In April 1963, a group of Haitian Army officers hatched a coup plot against Duvalier. After seeking American 
assistance but being turned down, they decided to carry out the plot regardless. The coup attempt would fail and as 
part of the purge of the Army, President Duvalier announced the immediate retirement of a number of Army 
officers. A number of those in the coup planning fled the country before the announcement and a number sought 
refuge in the Dominican Republic Embassy in Port-au-Prince. On 26 April, a presidential convoy carrying 
Duvalier’s children to school was attacked. The children were unharmed but the driver and two of the bodyguards 
were killed. Duvalier was convinced one of the Haitian military officers who had taken refuge inside the Dominican 
Republic’s embassy was responsible for planning the kidnapping. Over the radio, he ordered Haitians to find the 
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waters just off Haiti, but the success of an OAS mission defused tensions and allowed for a quick 
settlement. 97 
 The incident would have long-term repercussions.  The US position on Duvalier accepted 
that Duvalier “faced little threat to his rule” and adopted a foreign policy that continued to seek 
to work with the Duvalier regime through, for example, the Naval Mission, but would deny 
Duvalier foreign aid other than strictly humanitarian assistance.98 For their part, in the 
Dominican Republic, the military would use the threat of a potential Haitian invasion by the 
revolutionary-reformist president, Juan Bosch, as part of the justification for the coup it launched 
against him in September 1963.99 Duvalier launched a crackdown on domestic opponents, 
 
perpetrators and bring them to justice. Two armed police officers forced their way into the Dominican Republic’s 
embassy and seized a number of the former army officers. Embassy staff refused to allow them to leave with the 
Haitian asylum seekers, sparking a stand-off. The Dominican Republic’s president, Juan Bosch, threatened to invade 
unless the police withdrew from the Embassy without the asylum seekers. The OAS intervened, sending a team to 
negotiate a settlement. The team was able to negotiate the removal of the Haitian police and safe conduct for the 
asylum seekers to the Dominican Republic. Clément Barbot, the former chief of the Tontons Macoutes, would turn 
out to have been the mastermind behind the kidnapping attempt. See FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American 
Republics, eds. Edward C. Keefer, Harriet Dashiell Schwar and W. Taylor Fain III (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1961), Document 378. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v12/d378; and 
Williamson, The Naval Mission to Haiti, 1959-1963, 308-321. 
97 Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 60. See also a declassified CIA memorandum entitled “Alleged Plans of 
General Leon Cantave to Invade Haiti with the Support of the Dominican Army,” 02 July 1963. www.archives.gov.  
98 The Naval Mission would soon be ordered to leave Haiti but would instead transfer its members over to the 
MAAG, which was covered under a different treaty and was more difficult to force out of Haiti. On foreign aid, the 
plan was to “Continue blocking AID, IDB and IBRD [foreign aid] loans and discourage assistance from [the 
European] Common Market and other non-Communist countries on the grounds that such aid gives prestige and 
material support to an undesirable dictatorship; Continue to insist that the IMF fully justify on economic grounds its 
stand-by arrangements with Haiti; and Continue to press for payments on debts owed the United States Government 
even if only on a token basis in deference to the precarious state of the Haitian finances.” FRUS, 1961–1963, 
Volume XII, American Republics, “Proposed Plan of Action,” Washington, 13 November 1963, Document 391. 
99 Bosch was overthrown by a military coup in September 1963, in part because of the military’s unhappiness with 
the escalation along the Haitian border. The coup regime lasted less than two years before supporters of Bosch 
launched an assault on the junta and removed it from power. In early April 1965, a civil war broke out, leading US 
President Lyndon Johnson to order an invasion initially to evacuate American and allied citizens. That evacuation 
force would later fight on the side of the anit-Bosch forces. The OAS negotiated a ceasefire towards the end of April 
and the US forces withdrew. The OAS Inter-American Peace Force was present in the Dominican Republic until 
September 1966. See Abraham F. Lowenthal, “The United States and the Dominican Republic to 1965: Background 
to Intervention,” Caribbean Studies 10 no. 2 (July 1970), 30-55. 
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plotting coups or not, all the while claiming the moral high ground.100 The disappearance of 
foreign support demoralized Duvalier’s military opponents and left him firmly in control.  
 Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 began a new chapter in foreign relations with 
Duvalier. David Nicholls argues that from the mid-1960s onwards “the dictator [Duvalier] 
reached a temporary accommodation with the business community, with the US following the 
death of Kennedy, and with the church hierarchy.”101 Duvalier’s mid-1964 massacres of 
dissenters in the towns of Mapou, Thiotte, Grand-Gosier and Belle-Anse, carried out by 
Makoutes and Army troops, showed he had full control over the now compliant Haitian Army.102 
Washington had learned the hard way that bilateral approaches to Haiti were less effective than 
multilateral approaches which allowed more pressure to be brought to bear on Haiti and 
Duvalier.103 
 Ironically, Kennedy issued what became known as the Kennedy Doctrine on 18 
November 1963, four days before his assassination.104 The central point was a vow by Kennedy 
 
100 Remy claims that the fear of being linked to foreign invaders, coming as it did within a couple of generations of 
the last US occupation, led to the disbandment of the “Cassagnols, [a group of] mulattoes supporting the overthrow 
of Duvalier” based in the Dominican Republic. See Remy, 60 (footnote 39). 
101 David Nicholls, “Haiti: the rise and fall of Duvalierism,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 4 (Oct 1986), 1240. 
102 Civilian victims of these massacres are believed to have been as high as 60,000 lower class Haitians (Patrick 
Bellegarde-Smith to author, 18 December 2019. Personal correspondence). Further, and lest that combined operation 
appear an outlier, the Makoutes and Army collaborated again in a massacre in mid-1969, seeking to exterminate the 
remains of the Haitian Communist Party, members of which were then hiding in the area of Cazale. On the other 
hand, the 1967 Affaire des 19 was a horrific reminder that Duvalier did not trust the Army and would turn on it in a 
heartbeat. Prosper Avril goes further and claims that the macabre manner in which the execution of the 19 Army 
officers took place resulted in Duvalier succeeding “in enslaving the Haitian Army to the point of making it its own 
torturer.” See Diderich, Le prix du sang, 26-31; Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 33; 
and Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 150-175. 
103 A National Security study dated 1970 and produced for the US National Security Council (NSC) 
Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs points to humanitarian assistance as the only area requiring a 
bilateral approach to Haiti: multilateral assistance in all other areas “seems more likely to achieve the limited 
economic and social objectives attainable under the present conditions…” See “National Security Study 
Memorandum 70 – Haiti,” approved by the Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs 08 January 1970, 
declassified 1970/01/08. www.archives.gov.  
104 Off topic, Heinl and Heinl wrote that Duvalier had champagne served when he learned of Kennedy’s death. 
Duvalier was also reported to have claimed his ouanga [vodou term for a talisman] was responsible for Kennedy’s 
death. See Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 625n 40. 
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to “continue to support measures to halt communist infiltration and subversion. The American 
states must be ready to come to the aid of any government requesting aid to prevent a take-over 
linked to the policies of foreign communism rather than to an internal desire for change.”105 He 
further stated “[w]e in this hemisphere must also use every resource at our command to prevent 
the establishment of another Cuba in this Hemisphere.” 106  
Lyndon Johnson would commit his administration to preventing a second Cuba emerging 
with all the means at his disposal in a May 1965 speech that outlined the Johnson Doctrine.107 
That speech came on the heels of the April 1965 US invasion of the Dominican Republic and the 
overthrow of the Bosch presidency by US forces.108 The Dominican Republic would remain 
Johnson’s focus in the Caribbean. Haiti would receive little attention other than in the form of 
foreign aid.109 In 1966, the US foreign policy focus for Haiti was to ensure the US was able to 
influence both the choice and “character” of the successor government.110 
 
105  Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. National Security Files. Subjects. President’s speeches: Latin 
America speech, November 1963 (2 of 5 folders). www.jfklibrary.org.  
106  Papers of John F. Kennedy. 
107 The Johnson Doctrine focussed on providing technical assistance programs, encouraging foreign investment, and 
limited direct foreign aid. Between 1964 and 1968, the USAID reported providing Duvalier with US$15.2 million 
worth of grants. Heinl and Heinl, Written in Blood, 644n 59. 
108 Pro-Bosch forces launched a coup against the military junta ruling the Dominican Republic after it had 
overthrown Bosch as president. Johnson, however, supported the right-wing junta, finding Bosch’s left-wing 
political leanings suspect. Worse, Bosch had refused, “on civil liberties grounds,” to “outlaw” the communist party 
in the Dominical Republic. See Stephen G. Rabe, “The Johnson Doctrine,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36, no. 1 
(March 2006): 55. 
109 US National Security Staff outlined why the US needed to maintain involvement in Haiti: “First, we may need 
Haitiʼs OAS vote on one thing or another. Second, we may have to kick in at some time in order to stay in Haiti. 
State [Department]… feels that we should not lose contact with Duvalier again. Haiti is only fifty miles from Cuba. 
Also, Duvalier is a sick man, and could drop dead at any moment; and we want to be around if and when it 
happens.” See FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, eds. Daniel Lawler 
and Carolyn Yee (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2005), Document 328. 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v32/d328. 
110 See FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, eds. Daniel Lawler and 




By 1970, the Nixon administration judged that American vital interests in Haiti were “not 
greatly threatened…in the foreseeable future,” and recommended maintaining the status quo with 
Haiti.111 Economist Lisa A. McGowan has argued that:  
In 1971, at a time when development assistance to Haiti had been cut off due to the 
terrible human rights record of the Duvalier regime, the Nixon administration agreed to 
give political support to the transition of power from Papa Doc to Baby Doc—dictator to 
dictator—in return for the establishment of generous incentives to attract US private 
investors. These included maintenance of an extremely low minimum wage, the 
suppression of labor unions, and the right of foreign companies to repatriate their 
profits [emphasis added].112 
 
An uneasy relationship between the two nations continued with some improvement in the 
US-Haitian economic relationship. A State Department report to Henry Kissinger indicated that 
US commercial firms had established some light assembly industry in Haiti and that tourism was 
beginning to re-emerge.113 Pragmatically, Nixon’s advisors favoured a realpolitik approach to 
Duvalier (whether father or son) to ensure a non-communist regime remained in power, even if it 
meant sacrificing more stable and progressive institutions. The Administration assessed Jean-
Claude as “…self-indulgent, corpulent and far from brilliant…feckless and presumably 









111 “National Security Study Memorandum 70 – Haiti,” 19.  
112 McGowan, p. 3. 
113 Light industry in Haiti has included assembling baseballs, clothing, toys and electronics. By the 1980s, Haiti 
became attractive not only because of its cheap labour, but also because it was within the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
which allowed goods assembled in a Caribbean country to enter the US duty-free. See Clyde H. Farnsworth, “Haiti’s 
Allure for US Business,” The New York Times, 17 June 1984; and “Review of Contingency Plans for Haiti,” 14 
January 1971 Department of State Memorandum for Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, declassified 1971/01/14,  
www.archives.gov.  
114 “Review of Contingency Plans for Haiti.” 
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Passing the Torch to the Son: Jean-Claude Assumes the Presidency 
 
Lòt peyi ap devlope men Ayiti ap anvlope.115  
[Other nations are developing but Haiti is being enveloped] 
- Haitian proverb 
 
 With the passing of François Duvalier in 1971, his son, Jean-Claude, assumed the reins of 
power. He swiftly delegated much of the day-to-day administration of Haiti to the supervision of 
his mother, Simone Ovide Duvalier. His presidency began by ostensibly abandoning the harsh 
activities of his father and introduced what the American Embassy described as “a new 
liberalism,” including an apparent tolerance of criticism and a call for “equal justice for all – not 
just Duvalierists.”116 By 1972, relations between Haiti and the US had improved so much that the 
US Ambassador to Haiti wrote “with all its imperfections, the present government in Haiti 
appears at this point to represent the most promising political development in the last several 
decades of Haiti’s history.”117 
 Jean-Claude’s appeal to Washington was not only because of his regime’s stability, but 
also because he remained firmly anti-communist. The Nixon administration resumed aid to Haiti 
and in his first year, Duvalier saw it increase from US$3.8 million, to US$4.3 million. 
Pragmatically, the US had decided to support Haiti and Jean-Claude to ensure that the Haitian 
government was kept heading in the right direction. American Ambassador, Clinton E. Knox, 
argued exactly that in a 1972 telegram: 
IF WE WANT TO GET HUNG UP IN ISSUES LIKE REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT OR CORRUPTION WHICH VISITING AMERICAN 
 
115 Haitian proverb.  
116 FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents On American Republics, 1969–1972, eds. Douglas Kraft and 
James Siekmeier (Washington: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2009), 
Document 402. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d402. Elizabeth Abbot pains a 
different story of Jean-Claude’s reign, pointing out that none of the liberalism identified by the US Embassy came 
into being. Rather, behind the scenes, the same atrocities and ‘imperfections’ continued, but with Jean-Claude 
deliberately avoiding any real knowledge of what was occurring. Abbott quotes Jean-Claude as stating to friends: “I 
don’t want blood on my hands because once you start tasting blood, you can’t stop.” Abbott, Haiti, 174. 
117 FRUS, Document 408. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d408. 
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BUSINESSMEN TELL ME IS NO WORSE HERE THAN IN NEW YORK, ST. 
LOUIS, OR PASCALOOSA -- THEN THE POSSIBILITIES OF KEEPING THE 
HAITIAN GOVERNMENT HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION MAY WELL BE 
LOST… OUR POLICY TOWARD HAITI OUGHT TO BE BASED ON THE 
SITUATION HERE AS IT IS -- NOT AS WE MIGHT LIKE IT TO BE.118 
 
 To improve international relations and curry favour with the Americans, Jean-Claude 
reduced the influence and power of the Tonton Makoutes organization.119 Almost immediately, 
foreign observers credited his regime with reducing the national level of fear and suspicion in 
Haiti.120 Jean-Claude had his own reasons for reducing the influence of the Makoutes. He 
believed the organization created roadblocks to regional development, and actively opposed 
government work including the obstruction of tax collection.121 His marginalization of the 
Makoutes, who had infiltrated the Army during the era of Papa Doc and undermined its 
professionalism, helped to revitalize the Army as urged by American leaders who contributed 
assistance funds to the Army. The revitalization came with benefits in the form of military 
assistance monies, an important source of funds for the impoverished regime.122  
But the revitalization of the Haitian Army caused problems for Jean-Claude. Not only 
was the Army a legacy internal security force designed to control of the Haitian peasantry, it was 
 
118 FRUS, Document 408. 
119 The reality was more likely that, because the Makoutes were more his father’s organization and because they had 
become a liability to relations with the US, Jean-Claude was inclined to ending or marginalizing the organization. At 
the same time, he recognized the need for an organization loyal to him personally and one which could provide 
security against other military elements launching coup activities against him. Toward that end, he quickly created 
his own Makoute-style organization, the Corps des Leopards which will be explored later. 
120 Chochotte quotes Rony Gilot, a former member of Duvalier’s government, as confirming that the US pressured 
Duvalier to “dissolve the militia in return for financial aid and military assistance.” Rony Gilot, Au Gré de la 
mémoire, 115. Cited in Chochotte, “The History of Peasants,” 157. 
121 Chochotte further points out that the Duvalier regimes (father and son) would denounce Makoute terror tactics 
employed against the civilian population when it suited them, but rarely if ever when that behaviour was directed 
against political opponents or, conversely on those rare occasions when it was employed ostensibly to protect the 
civilian population from abusive police or taxation practices. Jean-Claude’s marginalization of the organization was 
for practical reasons aimed at satisfying powerful critics of Haiti’s government. Chochotte, 150-2. 
122 In a July 1971 telegram, US Ambassador Knox stated that Duvalier’s ruling “collegium” was willing “to consider 
what amounts to a vassal relationship. In return they wish to be able to count on our [US] good will and sympathetic 
hearing for the aid proposals they expect to make.” Ceding that amount of control, reminiscent of the effects of the 
Marine Occupation, would have had a major impact on both foreign and domestic policy, as well as Haitian pride 
and national spirit. FRUS, Document 402. 
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now forced to compete with the Makoute organization, which did not disband.123 Because neither 
organization was seen as loyal to the new president, Jean-Claude created his own presidential 
guard, the Haitian Corps des Léopards or Leopard Corps.124  
The US regional strategy focussed on developing a pan-Caribbean, Latin American 
campaign aimed at “turning the region into a counterinsurgency laboratory….”125 American 
training missions as a consequence multiplied, with many being aimed at the other Haitian 
security organization. For example, in December 1973, a US Drug Enforcement Department 
(DEA) team provided counter-narcotics training to Haitian Army, police and coast guard 
personnel.126 Jean-Claude quickly saw the value of the American program and made his 
Léopards available for any American COIN training offered during his presidency. 
Training for the Léopards was primarily provided by former US military members under 
contract to a CIA front company, Aerotrade International and Aerotrade Inc. The contractual 
arrangements were arranged through the US State Department.127 However, issues quickly arose 
 
123 Note that the Haitian Army at this stage still remained strongly infiltrated by Makoutes from the Papa Doc era. 
Chochotte, “The History of Peasants,” 160-67. 
124 The perceived requirement for a presidential guard was not unique to Haiti obviously. As recently as 2004, for 
example, recommendations for Iraq during its reconstruction included the reconstruction of the Republican Guard, 
which, like Duvalier’s Léopards, also served “to counter-balance the influence of an officer corps that had become 
accustomed to direct military involvement in politics…” See Julian Schofield and Micah Zenko, “Designing a 
Secure Iraq: A US Policy Prescription,” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2004), 685. 
125 Sprague, 36. See also US Department of State Telegram, “GOH Position on Byers/Aero Trade Suit in US District 
Court,” Wikileaks Cable: 1973PORTA01682_b, dated September 27, 1973,  
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973PORTA01682_b.html. 
126 The December team was the second training team that year, the first having targeted police services only. 
Ironically, Haiti had no drug problem but rather was being employed by drug smugglers as a transshipment point, 
according to this observation from the US Embassy:  
“SINCE CONTROL OF NARCOTICS SMUGGLING IN WINDWARD PASSAGE AREA 
INVOLVES US INTERESTS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY (HAITIANS HAVE NO DRUG 
PROBLEM OF THEIR OWN AND NARCOTICS DO NOT ORIGINATE HERE) AND GOH 
RESOURCES TO PAY FOR THIS SORT OF TRAINING ARE SCARCE, DEVELOPMENT OF 
HAITIAN COASTAL PATROL CAPABILITY WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY DEP END ON US 
GRANT ASSISTANCE.” US State Department telegram, “Narcotics Training and Drug Smuggling Control in 
Haiti,” Wikileaks Cable: 1973PORTA02166_b, dated December 21, 1973, 3-4,  
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973PORTA02166_b.html.  
127 Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 36 
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over the quality of the training and the equipment provided through the CIA contracts. Both CIA 
front companies provided ammunition and equipment which was either of unsuitable quality or 
quantity, or they failed to provide the equipment stipulated in the contractual arrangements.  
In May 1974, the two companies brought a lawsuit against the government of Haiti for 
withholding payments. Haiti had held the money back when the delivered goods were 
determined to be militarily unsuitable. The Aerotrade companies lost their lawsuits against Haiti 
but not before questions were raised about their services, the poor quality of the equipment 
provided to the Haitians, and their unsavory business practices.128 Speaking to the media after the 
conclusion of the lawsuit, Aerotrade’s CEO, James Byers remained unapologetic, stating he had  
no trouble exporting massive quantities of arms. The State Department signed off on the 
licenses, and the CIA had copies of all the contracts. M-16 fully automatic weapons, 
thousands and thousands of rounds of ammunition, patrol boats, T-28 aircraft, Sikorsky 
helicopters. Thirty-caliber machine guns. Fifty-caliber machine guns. Mortars. Twenty-
millimeter rapid-fire cannons. Armored troop carriers.129 
 
 By the end of 1977, Duvalier was subject to considerable push-back from the Makoutes 
over his apparent favouritism of the Army as well as his so-called liberalization efforts. 
Economically, the nation was suffering. By 1975, foreign aid had become Haiti’s main source of 
revenue.130 One of the major blows to the Haitian peasant economy was the 1978 African swine 
fever (ASF) epidemic, which spread through the local Creole pig population and required the 
eradication of the entire Creole pig population.131  
 
128 See Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).  www.law.justia.com. 
129 Jeb Sprague pointed out that “[a] handful of veterans from this force would later serve, off and on, as key figures 
in various paramilitary forces which the US used to carry out and maintain coups against the governments of 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991 and 2004. Cited in Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy 
in Haiti, 37. 
130 By the 1980s, Trouillot was describing the situation as dire, pointing out that “crushed by taxes and oligopolies in 
the commercialization of export crops, the Haitian peasant was becoming an economic maroon, avoiding all 
production that benefited the urban middlemen.” See Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 212. See also Abbot, 
Haiti: The Duvaliers and their Legacy, 169. 
131 Much of the information in this section is drawn from Philip Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings: African 
Swine Fever Eradication and Pig Repopulation in Haiti,” Stretch, Fall 1990. www.faculty.webster.edu.  
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The African Swine Fever Epidemic 
 
The first task is to find ways of inducing farmers to raise pigs as a cash crop rather than a 
‘savings bank.’ Until this occurs the farmer will not be motivated to invest time and 
money in processed or concentrated feed and other aspects of improved husbandry. If 
farmers continue to see pigs exclusively as a savings mechanism, it is almost certain that 
most of the pigs that they receive through this project will become scavenger pigs and the 
level of productivity will return to what it was before the arrival of ASF.132 
- Extract from USAID Project Paper 
 
 
Ironically, the ASF outbreak came to Haiti from Europe, either from airline waste or 
animal products first brought into the Dominican Republic and then spread across the border to 
Haiti. Initial efforts at eradication centred on the Haitian-Dominican border. The military and 
Haitian Ministry of Agriculture worked together to destroy all domestic pigs within 15 
kilometers of the border. No compensation was paid to Haitians for the loss of their pigs during 
this phase.133 The eradication program included a plan to protect the border area through 
quarantine. That plan failed and by December 1978 AFS had killed over 30,000 Creole pigs in 
Haiti.134 
Once it became clear that the disease had crossed the border and that both the initial cull 
and containment plan had failed, the OAS’s Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on 
Agriculture (IICA) forced the Haitian authorities to accept a full eradication program, arguing it 
was the only solution available to Haiti and was vital to protect the remaining domestic pig 
populations in the rest of the Americas.135 Duvalier reluctantly agreed and, backed by funding 
 
132 “Haiti: Project Paper: Interim Sime Repopulation (Amendment #II),” US International Development Cooperation 
Agency (USAID), 23 Jun 1986. 
133 Gaertner claims that 20,000 pigs were killed in the initial attempts at containment. Phillip Gaertner, “Whether 
Pigs have Wings: African Swine Fever Eradication and Pig Repopulation in Haiti” Stretch, Fall 1990. 
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/misctopic/pigs/gaertner.htm.  
134 Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings.” 
135 There is disagreement over whether the Haitian government authorities requested assistance or whether their 
failure to ask for assistance prompted international action.   
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from the US, Canada and Mexico, the IICA developed a program to slaughter all swine within 
Haiti’s borders and replace them with an “improved” breed.  
At the time, the 1978 swine population in Haiti was estimated at just under 2 million pigs. 
The importance of the Creole pig was its role as both a food source and a form of savings. 
Owned predominantly by rural peasants, the pigs in fact were a food source of last resort. The 
peasants kept the pigs on what amounted to a subsistence diet, garnered by scrounging on their 
own, until such time as the pigs were required for a meal. Alternately, the pigs were used in trade 
and bartered or sold as required.136 
 The African Swine Fever Eradication and Swine Industry Development Project 
(PEPPADEP) was developed and launched in 1981 by a partnership between the UN’s Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FOA); the OAS’s IICA; the International Development Bank (IDB); 
and the governments of Mexico, Canada, the US and Haiti.137 By 1984, the program had killed 
over 1.3 million pigs and ASF was considered eradicated in the affected countries.  
The program remained controversial as the determination of success was unclear.138 
Poorly publicized and executed, it suffered from numerous problems. For example, despite the 
IICA push to compensate Haitians for their pig losses, the Haitian government, according to 
Philip Gaertner, did not publicize the offer, either calling for voluntary slaughter or employing 
the army to do the killing.139 Rumours also spread regarding the value of compensation, with 
 
136 To maximize their value, just prior to their sale, their owners would switch them to a higher quality meal source 
to fatten them up and obtain a higher price per pound. 
137 Albert Ebert, “Porkbarrelling Pigs in Haiti: North American ‘Swine Aid’ an Economic Disaster for Haitian 
Peasants,” The Multinational Monitor 6, no. 18 (December 1985).  www.multinationalmonitor.org.  
138 The diverse entities involved in PEPPADEP brought different understandings of success. Researcher Allan Ebert 
pointed out the IICA, for example, saw the mission of the program as eliminating the "debilitating effects of the 
African Swine Fever in Haiti," and starting "the development of profitable swine production," while the US through 
USAID saw an opportunity to modernize Haiti’s swine production. Mexico and Canada saw the program through 
the lens of protecting North American markets. Ebert, “Porkbarrelling Pigs in Haiti.” 
139 Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings.” 
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middlemen convincing peasants that payments for their pigs were substantially lower than the 
government offered. They would then offer the lower amount and re-sell the pigs to the 
government at a higher profit.140  
The 1978 swine population was estimated as worth between US$70 and US$90 
million.141  The IICA pig repopulation program had a budget of only US$8.5 million.  It became 
controversial, again, largely because of poor information management. The pigs it introduced 
were judged by the peasants as unable to cope with the tropical sun and heat of the Haitian 
climate. They required significantly more maintenance than the pigs they replaced for housing 
and feeding and they succumbed to disease and malnutrition at a higher rate than their domestic 
predecessor. Not surprisingly perhaps, they were dubbed “American Princes.”142 
The relationship between the AID/IICA project and the Haitian-American Meat and 
Products Company (HAMPCO), a troubled meat slaughtering company headquartered in Port-
au-Prince, also presented a public relations nightmare.143 HAMPCO had the monopoly rights to 
all meat slaughtering in the Port-au-Prince area as well as the monopoly on meat products 
exported to the US market.144 HAMPCO engineered a complicated leasing plan with the 
AID/IICA project whereby its facilities were used as a breeding and slaughter facility, generating 
 
140 Gaertner identified the rumour being spread that the IICA was only paying 40 gourdes per pig (US$8) rather than 
the actual rate of US$40 per pig, a difference of over 500 percent! Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings.” 
141 Cristobal Zepeda, “The Social Impact of Disease Control and Eradication Programs: Case Studies,” in Antonio 
Morilla, Kyoung-Jin Yoon, and Jeffrey J. Zimmerman, eds., Trends in Emerging Viral Infections of Swine (Ames: 
Iowa State Press, 2002), 18. 
142 Patrick Bellegarde-Smith to author, 18 December 2019. Personal correspondence. 
143 An excellent account of HAMPCO’s history and operations can be found in Claire A. Payton, “The City and the 
State: Construction and the Politics of Dictatorship in Haiti (1957-1986)” (PhD diss., Duke University, 2018), 106-
121. www.dukespace.lib.duke.edu.  
144 World Bank Report no. 2165-HA, “Current Economic Position and Prospects of Haiti, Volume 1: Main Report,” 
22 December 1978, 15. www.worldbank.org.  
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US$1 million for the financially strapped company in revenues from the lease alone.145 However, 
HAMPCO was expected to reap millions more through the breeding program. 
In the end, by failing to properly educate Haitians regarding the program and its 
ambitious aims, the program earned negative press coverage which reportedly led to active 
subversion and sabotage by several NGOs.146  The negative experience of the rural farmers 
throughout the ASF program further contributed to problems in 1996 when Haiti was forced to 
deal with classical swine fever or CSF. CSF is easily treated with inoculations (unlike ASF), but 
mistrust and paranoia compounded by the ASF program became a serious impediment to success 
for the CSF program.147 
 
AIDS and Duvalier’s Haiti 
 
I realize that is a very broad category, quite damning the whole nation…But ethically we 
felt we had to report it just on that broad category because the attack rate was so 
high…We began to see cases that were referred in from other hospitals where they had 
been cared for for weeks…It was immediately obvious to us what was going on. But by 
the time we made the diagnosis and treated them it was too late. So we just felt ethically 
that we had to get the information out that Haitians were clearly at an increased risk so 
that people could start thinking about it and treating them.148 
- American AIDS researcher Dr. Margaret A. Fischl 
 
 The first recognized case of AIDS in Haiti was identified in July 1978, when a 20-year-
old man died of seizures after two weeks in hospital and was found to have had central nervous 
 
145 Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings.” 
146 Gaertner claims “many NGOs contributed greatly to the disinformation that threatened this project from the 
start.” Gaertner, “Whether Pigs have Wings: African Swine Fever Eradication and Pig Repopulation in Haiti.” 
147 Zepeda, “The Social Impact of Disease Control and Eradication Programs,” 18. 
148 Dr. Fischl’s University of Miami medical team found “the rate of AIDS among Haitian-Americans in the Miami 
area was so high, about one in 1,000, that her team had 'no qualms’ about saying Haitians were at a high risk.” 
Interview with American AIDS researcher Dr. Margaret A. Fischl of the University of Miami Medical School, in 
Lawrence K. Altman, “DEBATE GROWS ON US LISTING OF HAITIANS IN AIDS CATEGORY,” New York 
Times, 31 July 1983. www.nytimes.com. 
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system (CNS) toxoplasmosis, a complication in the late stages of the AIDS disease.149 That case 
made Haiti one of the first countries in which AIDS was recognized. The results have been 
catastrophic for Haiti economically and socially. Economically, Haiti’s tourism industry virtually 
collapsed overnight. In 1982, tourism had declined to some 70,000 visitors: by 1983, the number 
was around 10,000 including business travellers.150 Goods produced in Haiti were reported to 
have been refused in the US and marked ‘return to sender’. Haitians in the US were reporting 
they were refused employment or fired from their jobs because of their nationality and were 
unable to sell or purchase housing.151 By 1982, 34 Haitians living in the US had been recognized 
as having AIDS.152 
 The discovery of AIDS-infected Haitians in America led the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) to classify Haitian immigrants as an identifiable subgroup of 
heterosexuals at risk, meaning that Haitian males were categorized as a group at high-risk of 
contracting AIDS, along with homosexuals, intravenous drug users, hemophiliacs and recipients 
of blood transfusions.153 The colloquial grouping became known colloquially as the ‘4-H 
club.’154 Part of the problem was that a number of Haitian-Americans who died from late stage 
 
149 Jean Pape and Warren Johnson point out that the determination of AIDS in Haiti was made “retrospectively.” See 
Jean Pape and Warren D Johnson Jr., “AIDS in Haiti: 1982-1992,” Clinical Infectious Diseases 17, Supplement 2 
(Controversies in the Management of Infections in Immunocompromised Patients, November 1993): S341-S345. 
150 Marlise Simons, “For Haiti Tourism, the Stigma is Fatal,” The New York Times, November 29, 1983, 
www.nytimes.com  
151 Lawrence K. Altman, “Debate Grows on U.S. Listing of Haitians in AIDS Category,” The New York Times, July 
31, 1983, www.nytimes.com.  
152 US Center for Disease Control Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, “Opportunistic Infections and Kaposi's 
Sarcoma among Haitians in the United States,” 9 July 1982. www.cdc.goc/mmwr.  
153 In March 1983, the CDC asked Haitians to refrain from donating blood: the FDA would make that official policy 
in 1984, barring any Haitian immigrants after 1977 from donating. By 1990, Haitian immigrants regardless of year 
of entry into the US would be barred from donating. Amy L. Fairchild, and Eileen A Tynan, “Policies of 
Containment: Immigration in the Era of AIDS,” American Journal of Public Health: Public Health Now and Then 
84, no. 12 (December 1994): 2011-22. 




AIDS were found to have “toxoplasmosis,” but had been misdiagnosed as victims of 
tuberculosis.155 
 For Haiti as a nation to be so classified devastated tourism. By 1983, a year later, the 
Haitian tourism industry had declined by over 80 percent. One of the CDC epidemiologists 
stated: 
It's a working definition. If there turned out to be a large national or ethnic group, you 
would single that group out. But when you translate a working definition to a small, 
poverty-struck country like Haiti, it is devastating. It destroys one of their main cash 
industries - tourism.156 
 
Even worse, publicity struck as Haiti was identified as the likely birthplace of AIDS.157 
Initially, the debate arose over whether Haitians passed the disease to Americans on vacation or 
Americans visiting Haiti had passed it to Haitians. For Haitians living abroad, the stigma of 
AIDS quickly made itself felt with many losing jobs or unable to sell property they held overseas 
because of fears of contracting the disease. Ironically, by 1988, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) was able to show that AIDS rates in Haiti were actually lower than those in other 
Caribbean nations and the US! By 1990, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) dropped 
the ban on Haitians donating blood. At about the same time, however, the US began to 
 
155 Lawrence K. Altman, “DEBATE GROWS ON US LISTING OF HAITIANS IN AIDS CATEGORY,” New York 
Times, July 31 1983.  www.nytimes.com.  
156 Altman, “DEBATE GROWS ON US LISTING OF HAITIANS IN AIDS CATEGORY.” 
157 A 1981 CDC study of AIDS in the San Francisco area included a Haitian with AIDS identified as ‘Patient O’ 
meaning the patient was from ‘Outside of California.’ That label was instead interpreted to mean ‘Patient Zero’ and 
identified him as being the Haitian point of origin for the disease. A 2007 medical study claimed the HIV subtype B 
arrived in Haiti from Africa and was then transmitted on to the US, possibly as early as 1969. However, the virus 
was identified not only in Haiti, but also the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago at around the 
same time. Further, it also emerged amongst Haitian immigrants, meaning the nationality of the person who moved 
the virus to the US cannot be reliably determined. Nonetheless, Haiti does remain erroneously identified as the point 
of origin for HIV / AIDS. See M. Thomas P. Gilbert, Andrew Rambaut, Gabriela Wlasiuk, Thomas J. Spira, Arthur 
E. Pitchenik, and Michael Worobey, “The emergence of HIV/AIDS in the Americas and beyond,” Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 104, no. 47 (20 Nov 2007): 18566-18570. 
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quarantine Haitian migrants infected with HIV at the Guantanamo Bay Naval base in Cuba, a 
practice which continued for three years before it was discontinued. 
 
The Vatican Strikes Back 
 
It would appear that [François] Duvalier's policy towards religious groups in Haiti has 
been dominated by an insistence that the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church should 
no longer be foreign-dominated, combined with a determination to secure the political 
neutrality or support of the religious bodies in the country. The conflict between Duvalier 
and the Roman Catholic Church has partly also been concerned with the church's role in 
education.158 
- Professor of History and Theology David Nicholls 
 
 
By 1979, the Duvalier regime’s problems were becoming quite noticeable to the 
international audience. The US State Department wrote that “recognizable and increasingly 
cohesive and outspoken opposition, including…. independent political parties” heralding the 
beginnings of vocal and active discontent with his rule had now appeared.159 The following year, 
protests materialized in the Haitian countryside, the traditional Duvalier support space.160 The 
protests materialized for a variety of reasons, principally economic problems. In the Artibonite 
Valley, for example, protests arose over the development of the irrigation system and related 
issues of land ownership.161 The collapsing international economy caused the repatriation of 
 
158 Nicholls, “Politics and Religion in Haiti,” 413. The US State Department commented on the volatility of the 
emerging situation in Haiti, writing in August: “THE HAITIAN PEASANTRY, WHILE STILL LARGELY 
UNEDUCATED AND POLITICALLY PASSIVE, HAS BECOME MORE AWARE OF BOTH INTERNAL AND 
EXTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING GOH FAILINGS AND ABUSES, THROUGH THE SPREAD OF 
CREOLE-LANGUAGE RADIO BROADCASTING. IT IS THEREFORE LESS POLITICALLY 
PREDICTABLE.” See US State Department telegram, “Recent Political Developments,” Wikileaks Cable: 
1979PORTA03642_e, dated August 16, 1979, 2, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1979PORTA03642_e.html.  
159 US State Department telegram, “Recent Political Developments,” 2. 
160 Chochotte argues that “the nature of the peasant protest[s] was collective and derived from community council 
activities.” He believes the growth of community councils allowed rural peasants an access point to engage with the 
State: those engagements, unfortunately for Duvalier, overwhelmed his State’s ability to mediate and would 
eventually multiply and fester, leading to more and more protests. See Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton 
Makouts, and the Rise and Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in Haiti,” 200-05. 
161 Chochotte, 204. 
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many Haitians who had fled Haiti to enter the Bahamas and the US illegally. They carried their 
economic grievances home with them.162  
Growing unpopularity led Duvalier to seek out opportunities to shore up his image. One 
of the means he seized upon was to invite the popular Pope John Paul II to visit the nation. This 
was an error as it turned out.163 Jean-Claude’s somewhat frantic invitation was seized upon by 
the church as an opportunity to reverse the 1966 Concordat amendment that allowed the 
Duvaliers to nominate Haitian priests and bishops to the Pope.164 
Jean-Claude agreed to the reversal of the Concordat in return for the Pope’s visit to Haiti. 
What he did not realize, however, was that in his Papal address, the Pope would launch a direct 
assault on the Duvalier legacy, condemning his regime and calling for immediate changes to 
Haiti’s government.165 Pope John Paul II condemned the “excessive inequality and misery, 
hunger and fear” all too common in Haiti. He also called on Haiti to “to develop'' so that its 
people ''may work without constraint, without having to seek elsewhere - and often in pitiful 
conditions - what they ought to find at home.''166 Further, the Pope would use the opportunity to 
 
162 By October 1981, the tide of economic refugees fleeing Haiti for the US prompted the Reagan administration to 
pass the Haitian Migrant Interdiction Operation (HMIO) which involved permanently stationing US Coast Guard 
ships in the Windward Passage to interdict Haitians fleeing in boats. Once intercepted, the Haitians were 
interviewed and then returned to Haiti. The Coast Guard claimed almost all Haitians indicated they were enroute to 
the US for jobs and were not fleeing political persecution. See William Steif, “Haitian Hell: A Government Gone 
Awry,” The Multinational Monitor 6, no. 18 (December 1985). 
163 The Catholic Church had a tumultuous relationship with Papa Doc. The original Concordat of 1860 between the 
Church and the Haitian government had ceded to the Haitian president the right to nominate archbishops and 
bishops, the Pope retaining the right to refuse their appointment. François Duvalier sought to ‘Haitianize’ the 
Church and began a first round of expulsions of Catholic priests in the 1959-61 period, which led the Church to 
excommunicate him in 1961. Duvalier expelled a second round of priests in the 1966-67 period. In 1966, the Church 
offered Duvalier a bargain. In return for ending his attacks on the Church, his excommunication was lifted, and he 
gained the right to nominate Haitian-born clergy. See Greene, The Catholic Church in Haiti. 
164 The 1984 amendment to the Concordat completely reversed the original Concordat of 1860 and removed the 
president’s right to nominate bishops and archbishops, whether Haitian or not. 
165 Elizabeth Abbott claims that as a result of the Pope’s visit, “a new spirit of radicalism was born in the land.” 
Elizabeth Abbott, Haiti: Shattered Nation (New York: Overlook/Duckworth, 2011), 263.  
166 Marlise Simons, “Pope in Haiti, Assails Inequality, Hunger and Fear,” The New York Times, March 10, 1983. 
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attack Haiti’s Vodou religion, telling his listeners “not to submit to certain syncretic practices 
inspired by fear and anguish before forces one does not understand.”167 
The End? 
The government did nothing to stabilize prices or alleviate the plight of the urban poor. 
On the contrary, Jean-Claude Duvalier and his closest allies picked this very moment, 
when most citizens were having difficulty obtaining their daily ration of food, to flaunt 
their luxurious lifestyle. This alone was enough for some people to take to the streets.168 
- Professor of Anthropology Michel-Rolph Trouillot 
 
  By 1985, the writing was definitely on the wall for Duvalier. Citizens of the city of 
Gonäives broke into open revolt, raiding food distribution warehouses in the area and mounting 
food riots. Protests spread and by January 1986, Haitians in six other cities were revolting 
including Cap Haïtien. The Reagan administration quickly applied pressure on Duvalier, 
particularly after school children were killed by his regime while supressing the anti-government 
protests.169 American pressure included the suspension of aid to Haiti as of 31 January, cutting 
off the government’s essential source of revenue.  
Finally, facing the inevitable, Duvalier met with General Henri Namphy to discuss the 
transfer of power to a Conseil National de Gouvernement (CNG or National Council of 
 
167 The address by the Pope accomplished the Church’s goal of distracting Haitians from previous support given by 
the Church to the Duvalier regimes. Additionally, it provided the Church with a new image that allowed the Pope to 
be credited with forcing Duvalier to step down and head into exile. Ironically, Pope John Paul II would revert to 
form with the overthrow of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and in 1991 would extend the Vatican’s recognition to the violent 
military junta government installed following his coup. The Vatican was the only government in the world to 
recognize the junta government under General Cedras. (Simons, “Pope in Haiti, Assails Inequality, Hunger and 
Fear.”) David Nicholls argues a different point of view: “It would be unduly cynical to view the role of the church in 
the last few years merely as a revenge for the humiliation suffered under François Duvalier or as part of an attempt 
to re-establish its former role as a major political force in Haiti by siding with the growing opposition movement. 
While these considerations may carry some weight, it is undoubtedly the case that many parish priests and some of 
the bishops have genuinely and sincerely identified themselves with the cause of the poor and oppressed people of 
the country. The church constitutes one of the few Haitian institutions to have retained sufficient credibility to act 
effectively in the situation.” See Nicholls, “Haiti: the rise and fall of Duvalierism,” 1246. 
168 Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 216. 
169 That pressure included having US Embassy personnel meet with key Haitian Army officers who were plotting to 
overthrow the Duvalier regime. Key leaders were identified as Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, Commander of 
the Haitian Army, and Colonel Williams Regala. See Abbott, Haiti, 301. 
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Government). One of his last acts as president was to fire several right-wing Army officers and 
re-appoint a number of moderate officers who had been previously driven out of the military in 
an attempt to curb the probability the Army would employ violence to maintain his regime. 
Elizabeth Abbott claims the last-minute appointments by Duvalier were to ensure that Army 
units were commanded by officers who would refuse to fire on the Haitian people now in 
revolt.170  
Ironically, the CNG’s would launch a violent campaign against the democratic movement 
that would result in more Haitians being killed between Jean-Claude’s departure and the January 
1988 elections than had been killed over the previous fifteen years of Jean-Claude’s regime! Yet 
despite the Army’s violent spree, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Elliott Abrams, was quoted 
in the press as identifying General Namphy, the head of the ruling CNG, as “Haiti’s best chance 
for democracy,” stating further that the CNG had “contributed importantly to laying the 
groundwork for a new, more democratic Haiti.”171 
 Trouillot has a different and more plausible interpretation of Duvalier’s departure. He 
argues that his departure was the result of “a high-level coup d’état executed with international 
connivance” and that the “management of his departure, and its aftermath, effectively prevented 
the complete dechoukaj that most Haitians were calling for.”172 At its core, Trouillot’s argument 
claims the national elite was concerned with the “democratic steamroller” movement which 
eventually removed Duvalier from power. It believed the steamroller “might not stop at their 
door if the dechoukaj continued” and would ‘flatten’ the entire system. Unfortunately for the 
elite, while the dechoukaj was halted and its position remained secure, the democratic movement 
 
170 Abbott, Haiti, 304. 
171 Amy Wilentz, The Rainy Season: Haiti – Then and Now, rev. ed. (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 
2010), 237. See also Noam Chomsky, The Tragedy of Haiti. 
172 Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 226. 
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did gain momentum, weather the storm under successive military rulers who succeeded Namphy, 
and eventually triumphed to elect Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the presidency. That steamroller 
would become known as the Lavalas movement.  
To halt the dechoukaj before it was out of control, the Haitian elite sought out assistance 
from the international community, intending to re-invigorate the Army. It was not disappointed. 
It undertook two major initiative, the development of a new Haitian military unit,  
With Duvalier’s departure in 1986 came two major initiatives. The first was the the 
creation of a far-right paramilitary group, the Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haitien or 
FRAPH which will be covered later in Chapter Nine. The second was the development of the 
Service d’intelligence National or SIN unit. Ostensibly an intelligence unit intended to focus on 
counter narcotics activities, it was quickly coopted into the battle against the outbreak of peasant 
democracy.173 The unit was funded with CIA money and training support amounting to around 
US$500,000 per year.174 Ironically, the CIA training and funding would enable SIN’s key leaders 
to engage in drug trafficking and money laundering. By 1992, however, the US DEA agents 
were investigating them several senior members of the SIN unit identified as involved in drug 
trafficking and money laundering.175 
 
173 The same capabilities are required whether developing intelligence on the narcotics trade or on political 
opponents. 
174 Kathleen Marie Whitney, "SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA: US Covert Action in Haiti", Southwestern Journal of Law 
and Trade in the Americas 3, (Issue 2 1996): 303-332. 
175 The suspects included three former SIN commanding officers. One of the suspects, Colonel Joseph Michel 
François, was also involved in the 1991 coup. François was finally indicted by the US justice system in 1997, for 
smuggling of over 66 thousand pounds of cocaine and heroin into the US. See Stephen Engelberg, Howards W 
French and Tim Weiner, “C.I.A. Formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics Trade,” The New York Times, 
November 14 1993; and Tim Weiner, “A Leader of Former Haitian Junta is Charged with Smuggling Tons of Drugs 
to U.S.,” The New York Times, March 8, 1997. 
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More damning, SIN leaders would play key roles in the overthrow of the Aristide 
presidency.176 The unit was responsible for developing intelligence about Aristide and the 
Lavalas organization, and then ‘shaped’ that intelligence to reflect badly on both parties. The 
international press and politicians used the fake stories generated by SIN to argue against 
restoring Aristide to power after the September 1991 military coup.177 This false narrative caused 
the worst damage done by the paramilitaries, funded and trained by US intelligence agencies. 
Other initiatives spearheaded by the international community included the US Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) program transfer of close to US$400,000 worth of riot control gear to the Haitian 
Army.178 Even with the riot gear, the Army escalated to deadly force, lacking the training 
necessary to conduct effective crowd control operations. On April 26, 1986, after using tear gas 
on a peaceful protest estimated at 10,000 strong, the Haitian Army opened fire on the crowd, 




176 The SIN unit also played a hands-on role in the campaign against Aristide and his supporters. A high-profile 
example was the 1989 arrest of Port-au-Prince mayor Evans Paul by Colonel Prudhomme, the head of SIN. While in 
SIN custody, Paul was subject to a violent interrogation by SIN members, which left Paul with five broken ribs and 
internal injuries. See Howard W. French and Time Weiner, “C.I.A. formed Haitian Unit Later Tied to Narcotics 
Trade,” The New York Times, November 14, 1993.  
177 Whitney, SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA, 316-20. 
178 Farmer, 109. 
179 The march was intended to honour victims of Duvalierist violence and was led by a number of Catholic priests 
including Aristide. Farmer, 109. 
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Chapter Nine – Haiti: Life after Duvalier 
All important facts and personages of great importance in world history occur, as it were, 
twice. The first time as tragedy. The second as farce.1 
- Philosopher Karl Marx 
 
 
 The emergence of popular democracy in post-Duvalier Haiti, in the form of free and fair 
elections, can be accredited to General Hérard Abraham, the Army Chief of Staff under President 
Prosper Avril. In March 1989, the terror tactics and authoritarian governance of then-President 
Prosper Avril, a former Army officer, sparked public outrage and mass demonstrations, as well 
as attacks on his supporters. With Avril’s resignation, General Abraham, in accordance with the 
Haitian Constitution, handed the presidency to the Chief Justice of Haiti’s Supreme Court, Ertha 
Pascal-Trouillot.2 In doing so, he also stated “Madame President, the armed forces of Haiti are at 
your command.” For the first time in Haiti’s history, symbolically at least, a Haitian Army 
general officer voluntarily subordinated the military to Haiti’s civilian authority. 
 Abraham’s work to promote democracy in Haiti did not end there. Not only did he work 
closely with Pascal-Trouillot to ensure the 1990-91 general elections were free and fair by 
ensuring the military under his control worked closely and properly with the United Nations 
Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti or ONUVEH, a mission requested 
by Pascal-Trouillot, he also forestalled at least one attempt to steal the nation away from 
President-elect Jean Bertrand Aristide.3 Before Aristide could take power, Roger Lafontant, an 
ex-Makoute leader and a former Interior Minister under Jean-Claude Duvalier, kidnapped Pascal-
 
1 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1852. Cited in Henry F. Carey, “The Third US 
Intervention and Haiti’s Paramilitary Predicament,” Journal of Haitian Studies 11, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 111 (24f.). 
2 Pascal-Trouillot also had the distinction of being Haiti’s first female lawyer and was ironically named Chief Justice 
by President Avril. 
3 For more detail on ONUVEH, see https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unmihbackgr1.html.  
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Trouillot and forced her to resign, allowing him to assume the interim presidency.4 Once more, 
Abraham upheld democracy by ordering the Army to crush the rebellion.5  
On February 7, 1991, President Aristide was sworn in as president, an event which was 
carefully safeguarded by Abraham. Aristide then promoted Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras to 
Army Chief of Staff. Cedras was rewarded for his work on security for the 1990-91 elections, 
having impressed both the French and Americans involved in the process.6 Cedras, who was a 
former CIA informant, was also trained in special operations including counter-insurgency by 
the Americans, and had served in Duvalier’s Leopard Corps.7 Meanwhile, Aristide retired 
Abraham in July 1991, and then promoted Cedras to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the 
Haitian Armed Forces.8 
Post Duvalier American Foreign Policy: Considerations 
 
…there is a more widely shared view among Haitians that the US ‘intervention’ of 
February 1986 in combination with the Haitian army which finally helped oust Duvalier 
served to ‘avoid the full victory of the people and to slow down the process of change,’ in 
the words of a Haitian presidential candidate of the moderate centre…9 
- Extract from Caribbean Council of Churches report 
 
 
4 Pascal-Trouillot was arrested in April 1991 as a conspirator in the coup attempt but released the day after her arrest 
with the charges against her dropped. Reportedly, US President George H. W. Bush intervened personally with 
President Aristide and demanded she be released, and all charges dropped. See Abbott, Haiti, 358-9. 
5 Lafontant drew his support from the Army’s senior NCOs, rather than the senior officer corps. Under Abraham, the 
senior officers would not throw in with the NCO rebellion: that would change when Abraham, reportedly a 
Duvalierist, was retired by Aristide and Cedras took control. See Howard W. French, “Former Chief of Duvalier’s 
Militia Claims Power after Coup in Haiti,” The New York Times, January 7, 1991. 
6 Laguerre identifies Cedras as a member of the “Jean-Claude Duvalier class of 1973,” the first class to graduate 
from the Haitian Military Academy which had been re-opened by Duvalier in 1972. The class of 1973 was identified 
as handpicked by Duvalier, advancing the sons of those Tonton Makoutes and Duvalierist families considered the 
most loyal to his regime. See Laguerre, The Military and Society in Haiti, 10 (note 5). 
7 A November 14, 1993 article in The New York Times identified Cedras as a paid CIA informant, years prior to the 
1991 coup, and alleged that the CIA had covertly arranged for Cedras to be given responsibility for security of the 
1990 elections. Such status would make sense considering the post-coup payments the US promised to Cedras and 
his family in return for his departure from Haiti. See also Whitney, "SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA", 321. 
8 Avril claims that Abraham was a Duvalierist and removed from power because of that taint. Meanwhile, Avril has 
written that Cedras had previous experience in coups, implicating him as having been involved in the 1989 coup 
attempt against Avril’s government, although Avril is not explicit as to Cedras’ involvement, stating only that those 
who fail to denounce a coup plan when discovered are just as guilty as those carrying it out. See Avril, From Glory 
to Disgrace, 246-7. 
9 Caribbean Council of Churches, Mission to Haiti, in Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 201. 
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 Before turning to the 29 September 1991 military coup launched against Aristide, an 
examination of American interests in Haiti is warranted. Haiti was on the American 
government’s security radar first because Latin and South American drug cartels used it as an 
important narcotics transshipment point; and second because thousands of Haitians fled the 
country to seek refuge and a better life, with most immigrants aiming for sanctuary in the United 
States. In theory, both problems drove American officials to pursue stable government and the 
rule of law in Haiti.  
In practice, US foreign policy directed at Latin America had the twin goals of containing 
communism and popular democratic movements. Brenda Plummer has elaborated upon the 
historical development of containment, pointing to its early roots:  
Containment has always been a cornerstone of the US attitude toward Haiti…It explained 
away Haitian sovereignty in exceptionalist arguments…The desire for political stability 
in the Caribbean region is a thick thread running through the fabric of US diplomatic 
history. Policy-makers unfortunately equated stability with the promotion and retention 
of regimes that could neutralize endemic popular discontent.10 
 
The centrepiece of US containment strategy was maintenance of the status quo. Radical shifts in 
political power though coups or revolutionary movements were to be prevented. Coups were 
bad, for example, because they led to mass migrations and destabilized regions. Likewise, 
revolutionary movements also produced regional instability, leading Washington to downplay 
human rights issues and tolerate authoritarian regimes that were anti-communist and capable of 
suppressing popular dissent. Ideally, US foreign policy goals were served by a passive peasant 
class, compliant with the needs of American commercial interests.  
Radical behaviour within the region reflected badly on the United States and sent the 
signal that the United States could not control its allies in its own backyard. Hence, American 
 
10 Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 1902-1915, 210-11. 
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assistance to totalitarian regimes included military assistance necessary to counter communism 
as well as training to control local insurgent activities. In those instances when violent coups 
occurred, the US expected the local militaries to step in, take control and guide the nation to the 
next, non-communist, US-friendly government with a minimum of disruption. Political scientist 
Morris Morley and journalism professor Chris McGillion described the phenomenon thus:  
Consequently, Washington's policy toward the state in Latin America has remained 
constant; toward the regime it has been variable. Whether we are discussing Eisenhower 
policy toward Cuba, the Kennedy-Johnson approach toward the Dominican Republic and 
Brazil, Richard Nixon's hostility toward Allende's Chile, Jimmy Carter's policy toward 
Nicaragua and El Salvador, or Ronald Reagan's support for redemocratization in 
Guatemala, the thread that linked them all was a singular determination to preserve key 
state institutions (not least, the armed forces) in the event of a political transition, together 
with a flexible approach regarding support for elected regimes or dictatorial rulers.11 
  
The democratic election of Aristide on the back of a popular movement spearheaded by 
peasants and the Port-au-Prince urban poor, dramatically shifted power within Haiti and signaled 
the failure of the strategy of containment. The Haitian military also saw Aristide’s election as 
dangerous and especially among the ranks of the Army’s senior NCOs. While the reasons behind 
the 1991 coup against Aristide are complex and will be debated for many years, two triggers 
stand out.12 One of the first acts undertaken by the Aristide government was the abolition of the 
notorious chefs de sections program and its replacement by “communal police agents” under the 
control of the Justice Ministry.13 Aristide retired the chefs de sections and granted them their 
pensions, but declared that those guilty of human rights abuses would be brought to justice.14 He 
 
11 See Morris Morley and Chris McGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The 
Clinton Administration and Haiti,” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 3 (Autumn, 1997): 363-4. 
12 In addition to the forced retirement of a number of senior Army general officers, Aristide also created a 50-man 
presidential guard trained by the Swiss, the creation of which may also have been a source of concern for the 
military. For an excellent analysis of the Aristide presidency and its weaknesses in terms of power, see Bellegarde-
Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 234-47. See also Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 264-5. 
13 Blanchet, The Rural Police. 
14 Despite the best intentions of the Aristide government, justice proved very problematic. Tet Kole Ti Peyizan 
Ayisyen, for example, noted that a number of former chefs de sections were able to move into the new communal 
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also ordered them to hand in their weapons and ammunition, leaving them defenceless and 
facing retributive justice for their decades of predation. The way the program was dismantled left 
many within the Army, particularly the non-commissioned officers, uneasy, to say the least. 
  The second trigger was Aristide’s emphasis on stopping Haiti from being employed as a 
transshipment point for drugs. US agencies including the DEA have identified over the years 
senior officers within the Haitian security forces involved in the narcotics trade. Aristide’s anti-
narcotics campaign severely reduced the incomes of many key senior leaders within the Army 
and National Police who depended upon narco-trafficking. The Chief of the National Police, 
Colonel Michel François, was a major player in the narcotics trade in Haiti and was indicted by 
the US in March 1997. The indictment alleged he worked with the Colombian drug cartels to 
open new routes to the US for Colombian cocaine.15 
 
The Coup and the Response 
 
Did we place too much trust in the Americans? Were we too dependent on external 
forces? No. It would be mere demagoguery for a Haitian president to pretend to be 
stronger than the Americans, or to engage them in a constant war of words, or to oppose 
them for opposing’s sake. The only rational course is to weigh up the relative balance of 
interests, to figure out what the Americans want, to remember what we want, and to make 
the most of the available points of convergence. In 1994, Clinton needed a foreign policy 
victory, and a return to democracy in Haiti offered him that opportunity; we needed an 
instrument to overcome the resistance of the murderous Haitian army, and Clinton 
offered us that instrument. We never had any illusions that the Americans shared our 
deeper objectives. But without them we couldn’t have restored democracy.16 
- Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
 
police agent program despite being suspected of a number of human rights abuses. In some areas, the chefs de 
sections quit their posts before the communal police agents were in place, effectively leaving some areas without 
any policing whatsoever. See Blanchet, The Rural Police.; and Americas Watch, The National Coalition for Haitian 
Refugees and Caribbean Rights Report, Haiti: The Aristide government’s Human Rights Record, New York, 
November 1, 1991. 
15 DEA agents arrested François in Honduras, but the Honduran government eventually declined to extradite him 
and released him. See CNN News, “Haiti’s former police chief indicted on drug charges,” March 7, 1997; and The 
New York Times, “A Leader of Former Haitian Junta is Charged with Smuggling Tons of Drugs to US,” March 8, 
1997. 
16 Jean-Bertrand Aristide from a July 20, 2006, interview with Peter Hallward. Cited in Hallward, “An interview 





The 1991 coup has been attributed to the Haitian Army commander, General Cedras; the 
Chief of the National Police, Colonel Michel François; and Army Chief of Staff, General 
Philippe Biamby. They were prominent as the face of the coup and spearheaded all the 
negotiations with the international community. However, evidence strongly implicates the 
Army’s senior NCO corps as the prime movers behind the coup.17 Prosper Avril, for example, 
writes about the discontent with Aristide and the military protests that would eventually develop 
into the coup. He suggests that that the senior NCOs presented Cedras with a fait accompli and 
gave him the option of following the protest movement or being removed as an impediment to 
it.18 Regardless of the background and his motivation, Cedras would become the front man for 
the coup and synonymous with the undermining and removal of Haiti’s democratically elected 
president. 
 International interventionist activities that followed the 1991 coup were understandably 
controversial, complex, and inconsistent. For example, the commercial embargo placed on 
Haiti’s regime leaders by the OAS on 30 September, 1991, two days after the coup, was 
regularly flouted.19 American compliance with the embargo was non-existent for the first month 
 
17 Prosper Avril made the same claim. On 17 September 1988, a group of senior NCOs approached him and 
demanded he lead the new dictatorship on their behalf. While Avril presents himself as taking power to save lives, 
the account nonetheless provides more evidence that military coups often develop from the ground up and not 
necessarily within the officer corps. Instead, the officer corps often reacts to events as was claimed to be the case 
with Cedras in 1991. Understanding where the impetus for a coup emerges and the potential powers behind the 
throne can be useful in eventual negotiations to restore democracy. See Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 232-40. 
18 Avril wrote that Cedras, “Faced with the rapid spread of the revolt inside the Army…chose to follow the 
movement, perhaps for his own security.” One rumour claimed Cedras, when taken at gunpoint to the presidential 
palace, found the coup leaders ready to execute Aristide. Cedras interceded and successfully argued against such 
action as it would turn Aristide into a martyr and ignite a mass uprising. Avril, From Glory to Disgrace, 265. See 
also Whitney, “SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA,” 303-332.  
19 Felicia Swindells notes that OAS sanctions are not mandatory and were therefore not fully enforced by all OAS 
members including the US. Mandatory UN sanctions would not be imposed until June 1993. See Felicia Swindells, 
“U.N. Sanctions in Haiti: A Contradiction under Article 41 and 55 of the U.N. Charter,” Fordham International Law 
Journal 20, no. 5 (1996): 1914. 
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and remained spotty until February 1992 when President Bush partially lifted the embargo to 
exempt US assembly companies and allow them to ship their goods into the US.20 In 1992, 
American imports of clothing sewn in Haiti totaled over US$62 million, despite the embargo.21 
 Further, throughout Aristide’s exile from office, the Bush administration sought to 
distance itself from linking democracy in Haiti explicitly to Aristide’s return to power.22 Initially, 
the distancing was quite subtle. In October 1991, for example, President George H.W. Bush’s 
Secretary of State, James Baker, avoided mentioning Aristide and remarked that “we would send 
an important message to those who have taken power in Haiti, as well as to the Haitian 
people…This Organization…must not, and I am sure will not rest, until the people of Haiti 
regain their democracy.”23 Serious consequences flowed from Washington’s ambivalence 
towards Aristide. An after-action report prepared on Operation Uphold Democracy, the US 
intervention in Haiti, 1994-5, included an analysis of the impact of US participation in 
peacemaking:  
 
20 The US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Donna Hrinack, testifying before 
Congress, argued that the US suspended sanctions enforcement for those American companies with assembly 
industries in Haiti “out of concern for the effect the embargo was having on poor Haitian workers employed by these 
companies…We, likewise, acted to prevent what we concluded would have been disastrous and lasting damage to 
the Haitian economy through the bankruptcy of the 807 companies or their shift to third countries…To lessen the 
impact, we granted that sector a 30-day grace period during which companies could continue to ship materials and 
assembled goods to and from Haiti.” See Swindells, “U.N. Sanctions in Haiti,” 1914 n238. See also Charles 
Kernaghan, “Skirting the Embargo,” Multinational Monitor 15, no. 3 (March 1994). www.multinationalmonitor.org. 
21 Paul Farmer, Mary C. Smith Fawzi and Patrick Nevil, “Unjust embargo of aid for Haiti,” The Lancet 361 
(February 1, 2003):  420-23. doi:http://dx.doi.org.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/10.1016/S0140-6736(03)12380-X.  
22 As time progressed, Aristide would become more of an obstacle to US policy aims because of his perceived 
unwillingness to compromise. Strategic assessments of Aristide produced by US intelligence agencies and shared 
with key allies like Canada, portrayed Aristide as manic in behaviour and heavily medicated as a result of mental 
health treatment received in Montreal. The assessments were later shown to be fabrications, but they were quickly 
leaked and echoed in the media, leading to the portrayal of the president as erratic, unpredictable, and unsuited for 
office. The CIA had several reasons for wanting anyone but Aristide to be in power in Haiti, the first related to the 
agency’s intense distrust of adherents to liberation theology, which came back into vogue in the Americas at the 
time. In addition, Emmanuel Constant had reported that the CIA had two agents within the Haitian Army 
headquarters with General Cedras when the coup took place. There are unsubstantiated rumours that Cedras himself 
was a CIA agent. See Whitney, "SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA,” 303-332. 




US resolve on return of Aristide wavered; with many changes in policy – Policy 
oscillations reduced efficiency of military shows of force and threats of military action. – 
Limited US domestic support for Aristide and, later, events in Somalia fueled discord 
over Haiti policy.24 
 
The UN’s own background reports on Haiti and its past missions obliquely mentioned the 
attitude shift of attitudes towards Aristide:  
For this reason, the participants should resume an effective role in this process, and the 
international community and especially those countries most directly concerned should 
restore a unified approach in the negotiations. Without positive change, both from the 
Haitian side and from the international community, [emphasis added] it was difficult 
to determine what additional efforts the United Nations could undertake to resolve the 
crisis.25 
 
One controversial and early instance of that inconsistency that defied logic was the 
decision by the Vatican to formally recognize the coup regime in March 1992. A major blow to 
Aristide, the Vatican was fortunately the only state to take that dubious step.26 The Vatican’s 
decision, while stemming from Aristide having embraced liberation theology, which the Vatican 
loathed, was nonetheless surprising because attacking Aristide undermined the Catholic 
Church’s standing among the Haitian peasantry.27 
The initial international response to the coup, as with most violent transitions of power in 
Haiti, was to impose sanctions. The OAS had imposed regional sanctions on Haiti in October 
 
24 Adam Siegel, “OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: The US Intervention in Haiti, 1994-95: Lessons for 
Operational Strategy,” Presentation to Office for Strategy, US Assistant SecDef, S&R, Slide 10, 31 May 1995.  
25 See UNMIH Backgrounder, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr2.html.  
26 Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 233. 
27 Anne Greene points out the Catholic Church was in the midst of its own civil war in Latin America, with a new 
breed of liberation theologians in the form of priests like Aristide, arguing for a hands-on church tackling social 
injustice, while the old breed church leaders were more inclined towards a hands-off approach emphasising 
opposition to communism, or any real reformation revolution (the latter because they saw it as the gateway for 
communism to take hold). Those conservative elements would triumph and by 1988 Aristide’s political activities 
had led to him being expelled from his Salesian Order ostensibly for criticisms he had leveled at the Haitian Catholic 
leadership for its complicity with the Duvalier regime. By 1994, the Church would pressure Aristide to leave the 
priesthood, prompting this statement attributed to a close anonymous priest and friend of Aristide: “This is a sad day 
for all of us…it is very disturbing to see that the same bishops who supported the coup and the military dictatorship 
have now succeeded in forcing Aristide out of the church in the name of canon law.” Greene, The Catholic Church 
in Haiti. Cited in Richter, Larry, “Aristide decides to quit as priest,” The New York Times, November 17, 1994. 
www.nytimes.com.   
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1991, followed by the UN, which imposed international sanctions in 1993.28 Initially focused on 
two objectives - the restoration of President Aristide to power and an end to the refugee stream 
from Haiti to the US – commercial considerations undermined American enforcement of 
sanctions from the start.29 The US, for example, during both the George H.W. Bush and Bill 
Clinton administrations, allowed specific exemptions to the embargo by select US companies 
that were then doing business in Haiti, as mentioned earlier.30 It would not be until 1993 that the 
embargo regime grew any real teeth.31 
 American policy towards Haiti disguised itself as even-handed. Pressure was applied to 
the coup leaders and Aristide to come to a solution that would alleviate the refugee crisis 
precipitated by the coup and would allow Aristide to resume his presidency. In practice, the 1992 
OAS Washington Accord was forced on Aristide by the Bush administration, requiring him to 
 
28 The UN sanctions included UNSCR 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, which imposed an arms and oil embargo on 
Haiti and froze the regime’s foreign assets (suspended 27 August 1993, by resolution 861 (1993) and then re-
imposed on 18 October 1993, by resolution 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993); UNSCR  917 (1994) of 6 May 1994, 
which expanded the embargo but excluded medical supplies and foodstuffs; and UNSCR 944 (1994) of 29 
September 1994, which terminated the sanctions. 
29 The OAS identified over 38,000 refugees as having been intercepted at sea by the US Coast Guard within six 
months of the 1991 coup. Additionally, a significant number of Haitians either fled into the hills or across the border 
into the Dominican Republic. In 1994, US authorities had recorded over 10,000 refugees in a 10-day period, this 
shortly after “initiating on-ship refugee processing.” That the outflow of refugees from Haiti was due more to 
political repression than economic issues can be seen in the dramatic drop in flow when Aristide assumed office and 
the significant rise immediately following the coup. At the same time, the conditions within Haiti as a result of the 
sanctions imposed by the OAS and later by the UN resulted in Haitians starving to death, many resorting to eating 
mud pies in an attempt to survive. For a more complete picture of the Haitian refugee picture during this period, see 
Patrick Gavigan, “Migration Emergencies and Human Rights in Haiti,” From the “Conference on Regional 
Responses to Forced Migration in Central America and the Caribbean” paper, September 30-October 1, 1997. 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/gavigane.html. For a comprehensive study of US policy as it affected Haitian 
boat migrants, see Christopher Mitchell, “US Policy toward Haitian Boat People, 1972-93,” The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 534, no. 1 (Jul 1994): 69-80. https://doi-org.lib-
ezproxy.concordia.ca/10.1177%2F0002716294534001006. 
30 See, for example, Kenneth Freed, “US Eases Sanctions Against Haiti: Embargo: Bush bows to pressure from 
American businesses, angering OAS leaders,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1992, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1992-02-05/news/mn-1261_1_american-business. See also Sydney Freedberg, and Rachel 
Swarns, “Poorly Enforced Sanctions Botch US Embargo of Haiti,” The Seattle Times, November 3, 1994,  
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19941103&slug=1939459.  
31 As mentioned earlier, until June 1993, the UN was content to leave the OAS to impose sanctions on Haiti. 
However, when it became clear in June that sanctions were not being enforced and were not having the effect 
desired, the UN stepped in and passed mandatory sanctions on Haiti. From that point onwards, the suffering of the 
Haitian people would dramatically increase as the sanctions were enforced more effectively. 
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make a number of concessions.32 One was the appointment of René Théodore, a former 
communist and leader of the Movement for National Reconciliation, as Prime Minster in return 
for Aristide returning to Haiti as president.33 Théodore was one of Aristide’s main political rivals 
and not at all supportive of Aristide’s planned policies, but the US insisted on him, believing that 
he would keep Aristide in check. 
Other concessions included a general amnesty for the coup leaders; the requirement that 
Aristide abide by all parliamentary legislation enacted since the start of the coup; and, in what 
must have been the worst blow, an agreement for Aristide’s return without a confirmed date.34 
Aristide was forced to accept that his return was predicated on the establishment of a safe and 
secure environment, an ambiguous, discretionary and subjective metric. Ironically, and 
notwithstanding the favourable terms granted the coup leaders, they were vigorously opposed to 
it. Interim President Joseph Nérette quickly denounced the agreement, calling it the product of 
“meddling foreigners.”35 The Agreement died a painful death on 27 March 1992, when the 
Haitian Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional.  
 
32 The February 25th, 1992 Washington Accord signed between Aristide and Prime Minister-designate René 
Théodore recognized Aristide as head of state; called for an OAS mission to be deployed to monitor the human 
rights situation in Haiti; called for all parties to work with the Prime Minister to set the conditions for Aristide’s 
eventual return; allowed for the immediate lifting of the OAS embargo and sanctions; and called for the 
professionalization of the military to enable it to participate in the democratic process within its “constitutional 
role.” Complete text of the Protocol between Aristide and Théodore under the Auspices of the OAS can be found 
through UN Peacemaker, www.unpeacemaker.un.org.  
33 Ironically, as a Marxist communist, Théodore won the backing of the US Ambassador Alvin Adams, “a steely 
Donald Rumsfeld lookalike and counter-terrorism expert” who decided Théodore was the best candidate for the 
position of Prime Minister. Unfortunately for Théodore, he was never confirmed in the position. Théodore remained 
anti-Aristide throughout his life. In December 2002, a few months before his death and as part of a loose coalition of 
anti-Aristide groups, Théodore signed a declaration demanding Aristide’s resignation. See Greg Chamberlain, “René 
Théodore: Haitian communist leader who won US support,” The Guardian, June 20, 2003. www.theguardian.com. 
34 The amnesty agreed upon excluded “common criminals”: media reporting alleged Aristide had called the coup 
leaders ‘common criminals’ which was used to explain why that category was specifically excluded. 
35 In response to the OAS agreement, Nérette stated: “I am chief of the state, the free, sovereign and independent 
state of Haiti. My mission is to follow the constitution and [exercise] the public powers of the presidency until an 
election of a new president…. Any solution has to be a Haitian solution, negotiated by Haitians. It is time to take our 
own destiny into our own hands. We will never surrender. The solution is in our own hands and no negotiated 
settlement will be forced on Haiti." His opposition appears to have been based on the accord having been, in his 
words, foreign created and imposed. See Kenneth Freed, “Haiti’s Puppet Government Vows to Keep Power: Latin 
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Into the newly created void, the coup regime brought forward its own Villa d’Accueil 
Accord which outlined its terms for an end to the coup government. Not only did the new Accord 
call for the “provisional government” to be recognized as legitimate, it also called for an end to 
the OAS embargo, arguing that the installation of a provisional government had already ended 
the coup. One of the unwritten goals of the Accord was clearly to prevent Aristide from returning 
to the office of the presidency. No mention was made of Aristide nor was any role provided for 
him in the provisional government.36 It is worth noting that while diplomatic negotiations were 
underway from 1991 to 1993, the human rights situation in Haiti degenerated into a morass of 
violence and killings. Human rights groups operating in Haiti estimated that some 3,000 extra-
judicial killings took place in Haiti during the period October 1991 to August 1992 with the 
majority occurring in pro-Aristide Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods.37  
The military, including police, met pro-Aristide demonstrations with violence. Any hope 
of diplomatic action leading to a ‘safe and secure environment’ for Aristide’s return faded during 
this period. Coupled to the democratic and human rights crisis was the ongoing refugee crisis 
which President Clinton relieved by re-instituting Bush’s policy of forced repatriation of Haitian 
refugees. When the recalcitrance of the coup regime was factored into the equation and a balance 
drawn, the UN and OAS, at American urging, exerted the greatest amount of pressure to make 
concessions on Aristide. 
 By 1993, the OAS was left behind, and the United Nations spearheaded Haiti policy with 
a campaign of coercive diplomacy. The UN also launched a joint mission with the OAS in 
 
America: An OAS accord to resolve the nation's political and economic crisis appears to be doomed,” Los Angeles 
Times, January 14, 1992. www.latimes.com  
36 See Chapter 1 of OAS IACHR Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti, (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83), 09 March 
1993.  http://www.cidh.org.  
37 See Chapter 2 of OAS IACHER Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti.  
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March 1993, MICIVIH or the International Civilian Mission in Haiti, to verify “respect for 
human rights.” The human rights monitoring mission included a public information and 
education role. MICIVIH continued operations in Haiti until March 2000. Its size and mission 
sets were expanded in 1994, the latter to include “democratic institution-building, civic 
education, assisting with the repatriation and resettlement of displaced persons, and providing 
medical assistance to victims of human rights abuses.” 38  
The UN’s June 1993 ban on the importation of petroleum and arms into Haiti finally gave 
the economic embargo some teeth, and was the key to Aristide and Cedras signing the 
Governors’ Island Agreement.39 That agreement, much like the earlier Washington Agreement, 
faced almost immediate resistance from Haiti’s Prime Minster Marc Bazin, who denounced the 
agreement’s requirement for the deployment of human rights observers as the equivalent of 
placing Haiti under “international tutelage.”40  
Once again, the implementation of a proposed agreement was flawed. In this case, the 
UN agreed to prematurely lift the economic embargo against Haiti on 27 August 1993, with the 
signature of the Governors’ Island Agreement.41 With the signing of the Agreement and 
deployment of the international human rights observers, Haitian police and military stepped up 
their violent campaign against Aristide supporters and democratic activists, many of whom were 
 
38 See http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/micivih.htm and http://search.archives.un.org/international-
civilian-support-mission-in-haiti-micah. 
39 The key negotiator throughout this period was Dante Caputo, a well-respected former Argentinian politician and 
diplomat, who was appointed Special Envoy to Haiti in 1992, representing both the OAS and the UN. He would 
continue in that role in 1993 and has been credited with brokering the Governors’ Island Agreement. Interestingly, 
an assessment of the embargo published in 1994 by the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace in Haiti 
concluded that insufficient international attention had been paid to the porous Haitian-Dominican Republic border 
and that the heavy commercial flow including petroleum products had not been impeded to any significant extent. 
Cited in Chetan Kumar, Building Peace in Haiti (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 25. 
40 The phrase was attributed to Bazin and a speech he gave on 27 January 1993. See Howard W. French, “Mediation 
Effort in Haiti Collapses.” The New York Times, February 5, 1993. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/05/world/mediation-effort-in-haiti-collapses.html.  




openly attacked and beaten in front of UN observers then in Haiti.42 Confronted with the 
likelihood of an Aristide return to power, the more radical elements supporting the coup regime 
began a campaign of killing and intimidation which echoed some of the worst excesses 
committed during the Duvalier era. 
By September 1993, the right-wing para-military organization known as the Front pour 
l'Avancement et le Progrès Haitien or FRAPH emerged as a major terror force aligned with the 
ruling regime and began terror operations in earnest. FRAPH’s sought to undermine the 
democratic movement in Haiti and force Aristide, if he was to be allowed to return to his 
presidency (and Haiti), to accede to a much-reduced vision for his presidency, one more in line 
with US interests for Haiti and the region.43 Headed by a CIA informant named Emmanuel 
Constant, FRAPH was the creation of General Philippe Biamby, a tool he would later employ to 
consolidate his power within the coup regime.44 
The Clinton administration’s strategy towards Haiti guided the CIA manipulations of the 
FRAPH during this period. Through the CIA, Clinton sought to shape and present the FRAPH as 
a reasonable political alternative to both the coup leadership and Aristide, somewhere on the 
political spectrum between the two. That narrative found its way into the US military. During 
Operation Restore Democracy, for example, deployed units were given operational orientation 
briefings which specifically identified the FRAPH organization as a legitimate political party 
 
42 Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F Baumann, and John T Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’: A Concise 
History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth: USCGSC Press, 1998), 34-5. 
43 See Whitney, "SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA", 303-331. 
44 Ralph Pezzullo, US President Clinton’s former special advisor for Haiti, identified FRAPH as having been built 
by Biamby to provide him with control of the coup regime. The FRAPH was similar in organization to Duvalier’s 
VSN, not surprising given FRAPH included a large number of former Makoutes. The organization was reportedly 
underwritten by the CIA and had a large number of members trained and equipped by US Special Forces. See Ralph 
Pezzullo, Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aristide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 2010), 210-12. 
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organization and directed that it be treated as such.45 That narrative was not universal within 
American circles however. US embassy assessments flowing out of Haiti continued to identify 
the group as extremist. FRAPH members were labelled as “gun-carrying crazies…. evolving into 
a sort of Mafia.”46 
FRAPH terror operations began with a campaign based on extrajudicial killings, arson, 
torture, and sexual violence against women, including rape. All were aimed at weakening 
support for Aristide by exposing his inability to protect supporters. Yet despite its heinous 
activities, FRAPH would emerge as a player on the world stage only after its October 1993 
encounter with the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) force.  
On 11 October, the USS Harlan Country, a tank landing ship carrying a multinational 
force of American and Canadian combat troops, was steaming into Haitian waters, with plans to 
dock at the international port of Port-au-Prince. The ship was carrying the advance party for the 
Joint Task Force Haiti Assistance Group (JTF HAG), consisting of a US Navy construction 
battalion (SeaBees); Canadian combat engineers; and US Marines.47 The JTF HAG was the 
American multinational contribution to the UNMIH, established under UN Security Council 
Resolution 867 (1993). Tasked with “modernizing the armed forces of Haiti and establishing a 
new police force with the presence of UN personnel in their fields,” the force included 567 UN 
police monitors (UNPMS) and a military construction unit of 700, 60 of whom were military 
trainers. 48 
 
45 Kretchik, “Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,” 96. 
46 See Larry Rohter, “Cables Show US Deception on Haitian Violence,” The New York Times, February 6, 1996.  
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/06/world/cables-show-us-deception-on-haitian-violence.html?pagewanted=all. 
See also Whitney, “SIN, FRAPH, and the CIA,” 323n150. 
47 The role of the advance party was the provision of the expedient facilities required for the follow-on elements of 
the JTF HAG. Because this was planned as a permissive environment, a beachhead was not established. Nor was air 
support provided to the mission. See Kretchik et al, “Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,” 37. 
48 UNSCR 867 (1993), S/RES/867 (1993), 23 September 1993. 
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The JTF was dispatched to Haiti under the erroneous belief that the Agreement was 
supported by all parties and a permissive environment for disembarkation existed. The FRAPH, 
however, had a different plan in mind. Its members came out armed and in strength to oppose the 
landing. The Haitian military stood aside while the armed FRAPH mob demonstrated. The 
demonstrations by the armed protestors undermined the resolve of the US military leaders and 
the decision was made to not land JTFHAG forces. Instead, the USS Harlan County withdrew 
from Haitian waters and steamed back to Guantanamo Bay.49 Their decision to withdraw had 
extremely nasty repercussions in Haiti. Emmanuel Constant, the FRAPH leader claimed: 
 “That’s the day FRAPH was born. Before [the USS Harlan County affair] everyone said 
we were crazy, suicidal, that we would all be burned if Aristide returned. But now, we 
know he is never going to return.”50  
 
That retreat also heralded the moment when the coup leaders, General Cedras; Colonel 
Michel François; and General Philippe Biamby, lost any control over the organization. 
Emboldened by their success in standing up to the Americans, the FRAPH promptly embarked 
on a fresh wave of violence, a rampage which targeted Aristide supporters in an orgy of terror 
and murder. More troubling for the coup leaders, the FRAPH was “opening branches across the 
country” and challenging the Army over control of the country.51 Ralph Pezzullo identified 
Cedras confronting Biamby over his out-of-control terror force, “pounding on a conference 
table” and yelling at co-coup leader Biamby: “You’ve got to stop this!” in reference to the terror 
campaign then undertaken by the FRAPH which was undermining local military commanders. 52  
 
49 The 3 October, 1993, events in Somalia were reportedly seen by the Haitian coup leaders as demonstrating a lack 
of resolve on the part of the Clinton administration, something they believed could be exploited in Haiti through 
public demonstrations against the international force. That appeared to be correct initially when the USS Harlan 
County departed without landing its force. It would be proven wrong when the US returned and conducted a forcible 
entry. For a complete outline of the events, see Kretchik et al, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, 35-41. 





The UN delivered a textbook response to the renewed violence. The embargo was re-
instituted in mid-October, but this time, it included a global freeze on Government of Haiti bank 
accounts as well as those personal accounts belonging to members of the coup regime.53 In the 
end, and despite its efforts to undermine Aristide, the FRAPH would end up dramatically 
imploding. Its role as a viable alternative to the Lavalas movement evaporated. Nonetheless, 
FRAPH was a thorn in the side of the US and was at the centre of some serious operational 
planning issues in what would become known as Operation Uphold Democracy. 
 
“The Imperialists Must Leave us in Peace”: Operation Uphold Democracy54 
 
In Operation Uphold Democracy, the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps was prepared to 
carry out any of three distinct military operations. None of those operations were in fact 
executed. Instead, a fourth military option evolved, literally while the operation was 
unfolding.55 
- US Army Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Kretchik, Dr. Robert F. Bauman  
and Dr. John T. Fishel 
 
 Initially, the 30 September 1991, coup that overthrew President Jean Bertrand Aristide 
saw the American military ramp up its planning for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) 
into Haiti to rescue its own citizens and select foreign nationals, evacuating them from the 
country.56 By February 1992, the US had conducted a limited and unopposed NEO operation, 
and chose to “shelve” the plans for an opposed operation.  
 
53 That freeze on funds had previously been provided for under UNSCR 841 (1993), dated 16 June 1993. See 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/841(1993).  
54 Quote by Haitian human-rights lawyer Mario Joseph, representative of President Aristide while in exile. Cited in 
Andy Blatchford, “Haitian lawyer accuses Montreal mayor Coderre of lying about Aristide '04 ouster,” Canadian 
Press, February 27, 2014. Denis Coderre was the federal Liberal Minister for Immigration from 2002-03 within the 
Jean Chretien government. In 2003-04, he would become the Special Advisor on Haiti to Prime Minister Paul 
Martin as the Minister responsible for the Francophonie. 
55 Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, xi. 
56 A NEO may or may not be opposed, although planning for such an operation normally proceeds on the 
assumption that the use of force will be necessary (i.e. entry will be opposed). Planning initially for this NEO 
identified the evacuation of approximately 10,000 people over a 10-day period and was based on an opposed entry. 
The NEO operation was run in October 1991, as Operation Victor Squared, but the details remain classified. What is 
known is that the NEO operation was built around the US Coast Guard, with Marine Corps air protection, and had 
the mission of removing American citizens from Haiti then reeling from post-coup violence. Operation Victor 
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 The signing of the July 1993 Governors Island Agreement between Aristide and the coup 
regime initiated operational planning for what became the US Joint Task Force Haitian 
Assistance Group or JTF HAG, which was, initially, given the mission to plan to 
“professionalize and train” the Haitian Army.57 The JTF HAG boarded the USS Harlan County 
on 3 October 1993, and headed to Haiti, taking aboard a number of US Navy construction 
engineers and Canadian combat engineers.58 
 The arrival of the USS Harlan County in Haitian waters was met with armed 
demonstrations by Haitian coup supporters, leading the US Task Force leadership on the ground 
to conclude the environment was no longer permissive.59 US leadership decided prudence was 
the better part of valor and withdrew from Haiti. The failed USS Harlan County mission shifted 
operational planning from a permissive operation to a forcible entry operation.60 
 Planning for what would eventually be designated Operation Uphold Democracy was 
based on a rapid, forcible entry into a hostile environment, the aim being to quickly neutralize 
the Haitian military and establish the safe and secure environment that would permit Aristide’s 
 
Squared had a strong influence on planning for Operation Uphold Democracy. Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, 
‘Intervasion’, 32. 
57 Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,35. 
58 The USS Harlan County headed to Haiti the same time as the US was experiencing the fallout from the deaths of 
a number of US Army Rangers during the UN Operation in Somalia II or UNOSCOM II. The US conducted 
Operation Gothic Serpent using its special forces, the intent being to kill or capture one of the leading factional 
leaders, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. The operation led to the Battle of Mogadishu, and saw two US Black Hawk 
helicopters shot down as well as the deaths of 18 American soldiers and an estimated thousand Somali militia 
members. The battle would lead to the Clinton administration withdrawing US troops from UNOSCOM and would 
significantly influence US operations in Haiti. 
59 The recognition that the situation was no longer permissive rested with the Navy commander, US Navy 
Commander Marvin Butcher, who commanded the USS Harlan County and was the decision maker on whether to 
land the multinational troops in Haiti. The ground force commander, Colonel John Pulley, did not have operational 
command until his troops were landed in Haiti. See Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,37. 
60 The USS Harlan County incident left military planning in the dark. The coup regime was either unable or 
unwilling to compel other agencies to comply with agreements the regime reached with the international 
community. For the US, that meant military planning hoped for a permissive environment but planned for a non-
permissive one. Regardless, the FRAPH played the role of spoiler during the incident, clearly not interested in the 
settlement reached by the coup regime and able to exercise its power to undermine that settlement.. Kretchik, 43. 
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return to power. The operational plan was changed several times, including an option that 
oriented to support a quick hand-off of responsibilities to a follow-on UN force. 
 The apparent success of the diplomatic team of former president Jimmy Carter, Senator 
Sam Nunn, and retired General Colin Powell changed the operation once more. This time, the 
planning was based on “an administration landing of US forces rather than a combat operation.61 
This left operational planners and commanders in the dark as to what to expect, leading to the 
term “intervasion” to describe the new mission.62 
 Conducted between 19 September 1994 and 31 March 1995, Operation Uphold 
Democracy would become a special type of intervention. The last-minute change introduced a 
significant degree of risk, ambiguity, and uncertainty into mission planning. A non-permissive 
environment is always more dangerous, but risk can be compensated for by virtue of combat 
skills and capabilities possessed by American forces. US military forces are more comfortable 
and better trained for dynamic combat than static peacekeeping. An unconfirmed permissive 
environment meant that American forces were forced to consider peace support operations, 
which forced them into non-kinetic activities and capabilities rather than the activities for which 
they were trained.  
Not surprisingly, that shift into the unknown led to inconsistency in response to violent 
encounters once on the ground. What should be clear is that the classification changes in the 
Haitian environment meant that the planned campaign needed to be quickly reworked to “stress 
that US forces must enter Haiti quickly, gain the trust of the Haitian people, and stabilize the 
population, but not in a way that could be considered as overly aggressive.”63 The foundation for 
 
61 Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’,76. 
62 Kretchik. See also Siegel, “Operation UPHOLD DEMCRACY.” 
63 Not surprisingly, expectations of the American ‘intervasion’ were different for the two Haitian groups. Pro-
Aristide forces were expecting a version of the dechoukaj from the Americans, one which in which the Army and 
244 
 
successful stability operations like Operation Uphold Democracy is the creation of a safe and 
stable environment. That end state requires the establishment of trust with the Haitian people. 
Their trust is then built on managing expectations and ensuring they are realistic. Unfortunately 
for the Aristide forces, their expectations would be quickly dashed.  
Not only did the American forces avoid the recurrence of any form of dechoukaj, they 
also began “negotiating and then collaborating with despised FAd’H [Forces Armées d'Haïti – 
Haitian Armed Forces] in maintaining order in the capital.”64 Part of that behaviour was 
grounded in the uncertainty forced upon them by virtue of the last minute mission change. Part 
though was simple ignorance of the composition of Haitian society and the dysfunctional nature 
of the relationship between the security forces and the peasantry. Neither factor, though, 
explained why violent attacks by Haitian security and paramilitary forces on Haitian citizens 
were merely observed by US troops, something captured on several occasions by the ever-
present international media.65  
That failure of American troops to intervene was due to the apparent friendly stance of 
the Haitian Army and police services as partners of the US in Haiti, plus unclear rules of 
engagement (ROEs) which failed to address that type of violence perpetrated by supposed allies. 
The initial ROEs would be quickly changed, but the damage was done: the ‘intervasion’ was too 
 
FRAPH members would be disarmed and jailed, followed by justice through the legal system. Conversely, anti-
Aristide forces were expecting the American forces to prevent a dechoukaj and to re-establish the status quo as 
quickly as possible. See Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, 78. 
64 Kretchik, 97. 
65 One account of the American landing in Haiti stated “Late this afternoon, police and paramilitary troops armed 
with semiautomatic weapons broke up one pro-Aristide rally at the port, beating participants with nightsticks and 
planks of wood and chasing them for several blocks. Many demonstrators lost their shoes in their haste to escape 
beatings, and when they returned to retrieve them, the police again chased them away. American troops nearby 
watched but did not intervene, witnesses said.” A second account claimed that one person was beaten to death and 
several others wounded “while combat-ready American troops looked on.” See Larry Rohter, “Mission to Haiti: 
Overview; 3,000 US Troops Land without Opposition and Take Over Ports and Airfields in Haiti,” The New York 
Times, 20 September 1994; and Kenneth Freed, “Haitian Police Attack Crowds as American Troops Look On: 
Caribbean: At least one is killed, and dozens injured as local forces disperse demonstrators welcoming arriving 
soldiers. US policy leaves issue of civil order to Haitian authorities,” Los Angeles Times, September 21, 1994. 
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little, too late.66 Four days after the initial landing, US Marines engaged in firefights with Haitian 
police officers who had fired on pro-Aristide supporters in the capital. Marines would kill eight 
Haitians including at least one Haitian police officer.67 
 The second outcome, related to peacebuilding, was the expectation on the part of Haitians 
that the American military presence would spark the immediate flow of money and resources 
into Haiti to resolve chronic social development issues. However, American operational 
guidance to combat commanders on the ground focused on the need for safety and security rather 
than engaging in state-building efforts. Major General George Fisher, Commander of the 25th 
Infantry Division, noted, for example, that the “vague [mission] guidance” evolved into “…a 
conscious decision by the United States not to engage in nation building and the mission 
expansion and mission creep that accompanies nation building.”68  
Yet even in those instances when peacebuilding work was undertaken, they resulted in 
problems about expectations. For example, a senior US Army civil affairs officer noted in his 
post-deployment report that while US troops were employed to restore basic services within 
Haiti including power and water supplies, their employment rather than the hiring of locals to 
solve those issues “may have contributed to the perception among Haitians that the US military 
can ‘come and fix anything’.”69 He believed the deployed US forces had reinforced that 
expectation and that US forces became the first point of call for problems encountered by the 
population that should have been more properly dealt with by the civil government.  
 
66 The issues over ROEs and US soldiers watching beatings by Haitian police were both identified in the after-action 
review or AAR, completed by the US Army’s Judge Advocate General’s School. See Law and Military Operations 
in Haiti, 1994-1995: Lessons Learned for Judge Advocates (Charlottesville: Centre for Law and Military 
Operations, 11 December 1995). 
67 Eris Schmitt, “8 Haitians Killed by Marine Patrol,” The New York Times, September 25, 1994. www.nytimes.com.  
68 Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, 122. 
69 Kretchik, 123. 
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Among American forces, differing operating standards would lead to different results. 
Whereas the civil affairs officer noted the issues above, US Special Forces teams deployed 
throughout Haiti instead sought, wherever possible, to “encourage and support” Haitians in 
solving their own problems. This included sorting out distribution of food and water; community 
security, particularly after the disbandment of the Haitian police force; and many of the other 
missing services normally associated with civil government.70 
The operation had two distinct strategic mission objectives: the first was the creation of a 
safe and secure environment to which the deposed government of President Aristide could be 
returned to complete its term of office; and the second was the successful disengagement of the 
US and handoff to a UN peacekeeping mission.71 The concept of handing off the Haitian theatre 
of operations to the UN was controversial. It was the first time the UN had authorized an armed 
invasion for the “restoration of democracy.”72 Not surprisingly, that idea was not universally 
welcomed within the international community. Within the Americas, Mexico and Cuba were 
prominent among those nations that objected to the resolution. Brazil also opposed the 
resolution, but the United States was able to convince Brazilian leaders to abstain from opposing 
the resolution vote. 
The complete Operation Uphold Democracy invasion plan was briefed to a Haiti 
Interagency Working Group (IWG, an American multi-agency forum) on 11 September 1994, 
literally hours before the invasion was scheduled to begin. A key piece of the occupation plan 
 
70 Kretchik, 123-4. 
71 See UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 940, 31 July 1994; and Resolution 975, 30 January 1995. The 
latter stated the transfer to UNMIH from MNF was to be complete by 31 March 1995. 
72 UNSCR 940 (1994) was a Chapter VII mission and allowed “a multinational force under unified command and 
control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership, consistent with the Governors’ Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President 
and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure 
and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governors’ Island Agreement.” 
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was the development and training of a new Haitian police force; the current police force was 
judged to be unsalvageable and thus scheduled for a Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (DDR) operation. Unlike the military, the Department of Justice (DOJ) stepped 
away from the change in intervasion plans, making it quite clear that it was not ready to 
undertake the police force reform portion of the mission on such short notice. The result was the 
US Army took the lead on the police force development and training, and the associated DDR 
operation.73  This would mark one of the first instances of mission creep surfacing prior to the 
mission commencing! 
Haiti and UN Efforts at Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
 
The UN and Haiti have not turned the constant international attention the country has 
received over the past eight years into sufficiently sustainable public institutions and 
economic progress, even taking into account the huge damage from a series of natural 
disasters.74 
- Extract from International Crisis Group report 
 
Since 1993, security sector reform (or SSR) in Haiti has focused exclusively on police 
reform. Unfortunately for Haiti and the UN, SSR has continued to confound policing experts 
since that time. In 2004, Canadian expert David Beer, then in charge of the UN’s SSR program 
in Haiti, lamented “we’re essentially back to square one” following the forced exile of then-
President Aristide.75 He felt “the international effort in Haiti [was paying]… insufficient 
attention to the links between politics and policing… [and instead concentrating] too narrowly on 
 
73 The interim police force was planned to largely be composed largely of FAd'H members “who had no criminal 
record and no reported record of human rights abuses.” Those chosen as part of the interim force were to receive six 
days of police training and then begin work. See E.D. McGrady and John S. Ivancovich, “Operation Uphold 
Democracy: Conflict and Cultures A summary of material from CNA's 1995 Annual Conference, "Military Support 
to Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: From Practice to Policy," Center for Naval Analysis Professional Paper 
541, 10 June 1998, 27; and Kretchik, Invasion, Intervention, ‘Intervasion’, 71. 
74 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Transition,” International Crisis Group, Latin 
American/Caribbean Report No. 44 (02 Aug 2012): 13. 
75 Timothy Donais, “Back to Square One: The Politics of Police Reform in Haiti,” Civil Wars 7, no. 3 (2005): 271. 
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the technical aspects of policing.”76 The training programs conducted by the US, Canada and 
France focused on the tactical aspects of policing, like search and seizures, and crowd or riot 
control, with very little if any cultural training incorporated into the SSR curriculum.77  
Part of the problem was that the UN’s SSR program did not identify any metrics until 
2008. After program metrics were finally generated, they were developed internally by UN 
experts and included consultation with Haitian stakeholders. UN metrics highlighted the 
reduction of criminal gang influence, the reduction of criminal activity within the Port-au-Prince 
area (largely Cité Soleil), and the purging of the National Police Service of former Duvalierist 
and FRAPH members.78 Yet they did not tackle issues of local security requirements within the 
Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods nor did they examine the lack of rural policing. Yet again, 
Haitians were not consulted on the development of the program, leading to another program that 
did not reflect Haitian interests or values. And once more, that lack of consultation would result 
in tragedy, as will be demonstrated later in my thesis.  
Other problems became quickly apparent. For example, the SSR program was heavily 
biased against Aristide and his supporters. Both the UN and the US provided concessions to the 
coup leaders as well as a sympathetic ear to their grievances. Aristide, on the other hand, was 
quickly identified by the US administration, with sympathetic French and Canadian ears, as an 
obstacle not just to the process for his return to power, but particularly to implementation of the 
US’s idea of democracy in Haiti. Consequently, Haitian security services were not held 
 
76 Donais, “Back to Square One,” 271. 
77 Johanna Mendelson-Forman, for example, points out that initial police training included a mere nine hours of 
human rights training and 16 hours in “human dignity” classes. See Johann Mendelson-Forman, “Security sector 
reform in Haiti,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 (Mar 2006): 20. Reporter Linda Diebel quoted an unnamed 
RCMP officer who was involved in the training of the Haitian police as claiming that whereas the Canadian-run 
training produced a civil police officer, the American training program was producing officers trained for military or 
para-military operations rather than policing. See Linda Diebel, “Haiti: Canada’s Mission Impossible,” Ottawa 
Citizen, February 23, 1997. www.ottawacitizen.com.  
78 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 2. 
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accountable by the international community. Instead, they focused solely on resolving the 
impasse over Aristide’s return without dealing with more pressing issues like purging the 
security forces of Duvalierist and other extreme right-wing elements. Nor was any real plan 
developed that would map out the path by which the Haitian military would be conditioned to 
subordination to civilian authority. That critical vulnerability was completely absent from 
discussions and was not tackled properly in the SSR training eventually provided to the Army 
and police services. 
To understand why progress on international security sector reform work in Haiti has 
been so poor, the Haitian UN missions will be examined to compare their stated with their 
implementation; identify what was undertaken; and explore the issues which blocked progress 
and prolonged the SSR programs that have now entered their second decade in Haiti. 
 
Mission Civile Internationale en Haiti (MICIVIH), 1993-2001 
…la Police Nationale a des devoirs envers tous les citoyens indistinctement en leur 
garantissant les droits-sécurités, les droits-libertés. Cette garantie n’est cependant fondée 
que si tous les citoyens, y compris les policiers eux-mêmes, jouent à fond la règle 
démocratique, dans une projection en une unité effective et permanente.79 
- 1996 Statement by Ministère de la Justice de la République d'Haïti 
 
Of all the UN missions in Haiti, the joint 1993 OAS-UN International Civilian Mission in 
Haiti (Mission Civile Internationale en Haïti or MICIVIH) has received the most acclaim and 
generally has been judged the most successful.80 Interestingly, of all the missions, MICIVIH can 
 
79 The National Police have the responsibility towards all citizens, without discrimination, of guaranteeing their 
rights of security and freedom. This guarantee cannot be realized unless all citizens do their duty, including the 
police themselves, playing their role in the creation of a democratic framework that is effective and permanent. [my 
translation] Ministère de la Justice de la République d'Haïti, Recueil de textes et de réglementations applicables a la 
police nationale, 1996, 6. Cited in Timothy J.G. Ho, “Ordering Disorder: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of 
International Civilian Police Training in Haiti, 1994-2001,” (PhD diss., Royal Roads University, 2009). 
80 MICIVIH was preceded by the OAS Civil Presence mission which ran from October 1992 until February 1993. It 
was largely confined to the capital as the military considered its presence outside the capital as outside its mandate. 
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be seen as the most complex, blending the OAS and the UN into a hybrid or integrated mission, 
complete with international and regional goals.  
The initial progress made by the mission was largely at the grassroots level, facilitated by 
a mandate considered flexible and adaptive.81 MICIVIH’s original mandate centered on 
observation and verification of the human rights situation within Haiti, but this was an observer 
mission on steroids. MICIVIH’s head of mission, Mr. Dante Caputo, noted the mission was 
about “active observation,” which he defined as:  
carrying out human rights investigations, making its reports public as a form of 
deterrence, denouncing violations publicly through press releases, intervening with the 
police and judiciary on behalf of victims when there were clear breaches of the rule of 
law, providing, directly and indirectly, medical care for victims, and in certain urgent 
situations facilitating the sheltering or evacuation of pro-democracy activists tracked by 
the police, military and death squads.82 
 
MICIVIH’s flexible and proactive culture led to its mission’s expanding to include SSR 
and the establishment of the National Police Service; the creation of an independent judiciary; 
and penal reform. The National Police Service was initiated without meaningful Haitian input, a 
key point noted by the Aristide government, and was considered a “bastard child…created when 
Haiti was, for all intents and purposes, under military occupation by the US.”83  The “US will to 
 
Its role included shaping the conditions required for MICIVIH’s follow-on presence. OAS observers, who joined the 
Civil Presence mission, were deployed into Haiti as early as September 1992. 
81 See International Peace Academy, “Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti,” International Peace Academy 
Seminar Report dated 23-24 January 2002 (Rapporteur: Lotta Hagman). Colin Granderson also described the 
MICIVIH mandate as permitting “great flexibility in the activities and responsibilities that the mission undertook.” 
Colin Granderson, “Notes from 21 September 2010 Speech at an Inter-American Peace Forum,” OAS HQ, 
Washington D.C., 2010. 
82 Dante Caputo, “The MICIVIH: Insights, Challenges and Results, Inter-American Peace Forum, OAS HQ, 
Washington, D.C., 21 September 2010.  www.oas.org. Caputo spoke about the Mission during an OAS-sponsored 
Inter-American Peace forum held in Washington, D.C. 21 September 2010. In his remarks, Caputo claimed the 
mission was “also a source of great irritation for the military regime.” 
83 Patrick Elie. Cited in Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship, 162n65. Aristide’s fears came to pass. The US would fund 
and equip two of the key police units which became the most powerful within the force and have been implicated in 
the 2004 coup. They were also staffed almost entirely with ex-Army personnel. The first, ironically, was the 500-
strong Presidential Guard (Unité de Sécurité Générale du Palais National or USGPN) and the second was the quick 
response unit, broken into two company-sized SWAT-style sub-units (the Groupe d’intervention de la police 
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create a police that would have replaced the Army as a tool to secure US interests in Haiti and 
ultimately act as an arbiter of political life in Haiti” also antagonized Aristide.84 That perception 
would poison the Haitian government’s relationship with its new police force, particularly as 
conflict with the Lavalas movement increased. 
Unfortunately, the long-term nature of the development work was undermined by the 
short-term mandate of the MICIVIH and the demands made by the international community for 
immediate and measurable results. The pressure for immediate and measurable progress led 
directly to “the elimination of…the practical training [of police officers] and the education of a 
supervisory force.”85 Their elimination meant accountability and responsibility accompanied by 
oversight and transparency disappeared from the program. Instead, the program managers 
focused pragmatically on easily achieved and measurable objectives, such as the number of 
police officers patrolling the streets of Haiti. 
While police reforms were underway, Haiti struggled with an increase in corruption as 
well as drug smuggling involving senior government officials. In 2002, police officers were 
implicated in the extra-judicial executions of suspected drug dealers.86 However, rather than 
reorienting the SSR program to focus on such emerging issues, the long-term training and 
mentoring program remained broad and unfocussed. Further complicating the process, the SSR 
programs of the international partners were not harmonized. Instead, each nation employed 
different training doctrine and methods, and enforced their own standards. MICIVIH did not 
enforce harmonization. Rather, judicial vetting and reform within the SSR mandate was 
 
nationale d’Haiti (GIPNH) and the Corps d’intervention et de maintien de l’ordre (CIMO)). See Hallward, 
Damning the Flood, 67. 
84 Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship, 163. 
85 International Peace Academy, “Lessons Learned,” 7. 




conducted separately from the police training and reform program.87 The complete separation of 
the various elements of the SSR program created problems of its own. 
 
United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), 1993-1997. 
Of significance was the increase in the level of violence observed during this deployment.  
An increase in the rate of violent crime and attacks, mainly against members of Haitian 
National Police started in late April 96.  The violence culminated with attacks around the 
Presidential Palace and against three police stations on 19 Aug 96. The situation 
remained tense but under control until mid-Sep 96 when it started to abate.  
UNMIH/UNSMIH [UN Support Mission in Haiti] personnel and infrastructures however, 
remained regular victim of thefts.88 
- Extract from Canadian Army Lessons Learned Op STANDARD / STABLE Report 
 
UNMIH was authorized by the UN on 23 September 1993, tasked with “modernizing” 
the national army and creating a new and modern national police force separate from the military 
chain of command. The police service was to include a disaster response and border security 
component.89 However, on 11 October 1993, the deployment of the mission was prevented by 
the presence of armed anti-Aristide attachés whose demonstration in the Port-au-Prince 
dockyard led to the USS Harlan County incident. The UN de-activated the mission, pending the 
resolution of the situation in Haiti. Almost a year later in October 1994, UNMIH recommenced, 
but this time as a follow-on Chapter VI mission to the US-led UN Chapter VII Multinational 
Force (MNF) mission.90 UNMIH would also end up overlapping with MICIVIH.91 Unlike 
 
87 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2002 - Haiti. 
88 Canadian Operation STANDARD / STABLE was the name given to the deployment of troops in support of 
UNMIH from April through to October 1996, the tail end of the mission. Comments from Canadian Armed Forces 
(CAF) 3452-034/134 (J3 Lessons Learned 2), “OP STANDARD/STABLE (APR-OCT 96) - DRAFT INTERIM 
LESSONS LEARNED REPORT,” April 1997. Retrieved from the Canadian Army Lessons Learned Centre (ALLC) 
database June 2015. 
89 UNSCR 1063 (1996) of 28 June 1996. 
90 See the previous discussion on Operation Uphold Democracy. 
91 MICIVIH deployed into Haiti in February 1993, evacuated from October 1993 through to January 1994, and 
would remain until March 2000. UNMIH, established by UNSCR 867 (1993), initially deployed an advance team 
into Haiti on 23 September 1993 which ended in early October. The team included 53 military and 51 police 
members. However, full deployment of UNMIH was prevented until September 1994: between October 1993 and 




MICIVIH, which saw its mission expand to include SSR work, UNMIH was originally designed 
to include that SSR mandate. The intransigence of the coup regime in Haiti forced the UN to 
expand the mandate of UNMIH to include “sustaining the secure and stable environment 
established during the multinational phase and protecting international personnel and key 
installations,” as well as the original mission of completing “the professionalization of the 
Haitian armed forces and the creation of a separate police force.”92 To accomplish its revised 
mandate, the UN increased the size of UNMIH to 6,000 military personnel.93 
The importance of the creation of a safe and secure environment for institutional 
development cannot be overstated, as noted in this observation from the US Center for Army 
Lessons Learned (CALL):  
When UNMIH published Force Operation Order 95-1, it refined its concept to read that 
the strategic center of gravity was the maintenance of a secure and stable environment. 
The operational centers of gravity are the two largest population centers, Port-au-Prince 
and Cap Haïtien. Critical elements of the secure and stable environment included: 
President Aristide's security, the security of political and economic centers, relations 
between the new Haitian police force and the general populace, and lastly, the influence 
of the national government. If UNMIH and the Government of Haiti could not "facilitate 
positive development" in these areas, the collapse of the democratic process and violence 
might result.94 
 
The handover between the MNF and UNMIH took place as planned on 31 March 1995.95 
The end of the MNF mandate coincided with a UN assessment that identified the overall 
 
92 UNSCR 940 (1994), para 9. 
93 United Nations Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI), UNMIH Background, 
2003. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr2.html. 
94 See US Army CALL report on the MNF, “CALL – Haiti Initial Impressions Vol III,” July 1995, 15/156. 
95 The Haitian government had, by this time, turned its attention to reformation of the justice system. President 
Aristide established the Commission nationale de vérité et de justice (CNVJ) on 28 March 1995 to begin public 
consultations, with the mandate to “identify instigators, criminals, and accessories to the serious human rights 
violations and the crimes against humanity that had been carried out during the coup d'état, from 29 September 1991 
to 15 October1994, both inside and outside of the country…to establish the overall truth about the gravest violations 
of human rights abuses during the specified dates, and to aid in the reconciliation of all Haitians, with the potential 
for legal recourse.” Peter Hallward argues that the US obstructed the CNVJ’s attempts to prosecute crimes 
committed by Cedras and his regime, and ensured the CNVJ “was restricted to the mere documentation of cases – 
some 8,652 in total – of human rights undertaken between 1991 and 1994.” See Joanna R. Quinn, “Haiti’s Failed 
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situation in Haiti as “generally good” with “tremendous” improvements in the human rights 
situation.96 This proved to be inaccurate and would impact badly on the UNMIH mission. 
Further complicating the UNMIH mission were a number of issues that had not been understood 
or dealt with during the handover, and for which the UNMIH was unprepared.97  
The most critical issue which came to dominate UNMIH was the requirement to maintain 
a safe and secure environment. While the MNF mission believed it handed over a safe and secure 
environment to the UNMIH, maintaining that condition would expose the significant differences 
in the capabilities and mandate of the two missions. Whereas the MNF had been authorized to 
“use all necessary means” to implement the Governors’ Island Agreement, UNMIH was by 
contrast a Chapter VI ‘peacekeeping’ mission which required Haitian concurrence for its 
continued presence in the country and its operations. This meant that UNMIH was forced to gain 
Haitian government concurrence for any operational activities in support of maintaining the safe 
and secure environment, and could not act without Haitian agreement. 
The other significant difference between the two missions was that whereas the MNF was 
configured for combat, the UNMIH was instead a peace support mission oriented towards 
policing rather than combat. It was also highly dependent upon Haitian security forces to provide 
a significant portion of its capabilities. At the same time, the Haitian government proved loath to 
surrender sovereignty over national law and order, and allowed UNMIH to enforce law and order 
on Haiti’s own citizens by exception only. 
 
Truth Commission: Lessons in Transitional Justice,” Journal of Human Rights 8, no.3 (2009), 265-281; and 
Hallward, Damning the Flood, 66. 
96 NDHQ ADM (Pol & Comm) DI Pol 4, “Briefing Note: UN Secretary General’s Report on Haiti,” dated 18 
January 1995. Obtained through ATI 96/1101B. 
97 A US Army CALL report on the MNF stated clearly “Not all of the agreed upon conditions for transition from the 




This translated into a major operational dilemma for UNMIH. While the mission’s police 
elements were responsible for supervising and tutoring the fledgling Haitian police force, they 
were also charged with sustaining an active security presence to maintain the safe and secure 
environment bequeathed to them by the MNF. A safe and secure environment requires an active 
policing role by a well-trained and robust police force, capabilities not yet present in the Haitian 
security services.98 Complicating the security situation further was the 28 October 1994 
presidential decree from President Aristide disbanding the rural chefs de sections.99 During the 
previous six months of 1994, MICIVIH human rights observers reported "an alarming increase 
in extrajudicial executions, suspect deaths, abductions, enforced disappearances and politically -
motivated rapes" within the capital as well as human rights abuses in the outlying regions, 
creating “an unprecedented human rights crisis.”100  
The chefs de sections had previously been incorporated into the military and had, for 
better or worse, governance, judicial, and security responsibilities in many of the rural areas. 
Their disbandment left major security voids in local rural towns and villages. The Haitian 
government ran a hasty DDR program to ensure the chefs de sections were disarmed quickly and 
their weapons and ammunition collected before they disappeared or joined anti-Aristide 
 
98 In his 21 November 1994 report, the UN Secretary General identified the time requirement for the new Haitian 
police force to “reach the strength necessary to enforce law and order effectively…” That assessment spoke only to 
number targets: it did not address the quality and duration of training necessary to achieve the designation of well-
trained. Many of those who applied for employment as police officer, for example, were either former army or 
former police, and therefore needed extensive vetting and re-training to ensure they were right for the new security 
forces. See UN Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 940 (1994) (S/1994/1322), 21 
November 1994, 3. 
99 In 1991, shortly after taking office, President Aristide send out a presidential decree ordering the dismantling of 
the rural police or sheriffs’ program. His intent was to replace the system with a new rural system of governance, but 
he was overthrown by a military coup. Once he was removed from Haiti, General Cedras, the coup leader, reversed 
the presidential decree and reinstituted the rural police organization. When Aristide was reinstated as president in 
1994, he once again passed a presidential decree ordering the end of the sheriff program. Hallward, Damning the 
Flood, 18. 
100 See United Nations Information Technology Section/ Department of Public Information (DPI), UNMIH 
Background, 2003. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmihbackgr2.html. 
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paramilitary groups, but the program was flawed.101 At the same time, the Haitian police were 
stretched further and were forced to scramble to fill the security gaps left by the departure of the 
chefs de sections. MICIVIH observers, for example, reported a “marked increase in banditry and 
criminality throughout the country,” attributed to the uncertain future of the chefs de sections, 
especially following Aristide’s return to the presidency.102 
As if that was not enough, UNMIH discovered that the media’s picture of a pacified and 
calm Haiti was wrong. Despite its reporting, the US-led MNF did not control the “arms on the 
ground” and the security situation in Haiti was volatile enough to present a clear and present 
danger during the election period with legislative elections scheduled for June 1995 followed by 
presidential elections in December 1995.103 The UN’s solution prioritized quantity over quality 
and was based on the quick creation of an Interim Police Security Force (IPSF).104 
As of 1 January 1995, the IPSF numbered about 3,000 Haitians and was sufficiently 
trained that Canadian officials deemed it trained and operational.105 Once declared operational, 
the force was deployed to 11 cities around the country. In support of the IPSF detachments were 
around 800 International Police Monitors (IPMs) who were deployed to provide mentoring 
 
101 See UN Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 940 (1994) (S/1994/1322), 21 
November 1994, 4. Around the same time as the chefs de sections DDR program, the Army was also dismantled, 
initially by the US through confiscation of heavy weapons in 1994 and later by Aristide’s presidential decree on 6 
December 1995, ordering complete disbandment. Peter Hallward claims that “much to Aristide’s horror…the US 
adamantly refused to disarm remaining members of the FAdH and FRAPH, who took their weapons with them into 
an embittered retirement.” The US had refused to participate in the disarmament of paramilitaries as early as 1994, 
and by 1995, were refusing to conduct further disarmament beyond the heavy weapons already done. See Hallward, 
Damning the Flood, 68; and Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 79-83. 
102 UN Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Resolution 940 (1994) (S/1994/1322), 21 
November 1994, 4. 
103 It is important to note UNMIH measured success by the conduct of free and fair elections for both parliament and 
for the presidency. To conduct such elections, maintenance of the safe and secure environment was absolutely 
critical. See US Army CALL report on the MNF, “CALL – Haiti Initial Impressions Vol III,” July 1995, 14/156. 
104 The IPSF was initially manned by around 3,400 ex-Army soldiers who had been retained when the Army was 
disbanded in 1994. Peter Hallward points out that many of the ex-soldiers who became members of either the IPSF 
or the new National Police were approached by the CIA which was actively recruiting sympathetic informants as 
well as potential sleeper agents. See Hallward, Damning the Flood, 66-7. 
105 See NDHQ ADM (Pol & Comm) memorandum 3451-1 (DI Pol 4) 20 Jan 95. Obtained through ATI 96/1101B.  
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support. The force was due to increase to at least 4,000 members, as a further 1,000 police 
officers were in training at that time, with 900 at the US Base in Guantanamo, Cuba and 100 in 
Canada. The IPSF was intended to be replaced by the National Police Force once it was trained 
and operational. Coinciding with the standing-up of the IPSF was the establishment of a 
government committee charged with creating the terms and conditions under which the new 
Haitian Army would be created.106 
Despite being declared operational, the IPSF suffered from a number of operational 
problems. It lacked critical capabilities, including communications gear and vehicle 
transportation. Most Haitians perceived the new force as lacking moral authority as many of its 
members were human rights abusers from the Army and police.107 It was also the recipient of a 
hurried and low-quality training program only one weeklong. As the UN Secretary General 
report to the Security Council made clear,  
An added complication will be the sensitive issue of integrating 3,000 former FADH 
soldiers who will have received one week’s training locally, 900 young people who have 
had a three-week training programme in Guantanamo and 100 graduates from a three-
month course in Canada. Only in June 1995 will members of the National Police begin to 
appear on the streets after graduating from the Police Academy at the expected rate of 
375 police officers each month.108 
 
 
106 The new Army organization was based on three battalions, each of some 500 personnel. It was unclear what role 
the military would have when reconstituted. 
107 The battle between the US and Aristide over the future of the Haitian Army would spill over onto the new IPSF. 
In February 1995, the US mission instructing the IPSF on behalf of the UN announced that it was “starting a two-
week program to weed out several hundred members” of the force, claiming that “Aristide managed to 
insert…several hundred really bad guys” into the IPSF. The Americans claimed that Aristide had appointed a large 
number of officers to the IPSF without consulting them as required by the terms of their agreement. The American 
announcement was the quid pro quo for Aristide having ‘retired’ all the generals in the Haitian Army and a 
significant number of its senior officers, leading American diplomats to declare “today, Aristide buried it [the 
Haitian Army].” See Kenneth Freed, “Aristide, US Split over Makeup of Haiti Army, Police: Caribbean: President 
defies Washington, retires 43 officers. Some say move spells end to military.” LA Times, February 22, 1995. 
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-02-22/news/mn-34692_1_police-force.  




 The implications of this process are readily apparent. For UNMIH, there was an 
expectation that it “may itself have to take coercive action from time to time, in the closest 
consultation with the Government of Haiti and in accordance with the rules of engagement….”109 
The UN assessment indicated that “an effective Haitian police force” would not be in place by 
the time UNMIH took over and that the IPSF was “untested and lacks, besides basic equipment, 
the experience and self-confidence that are indispensable to any police force….” That 
assessment was particularly damning as it meant that UNMIH soldiers and those few police 
monitors within its ranks would be responsible for the enforcement of law and order upon 
deployment, including the very likely requirement of resorting to the use of force, including 
lethal force, against Haitians. 
 By April 1995, the UN recognized that the IPSF and UNMIH were unable to adequately 
deal with the security situation.110 A UN report stated that “crime remains at [a] high level by 
Haitian standards and a sense of insecurity prevails…The violence, together with the 
shortcomings of the IPSF, have led to [a] concern that UNMIH, operating without enforcement 
authority, will not prove as effective as the MNF…Members of the IPSF…remain unmotivated 
and many are regarded as lacking basic police skills.”111 Further undermining their morale and 
work was the lack of a clear future for members of the IPSF. Not only were no plans being 
drafted to provide them with an opportunity to continue in the new police force, after proper 
 
109 UNSC S/1995/46, para 86. 
110 Not only were there issues with training, morale and lack of equipment, there were reported instances of the local 
people in various locations refusing to accept the presence of IPSF units, or their activities in locations having been 
severely circumscribed by local elected officials. See, for example, Human Rights Watch March 1995 report on 
Haiti, “Security Compromised: Recycled Haitian Soldiers on the Police Front Lines,” 7, no. 3 (March 1995). 
www.hrw.org.  




training and vetting, there were also no plans to provide them with any other employment after 
the new police force was operational. 
The Secretary-General’s report of July 1995 indicated that the post-IPSF question was 
beginning to be considered. The DDR aspects of SSR were mentioned for the first time. As the 
report made clear, as newly trained national police graduates were brought on line in Haiti, IPSF 
members were being separated from the interim service in the same numbers, but were now 
offered training by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in related speciality areas 
like border or prison security.112 While promising, it was clear many IPSF members would or 
could not be accommodated in new jobs within the security field and that most would require re-
integration into Haitian society, which in turn meant an appeal to the international community 
for more funding for the next phase of SSR. Finally, the Secretary-General chose February 1996 
as the target date for a “functioning security system” to be in place in Haiti.113 
In June 1996, the Secretary-General reported that while the last training class had been 
completed at the Police Academy and the National Police brought up to its nearly 6,000-person 
strength, the force continued to be confronted with serious operational issues, not the least being 
the absence of trained senior and middle level leaders.114 The most apparent pressing problem 
was a force of 6,000 personnel responsible for policing a nation of over seven million persons! 
This challenge was compounded by the dire lack of communications equipment to allow 
outlying stations to communicate with the command element in the capital. Despite that, 
 
112 The July 1995 report indicated a number of IPSF personnel were released from the interim force and 
subsequently retrained, again “temporarily,” as prison guards. Between 29 May and 13 July, some 288 IPSF 
personnel were retrained under the IOM program. UNSC, “Report of the Secretary-General on the UNMIH,” 
113 UNSC, para 59. 
114 Training of mid and high-level leaders for the national force were begun around this time, with a projected 
completion of all leader training sometime in the latter half of 1997. UNSC S/1996/416, “Report of the Secretary-
General on the UNMIH,” 05 June 1996, paras 17. 
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specialized training was continuing and appeared to be making good progress in such areas as 
border security and VIP security.  
These obstacles notwithstanding, the assessment by the UN leadership on the ground in 
Haiti was realistic. The Haitian National Police were not yet capable of providing, on their own, 
the safe and secure environment required for democratic development. In a key 5 June 1995 
report on UNMIH, the UN Secretary General identified a continued UNMIH presence as critical 
to the maintenance of forward momentum on security in Haiti.115 The UN Secretary General 
recognized that “fundamental reform and professionalization of the country’s justice sector is 
required for the new police force to operate effectively.”116 
 
United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), 1996-1997 
The IPSF, for the most part, did not have handguns…. Because of that, these guys were a 
joke. Not so much that they looked stupid or incapable, but the people just didn’t respect 
them.117 
- US Special Forces Major Walter Pjetraj 
 
In response to the June 1995 report, the UN established a follow-on mission to UNMIH, 
one intended not only to continue the work of professionalizing the national police and military, 
but to coordinate UN activities “to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and 
economic rehabilitation in Haiti.” At the same time, the follow-on mission, designated the UN 
 
115 A year later, the Secretary General again identified the national police remained unable to provide security on 
their own, reinforcing the continued need for a UN presence: “the HNP has not reached the level of experience and 
confidence required to control and defeat threats posed by subversive groups. It is clear, therefore, that UNSMIH's 
military element, which is still the largest and best equipped security force in Haiti, is a key factor in the ability of 
the Haitian authorities to contain the danger of destabilization by forces threatening democracy.” UNSC S/1996/813, 
“Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti,” 01 October 1996. 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aecf28.html. 
116 UNSC S/1996/416, para 21. 




Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), was intended to be more robust and thus more capable of 
maintaining the safe and secure environment so essential for development work. The UNSMIH 
mandate was three-fold:  
“Assistance to the Haitian authorities in the professionalization of the Haitian National 
Police; Assistance to the Haitian authorities in maintaining a secure and stable 
environment conducive to the success of the current efforts to establish and train an 
effective national police force; [and] Coordination of activities by the United Nations 
system to promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic 
rehabilitation in Haiti.”118 
 
The mission dealt with a number of new issues. Undocumented Haitian workers within 
the Haitian-Dominican border area were stirring up tensions between the two nations. The border 
area had become quite volatile and the Dominicans vented their frustrations on Haiti’s border 
police.119 A second problem highlighted by the UN Secretary General was the “recent gang 
warfare in Cité Soleil.”120 This problem would remain unresolved and was part of a larger 
security problem the UN and the government of Haiti faced. The UN missions were too small to 
provide national coverage and policing was largely concentrated on the capital, Port-au-Prince. 
Haitian municipalities created their own security forces, which were outside the national police 
chain of command, and operated those forces outside national control. In addition, private 
security forces multiplied, with major commercial entities employing foreign firms for 
security.121 The state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of violence within Haiti was challenged 
 
118 UNSCR 1063 (1996). 
119 UNSC Report of the Secretary General on UNSMIH, S/1997/244, 24 March 1997, para 4. 
120 UNSC S/1997/244, para 31; and UNSC S/1997/564, para. 13. The UN position on gangs at this time was heavily 
prejudiced, arguing the majority of the armed gangs in the poor neighbourhoods were pro-Aristide “chimères” or 
“zenglendos” who used their “neighborhood security mandates” to run “protection rackets, extorting ‘market sellers 
and other businesses in exchange for protection.” The UN did concede that “sometimes…[they] became involved in 
drug smuggling and other illicit activities.” No mention was made of the FRAPH ‘gangs’ or those of Duvalier 
supporters, which had better weapons holdings than did pro-Aristide gangs. James Cockayne, “The Futility of 
Force? Strategic Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional Armed Groups from the UN’s War on Haiti’s Gangs,” 
The Journal of Strategic Studies 37, no. 5 (2014): 741. 
121 Hallward points out that in the 1980s, the Haitian people were ruled by an army of around 7,000 troops, poorly 
trained and armed. By the 2000s, “the violent pacification of post-Aristide Haiti would require some 9,000 or so 
international soldiers armed with state-of-the-art equipment, reinforced by some 6,000 internationally trained police 
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and undermined by many of these initiatives and gaps. At the UN’s urging, the Haitian 
government sent out a nation-wide statement re-affirming that the National Police was the only 
force authorized to employ force in Haiti. Municipalities were specifically ordered to disband 
private forces immediately.122 
 By 1997, UNSMIH reported the national police were not yet fully operational.123 Over 77 
police officers were dismissed for various offenses, including 11 senior police leaders.124 
Corruption aside, the force lacked key capabilities, including a criminal investigative unit and the   
police judiciare, the unit charged with working with Haiti’s judicial service. The latter was 
assessed by UN experts as “non-functional.”125 Overall, the police service was still not fully 
operational and Haitian ideas on SSR diverged from the UN’s international standards. 
On the plus side, UNSMIH created and declared operational “a National Penal Unit” to 
support the handling of major human rights abuse cases. However, the justice system was unable 
to support the Penal Unit because judicial reform was still awaiting UN attention. UNSMIH 
reported that the existing justice system “impeded proper use of that support.”126 Progress on the 
penal system likewise remained underwhelming. The training of prison guards conducted was 
poor and the number of jails and guards well below desirable thresholds. Overall, the prognosis 




and an eclectic (and rapidly expanding) array of around 10,000 private security guards.” Hallward, Damning the 
Flood, xxxi. 
122 UNSC S/1997/244, para 10. 
123 Interestingly, Peter Hallward states that the Haitian National Police in 1997 enjoyed a “public support rate of 70 
percent – more than enjoyed by any other Haitian institution.” Hallward, Damning the Flood, 86. 
124 UNSC S/1997/244, para 12. 
125 UNSC S/1997/244, para 13. 
126 UNSC S/1997/244, para 16. 
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United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), July-November 1997 
…the resources available to the Haitian National Police remain insufficient and the 
countries contributing the majority of the civilian police element are not prepared to 
deploy their personnel without appropriate security backing….127 
- Extract from UN Security Council report on UNTMIH 
 
 As with UNSMIH, the core mission of UNTMIH, a four-month transitional mission, 
remained professionalizing the Haitian National Police ability to manage crowd control, rapid 
reaction and presidential/palace security. Most of the UNSMIH-deployed foreign police officers 
were not involved in front-line, daily patrolling activities, but instead were deployed into the 
administrative department-level Haitian Police HQ to provide “assistance at the supervisory 
level.”128 The UN believed the Haitian police force was capable of operating without tactical 
supervision and instead focused its attention on the police force’s middle and senior ranks. 
In response to an increase of “banditry and drug trafficking” which elevated insecurity in 
Haiti, the mission shifted in a new and troubling direction.129 The mission stood up a special 
police unit responsible for ensuring UNSMIH security. Specifically, the unit was given 
responsibility, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, to provide on-call assistance to those members 
of the mission deployed into the outlying areas of Haiti. Planning identified the unit as providing 
security for mission essential equipment as well as for mission personnel. The unit had no patrol 
or mentor responsibilities with the Haitian police force. The unit signalled a new UN trend 
towards prioritizing the security of UN personnel and equipment over that of the mission.130 
 
127 UNSC Report of the Secretary General on UNTMIH, S/1997/832/Add.1, 20 November 1997, para 7. 
128 UNSC S/1997/832/Add.1, para. 5. 
129 UNSC S/1997/832/Add.1, para 15. 
130 An incident in Juba, South Sudan, illustrates the issue and provided a number of troubling lessons. In July 2016, 
UN elements, deployed in Juba, South Sudan, failed to respond to Western aid workers who appealed for help 
during a crisis involving fighting between government and opposition forces. A number of UN units refused to 
deploy to assist, claiming to be fully occupied with defending the UN compound against the government forces 
assault. The civilians included a number of American citizens. Most were assaulted and at least three were raped. A 
local South Sudanese journalist at the scene was shot dead. This was perhaps one of the best and most recent 
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Mission de Police Civile des Nations Unies en Haïti (MIPONUH), [United Nations Civilian 
Police Mission in Haiti], 1997-2000 
 
…the visibility of the National Police in both the capital and the provinces has been 
enhanced further through increased patrolling activities. This stronger presence of the 
National Police in the day-to-day life of the Haitian citizenry is perceived as a positive 
development by the population.131 
- Extract from UN Security Council report on MIPONUH 
 
On 30 November 1997, UNTMIH successfully transferred responsibilities to the United 
Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH). The key members of the UNTMIH were 
rolled into the new mission, but what made MIPONUH different from its three predecessor 
missions, as its name suggested, was the absence of a military component. As a mission, it was 
composed of civilian police and focussed on the development of Haiti’s police force. One of 
areas discussed with Aristide’s successor, President René Préval, was the creation of a rural 
police. However, despite fruitful discussions with President Préval, the UN decided not to pursue 
the project, having concerns that “these [rural] policemen would be less well qualified and less 
well paid than regular members of the National Police and at the risks of political pressure on 
such a force, in the initial selection of which the local government authorities (collectivités 
territoriales) would be involved.”132 Préval’s proposal would eventually be dropped due to 
 
examples of the UN trend that has shifted UN personnel and equipment security to a higher priority than the mission 
of protecting civilians. See, for example, the executive summary of the report by retired Dutch general Patrick 
Cammaert,  
https://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/sudan/Public_Executive_Summary_on_the_Special_Investigation_Report_1_
Nov_2016.pdf; or “UN peacekeepers in South Sudan ‘ignored rape and assault of aid workers’,” Associated Press, 
15 August 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/15/south-sudan-aid-worker-rape-attack-united-
nations-un.  
131 UNSC Report of the Secretary General on MIPONUH, S/1998/434, 28 May 1998, para 19. 
132 President Préval and the Director-General of the Haitian National Police announced their plans to establish rural 
police force and brought the plan to UN officials to develop the details on the implementation of the force. The UN 
proved less than interested and in addition to claiming the program would run into more political interference in 
rural areas than in the major urban centres, they also declined to take resources away from the SSR programming for 
the Haitian National Police. UN officials insisted the rural police be integrated into the structure of the National 
Police but declined to divert resources for the new force component, effectively killing the proposal. Thus, despite 
the Haitian government recognizing a security concern and providing a proposed solution, the UN declined to 
implement it. See UNSC S/1998/434, para 16; and UNSC S/1998/144, 20 February 1998, para 21. 
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political and financial issues, but once again, the episode pointed to a UN mission out of touch 
with Haitian interests. 
The UNTMIH mission was able to point to some indicators of success. In May 1999, the 
tenth class of Haitian police cadets graduated from the Haitian Police Academy. What made this 
milestone important was that the class was the first taught and run entirely by Haitian 
personnel.133 A second indicator was the conduct of a number of successful small-scale 
operations to counter “delinquency” and drug trafficking.134 Judicial reform, while remaining 
“impeded by a lack of political will,” did show some peripheral success with the graduation of 
the first class of 60 Haitians judges from the “École de la Magistrature… after a 24-week 
training programme.”135 
Overall, the mission showed limited albeit incremental progress, and remained hampered 
by a deteriorating political and security situation within Haiti. The mission would also begin 
feeling the effects of the suspension of aid by the US and its associated donors in 2000.136 The 
National Police continued to hemorrhage police officers, with the Inspector General reporting 
that 673 Haitian police officers were dismissed from the service between 1995 and 1999 for 
various offenses.137 The state of respect for human rights among National Police members is 
 
133 UNSC Report of the Secretary General on MIPONUH, S/1999/579, 18 May 1999, para 24. 
134 UNSC Report of the Secretary General on MIPONUH, S/2000/150, 25 February 2000, para 25. 
135 UNSC S/2000/150, 23. 
136 Following the return of Aristide to the presidency in 1995, President Clinton restored American US aid to Haiti. 
The passage of the Dole-Helms Amendment in 1996 put pressure on Aristide to conform to and implement the IMF 
and World Bank economic policies or face aid being cut off. By 2000, Clinton had moved to suspend American aid 
over concerns about the legitimacy of parliamentary elections. President George W Bush would continue the aid 
embargo, including blocking those multinational donors who had already committed funding to Haiti. Aid would not 
be fully restored until July 2004 with the forced departure of Aristide. See Vijaya Ramachandran and Julie Walz, 
“Where has All the Money Gone?,” Journal of Haitian Studies 21, no. 1 (Spring 2015), 29-30. 
137 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2000,”  www.hrw.org. Under Haitian law, the Haitian National Police 




reflected in the fact that MICIVIH identified 130 violations of human rights cases under 
investigation.138 
Mission Internationale Civile d’Appui en Haïti, (MICAH) [International Civilian Support 
Mission in Haiti], 2000-2001 
 
[The UN General Assembly] Affirms the will of the United Nations to continue to 
accompany Haiti in its democratic, economic and social development, in particular 
during the next crucial period.139 
- UN General Assembly Resolution 54/193 
 
The International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (MICAH) was a peacebuilding 
mission with the mandate: 
to support the democratization process and assist the Haitian authorities with the 
development of democratic institutions; assist  the  Haitian  authorities  in  the  reform  
and  the  strengthening  of  the  Haitian  system  of justice, including its penal institutions, 
and to promote the Office of the Ombudsman; support the efforts of the Government of 
Haiti to professionalize the Haitian National Police through  a  special  training  and  
technical  assistance  programme  and  help  the  Government  to  coordinate bilateral and 
multilateral aid in this area; support the efforts of the Government of Haiti aimed at the 
full observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms; and provide technical 
assistance for the organization of democratic elections and to collaborate with the 
Government of Haiti in the coordination of bilateral and multilateral assistance.140 
 
The MICAH mission not only undertook to work on institutional processes which 
required many years, if not decades to succeed, it was also forced to work in the aftermath of the 
turbulent November to December 2000 presidential elections.141 The elections triggered the 
 
138 Human Rights Watch. The report indicated a rise in police killings in 1999 to 66, up from 31 reported the year 
prior. 
139 UN General Assembly Resolution 54/193, International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti, 18 February 2000. 
140 UNGAR 54/193. 
141 The Haitian government held legislative, municipal and local elections on May 21, 2000, and the presidential 
election on November 26, 2000. Haiti had been without a working parliament since January 1999 and international 
aid money was being held up as a result. The May elections saw voter electoral cards for the first time, which 
provided picture identification. The OAS monitors noted that “[t]he electoral card was well received by the majority 
of Haitian society and understood as an acquisition, in particular by those Haitians in rural areas who found 
themselves for the first time with a picture identification. “Over 90 percent of eligible voters were registered 
successfully, and the elections were, in the opinion of the OAS observers, “the high point of the electoral process.” 
They further stated: “An estimated 60 percent of registered voters went to the polls.  Very few incidents of violence 
were reported. The Haitian National Police responded efficiently and professionally to situations that could have 
deteriorated into violence.  Party poll watchers and national observers were present at almost every polling station 
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beginning of an increasingly violent crisis and undermining of the ‘safe and secure’ environment 
into which the mission had deployed. Members of MICAH were unarmed, a change from 
previous missions.  
As a mission, MICAH suffered for some time from budget uncertainty with the UN 
contributing just over US$9million of the mission’s US$24million budget, and donor nations 
contributing the remainder. The US decided to suspend aid funding to Haiti starting in 2000 
because of what it termed election irregularities.142 It also terminated the International Criminal 
 
observed by the OAS and performed their jobs for the most part in an objective manner.  Despite long lines, voters 
were able to cast their ballots free of pressure and intimidation. Most voters were able to find their polling stations 
with relative ease.” Unfortunately, the methodology for calculating percentages which then allowed for the 
allocation of senate seats, was applied in a flawed manner and led the OAS monitoring team to conclude “the senate 
results were flawed.” The material on the 2000 elections is drawn from the Organization of American States (OAS) 
Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, SG/UPD-1194/00, “The Election Observation Mission for the Legislative, 
Municipal and Local Elections in Haiti February to July, 2000,” 12 December 2000. 
142 The flawed results stemmed from a failure to run a second round of voting in some races and from a 
miscalculation of voting results percentages. For example, the OAS outlined the results in the Las Cahobas district 
where the Lavalas candidate was elected and credited with 51.84, whereas the OAS calculated the vote percentage 
lower at 46.9 percent. In all races, the Lavalas candidate was far ahead in votes of the other candidates. Ironically, 
the team noted that similar problems had plagued the last four Haitian elections. One issue was the Provisional 
Electoral Council (CEP) was constituted when required for elections and was not a permanent body. Despite a 
voting process being certified by the OAS monitoring team as free and fair, the head of the OAS Electoral Mission 
to Haiti, Orlando Marville, claimed that the CEP had committed a “serious error affecting the number of 
parliamentary races won in the first round.” The CEP president, Léon Manus, countered that the system used to 
calculate the voting percentages for each candidate had not been invented just for this election, but had been in 
effect for the last four and was therefore an accepted international standard method. Manus would later reverse his 
opinion on the elections, and refuse to certify the legislative and local election results, leading to him crossing into 
the Dominican Republic to fly to Miami for asylum in the US, claiming he feared for his life. Peter Hallward has 
documented Manus’ claims about coercion by Aristide and Preval to certify the elections as free and fair with minor 
irregularities. Hallward points out that two and a half years later, Manus was the frontman for the newly created 
‘Group of 184’ launch. The US government seized on the alleged problems to denounce the elections, claiming that 
Aristide’s intransigence in refusing to deal with contested election results had created a crisis. A 2008 US 
Congressional Research Service report would claim the elections were boycotted by opposition groups and that as a 
result the “turnout was very low, with estimates ranging from 5% to 20% of eligible voters participating,” this 
despite OAS monitoring noting over 93 percent of eligible voter having registered and 60 percent of those registered 
actually voting. Thus, despite winning the presidency with over 90 percent of the vote and his party Fanmi Lavalas 
emerging with uncontested control over parliament, Aristide’s administration was in trouble before it began 
governing. In fact, the 21 May 2000 elections saw a high voter turnout running around 60 percent of registered 
voters. However, the second round held in July 2000, for rural seats, saw a very low turnout, partially because the 
opposition parties, which had been devastated in the first round, concluded cleverly that a boycott would allow the 
elections to be cast in doubt. The third round held in November 2000 was likewise subject to low voter turnout and, 
again, an opposition boycott. The third round also included controversy because of irregularities in vote counts. See 
OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, SG/UPD-1194/00, “The Election Observation Mission for the 
Legislative, Municipal and Local Elections in Haiti February to July, 2000,” 12 December 2000. See also “Haitians 
Rise Up against OAS ‘Impertinence,” Haitian Progres 18, no. 12 (June 7-13, 2000), reproduced at 
www.faculty.webster.edu; and Hallward, Damning The Flood, 79-81. 
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Investigative Assistance Program in May 2000, again because of concerns over the conduct of 
the Haitian congressional elections. The aid suspensions placed MICAH’s development program 
in danger and in 2001, the UN Development Program (UNDP) ceased funding police reform 
projects in Haiti.143 The UNDP would not re-engage in Haiti until 2003.144 
Once again, judicial reform remained undeveloped and appeared to be dead in the water. 
The UN Secretary General’s report of August 2000 included the comment: “I cannot but deplore 
once again the delays in implementing the judicial reform process.” The same report noted the 
prisoner population in Haiti had grown from 1,500 in 1995, to over 4000 by 2000 with most 
prisoners held in pre-trial detention at the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince.145 One of the 
areas provoking significant interest was that of so-called “deportees,” Haitians who had 
committed serious crimes in the US or Canada. They had been tried, convicted, and served 
sentences in US or Canadian jails, and then were deported back to Haiti upon completion of their 
sentences. The Haitian authorities received these felons and promptly jailed them in the name of 
public security. That arbitrary jailing was illegal and, in the eyes of the UN, required resolution 
between Haiti, the US, and Canada.146 One of the reasons that particular problem surfaced and 
was brought to the Secretary General’s attention was the visits of members of MICAH to 
detention centres and jails in Haiti.  
 
143 Note that the World Bank had halted development assistance in 1997 when President Préval had suspended 
Parliament and ruled by decree: the suspension of assistance continued through 2000.  
144 Terry F. Buss and Adam Gardner, Haiti in the Balance: Why Foreign Aid has Failed and What We can do About 
it (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 76-77. 
145 UN General Assembly Report of the independent expert of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of 
human rights in Haiti, 28 August 2000, 11. 
146 The problem was that most if not all of those transferred back to Haiti were involved in violent crimes, often 
within the drug trade, and were thus a danger to Haitian society once transferred back to Haiti. However, Haiti’s 
ability to deal with these violent criminals was limited. Jail became the means of effecting that control. UN General 
Assembly Report of the independent expert of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in 
Haiti, 28 August 2000, 16. 
269 
 
With the end of the MICAH mission in 2001, the UN would disappear from Haiti until 
2004. During this hiatus, the limited gains which had been made in the SSR sector were almost 
completely reversed. 
 
La Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH), 2004-2017 
…we are not only going to help stabilize the current situation, but assist the Haitians over 
the long haul and really help them pick up the pieces and build a stable country.147 
- UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
 
We try on the margins of the mandate to do what we can, to do simple things for people 
to meet emergency needs…but we don’t have a development mandate and never will.148 
- UN Special Representative Hedi Annabi 
 
 The UN would re-launch into Haiti with the Mission des Nations Unies pour la 
stabilisation en Haïti [United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti] or MINUSTAH on 1 June 
2004, following the Multinational Interim Force or MIF.149 The MIF was deployed in response to 
the departure of President Aristide following an apparent coup.150 Established by UN Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1542 (2004) as a Chapter VII mission, MINUSTAH’s central 
mandate was focussed on three development areas: the creation of a secure and stable 
 
147 Quote attributed to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. “Security Council Authorizes Three-Month Multinational 
Interim Force for Haiti,” UN News, 29 February 2004.  Cited in Brian W. Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti: A 
Progress Report,” DRDC CORA Technical Memorandum 2009-007, January 2009, 3. http://cradpdf.drdc-
rddc.gc.ca/PDFS/unc84/p531532.pdf.  
148 Quote attributed to UN Special Representative Hedi Annabi. “UN Force in Haiti Likely to be Renewed,” 
International Herald Tribune, 8 October 2008.  Cited in Greene, 18. 
149 The MIF, acting under a UN Chapter VII mandate, ran from 29 February to 31 July 2004. Its mission under 
UNSCR 1529 (2004) was to “[t]o contribute to a secure and stable environment in Haiti, facilitate the provision of 
humanitarian assistance, assist the Haitian police and Coast Guard, and to coordinate their efforts with the OAS 
Special Mission to prevent further deterioration of the humanitarian situation.” Haiti’s Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, Boniface Alexandre, had been sworn in as Haiti’s interim president upon Aristide’s departure, and Alexandre 
immediately requested UN assistance. 
150 Without exploring whether Aristide resigned under duress or to save his own life, his removal was clearly part of 
a coup. Interestingly, an article by Michael Wines mentioned “Mr. Aristide was ‘under protection’ and 
incommunicado in Bangui [in the Central African Republic or CAR].” Wines goes on to say that the CAR a 
“destitute republic, like Haiti once a French colony, depends heavily on foreign aid. Its decision to accommodate 
Mr. Aristide is at once a favor to France and the United States, which supported his resignation, and a potential 
black mark in view of Mr. Aristide’s critics.” See Michael Wines, “The Aristide Resignation: Exile; The Host of 
Aristide is Uneasy,” The New York Times, 3 March 2004. 
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environment; the creation of a stable political process that would allow the extension of the state 
authority throughout Haiti and support good governance practices at the local levels; and the 
promotion and protection of human rights.151 
For the first few years, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) tasks 
involved  “all armed groups, including women and children associated with such groups,” 
“neutralization of urban gangs and their incorporation into appropriate DDR programs…curbs on 
crime…[and] a purge of the Haitian National Police.”152  The mission was also responsible for 
laying the foundation for the February 2006 elections – municipal, parliamentary and 
presidential. It successfully completed its tasks. Few electoral irregularities were reported and 
over 60 percent of the Haitian population voted. 
Haiti’s human rights picture was quite poor during first few years of MINUSTAH, due to 
the dechoukaj directed against pro-Aristide supporters.153 Initially, MINUSTAH paid no heed to 
human rights investigations. During an October 2004 interview with MINUSTAH military 
commander, Brazilian General Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, human rights experts affiliated 
 
151 The mission was a mixed civilian-military stabilization mission with a strong emphasis on security sector reform. 
The mission was capped with the Resolution specifically identifying the civilian component at no more than 1,622 
civilian police; and the military component at 6,700 troops. The Resolution specifically identified that MINUSTAH 
would “cooperate and coordinate with the OAS and CARICOM…” By 2008, the MINUSTAH manning levels had 




152 Despite the Haitian Army having been disbanded in December 1995, MINUSTAH still required DDR programs 
for former Fad’H members and their insurgent partners (e.g. FRAPH). See “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 2. 
153 Hallward provides a graphic account of how the pro-coup leaders fashioned a COIN campaign against the pro-
Lavalas forces, having learned through their American teachers that “it is much easier to split and control a 
revolutionary movement [like Lavalas] if you can first force it onto the paramilitary terrain.” Key, of course, had 
been the active complicity of the Americans, Canadians and French in decapitating the movement by removing 
Aristide not just from the presidency, but from the country; and detaining him incommunicado to prevent him from 
making the siren call to arms. See Hallward, Damning the Flood, 253-58. 
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with Harvard University learned that “the commanders of the mission did not see such [human 
rights] investigations as part of MINUSTAH’s mandate.”154  
General Augusto Heleno’s perspective can be linked to the deliberate US strategy of 
containment employed against Haiti. While the strategy of containment had its origins in the 
Cold War and was previously aimed at communism, it was now focussed on the repression of 
Haiti’s disruptive peasant and urban poor democracy, which threatened the status quo and 
contained their revolutionary intent. That was deemed necessary to prevent mass migration from 
Haiti, a likely phenomenon if the country was allowed to descend into civil war.  
The American tools for containment remained almost entirely the same, namely the army 
and the paramilitaries, as well as the press.155 Two new tools were now added to the containment 
tool chest.  The United Nations was conscripted into the US strategy, and that will be explored 
later. The other tool was the international and national media which was carrying the narratives 
of containment to the world. A sophisticated public relations campaign was undertaken by the 
Haitian elites in conjunction with the United States with two objectives in mind.156 The first was 
an international campaign to undermine UN and OAS support for Aristide and permit the use of 
international forces to destroy the democratic movement in Haiti.157 The second was the creation 
 
154 Justin Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship: The Coup, the Earthquake and the UN Occupation (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2012), 79. 
155 The US enabled the army, as well as the army’s paramilitary proxies, to contain peasant democracy through 
money and equipment transfers, as well as specialized training. 
156 The media campaign undertaken by the ‘Group of 184,’ and led by Haitian businessman Andy Apaid, was 
carefully orchestrated to ensure the Group appeared to occupy the non-violent middle road and therefore a 
reasonable compromise to the extremist, violence of the far right, then making its assault in the north in the area of 
Gonaives, and Aristide’s supporters, who were portrayed as revolutionary and equally as violent. An example of the 
ostensibly reasonable, and therefore attractive, alternative, can be found here: 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4326037/ns/world_news/t/no-peace-sight-haiti. For more detail on Andy Apaid and his 
opposition role to Aristide and his supporters, see Thomas M. Griffin, “Haiti Human Rights Investigation: 
November 11-21, 2004,” University of Miami School of Law, Center for the Study of Human Rights, January 14, 
2005. http://www.law.miami.edu/cshr/CSHR_Report_02082005_v2.pdf.  
157 Peter Hallward provides the example of the international NGO, Christian Aid, using aid monies to finance, on 
behalf of the Group of 184, and to feed into the narrative emerging about Aristide being an obstacle to peace and 
security. Aristide himself spoke about the diversion of aid monies destined for Haiti and suspended in the aftermath 
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of a national campaign that would create doubt in the minds of Aristide’s supporters by 
obscuring the reality behind Aristide’s removal from power.158 The overall campaign aimed to 
make subsequent UN combat operations more acceptable within the international community. 
MINUSTAH combat operations against armed gangs began in 2005 and continued to 
2007 until the public backlash against the “collateral damage” forced the UN to implement a 
different strategy.159 The UN’s Operation Iron Fist, for example, was conducted on 6 July 2005, 
with the intent of capturing a gang leader in Cité Soleil. The operation led to “numerous civilian 
deaths” after the UN forces expended over 20,000 rounds of small arms fire, numerous grenades 
and mortar rounds, as well as aerial machine gun fire from UN helicopters.160 Reports estimated 
that civilian casualties numbered from 10 to a high reported “in the dozens.”  
 
of 2000 elections, into a “a propaganda and destabilization campaign waged against our [Aristide’s] government and 
against Famni Lavalas.” See Hallward, Damming the Flood, 182-3, 331. 
158 Photos of Aristide on arrival at the Bangui M’Poko airport in the Central African Republic were shot as part of 
the campaign to trigger comparisons with other Haitian leaders who departed Haiti for exile, like Jean-Claude 
Duvalier. The intent was to undermine Aristide’s narrative of a forced exile and instead present him and his family 
as having fled voluntarily. That counter-narrative spread the message that Aristide had abandoned Haiti and his 
followers and was quite successful in creating divisions within the Lavalas movement. The abandonment narrative 
was carefully crafted around Aristide’s post-1994 return to power. At that time, his return to power had been 
preconditioned based on American pressure for a structural adjustment programme (SAP) that the IMF and World 
Bank wanted implemented. The SAP, as will be explored later, was disastrous and harmed many of Aristide’s 
supporters, some of whom saw this as a dangerous compromise by Aristide. See, for example, Jason Podur, “Kofi 
Annan’s Haiti,” New Left Review 37 (January-February 2006): 151-159; and Clara James, “The Raboteau Revolt,” Z 
Magazine Online 15, no. 12 (December 2002), www.zmag.org.  
159 Initially, the MINUSTAH made no effort at differentiating the gangs operating in Haiti, categorizing them all as 
armed and criminal, without further differentiation based on motives, background, or political affiliation. In 2006, a 
better taxonomy was provided by a consultant to MINUSTAH: “Popular Militias: they often act in a semi-official 
capacity with the connivance of the local authorities, control entire neighbourhoods and, in this capacity, are the 
most dangerous of all the armed groups. Women participate in them and carry weapons; Vigilant Brigades: they 
patrol in the more defined territory of their immediate neighbourhoods. Women participate in them and do not 
usually use weapons; Popular Organisations; they have a political basis and do not target women; [and] The 
Chimères or criminal gangs: they control neighbourhoods which are not their own through intimidation and 
racketeering and instil a generalised sense of fear and insecurity. Women are involved in them, both as members or 
partners of the male members, and are also victims of their violence, especially sexual violence.” See Wiza Loutis, 
“Evaluation de la situation des femmes dans le cadre de la violence armée en Haïti,” June 2006, cited in Eirin 
Mobekk and Anne M. Street, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: What role should the EU play in 
Haiti? Recommendations for change,” act!onaid international, October 2006, 9. 
160 US Embassy in Port-au-Prince cable. Cited in A. Walter Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping: The United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2006–07,” Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 6 (2006-
07): 812. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520903320410.  
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The assault also coincided with the start of the UN’s disarmament campaign. By January 
2006, that campaign was credited with collecting only 30 weapons161 Overall, between 2004 and 
2007, MINUSTAH launched at least 15 combat operations against Port-au-Prince gangs. The 
largest was launched on 9 February 2007, and involved over 700 UN combat soldiers plus 
Haitian national police and UN Civil Police (UNPOL).162 Dubbed Operation Jauru 
Sudamericana, it was the largest combat operation conducted by the mission. General Dos 
Santos Cruz, the Brazilian commander of the operation pledged to “…cleanse these areas of the 
gangs who are robbing the people of their security.”163 His troops took a page from the US 
Marine occupation, broadcasting the following message in Creole to the citizens within the 
Boston neighbourhood of Port-au-Prince: 
BANDITS! LAY DOWN YOUR WEAPONS AND SURRENDER. WE WILL NOT 
HESITATE TO USE THE NECESSARY FORCE TO PLACE YOU UNDER ARREST. 
TURN YOURSELVES IN NOW. IF YOU DO NOT SURRENDER, YOU WILL 
CERTAINLY BE TAKEN BY FORCE. LAY DOWN YOUR WEAPONS, PUT YOUR 
HANDS ON YOUR HEAD, GET OUT OF THE HOUSE QUIETLY. YOU BANDITS: 
IT IS NOT OUR INTENT, BUT WE WILL SHOOT IF IT IS NECESSARY. TURN 
YOURSELVES IN NOW.164 
 
 MINUSTAH began to shift its focus mid-2006, towards governance and developing state 
institutions, particularly the judiciary.165 The shift did not mean that security within Haiti was in 
good order, but rather, reflected the election of René Préval to the presidency (2006 to 2011) for 
a second time. Not satisfied with MINUSTAH’s DDR program and responding to domestic and 
 
161 The disarmament campaign was implemented in a selective fashion, mainly targeting the capital’s slum 
neighbourhoods and therefore mainly pro-Aristide groups. Not surprisingly, especially after the dechoukaj following 
Aristide’s overthrow, his supporters were ‘reluctant’ to hand over their only protection.  
Hallward, Damning the Flood, 270. 
162 Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping,” 815-16. 
163 “Haiti: UN peacekeepers launch large-scale operation against criminal gangs,” UN News, 09 February 2007.  
www.news.un.org.  
164 Dorn, “Intelligence-led Peacekeeping,” 817. 
165 Sean Blaschke, Andrew Lucas Cramer, Marcy Hersh, Carina Lakovits, Leila Makarechi, Alejandro and Gomez 




international criticism over the draconian measures undertaken by MINUSTAH, Préval formed a 
National Disarmament Commission (NDC) to provide better options for a national DDR 
campaign. 
The campaign developed and accepted by Préval and the UN was built on five pillars: the 
disarmament and reinsertion of armed gangs; the reinsertion of youth; the reinsertion of women; 
a legislative framework to control arms; and community disarmament.166 The new program 
shifted away from a national level campaign and instead focussed on community-based DDR to 
develop safe and secure neighbourhoods. It retained a national nexus, however, through a 
renewed commitment by MINUSTAH officials to re-emphasize the building of the national 
institutions necessary to support the local level work.  
Between 2007 and 2009, MINUSTAH’s mission shifted away from “targeting localised 
armed gang violence” which had seen the use of heavy combat, towards a “more regionalized 
[approach to] crime such as arms and drug trafficking, as well as… [crimes and] wrongdoing 
affecting government revenue.”167 The latter was the beginning of a shift towards rebuilding 
Haiti’s state institutions and re-instilling confidence in their capabilities. However, 
MINUSTAH’s mandate was too large based on the resources provided and the tasks were too 
complex.168 The mission suffered from a shortage of personnel, both military and the civilian.169  
 
166 Mobekk and Street, “Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration,” 14. 
167 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 2. 
168 Brian Greene points out that while “there is broad agreement on what needs to be done in Haiti, it is increasingly 
clear UNMUSTAH’s current configuration and mandate are no longer suitable to the task at hand.” He believes that 
the international community will never abandon Haiti, but that its commitment will drop dramatically, well below 
what is required for true peacebuilding in Haiti. See Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” 18. 
169 Interestingly, MINUSTAH was assessed as costing close to US$575 million annually. Development money, 
however, was proving much harder to gain commitment from the international community. See Jonathan M. Katz, 




Haiti’s state institutions also remained weak. Despite being essential for good governance 
and the protection of human rights, the judicial system remained “largely dysfunctional,” 
plagued by chronic prison overcrowding, “prolonged pre-trial detention” and little cooperation 
between the police and the courts.170 Corruption remained rampant and the application of the rule 
of law was usually biased and showed partiality towards the wealthy, as well as the economic 
and political elite. 
The new DDR campaign began with the 2006 establishment of the community violence 
reduction (CVR) program. The program targeted the members and potential recruits of the gangs 
within the slum areas by working to “create economic and social opportunities with a view to 
extracting former gang members and at-risk youth…from violence.”171  The program tried, with 
some success, to bridge the divide between rival gangs by focussing on shared economic and 
social conditions.172 Projects were designed to cater to gang members from both sides (pro-
Aristide and pro-coup) by tackling their shared grievances within a shared setting. Joint projects 
also avoided the CVR program being accused of favouring one side over the other. 
In the case of the CVR program, MINUSTAH’s DDR section determined that the aim of 
the program was to develop grassroots level strategies for youth designed to provide alternatives 
to armed gangs. The alternatives needed to be empowering and more appealing than gang 
 
170 “Report of the Secretary General on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti,” S/2006/1003, 19 December 2006, 
7/18. Brian Greene points out that in February 2004, some 3800 prisoners in the jails were released during the 
uprisings to oust President Aristide and most of the criminal record system was destroyed. See Greene, 
“Peacebuilding in Haiti,” 9. 
171 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,”, 8. See also Moritz Schuberth, “Disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration in unconventional settings: the case of MINUSTAH’s community violence reduction,” International 
Peacekeeping, Vol. 24, No. 3 (June 2017): 410-33. 
172 A 2013 interview with a member of MINUSTAH’s DDR section included a complaint about the scope of their 
work within the new mandate that was unintentionally ironic: “…money is injected into community through ‘soft’ 
projects. You give training to elements at risk, you work with women, you create revenue-generating activities, you 
repair roads, you finance some festivals, and so on. But the resources are spread too thin, there’s no logic.” As 
Schuberth points out, that shift from DDR programs based on individuals, to the programs like CVR and based on 
geography, showed promise as a progressive way forward. See Schuberth, “Disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration in unconventional settings,” 426. 
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membership, as well as provide a source of income to youth within the urban slums.173 The 
program as implemented was designed as a bottom-up peacebuilding effort rather than top-down 
state-building, and was intended to be linked with national institutional development. That nexus 
was not well understood and led to the CVR being criticized for bypassing traditional 
government services, a not unfamiliar complaint about externally constituted programs.174 
International work continued on the Haitian national police. MINUSTAH adopted a 
three-prong approach, based on policing, border security and prison construction.175 Policing 
between 2006 and 2011 saw the force increase by over 3,000 trained officers.176 Yet the force 
was adding new and specialized capabilities including border control, corrections work and 
firefighting.177  
The additional tasks required additional personnel. In addition to the 14,000 required for 
regular policing duties, the force required an additional 18,000 to 20,000 uniformed personnel 
trained for the new specialities. Recruiting suitable personnel and training them was a lengthy 
process. By August 2008, the force included only 8,546 officers and, of that number, about 1,000 
were “assigned non-policing duties.”178 By 2011, the police force was around 10,000 strong.179 
 
173 Schuberth, 422. Moritz Schuberth identified “the ultimate goal of CVR is to cut the stream of new recruits from 
the community to UAGs [urban armed gangs] by replacing the income-generating function” provided by the UAGs. 
174 Schuberth, 424. One of the success stories from the CVR experience was the Haitianization of over 70% of the 
CVR staff, giving Haiti a well-trained capability, as of 2012, that could continue and expand the program as desired. 
See “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 8. 
175 Kevin Walby and Jeffrey Monoghan, “’Haitian Paradox’ or Dark Side of the Security-Development Nexus? 
Canada’s Role in the Securitization of Haiti, 2004-2009,” Alternates: Global, Local, Political 36, no. 4 (2011): 275. 
www.alt.sagepub.com. 
176 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 7n58. The 18th through 22nd classes of the Haitian Police Academy 
graduated during that period. 
177 Schuberth, “Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in unconventional settings,” 424. MINUSTAH’s 
mandate identified arms control and border security as new tasks requiring the mission provide “technical support 
for comprehensive border management” to the Haitians.  
178 Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” iii. 
179 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 7. Growing the police force was complicated by the force’s high attrition 
rate. Reasons for the high attrition featured a high dismissal rate for corruption and human rights abuses. Vetting of 
new officers at this time was badly in arrears as many of the new candidates were either ex-Army or were former 
police in some capacity. 
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According to a 2009 Government of Canada assessment, MINUSTAH had its greatest 
impact on security, marked by political crime nosediving as a result of MINUSTAH’s work.180 
Yet the assessment did not take into consideration the rising commitment of “common crime” in 
Haiti involving drugs, gang violence and kidnappings. MINUSTAH operations shifted away 
from an emphasis on ‘armed gangs’ and instead prioritized combatting regional crimes like arms 
smuggling and drugs.181 
Despite this shift in focus between 2012 and 2015, MINUSTAH was still confronted by 
‘common crime,’ including an epidemic of lynchings.182 The high incidence of actual and 
attempted lynchings reflected “a lack of confidence in police and justice…” revealing that 
lynching was “implicitly an accepted practice.”183 Ironically, UN investigations of the practice 
found that the lynchings took place in urban areas which had the highest number of police per 
capita! Further, any claim of progress was damned by MINUSTAH’s statement that: 
[w]hile Haiti is far more stable today than it was prior to MINUSTAH’s deployment in 
2004, it is apparent that the peacebuilding campaign has not produced the kind of results 
that the mission’s backers had hoped for when they embarked on this most recent 
intervention.184 
 
MINUSTAH viewed Haiti through rose-coloured glasses. Not surprisingly, progress in 
political stability led to the UN expanding the mandate of the mission yet again in 2009. The UN 
Security Council added the promotion of political dialogue and reconciliation to MINUSTAH’s 
 
180 Greene, iii. 
181 Because Haiti has been a major transshipment point for narcotics, the Americans have given significant aid to 
Haiti to develop a counter-narcotic capability, which they have continued to fund. That continued funding explains 
why drugs are always a Haitian priority for crime prevention activities. Outside of cannabis use, Haitian drug use is 
considered quite low due to poverty. See “Haiti: Security and the Reintegration of the State,” International Crisis 
Group, Policy Briefing no. 12, 30 October 2006, 6. www.crisisgroup.org 
182 MINUSTAF Human Rights Section Report dated January 2017.  
https://minustah.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/170117_exec_summary_haiti_-
_taking_justice_into_ones_own_hands_-_en.pdf. The period in question saw 483 lynchings (or attempted lynchings) 
take place largely in the vicinity of the capital, with only one solitary conviction. 
183 MINUSTAF HR Section Report. 
184 MINUSTAF HR Section Report, iv. 
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tasks “in anticipation of presidential and parliamentary elections the following year.”185 At the 
same time, the mission implemented “consolidation” measures directed by the UN Security 
Council. They included the reconfiguration of the military forces coupled to “a small force 
reduction.”186  
The 2010 earthquake led MINUSTAH to shelve its consolidation plan while the mission 
dealt with the crisis. Rather than the force reduction called for under the consolidation plan, 
MINUSTAH’s “force levels [were]… increased to boost security and support recovery and 
reconstruction.”187 By 2012, the NGO International Crisis Group or ICG identified Haiti as being 
in the midst of four significant transitions:   
…from armed violence to reconciliation and peace; from a non-democratic culture to a 
democratic society; from a failed to a modern nation-state; and from a situation of 




The year 2012 also saw MINUSTAH confront a remobilization by former Haitian Army 
members. A number of former soldiers as well as young men who were interested in becoming 
soldiers, began to take over public spaces all over the country. Many were armed. Their activities 
included occupying government buildings and establishing illegal checkpoints. They demanded 
President Michel Martelly, elected in May 2011, honour his pledge to reconstitute the Haitian 
Army and that the government pay military pensions to demobilized soldiers and police.189 
As of March 2017, and despite the plan to wrap-up the larger MINUSTAH mission and 
replace it with a substantially smaller mission, UN Secretary General António Gutierrez stated 
 
185 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 2. 
186 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti.” 
187 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti.” 
188 ICG also claimed that “the earthquake [added] a fifth transition: from a destroyed country to one not only rebuilt 
but ideally transformed.” This last transition was not defined and was clearly defined by the interests of the NGO. 
See “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti,” 4. 
189 “Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti.” 
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publicly that the national police service “has yet to build adequate capacity to address all 
instability threats inside the country, independently of an international uniformed presence and in 
line with human rights standards.”190 The police per capita ratio remained low at 1.3 police 
officers per 1,000 Haitians.191 The Secretary General also damned MINUSTAH with faint praise, 
noting, on the eve of the mission’s withdrawal from Haiti, that the overall security situation, 
despite “[g]rowing tensions linked to socioeconomic grievances notwithstanding, key indicators, 
including crime and civil protests, remained within historically established statistical 
parameters.”192 His assessment of judicial institutional reform progress was not much better, 





[I]t was the first time for the United Nations to intervene in a country that was not in war, 
but with an exceptional proliferation of arms, gangs, and political violence, and in the 
urban context. The United Nations didn’t know how to deal with all of this. So in the end 
Haiti served a bit like a laboratory to try to understand what to do.194 
- Professor of Peace Studies Moritz Schuberth 
 
 Life after Jean-Claude Duvalier saw efforts to introduce democratic governance 
undermined almost immediately. Despite the growth and maturity of the many democratic 
grassroots peasant organizations which spearheaded the 1990 election of President Aristide, 
 
190 The UN plan calls for the mission of over 2300 peacekeeping soldiers, police and civilians to be withdrawn 
gradually and replaced with a smaller police presence of some 295. Charles, Jacqueline, Miami Herald, “U.N. 
secretary general: Time for peacekeeping mission in Haiti to end,” March 17 2017.  
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article139256983.html.  
191 For comparison, Canada, considered as having one of the lowest rates in the West, possesses 1.88 police officers 
per 1,000 Canadians. See Catharine Tunney, “Number of police officers per Canadian hits 13-year low, Goodale 
told,” CBC News, June 27, 2018.  www.cbc.ca.  
192 UN Security Council Report of the Secretary-general on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, S/2017/604, 12 
July 2017. https://minustah.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n1720836.pdf.  
193 UNSCR S/2017/604.  
194 Schuberth, “Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in unconventional settings,”417. 
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many countries, including the United States, opposed his rule because they suspected his 
‘socialist’ agenda. Under Jean-Claude’s regime, the international community was responsible for 
reinvigorating the Haitian Army through training and equipment assistance, which allowed it to 
resume its role as oppressor of popular movements that challenged the status quo. Its 
invigoration culminated in the 1991 coup against President Aristide.  
International efforts to negotiate a solution between Aristide and the Army stalled. The 
imposition of an embargo against the coup regime in 1993 was undermined by the failure of the 
international community (the US in particular) to respect the embargo.195 Despite the embargo, 
over US$67 million worth of clothing sewn in Haiti was imported into the US and at least one oil 
tanker from Texas delivered oil to Haiti during the embargo.196 The Bush Administration (1989 
to 1993) suspended its foreign aid to Haiti, creating massive hardship, including starvation, for 
the many Haitians.197 
The 1994 ‘intervasion’ by the international community and the subsequent hand-off from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the UNMIH began the occupation of Haiti by the UN. 
The invasion marked the first time the UN had authorized forceful regime change, in this case, 
from coup regime to a democratically elected leader. It also marked the shift towards Structural 
Adjustment Policies (SAPs) and the domination of Haitian fiscal policy by the IMF and World 
Bank, as well as the ‘NGOization’ of Haiti and its attendant loss of sovereignty.198 With 
 
195 Haitians were starving as a result of the embargo imposed on Haiti, so it is quite possible that transgressions 
noted may have been in response to those dire conditions. If so, it raises the question of why a humanitarian 
emergency was not declared, allowing humanitarian goods to be brought in legally. 
196 Paul Farmer, Mary C. Smith Fawzi, and Patrice Nevil, “Unjust embargo of aid for Haiti,” The Lancet 361 
(February 2003): 420-23. See also Kernaghan, “Skirting the Embargo.” 
197 While the Bush administration did allow humanitarian aid to continue to flow into Haiti, Haiti not only lacked the 
capacity to effectively distribute the aid, the country was also in considerable turmoil that aid was not reaching much 
of Haiti’s rural areas. 
198 The literature is unclear on SAPs. I am using SAPs as Structural Program Policies and SAP as the Structural 
Adjustment Program. Each nation targeted by an IMF/World Bank SAP will have a number of SAPs to fulfill, 
somewhat akin to the program’s objectives. 
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Aristide’s return to power, economic aid from the Clinton administration began to flow back into 
Haiti. However, in 1995, when Aristide pushed back against the SAP requirements levied against 
Haiti, the US quickly suspended direct aid money to Haiti, including previously promised aid 
and instead began funnelling it through various international banking agencies, USAID and what 
Peter Hallward has termed “a plethora of liberally funded technocrats and NGOs.199  
The message was clear. Opposition to internationally mandated IMF and World Bank 
reforms for fragile nations like Haiti would not be tolerated.200 Haiti’s loss of sovereignty did not 
stop with its economic sector, however. It extended into Haiti’s security sector, driven by a 
lengthy and unfruitful UN-led process to create a Haitian national police force, based on an 
international community model and training not wanted by the majority of Haitians. UN 
involvement in Haiti showed in limited gains during this period. 
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) 
programs were badly serviced and poorly understood. Most of the UN missions in Haiti 
approached SSR as separate from the related fields of penal and judicial reform. The limited 
duration of most missions (six months usually) worked against the ambitious program goals 
identified and implemented.  
Programming by the UN was often disjointed, uncoordinated and poorly planned. With 
the coup of 2004, the UN’s progress on SSR was completely undone. Future progression on SSR 
looks unlikely to produce the results desired. The employment of combat troops to deal with 
 
199 Hallward, Damming the Flood, 60. 
200 Withholding of aid monies became a frequent weapon wielded by the US to ensure compliance by Haitian 
leaders. In 2000, for example, the US withheld foreign aid to Haiti following Haitian opposition groups’ complaints 
about minor irregularities associated with the 2000 elections. The US was also able to prevail on its allies and other 
agencies to follow suit. Tragically, the majority of the aid withheld was earmarked for education programming, 
potable water, and health care. Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 382. 
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Haitian gangs also damaged the relationship between the UN and ordinary Haitians, leading to 




Chapter Ten – Understanding Foreign Dominance 
Should we have learned by now that outsiders cannot solve Haiti’s problems? For a time 
in the early twentieth century it was a US protectorate. Should it not now be left alone to 
sort itself out? The proposition is attractive only in the abstract. Haiti is clearly unable to 
sort itself out, and the effect of leaving it alone would be continued or worsening chaos. 
Our globalized world cannot afford a political vacuum, whether in the mountains of 
Afghanistan or on the very doorstep of the remaining superpower.1 
- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
 
[T]he most effective interventions are not military.2 
- UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
 
There are two principal reasons for the almost total absence of examples of humanitarian, 
military intervention. Firstly, because it had no reason to feature in the superpower 
interplay and secondly, because humanitarian intervention has been perceived as 
transgressing Article 2(7) [of the UN Charter], that well-established international tenet of 
non-interference in a state’s domestic affairs.3 
- Retired British Colonel Richard M. Connaughton 
 
Before outlining lessons, a review of those elements of the core strategy undertaken by 
the West to deter fundamental change in Haitian development is warranted.4 Indeed, the core 
elements of Western interventions in Haiti are the building blocks of the West’s modus operandi 
in Haiti. They lead to similar outcomes and are repeated over and over again. Recognizing the 
West’s modus operandi and its effects will allow lessons to be derived. The three core elements 
are criminalization, economic warfare and ‘deliberately’ missed opportunities.  
 
1 Kofi Annan, ‘Helping Hand: Why We Had to Go into Haiti’, Wall Street Journal, March 15 2004, 
A12. Cited in Johanna Mendelson-Forman, “Security sector reform in Haiti,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 1 
(March 2006): 14-27. 
2 Remarks by Kofi Annan at the 35th Annual Ditchley Foundation lecture, United Kingston, 26 June 1998. 
https://www.ditchley.com/past-events/past-programme/1990-1999/1998/lecture-xxxv.  
3 Richard M. Connaughton, Peacekeeping and Military Intervention, The Occasional No. 3 (Surrey, U.K.: The 
Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1992), 17.  Article 2(7) of the UN Charter states “Nothing contained in the 
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”  
4 Some key components of Western interventions are repeated consistently. These behaviours need to be anticipated 




Qui veut noyer son chien l’accuse de la rage.5 
- French proverb 
Being called a barbarian means being consigned to a zone in which violence is permitted 
or mandated – for now.6 
- Professor of German literature, Jan Philipp Reemtsma 
 
The first element comes from understanding that Western interventions are undertaken to 
impose order and stability in Haiti, as order and stability are defined and judged by the West, not 
Haiti.7 The West has historically identified Haitians as a threat, initially because of their 
successful fight for freedom and later in their pursuit of peasant democracy. For the West, Haiti 
is a menace not only to long-term regional stability, but also to international stability.8 In 1801, 
the French, for example, identified the ‘colonie révoltée’ as “another Algiers [or piratical state] 
in the seas of America.”9 Revolution was bad enough, but in the eyes of the international 
community, the new state of Haiti committed worse acts of deviance, acts which would lead to 
the ostracism and criminalization of Haiti by the West. 
 
5 Translation: He who wants to drown his dog accuses it of rabies.  
6 Jan Philipp Reemtsma, Trust and Violence: An Essay on A Modern Relationship (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2009), cited in Julia Borst, “Re-Thinking the Haitian Other ‘in Relation’ as ‘prochain’: A Reading 
of Edouard Glissant and Lyonel Trouillot,” Journal of Haitian Studies 19, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 139-162. 
7 Conflict theory identifies the interests and values of the US as being in conflict with those of Haiti, leading to the 
US as the more powerful entity being able to disproportionately shape the nature of the conflict through the use and 
abuse of the law. Threats to the more powerful entity, through resistance, are controlled through the development 
and use of criminal law. The law is used to determine who and what is either deviant, criminal or delinquent. This 
was the case when the powers of young US Marine officers were expanded during the Marine Occupation to allow 
them to act not only as local police chiefs, but also to enforce trade measures within their local areas of 
responsibility, while also acting as judges on civil and criminal cases. See Benjamin R. Beede, ed., The War of 1898 
and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934: An Encyclopedia (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), 198-99. 
8 The Haitian revolution and the potential for its export abroad, for example, shaped the West’s perception of Haiti 
as an international threat. 




The first ‘deviant’ act Haiti committed was its successful revolution.10 As early as August 
1799, US Vice President Thomas Jefferson showed his personal dismay over continued unrest 
within Saint Domingue in a letter to Virginia Court Justice and gradual abolitionist, St. George 
Tucker, originally from Bermuda and later resident in Williamsburg, Virginia.11 Jefferson wrote 
that “if something is not done, and done soon, we shall be the murderers of our children,” 
arguing for the need to implement gradual emancipation to avoid violent revolution by American 
slaves and the massacre of their oppressors.12 He would again reiterate the need to pre-empt the 
possibility of a violent rebellion by understanding what he saw to be the pernicious nature of the 
Haitian revolution. 
In 1801, in a letter to James Monroe, Jefferson made it clear that while he admired Saint 
Domingue and the liberated slaves’ ability to establish a self-governing state subject to the rule 
of law, he did not consider Saint Domingue to have the means to threaten the United States. He 
was nonetheless concerned about certain “criminal” elements: 
The most promising portion of them [the West Indian colonies] is the island of St. 
Domingo, where the blacks are established into a sovereignty de facto, and have 
organized themselves under regular law and government. I should conjecture that their 
present ruler might be willing, on many considerations, to receive even that description 
which would be exiled for acts deemed criminal by us, but meritorious perhaps by him. 
The possibility that these exiles might stimulate and conduct vindictive or predatory 
descents on our coasts, and facilitate concert with their brethren remaining here, looks to 
a state of things between that island and us not probable on a contemplation of our 
relative strength, and of the disproportion daily growing: and it is over-weighed by the 
 
10 Deviance is defined as action or behaviour which violates established social norms, either formal or informal. 
Colloquially, it can be understood as odd or unconventional, unacceptable behaviour which can be either criminal or 
non-criminal.  
11 Note that while Jefferson feared the black revolution and its repercussions for the US South, the Federalist 
president, John Adams, supported Toussaint during his war with Rigaud. Jefferson would eventually succeed Adams 
as president, and it is in this context that his earlier misgivings about the turmoil in Saint Domingue become 
particularly relevant in the course of later US-Haiti relations. 
12 Jefferson, writing to St. George Tucker in August 1799, was referring for the need for gradual, controlled 
emancipation of the American slaves, otherwise one risked having them rise up in violent rebellion and massacring 
their white oppressors. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-29-02-0405.  
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humanity of the measures proposed, and the advantages of disembarrassing ourselves of 
such dangerous characters.13 
 
The second act of deviance, the 1804 massacre of the Haiti’s remaining white colonists 
was horrific and affected Haiti’s international relations. Officially, the Jefferson administration’s 
position on trade with Haiti identified “San Domingo…. [as a] French colony….in state of 
rebellions against the Mother Country [France].”14 But despite that presumed status, the US 
continued to trade with the rebels as they struggled to maintain their freedom. But the 1804 
killings of the remaining French in Haiti caused a shift in Jefferson’s relationship with Haiti. 
Citing the massacres as cause, Tim Matthewson points out that the Jefferson administration 
“abandon[ed]” its unofficial trading relationship with Haiti and began advocating for an embargo 
against Haiti.15 On 3 March 1805, Jefferson signed a limited embargo into law, prohibiting the 
sale of arms and ammunition to Haiti. While unarmed trade was still allowed, it too would be 
fully boycotted in 1806.16  
The arms embargo ran from 1806 to 1808. US Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin 
wrote President John Quincy Adams on 26 September 1822, explaining his understanding of 
why Jefferson had imposed the embargo on Haiti: 
 
13 Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 November 1801, cited in Merrill Peterson, ed. Thomas Jefferson Writings 
(New York: Literary Classics of the U.S., 1984), 1098.  
https://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/st-domingue-haiti#footnote30_qt0o4c3 
14 Matthewson, 31. 
15 Matthewson, “Jefferson and the Nonrecognition of Haiti,” 29. 
16 While official sales were denied, American merchants trading in the Caribbean area would regularly deal with 
Haiti. Indeed, during the Haitian civil war that began in 1806, Christophe would regularly seize men and supplies 
from American ships in the area, which in turn would result in American government officials being dispatched to 
deal with the issues. However, Christophe would refuse to deal with the American government officials because of 
the lack of diplomatic recognition. That defiance prompted this prescient writing from a US commercial agent in 
Port-au-Prince in 1823: “. . . the interest of the United States would be greatly promoted by a vessel of war looking 
in here at least once in two months…” Cited in Johnhenry Gonzalez, “Defiant Haiti: Free-Soil Runaways, Ship 
Seizures and the Politics of Diplomatic Non-Recognition in the Early Nineteenth Century,” Slavery & Abolition: A 
Journal of Slave and Post-Slave Studies 36, no. 1 (2015): 124-35. See also Alfred N. Hunt, Haiti’s Influence on 
Antebellum America: Slumbering Volcano of the Caribbean, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988). 
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[t]o the enquiry whether the United States had in any instance at the request of a foreign  
nation, carried laws to restrict the commerce of their citizens…I said that it was true that 
they had, on one occasion, passed a temporary law forbidding  the trade with San 
Domingo; but the act was much disapproved, had not been renewed, and  would not be 
admitted as a precedent, the less so, as one of the principal motives for passing it  was the 
apprehension of the danger which at the time (immediately after the last massacre of the  
whites there) might on account of our numerous slaves, arise from the unrestricted 
intercourse  with the black population of that island. 17 
 
The third act of deviance in the eyes of the international community was Dessalines’s 
invasion of French-controlled Santo Domingo in 1805. Seeking to unite the entire island under 
his rule while removing the threat of invasion from his flank, the invasion plan was clearly 
justifiable from the perspective of the strategic threat that Dessalines faced. However, within the 
international community, the signal the attack sent was that Dessalines had lied and was not to be 
trusted.18 As such, Haiti was clearly marked as a state with expansionist aspirations. Worse, it 
was seen as an expansionist state led by blacks; in the eyes of the Great Powers, the truly 
unthinkable had come to pass.19 
These three deviant acts marked Haiti as a rogue entity and effectively placed the country 
under a state of siege.20 Western isolation of Haiti also exacted a huge toll on Haiti, forcing its 
early leaders to devote resources more urgently needed for development to defence. An early 
 
17 Albert Gallatin to John Quincy Adams, 26 September 1822. Cited in Mathewson, 240. 
18 Dessalines had pledged in his Constitution of 1805 that Haiti would not interfere in the affairs of other nations. 
See Matthewson, 120. 
19 Note that from the Haitian perspective and in line with Toussaint’s Constitution of 1801, the entirety of 
Hispaniola including the Spanish portion of the island ceded to France in 1795, fell under Toussaint’s sovereignty. 
With independence in 1804, Toussaint could legitimately make the claim to the Spanish portion of the island as 
putatively belonging to Haiti, which then mean his actions in 1805 were not expansionist at all. 
20 Julia Gaffield points out that after independence, the West’s relations with Haiti were largely commercial and 
were built on “us[ing] Haiti to their own advantage in influencing the balance of power in European warfare.” 
Foreign powers sought to divide the inextricably linked concepts of “independence and sovereignty (or liberty)” 
expressed in the Haitian Declaration of Independence, leading to Western conceptualizations of relations with Haiti 
becoming an exploitive nightmare for Haiti. “[F]oreign officials could imagine a situation in which they would 
recognize Haitian independence but also assume a level of control over internal and external affairs that 




essay, written in 1819 by Baron de Vastey, a member of Henri Christophe’s court, existentially 
reflected on Haiti’s fragile position in the global Atlantic should Haitians ever abandon their 
arms and compromise their freedom:  
So, there were men here before us! They no longer exist, here are their pitiable remains! 
They were destroyed! What had they done to suffer such a calamitous fate! Did some 
race of exterminating men happen upon them? Had they no weapons, those unhappy 
souls? Could they not defend themselves? At this thought, I seize hold of my own 
weapons and thank the heaven for having placed in our hands the instrument of our 
deliverance and our preservation. O precious force of arms! Without you what would 
have become of my country, my compatriots, my kinsfolk, my friends? From that 
moment on, I looked upon those weapons of mine as the greatest of all 
possessions…Sons of the mount, dwellers of the forests, cherish these weapons of yours, 
these precious tools for preserving your rights. Never abandon them, pass them on to 
your children along with the love of liberty and independence, and a hatred for tyrants, as 
the finest legacy you can bequeath them.21 
 
Tim Matthewson identified the deviant acts committed by Haiti as the stimulus which 
opened the racist flood gates in the West and re-shaped the narrative of the Haitian revolution 
with a vengeance. The new narrative portrayed Haiti as a rogue nation based on its deviant acts 
and introduced the West’s ‘civilizing mission’ stereotype that required white mastery to restrain 
natural black ‘savagery.’22 The deviant or ‘criminal’ label which France painted on Haiti’s back 
also precluded the country from developing normal relations with neighbouring colonial states in 
the Caribbean region. As already discussed, France insisted that Haiti pay crippling 
compensation for its ‘criminal behaviour’ in the 1825 indemnity treaty.23 Thus, while the 
 
21 Baron de Vastey in 1814 was writing about the decimation of the Taíno people on Hispaniola at the hands of the 
Spanish, which in turn led to the slave trade for labour replacements. Baron de Vastey, The Colonial System 
Unveiled, trans. and ed. Chris Bongie (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2014), 86-7. 
22 The stereotype was built on Western ‘whiteness’ and paternalism and was not unusual for the period in question. 
Matthewson, 146-7. 
23 Cleverly, the French foresaw Haiti being unable to make payments for the massive debt and needing to borrow 
funds to make payments. They included provisions within the indemnity agreement requiring Haiti to use a French 
bank for such borrowing. The French did allow re-negotiation of the original indemnity agreement in 1838, the key 
result being the reduction of the indemnity by 30 thousand francs. See Gusti-Klara Gaillard, L’Experience Haitienne 
de la Dette Exterieure, (Imprimerie HenriDeschamps, 1988), 18-19. See also Dalloz, Consultation de MM. Dalloz, 
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relationship that developed superficially appeared to be dominated by extreme Western animus, 
conditioned through narratives of fear, bias, coercion and racism, the reality was the emerging 
relationships with Haiti were conditioned, or perhaps, tempered, by economic pragmatism built 
on commercial trade – both legal and illegal – and the profits derived therefrom.24 
Just as the West refused, by withholding diplomatic recognition until well after 1825 in 
some instances, to admit Haiti into the normative international community, Western 
interventions likewise treated Haitians citizens collectively through a lens that labelled them as 
criminals. Resistance to Western interventions and their ‘civilizing’ missions would become 
intolerable, and, in the extreme, Haitian resistance was met with extra-judicial killings. As stated 
earlier, the law is frequently used as a weapon to determine and define who and what behaviour 
is deviant, criminal, or delinquent. 
During the Marine Occupation of 1915-1934, the Marines used military courts quite 
liberally and to great effect to suppress the opposition. Not only did the Marines employ the term 
cacos broadly to encompass those who were actively resisting the occupation with force, but 
they applied the term to the peaceful political opposition as well. This included, for example, 
punishing journalists who criticized the occupation with imprisonment or exile as weapons.25 
 
Delagrange, Hennequin, Dupin, Jeune, et al., pour les anciens colons de St. Domingue 16, 26-27 (Imprimerie Mme 
Veuve Agasse, 1829), cited in Phillips, “Haiti, France and the Independence Debt of 1825,” 4. 
24 Whereas Napoleon entertained genocide – the extermination of all black males on the island over the age of 12 
and who wore an epaulette – as a solution to his rebellious colony, Western reactions to Haiti were more pragmatic, 
considerably less extreme, and mixed. Julia Gaffield’s concept of multilayered sovereignty as implemented by the 
West in its dealings with Haiti provides an excellent theory to understanding the complexity and varied nature of the 
Western relationship with Haiti. See Julia Gaffield, Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after 
Revolution. On Napoleon’s plan for genocide, see Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 62. Farmer notes the idea of 
exterminating all the black males over 12 years of age originated with General Leclerc and was based on a strategy 
of desperation. 
25 A number of journalists and editors were tried and sentenced in US military courts, some of whom were jailed, 
and others exiled or forbidden to engage in journalism. Further, The American Brigade Commander, General John 
Russell, forwarded a report to his superior, the Chief of Naval Operations, which argued “…the Haitian Government 
should be forced to openly admit its inability to restrain the press and protect itself, the Occupation and the 
Gendarmerie from its insulting and scurrilous remarks due to the inefficiency and inadequacy of the Judiciary 
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Reporting from the US Brigade commander, General John H. Russell, amply demonstrated the 
free use of the law against cacos, their supporters and just about anyone who was critical of the 
American occupation: 
During the years 1919 and 1920 from five to six thousand bandits were operating in the 
interior of Haiti while in the large coast cities certain groups were formed to assist the 
bandits. As a result, the use of provost courts greatly increased. With the end of banditism 
and the re-establishment of law and order in the country provost courts were used most 
sparingly and solely as a means of maintaining tranquility. The mere fact that such courts 
could be employed had, as a rule, the necessary effect. The power was there but lying 
mostly dormant, to be employed only on special occasions.26 
 
Russell eventually proscribed the use of the term caco and insisted that the term “bandit” 
be used instead in all official correspondence and reporting. Marine Corps members writing 
about their experience in Haiti regularly used the words caco and bandit interchangeably, in 
addition to using the term vagabondage (vagrancy), as tools of  repression as late as 1929.27 An 
excellent example of such language is found in a Marine Corps article entitled, “Black Bandits of 
Haiti,” which states: 
There were the Cacos. These were native bandits, descendants of black slaves who had 
run away from their French masters to live in the mountains. They were savage and 
lawless, keeping the peaceful elements in a constant state of dread.28 
 
System of Haiti…If so made, it would throw the onus of such work on the Military Occupation which could put in 
operations laws similar to those now existing in the Dominican Republic relating to the press, freedom of speech, 
etc.”  John H. Russell, Brigade Commander to Chief of Naval Operations (18 January 1921), Box 1, Folder 13, John 
H. Russell Collection, COLL/158, [Special Correspondence with Higher Headquarters], Archives Branch, Marine 
Corps History Division, Quantico, VA. See also Roberts, “Then and Now,” 241-268. 
26 John H. Russell, High Commissioner to Secretary of State: report on use and need for Martial law and provost 
courts to impose stability in Haiti (6 September 1922), Box 1, Folder 13, John H. Russell Collection, COLL/158, 
[Special Correspondence with Higher Headquarters], Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, 
VA. 
27 In his 1923 annual report, Russell stated that the number of prisoners had decreased significantly, with vagrancy 
and theft the chief offenses of those still being held. John H. Russell, Report of the American High Commissioner at 
Port au Prince submitted to the Secretary of State, Haiti (1 January 1923), Box 1, Folder 14, John H. Russell 
Collection, COLL/158, [Special Correspondence with Higher Headquarters], Archives Branch, Marine Corps 
History Division, Quantico, VA. See also Chochotte, “The History of Peasants, Tonton Makouts, and the Rise and 
Fall of the Duvalier Dictatorship in Haiti.” 
28 The state of marronage describes a fugitive slave still within the framework of slavery and the master-slave 
relationship and was defined by specific legislation. The idea of being a caco was related to banditry, that is, 
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Criminalization of dissenting Haitians likewise took place during the UN occupation of 
Haiti.29 The terms used today in UN operations reports are “criminal gangs,” “urban armed 
gangs” or simply “gangs.”30 The terms are often applied to residents of slum neighbourhoods in 
Port-au-Prince like Cité Soleil. A 2008 US Institute of Peace report stated: “[a]lthough ostensibly 
criminal in nature, the gangs of Port-au-Prince were an inherently political phenomenon. 
Powerful elites from across the political spectrum exploited gangs as instruments of political 
warfare, providing them with arms, funding, and protection from arrest.”31 That understanding 
by MINUSTAH’s leaders and planners – that commercial and political elites were driving gang 
activity – led them to decide in 2004 to commence urban combat operations against the gangs 
operating in the urban slums of Port-au-Prince. 
The MINUSTAH campaign continued off and on from December 2004 until well into 
2007 and saw high intensity combat operations employed against ‘gang’ members residing in 
neighbourhoods composed of housing constructed of wood, cardboard, and clapboard, and 
covered with tin roofs.32 In short, the houses provided little to no protection from the projectiles 
 
labelling someone as a means of treating them like a criminal. While there are similarities, the two concepts are 
quite different from a legal perspective with the chief offenses of those still held being vagrancy and theft. Edwards 
Bimberg Jr., “Black Bandits of Haiti,” The Leatherneck (August 1941): 6. 
29 Robert Fatton Jr. points out that this process of criminalization originates not just with outside actors. He points 
out that the “dominant class” in Haiti employed an ideological campaign built around the term “Chimères” and 
succeeded in equating Lavalas to Chimères and, finally, to criminals. Fatton points to the deadly irony of “the great 
majority of urban poor” now being subjected not only to the deadly ministrations of actual Chimères but also the 
violence of the state (and the UN) which see them as outside the rule of law and subject to killing with impunity. See 
Fatton, The Roots of Haitian Despotism, 113-14. 
30 It is true that a number of those were criminal gangs. Likewise, Aristide may indeed have tolerated gang 
operations, and not been able or willing to control them. In either case, those gangs then became the responsibility of 
the police force and should not have been the target of combat operations. UN operations, as shown, were based on 
kill or capture operations against key gang leaders. Those operations involved considerable combat firepower and 
usually degenerated into kill operations. They also violated the accepted UN concept on escalation of force and 
minimizing civilian collateral damage or killings. 
31 Michael Dziedzic and Robert M. Perito, “Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince,” US Institute of Peace 
Special Report 208 (Summer 2008): 1. 
32 Details in this section are drawn from a number of sources, including Dziedzic, “Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of 
Port-au-Prince,”; Gabriel Stargardter, “General behind deadly Haiti raid takes aim at Brazil’s gangs,” World News, 
November 29, 2018; numerous Reuters accounts; the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (www.ijdh.org); 
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fired by either side. On the UN side, the Brazilian troops involved in the combat operations not 
only fired small arms and heavy machine guns during these operations, they also employed 
mortar fire and, as indicated by spent casings found after the attack, directed automatic weapons 
fire from helicopter gun platforms. Likewise, UN armoured vehicles were employed to provide 
stable machine gun platforms during the assault, further adding to the damage and collateral 
deaths and injuries.  
The application of force by UN troops during this period was generously described as 
indiscriminate. Post-operational interviews and reporting indicated that UN soldiers, within the 
Port-au-Prince area specifically, showed no signs of restraint or, indeed, any effort at minimizing 
the use of force and the ensuing injuries to civilian bystanders.33 What was most damning were 
the conclusions raised in a 2009 Centre for Operational Research and Analysis progress report on 
peacebuilding in Haiti which found that the ‘gang’ issue remained unresolved:  
While Haiti’s murder rate is thought to be well below that of many other countries in the 
region (there are no official statistics), gangs remain a serious problem, particularly in the 
slums of Port-au-Prince.34 
 
Aggregating the various groups within the urban slum areas not only criminalized all the 
groups so identified, it also led to the stigmatization of grass-roots security networks within the 
 
and the Haitian Information Project (www.haitiaction.net); James Cockayne, “The Futility of Force? Strategic 
Lessons for Dealing with Unconventional Armed Groups from the UN’s War on Haiti’s Gangs,” The Journal of 
Strategic Studies 37, no. 5 (2014): 736-739. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.901911.  
33 The most controversial and potentially most egregious example of the indiscriminate nature of engaging gangs 
within the urban slums was MINUSTAH’s July 2005 raid, dubbed Operation Iron Fist, into Cité Soleil, intended to 
kill or capture Dread Wilme, a local leader identified and labelled by the US and UN as a gang leader. The 
Brazilian-led assault saw MINUSTAH engaging indiscriminately using small arms, mortar, and aerial gun ships, 
with over 22,000 rounds fired into the suburb. The attack not only killed Wilme, but at least another 20 persons 
according, to Reuters reports, along with dozens wounded. Andrew Buncombe, “UN admits civilians may have died 
in Haiti peacekeeping raid,” The Independent, January 10 2006. www.independent.co.uk  
34 Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” 8. 
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various Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods.35 The security networks played a constructive role, in 
the aftermath of the 2004 coup not only to counter the actual criminal gangs involved in  
narcotics and kidnapping schemes, but to provide security from the ineffective and corrupt 
activities of the Haitian National Police.36 James Cockayne at the UN University recognized 
MINUSTAH’s mistake in 2014, noting that when “confronted by non-conventional non-state 
military forces enjoying high – but very localized – social legitimacy, MINUSTAH struggled to 
embed the use of force in a larger strategy of state consolidation.”37 In effect, the UN 
marginalized by labeling and then criminalizing groups established for self-defence, especially 
after the state and the UN had abdicated their responsibility for providing security. 
Economic Warfare 
I do not like the idea of forcible intervention on purely business grounds.38 
- US Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan 
 
In late 1931 and early 1932, the Senate Finance Committee investigated the extent to 
which the practices of investment bankers had contributed to the defaults. Charges 
against the bankers alleged that they had consistently failed to obtain accurate 
information about the ability of foreign governments to repay loans, disregarded prior 
records of poor repayment, ignored local political conditions, did not care whether or not 
loans would be used productively, and were consumed with the lure of quick profits.39 
- Professor of History William O. Walker III 
 
 
35 Peter Hallward, for example, identified one of the key grass-roots security organizations within the various Port-
au-Prince neighbourhoods as comités de vigilance which dated back to the Duvalier era and countered the worst 
excesses of the dictatorship. They were active during the UN occupation, confronting American elements of the 
Multinational Force (MNF) in Spring 2004 who entered areas under their control, as well as attempting to counter 
the actions of security services operating under the coup regime’s orders. See Hallward, Damning the Flood. 
36 In 2007, the US State Department identified the alleged participation of Haitian National Police in the following 
activities: “…unlawful killings and kidnappings; arbitrary arrest and detention; widespread violence and 
discrimination against women; child abuse, including the internal trafficking of children and the use of child 
domestic labour; and the ineffective enforcement of trade union organizing rights.” United States Department of 
State, “Haiti,” Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2007, March 11 2008 
(http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100643.htm). Cited in Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” 11. 
37 Cockayne, “The Futility of Force?” 737. 
38 William Jennings Bryan to President Woodrow Wilson, 1915. Cited in Jeffrey W. Sommers, “The US Power Elite 
and the Political Economy of Haiti's Occupation: Investment, Race, and World Order,” Journal of Haitian Studies 
21, no. 2, Special Issue on the US Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 (Fall 2015): 52.  
39 William O. Walker III, "Crucible for Peace: Herbert Hoover, Modernization, and Economic Growth in Latin 




 The second element of the core strategy undertaken by the West to deter fundamental 
change in Haitian development was recognizing that the West has waged economic warfare 
against Haiti ever since its founding.40 While Thomas Jefferson’s 1806 embargo may have stifled 
Haiti’s full commercial relations with international powers, it was Haiti’s indemnity to France in 
1825 that started Haiti down the road to ever greater foreign indebtedness and served to keep the 
new nation insolvent throughout its history. 
 Exploitation of Haiti by foreign lending reached new heights during the nineteenth 
century with the era of gunboat diplomacy.41 In addition to deploying gunboat diplomacy to 
ensure by force the payment of Haitian fiscal obligations, the West also employed force in 
violation of international law as well as Haitian domestic law. The previously cited HMS 
Bulldog affair was just one such incident of this. Coercive use of raw gunboat power, ostensibly 
a form of naval diplomacy, added further to Haiti’s economic woes. Over US $100 million was 
extorted by threats of violence perpetrated by France, Britain, Germany, and the United States. 
Even worse, the threats were directed at cities and towns rather than Haitian military targets. 
By the time of the Occupation, Haiti was basically bankrupt. American officials found 
the government of Haiti expending over three-quarters of its revenue to service its foreign debt 
with another 20 percent going to the police and army.42 During the Occupation, little change 
 
40 Generally, my use of the term economic warfare should be understood as economic measures deliberately 
undertaken by an adversary to undermine a nation’s economy by denying access to international markets or to 
required resources. It also includes measures forced on a nation that require it to re-shape its economic policy in a 
direction not in its national interest: that direction may be in pursuit of an adversary’s economic, political, or 
military aims.  
41 US Professor Paul Douglas pointed out that gunboat loans made by German merchants between 1911 and 1914 to 
finance the various revolutions were typically made with very high interest rates. He cites the example of one loan 
“at a rate of 48” meaning that for every US$48 loaned, the revolutionary leader was expected to repay US$100! 
Haiti as a nation was held responsible for the revolutionary loans made, whether repaid or not, and under the Marine 
occupation, the outstanding ‘internal loans’ interest was repaid in 1922. See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 46-7. 
42 Financial data in this section is taken from the US High Commissioner’s report. See BGen John H. Russell, 




occurred as most of the remaining revenues collected were diverted to support the office of the 
American Financial Adviser-General Receiver. 
Foreign loans to Haiti amounted to just over US$30 million in 1916. By 1929, General 
Russell, the American High Commissioner in Haiti, reported that his efforts to ensure Haiti 
serviced its foreign debt had resulted in Haitian debt being reduced to around US$18 million, this 
despite new loans to Haiti in 1922, 1923, and 1924.43 At the same time, Haitian government 
revenues began to shrink due to declining coffee revenues and the economic conditions leading 
to the Great Depression. Imports declined significantly during 1928 and 1929 as the High 
Commissioner moved to “effect economies in the various departments…. consistent with 
efficiency,” including reducing expenditures to a minimum.44 
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot provides a summary of the economic effects of the Occupation, 
emphasizing that “the tax burden on the peasantry and lower classes was heavier under the 
occupation than had been leveled during the nineteenth century.”45 As Mats Lundahl points out, 
President Hoover’s commission concluded that debt retirement had been undertaken too quickly, 
leaving Haiti woefully short of development funding.46 Ironically, while Haiti was paying off its 
 
43 Russell, 93. William Walker points out that President Hoover held the belief that “capital investment” had the 
power to “maintain economic stability,” that “the sound disbursement of capital was a prerequisite for peace, 
prosperity and security,” and accordingly, subscribed to a foreign policy which used Latin America as a “laboratory” 
in which to confirm his theories. The problem was that while he believed in government oversight on foreign loans, 
that concept came into conflict with his own “aversion” to greater state interference and led to only “nominal” loan 
supervision. As Walker points out, Hoover, in his memoirs, lamented the “dubious quality” of many of the 
American bankers peddling loans to Latin American leaders and, further, that their activities clearly showed they did 
not understand US foreign policy interests whatsoever. See William O. Walker III, “Crucible for Peace: Herbert 
Hoover, Modernization, and Economic Growth in Latin America,” Diplomatic History 30, no. 1 (January 2006): 83-
117. 
44 Russell, 80. Ironically, in the realm of public works, the construction of the new headquarters for the Garde 
d’Haiti was the largest public building project completed by the Americans. Most other public works spending was 
for vocational schools intended to shift Haitian education into the agricultural realm. Nor was the reform of the civil 
service or the judiciary ever undertaken, and in fact in both cases, it was placed on indefinite hold 
45 Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 103. 
46 Lundahl, Peasant and Poverty, 372. American control over the BNRH was also manipulated by the Occupation 
forces. For example, neither the 1910 nor the 1922 contracts put in place between the BNRH, controlled by 
American interests, and the Haitian government included any provision for interest payments on Haitian government 
deposits held in the bank. As US Professor Paul Douglas found out during his 1926 fact-finding visit, this was not an 
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foreign debt faster than needed, other Latin American nations had defaulted on their debts. Not 
only did Haiti not receive any debt relief, the marketplace also did not reward Haiti’s stellar debt 
repayment record with any interest rate relief.47 
One of the more significant effects of the Occupation, described under the umbrella of 
the centralization of power in Port-au-Prince, was the centralization of economic power in the 
capital by the Marines, which led to the removal of the “feeble [economic] restraints remaining 
from the nineteenth century” and spelled the collapse of regional economies.48 Trouillot points 
out that the centralization of economic power in Port-au-Prince “contributed to the growth of 
urban parasitic groups” within Haiti’s political sphere, each seeking to grab a piece of the action 
in the “state apparatus.”49  
Brian Weinstein and Aaron Segal argue similarly, pointing out that centralization of 
power in Port-au-Prince led to “differential customs policy making trade through Port-au-Prince 
cheaper than elsewhere.”50 The collapse of the regional economies was yet another nail in the 
coffin of Haitian development. With most of Haiti’s budget going to debt repayment anyway, 
 
issue until the Occupation authorities were able to generate a surplus of over US$4 million. As Douglas points out, 
the Haitian Ministers of Finance were under the “misapprehension…[that] the modern bank [was] analogous to a 
safety deposit vault…by keeping their assets liquid…” Douglas criticized American financial officials, noting that a 
“high standard of business ethics would….have led the bank to be unwilling to take advantage of the ignorance of 
the Haitians.” This did not occur. Douglas noted that the American Financial Adviser did eventually transfer around 
US$3 million in surplus Haitian government funds to the National City Bank in New York. Interest on the deposited 
funds accrued at the rate of 2.5 percent annually. However, the National City Bank’s commercial rates at the time 
were between 3 and 3.5 percent, meaning the New York bank was paying around US$80,000 less in interest 
payments annually than should have been available from commercial rates! See Balch, ed., Occupied Haiti, 49-51. 
47 Lundahl points out that Haiti was able to negotiate the payment of interest charges and token amortization 
payments to American bondholders in 1937 when the coffee market collapsed and destroyed Haiti’s main source of 
revenue. The period 1937-41 would be the only period that Haiti failed to make payments on its foreign debt. 
Lundahl, 372, 374. 
48 Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation, 102. 
49 Trouillot, 102, 104. 
50 They identified the nature of the road construction undertaken during the Occupation as favouring goods 
travelling to the capital over regional ports like St. Marc, Jérémie and Jacmel, making Port-au-Prince more 
convenient and less expensive to use as a port. See Weinstein and Segal, Haiti: Political Failures, Cultural 
Successes (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 29.  
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less than 20 percent of the national budget was allocated to public services like education and 
health care with most of those meager funds expended in the capital.51 
At the same time, the US remained the top exporter of products to Haiti, while, as an 
importer of Haitian goods, the US ranked well behind France, Great Britain, Denmark, Belgium 
and Italy.52 With the American declaration of war in 1917, the US pressured Haiti to imprison or 
deport German businessmen.53 The Americans also began to work actively to exclude Germans 
from Haiti’s economy, as in the case of persuading HASCO to move its financial operations 
from German banks to American ones instead. By September 1918, American diplomats were 
reporting that “a number of Germans [had been] interred and about 20 firms sequestrated.”54 By 
removing German economic competition, the US became the dominant player within Haiti’s 
commercial space.  
 The end of the Occupation did not bring an end to American control over Haiti’s 
economy. The US-appointed Financial Adviser-General Receiver remained in control of Haitian 
finances and fiscal policy, including the customs houses, until 1941, with his primary objective 
to ensure that Haiti met its foreign debt obligations, largely held by Americans. Continued US 
control over the Haitian economy would prove to be disastrous.  Problems in the 1930s, 
including the coffee market crash and boll weevil infestation in the cotton industry — and, in 
 
51 See, for example, Chapter 2 of Dorte Verner and Willy Egset, “Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti,” 
World Bank Country Study 40927 (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2007). 
52 Verner and Egset, “Social Resilience and State Fragility in Haiti,” 103. 
53 Haiti would declare war against Germany in July 1918. By the end of the war in November 1918, those Germans 
who either had been expelled or had their businesses sequestered wanted their property reinstated. The struggle by 
the Germans for restitution continued well into 1921. Russell commented on the German situation: “The Germans 
are doing all in their power to have the sequestered goods returned to them and it is even said that the Haitien 
Government, or at least one or two prominent members of it are working very hard to that end with the ultimate 
view of re-establishing the Germans in their former almost impregnable commercial position in Haiti.” Russell, 
“The Development of Haiti during the Last Fiscal Year,” 113. 
54 FRUS, 1918, Supplement 2, The World War, ed. Joseph V. Fuller (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1933), Document 124. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp02/d124.  
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1936, France’s rescinding of Haiti’s favorable tariff status — all led to the collapse of Haiti’s 
economy. By 1937, Haiti defaulted on its existing loans and was looking for new foreign loans. 
Despite President Dumarsais Estimé finally wiping out the interest from the 1825 French 
indemnity debt in 1947, Western forces continued to dominate Haiti’s economic future.55 
Predatory loans to Haiti after World War II put Haiti once more at the mercy of international 
lenders. 
 As noted in Chapter Seven, US economic assistance to Haiti began in 1941 with the 
US$4 million Export-Import Bank credit note to the SHADA Corporation.56 The risk represented 
by the credit note was offset by a cost-plus contract awarded to the SHADA agricultural 
development corporation, a trend which has continued into recent times.57 Later economic 
assistance was considered technical in nature, focusing on the education and the rural sectors, 
and was often in the form of payment for US experts to travel to Haiti and lecture before Haitian 
audiences. Emergency aid was granted to deal with several humanitarian disasters such as 
earthquakes and hurricanes.  More often, though, Haitian governments were offered new 
combinations of assistance loans and credits through small grants, with most of the money being 
funneled through the UN and various US-controlled entities such as the World Bank, the 
 
55 Mats Lundahl points out that while the indemnity loans were paid off during Lysius Salomon’s presidency, 
repayment consumed all of Haiti’s economic energy, forcing the administration back into the predatory world of 
foreign loans almost without pause. Hence, and notwithstanding the role played by Haitian government corruption, 
Haiti’s foreign indebtedness attributable to the 1825 French indemnity would not be wiped out until 1947. See 
Lundahl, Peasants and Poverty, 366-75. 
56 American economic assistance and foreign aid under discussion is official government to government assistance, 
rather than private aid. Private aid predates government assistance. Most private aid from the US (not including 
remittances) has originated from church organizations. See Simon M. Fass, Political Economy in Haiti: The Drama 
of Survival (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2004): 22. 
57 In return for allowing the import of materials necessary for export-bound clothing free of tariffs, US firms have 
provided guaranteed contracts for the purchase of the assembled clothing at set prices and quantities. 
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International Development Bank (IDB) and, less frequently as time progressed, the Export-
Import Bank.58 
 United States interests, economic and otherwise, dictated the disbursement of American 
foreign aid like that provided to SHADA. Between 1957 and 1963, the US provided US$60 
million in aid to François Duvalier in support of its foreign policy of containment. Duvalier’s 
stable anti-communist dictatorship was preferable to any socialist or communist alternatives 
likely to emerge if he was removed from power.59 Even when the US suspended aid to the 
regime from 1963 through to 1973, American money continued to flow into Haiti in the form of 
numerous small programs that supported US regional interests, resulting in about 70 percent of 
the government’s revenues coming from foreign aid.60 President Richard Nixon resumed aid to 
Haiti in 1973, in part because of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s pledge to reform, but mainly to counter-
balance Fidel Castro and his communist regime.  
Although the international community would turn the aid taps on and off whenever it 
suited its policies, it was unable to resolve two major problems tied to providing aid to Haiti. The 
first problem was the chronic corruption of Haitian governments, particularly those led by the 
Duvaliers. Corrupt practices including embezzlement by authoritarian and military regimes, 
coupled to predatory international lending practices, meant that the successor regimes inherited 
 
58 Note that the IMF considered Haiti fourth in their ranking of countries which had the lengthiest “Prolonged Use of 
Loans” index rating for the period from 1971 to 2000. See Terry F Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state 
building in Haiti under the Duvaliers, Aristide, Préval, and Martelly,” United Nations University, WIDER Working 
Paper No. 2013/104 (October 2013): 18. 
59 Note that many foreign investors also paid bribes to both Duvalier regimes to do business in Haiti and that some 
of the money may have been included in aid money totals. The figures for aid monies flowing into Haiti are 
extracted from Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state building in Haiti under the Duvaliers, Aristide, Préval, and 
Martelly.” 
60 Despite statements and legislation suspending aid to Haiti, it did not actually stop flowing into Haiti. Instead, aid 
was provided through two smaller programs: the national anti-malarial program and assorted small surplus food 
distribution programs. Buss, “Foreign Aid and the failure of state building in Haiti under the Duvaliers, Aristide, 
Préval, and Martelly.” 
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massive debts. The second problem was Haiti’s low absorption capability for foreign aid. Haiti 
was not able to properly exploit the aid monies it received. It had neither the bureaucratic 
expertise nor the economic capacity to implement large scale projects costing huge sums. 
Attempting to remediate both problems, the Kennedy administration directed most of its aid 
money to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rather than the Haitian government. This 
practice of using NGOs soon became the modus operandi of other donor nations including 
Canada. 
The issues caused by funneling aid through NGOs are now legendary.61 Two areas stand 
out. The first is that without any real accountability or transparency about how and where NGO 
resources including monies are being employed, the NGOs have become the de facto 
government in those sectors abandoned by the real government. Not only are host government 
sectors being supplanted by NGOs, the Haitian government has also abandoned specific sectors 
to NGOs because of a chronic lack of resources.  
The second issue is more troubling. NGOs are accountable to their foreign donors. This 
includes not only foreign NGOs linked to charities, but more so those NGOs which rely upon 
foreign governments for most of their funding. Often, that NGO funding from foreign 
governments is linked to specific foreign government policy expectations that are not in the 
interest of the Haitian majority. Further, NGO funding was linked to the international 
community’s draconian Structural Adjustment Program, or SAP. The impact of these two related 
issues are key instruments of the economic warfare the international community waged against 
Haiti since independence. 
 
 
61 For details, see, for example, Mark Schuller, “Gluing Globalization: NGOs as Intermediaries in Haiti,” PoLAR: 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 12, no. 1 (2009): 84-104. DOI: 10.1111/j.1555-2934.2009.01025.x. 
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Economic Warfare: Haiti and Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) 
 
The I.M.F. and the World Bank are the purveyors of the new orthodoxy. They come in to 
bail out a country that is bankrupt. They do so by drawing up a "structural adjustment 
program," a tight package of economic prescriptions designed to bring about free market 
enterprise and minimize governmental interference…Because the package is tied to 
millions of dollars in aid from Western donor countries, it is an offer that can't be refused. 
And so the I.M.F. and the bank end up calling the shots on a broad range of issues — 
even political matters like calling multiparty elections — that affect the lives of 
millions.62 
- The New York Times journalist John Darnton 
 
The employment of the SAP grew out of the Carter administration’s economic tactics 
initially aimed at its major trading partners like Japan and Germany, but later expanded to the 
developing world.63 The 1986 Tokyo Summit Conference issued an Economic Declaration based 
on the Reagan administration’s aim of ensuring that the financial collapse of the 1980s, brought 
about by a global economic downturn and a spike in US interest rates, did not lead to loan 
defaults by the developing nations.64  
The SAPs sought to re-orient developing nations’ economies towards ensuring the 
repayment of debt while creating an economic climate within the developing nation that was 
favourable to foreign investment and export market production. The SAPs were the quid pro quo 
for foreign aid and were overseen by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
 
62 John Darnton, “In Poor, Decolonized Africa, Bankers Are New Overlords,” New York Times, June 20, 1994. 
www.nytimes.com. 
63 The New York Times identified the approach as follows: “the United States is asking that its trading partners phase 
out subsidies to inefficient industries and accept the free play of world market forces. In time, the theory is, these 
changes should allow American businesses to take more advantage of the competitive edge the dollar's recent fall 
has given their products in foreign markets, increasing their export sales and narrowing the United States trade gap.” 
The idea was that markets would not be ‘shielded’ from market adjustments and would instead be open to more 
competitively produced goods from the US, for example. See Paul Lewis, “U.S. Seeks Partners’ Trade Help,” The 
New York Times, May 14, 1979. www.nytimes.com. 
64 The spike in US interest rates in 1979 brought into play by US Federal Reserve Chairman, Paul Volcker, was an 
internal US policy intended to curb runaway inflation. Unfortunately, because international loans to developing 
nations like Haiti were largely in US dollars, the so-called Volcker Shock also increased quite dramatically the cost 
of their borrowing, leading to default issues. 
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Bank (WB), both agencies largely controlled by the US.65 They were seen as opportunistic 
mechanisms by Reagan’s economic team:  
 
[T]o the U.S. Treasury staff…the debt crisis afforded an unparalleled opportunity to 
achieve, in the debtor countries, the structural reforms favored by the Reagan 
administration. The core of these reforms was a commitment on the part of the debtor 
countries to reduce the role of the public sector as a vehicle for economic and social 
development and rely more on market forces and private enterprise, domestic and 
foreign.66 
 
SAPs implemented in Haiti have been directly linked to the decline of Haiti’s domestic 
rice supply.67 Until the 1980s, the Haitian domestic foodstuffs industry was protected from the 
outside world with import tariffs as high, in some cases, as 150 percent. As an SAP adjunct, 
Haiti began dismantling its protectionist trade system around 1986-87, making it, by the 1990s 
according to the International Monetary Fund, “among the most open economies worldwide.”68 
Despite this, the IMF highlighted Haiti’s “slow pace of structural reforms in other crucial areas, 
 
65 Article 10 of the 1986 Tokyo Economic Declaration outlined the new relationship for debtor nations: “We 
reaffirm the continued importance of the case-by-case approach to international debt problems. We welcome the 
progress made in developing the cooperative debt strategy, in particular building on the United States initiative. The 
role of the international financial institutions, including the multilateral development banks, will continue to be 
central, and we welcome moves for closer cooperation among these institutions, and particularly between the I.M.F. 
and the World Bank. Sound adjustment programs will also need resumed commercial bank lending, flexibility in 
rescheduling debt and appropriate access to export credits.” See “SUMMIT IN TOKYO: THE CURTAIN COMES 
DOWN; TEXT OF ECONOMIC DECLARATION ISSUED AT END OF TOKYO SUMMIT CONFERENCE,” 
The New York Times, 7 May 1986. www.nytimes.com. 
66 Former Inter-American Development Bank official Jerome Levinson, cited in Doug Henwood, “Impeccable Logic 
Trade, Development and Free Markets in the Clinton Era,” Report on the Americas 26, no. 5 (May 1993): 25. DOI: 
10.1080/10714839.1993.11723044.  
67 Note that while SAPs were a major contributing factor to the decline of Haiti’s domestic rice industry, there were 
other factors which contributed as well. Mats Lundahl has credibly refuted the oft-cited narrative linking SAPs 
opening the Haitian economy and related reductions in import tariffs as being solely responsible for the destruction 
of the domestic Haitian rice industry. Instead, he states “To argue that the decline of Haitian agriculture began with 
the reduction of the rice tariff in the mid-1990s amounts to sheer ignorance of conditions in the countryside.”  
Instead, he claims rice tariffs were the result of population growth, coupled to rice shifting from a luxury item to a 
daily staple. Those tariffs, coupled to soil erosion and a falling domestic rice production, combined to make tariff 
reductions on foreign rice imports logical and necessary. See Mats Lundahl, “The Haitian Rice Tariff,” 
Iberoamericana. Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies XLIV, no. 1-2 (2014): 47-72. 
68 IMF Staff Country Report No. 01/41, Jan 2001, 41. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0104.pdf.  
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in particular the privatization of public enterprises” which the IMF then identified as “thereby 
depriving the population of some of the benefits of the liberal trade policy.”69  
The tariffs on imported rice were reduced in 1995, dropping from 50 percent to a mere 
three percent.70 Between 1998 and 2008, Haiti’s domestically produced rice declined from 47 
percent of Haiti’s total rice supply to 15 percent. By 2010, even US President Bill Clinton was 
apologizing for the American role in speeding up the destruction of Haiti’s domestic rice 
industry:  
Since 1981, the United States has followed a policy, until the last year or so when we 
started rethinking it, that we rich countries that produce a lot of food should sell it to poor 
countries and relieve them of the burden of producing their own food, so, thank 
goodness, they can leap directly into the industrial era. It has not worked. It may have 
been good for some of my farmers in Arkansas, but it has not worked. It was a mistake. It 
was a mistake that I was a party to. I am not pointing the finger at anybody. I did that. I 
have to live every day with the consequences of the lost capacity to produce a rice crop in 
Haiti to feed those people, because of what I did. Nobody else.71 
 
  At the same time that Haiti was being forced to open its economy, the US was heavily 
subsidizing its own rice farmers, according to Mats Lundahl, pointing to direct subsidies to US 
rice farmers amounting to roughly US$1 billion annually.72 Those subsidies allowed exported 
rice to be sold at a discount of around five percent, not a huge discount, but enough to attract 
Haitian consumers considering that rice consumption, formerly a foodstuff found mainly on the 
 
69 IMF Staff Country Report No. 01/41. President Aristide delayed as much as he could the sale of the nine state-
owned enterprises targeted by the IMF for privatization. The enterprises include the telephone company, the 
electrical company, the flour mill, the cement mill, the Port-au-Prince port facilities, the Port-au-Prince airport, two 
banks, and an animal feed firm. The IMF claimed the privatization philosophy was based on the following: “The 
point of selling state enterprises is to improve company efficiency and performance, and thereby make governments, 
consumers, employees and investors better off.” See Tatiana Wah, “Rethinking Privatization in Haiti: Implications 
from the Initial Experience,” Journal of Haitian Studies 3/4 (1997-1998): 15-29. 
70 Lundahl, “The Haitian Rice Tariff,” 48, note 4. 
71 Former U.S. President Bill Clinton, 1 April 2010 speech, recorded by Democracy Now!  
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/1/clinton_rice.  
72 Lundahl, “The Haitian Rice Tariff,” 53. 
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table of the wealthy, had been steadily increasing in Haiti from at least the mid-1990s.73 Whereas 
the early 1980s saw negligible amounts of imported rice, by the early 2000s, imported rice had 
risen to over 300,000 metric tons.74 For the US, Haiti is an important rice market: the USDA 
identified Haiti as the second or third largest market for US rice generally and the largest market 
globally for the US long-grained variants.75 
 SAPs ignored Haitian culture as well as Haiti’s specific societal circumstances, and 
instead sought to force policy reform focused on “privatization, deregulation and liberalization of 
goods and financial markets.”76 Ironically, Haiti’s financial market has been described as 
“informationally and operationally inefficient, illiquid, and volatile,” whereas the IMF and 
World Bank reforms require “liberalized and competitive financial markets.”77 
 Another area seriously damaged by SAPs was Haiti’s civil service. SAPs required Haiti 
to downsize its civil service, which was a ludicrous requirement given Haiti’s dysfunctional and 
all too small civil service. Camille Chalmers, President Aristide’s former Chief of Staff, claimed 
in a 1997 interview that Haiti’s civil service, at the time of the coup, numbered just shy of 48,000 
state employees, including those in education, health care and the police.78 The majority of those 
 
73 The USDA identified Haiti’s rice intake as beginning noticeable increases from 1986 onwards and tied the 
increased consumption to the opening of Haiti’s economy by the SAPs. See Nancy Cochrane, Nathan Childs and 
Stacey Rosen, “Haiti’s U.S. Rice Imports,” USDA Economic Research Service Report RCS-16A-01, February 
2016,1. 
74 Lundahl points out that a number of factors were responsible for the increased rice consumption (and therefore 
increased imported rice to make up the difference) including a population which nearly doubled between 1980 and 
2013, increasing from 5.7 million to over 10 million. See Lundahl, “The Haitian Rice Tariff,” 56. 
75 Choice of rice as a source of food was not just about cost. Ease of cooking and taste also entered into decisions 
regarding the choice of foreign rice over domestic. Haitians are reported to prefer American rice because of its 
cooking properties and have, for example, eschewed Vietnamese rice because of its taste and cooking texture, 
despite it being considerably cheaper than the American varieties sold in Haiti. See Cochrane, “Haiti’s U.S. Rice 
Imports,” 9. 
76 Eirin Mobekk and Spyros I. Spyrou, "Re‐evaluating IMF involvement in low‐income countries: the case of Haiti", 
International Journal of Social Economics 29, no.7 (2002): 531. 
77 Mobekk and Spyrou,” 531. 
78 Chalmers also headed up the Plateforme Haïtienne de Plaidoyer pour un Développement Alternatif or PAPDA, 
described as “un regroupement de mouvements sociaux et d’organisations de la société civile haïtienne qui travaille 
sur les politiques publiques par le biais de l’information, la formation, l’analyse critique et l’élaboration de 
propositions alternatives.” See “Haiti's Latest Coup: Structural Adjustment and the Struggle for Democracy. An 
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employees were located within the major cities, while the rural countryside and smaller urban 
centers had next to no government services or employees whatsoever.79 
 Chalmers also pointed out that SAPs had undermined Haitian sovereignty. During the 
Aristide administration prior to the 1991 coup, the government sought to implement policy 
according to the interests of the Haitian majority, but after the coup, Aristide’s policy was driven 
by the requirements of SAPs, representing international banking interests. The attempt by Prime 
Minister Claudette Werleigh to push for changes to the SAPs in 1995 saw an international 
response that was as swift as it was “brutal.” USAID specifically withheld funds allocated for 
food aid, causing a political crisis in Haiti. Other international agencies also followed suit by 
withholding aid previously committed.80 
 Chalmers further pointed out that SAPs were focused on the creation of a favourable 
business climate in Haiti for foreign investment, as well as to direct investment away from 
agricultural production and instead into the light assembly manufacturing sector.81 That sector 
produced negligible benefits for Haiti. In 1991, US$150 million worth of items were produced 
 
interview with Camille Chalmers,” The Multinational Monitor 18, no. 5 (May 1997): 20. https://search-ebscohost-
com.lib-ezproxy.concordia.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=9708045540&site=ehost-live&scope=site.  
79 One example of the undesired effects of downsizing the civil service was witnessed in the 2000 elections. Rural 
voters were required to have ID cards with photos: those were unavailable as there were not enough registration 
offices nor material to produce them. The areas mainly affected were the poor slum areas in the capital and the rural 
areas, supporting allegations that this was a deliberate tactic to undermine more progressive left-wing candidates 
from those areas. See Eirin Mobekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti,” Democratization 8, no. 3 (2001): 183. 
80 “Haiti's Latest Coup.”  
81 Marylynn Steckley and Yasmine Shamsie argue that “[t]he neoliberal restructuring of agriculture, which hinged 
on the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), was a final blow to Caribbean food systems. 
SAPs enforced state cut-backs, market and trade liberalisation, land privatisation and currency devaluation, with the 
reasoning that increased export revenues would service debt, that market liberalisation would enable the cheaper 
production and the global flows of goods, and that these would maximise productivity and reduce poverty and food 
security. Instead, neoliberal globalisation has entailed chronic declining terms of trade, de-peasantisation, greater 
rural poverty, increased unemployment, and an inability to diversify economically or agriculturally. Across the 
region food import dependence has worsened: from 1975 to 1989 food imports rose from 8% to 16% in Trinidad, 
from 11% to 40% in Guyana, and from 21% to 36% in Haiti. The Caribbean is now the most food-import dependent 
region in the world and most Caribbean nations have a food deficit. Haiti, for example, imports 60% of the food it 
needs, including as much as 80% of the rice it consumes.” See Marylynn Steckley and Yasmine Shamsie, 
“Manufacturing corporate landscapes: the case of agrarian displacement and food (in)security in Haiti,” Third World 
Quarterly 36, no. 1 (January 2015): 183-4. 
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for export, yet the cost of the materials imported for assembly into the final exported products 
cost US$134 million, meaning the sector generated less than US$20 million in profits. In 
Chambers’ opinion, the foreign ‘guidance’ that shifted investment into light assembly rather than 
agricultural production helped to create “the economic apartheid that we now have in Haiti.”82 
 
Economic Warfare: NGOs and Haiti 
 
NGOs give the impression that they are filling a vacuum created by a retreating state. 
And they are, but in a materially inconsequential way. Their real contribution is that they 
defuse political anger and dole out as aid and contribution what people ought to have by 
right. NGOs alter the public psyche. They turn people into dependent victims and blunt 
political resistance.83 
- Political activist and novelist Arundhati Roy 
 
 Closely related to SAPs was the locust-like rush of non-government organizations 
(NGOs) into Haiti such that by 2006, Haiti had been nicknamed the “Republic of NGOs.”84 
Because SAPs were recognized as affecting the poor of the target nations most severely, the 
World Bank and IMF had put additional aid into social development, the intent being to mitigate 
the social costs of SAPs while simultaneously seeking to strengthen societal resistance to 
authoritarianism.85 Because NGOs were involved in grassroots social programs in a fragile state 
like Haiti, and because they provided what amounted to replacement government services within 
an inexpensive framework, aid donors believed funding social development programs would 
peacefully bridge the SAP rollout period. 
 
82 “Haiti's Latest Coup.” 
83 Arundhati Roy, “The NGO-ization of resistance,” Invetig’Action, 25 July 2018, 
https://www.investigaction.net/en/the-ngo-ization-of-resistance/. Suzanna Arundhati Roy, a renowned Indian writer, 
was awarded the Man Booker Prize for fiction in 1997. 
84 The term ‘Republic of NGOs’ appears to have been coined initially by the Haitian poet and historian Robert 
Maguire, speaking at a 2006 US Institute of Peace meeting. That speaking engagement was summarized and 
published in 2008. See Robert Maguire “Toward the End of Poverty in Haiti,” USIPEACE BRIEFING, 1 December 
2008. www.usip.org. 
85 Mark Schuller, Killing with Kindness: Haiti, International Aid, and NGOs (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 2012), 24. 
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 For Haiti, the NGO explosion began with the resistance shown by the democratic election 
of non-US-supported candidates, beginning with Aristide. From 1990 onwards, most if not all of 
US aid money was directed to NGOs operating in Haiti rather than directly to the Haitian 
government, as had been the case, for example, with the Duvalier regimes.86 Aristide’s social 
reform program, announced prior to the 1991 coup, was not generally popular with the 
international community and the US specifically. It is therefore not surprising that American 
support for his return to the presidency was predicated on his agreement to the SAPs identified 
above. 
The NGO explosion and the shift in American policy (among others) to funnelling the 
majority of foreign aid through NGOs has another effect within the targeted country. Foreign aid 
is provided in one of three forms: direct money transfers, which have become rarer as time 
progresses, other than in the form of foreign loans; materials; and services.87 The cost of 
deploying troops on UN peacekeeping missions, for example, is included in foreign aid totals. 
Ironically and sickeningly, the 20,0000 rounds of ammunition used during the July 2005 assault 
on the neighbourhood of Cité Soleil by UNMISTAH troops would have been included in the 
foreign aid totals provided to Haiti! 
 
86 An extreme example of the domination of NGOs in receiving foreign aid was a 2012 UN report explaining that 
“[o]f the $2.4 billion in humanitarian funding [received in response to the 2010 earthquake], 34 percent was 
provided back to the donor’s own civil and military entities for disaster response, 28 percent was given to UN 
agencies and non-governmental agencies (NGOs) for specific UN projects, 26 percent was given to private 
contractors and other NGOs, 6 percent was provided as in-kind services to recipients, 5 percent to the international 
and national societies, 1 percent was provided to the government of Haiti, four tenths of one percent of the 
funds went to Haitian NGOs.”[emphasis added]. See Oliver Cunningham, “The Humanitarian Aid Regime in the 
Republic of NGOs: The Fallacy of ‘Building Back Better',” The Josef Korbel Journal of Advanced International 
Studies 4 (Summer 2012): 116-17. 
87 Direct money transfers involve government to government money transfers, rather than money being funnelled 
through foreign GOs or NGOs as has become the normal process for most Western foreign aid. Note that while 
remittances from the Haitian diaspora could be considered as a form of direct money transfer, they are excluded 
from the discussion at this point and instead this section focusses only on aid money from foreign governments like 




At the same time, most Western countries have tied their foreign aid to specific 
conditions, including a requirement to use those funds to procure goods and services only from 
the donor country.88 The Second World War US Marshall Plan and its benefits for the American 
post-war economy are typically cited as responsible for foreign aid policy becoming a major 
component of American foreign policy.89 Contrary to American Government practices in Haiti, 
the Marshall Plan included the following statement intended to guide the program development: 
It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further 
in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to 
recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the 
requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to 
give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would 
be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally 
a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the 
Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. [emphasis added] The role of 
this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of 
later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program 
should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.90  
 
The altruistic sentiment expressed in the Marshall Plan was noticeably absent from the 
NGO industry’s involvement in Haiti. Moreover, American foreign policy has embraced NGOs 
 
88 As of 2006, the US required about three-quarters of its foreign aid to be tied to American goods and services, 
while Canada required about 40 percent. For example, the 2000 Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) 
allowed Haitian assembled apparel to be imported into the US at lower-than-normal tariff rates, if the apparel was 
assembled or “knit-to-shape” using American materials. The 2006 Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through 
Partnership Encouragement Act (HOPE I) allowed for duty-free status on Haitian assembled goods and also 
loosened up on material sourcing requirements. See R. Riddell, “Does foreign aid really work?” Background paper 
to keynote address to the Australasian Aid and International Development Workshop, Canberra, February 2014, in 
Clair Apodaca, “Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, April 2017. 
www.oxfordre.com.  See also J.F. Hornbeck, “The Haitian Economy and the HOPE Act,” US Congressional Review 
Service (24 June 2010): 15-16. www.crs.gov.  
89 The Marshall Plan increased US exports into Europe, provided employment to American post-war workers and 
proved to be a great stimulus for the post-war economy. Likewise, tying modern foreign aid to the provision of 
donor country goods and services is intended to provide similar benefits, despite the effects on the targeted country’s 
economy. There are arguments that foreign aid pre-dates the Marshall Plan. See, for example, Daniel Markovits, 
Austin Strange and Dustin Tingley, “Foreign Aid and the Status Quo: Evidence from Pre-Marshall Plan Aid,” 2018.  
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/dtingley/files/foreignaidhistory.pdf.  




as an effective foreign policy tool. The US funnels its foreign aid almost exclusively through 
NGOs, allowing it considerable leverage over the organizations and making them an excellent 
tool for manipulating Haitian attempts at governing. The US has most recently used NGOs to 
gain influence within the left-wing sphere of Haiti’s political world, an exclusive community 
with which it is normally excluded from direct interaction. 
But the US has targeted both right-wing opposition groups as well as those on the left 
through the funding of NGOs affiliated with both sides of the political spectrum.91 At first 
glance, spreading foreign aid across the political spectrum gives the appearance of supporting the 
establishment of democracy. Funding NGOs across the political divide also allows all factions in 
theory to have a voice in the future of Haitian governance and to participate in the election 
process. In practice, however, the American government’s intent was to marginalize the left-
wing voice and reduce the influence of its messiah, Aristide. Not surprisingly, funding of the 
left-wing has proven very selective and has been identified by Amy Wilentz as a tactic employed 
by the US to create divisions within the left-wing.92 
In the period following the ouster of Jean-Claude Duvalier in 1986, the left-wing Lavalas 
popular movement, which was largely responsible for the end of the Duvalier presidency, 
attracted the support of the moderate middle-class elements within Haitian society. At the same 
time, elements of the middle-class were becoming more dependent upon NGOs for their 
 
91 This division of a fragile nation’s political understanding into either left or right leaning is a Western construct 
and reflects its bias and lack of understanding when dealing with nations like Haiti. 
92 Hallward, Damming the Flood, 57-8. Farmer cites Amy Wilentz who claimed USAID’s approach to Haiti and 
Aristide was “specifically designed to fund those sectors of the Haitian political spectrum where opposition to the 
Aristide government could be encouraged.” Farmer points out the USAID operation in Haiti was remarkably similar 
to those which were undertaken in Nicaragua after Somoza’s overthrow, the intent there being to suppress a similar 
worker-peasant left-wing movement led by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, or FSLN. Farmer, The 
Uses of Haiti, 144. 
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employment and improvement of their well-being.93 The US saw this as a vulnerability and 
decided to exploit it to reduce Aristide’s hold on power by enforcing the SAP.  
The tactic employed was quite simple. USAID told those NGOs that did not support 
structural adjustments that they would be defunded. Clearly, those Haitians who were involved 
in an NGO that did not support the SAP for Haiti would lose their employment.94 The US 
specifically targeted those of the Haitian “donor-dependent class” to create a rift within the 
Lavalas movement, using structural adjustments as the mechanism.95 The American plan worked 
with a rift quickly emerging. The coercive tactic contributed to the desired split within the 
Lavalas movement in 1995. 
Peter Hallward identified the Lavalas split as centered on the neo-liberal demands of the 
SAP (also known as the Paris Plan) of August 1994, which returned Aristide to power in 
exchange for acceptance of the IMF and World Banks’s SAP.96 Elements within the Lavalas 
movement viewed compliance with the SAP as a means of continuing to receive foreign aid 
which they considered essential to Haiti’s economy. Yet Aristide viewed the SAP demands as 
 
93 Mark Schuller points out NGOs provide one-third of all jobs within Haiti’s formal economy, creating what he 
identified as a “klas ONG” [NGO class]. They are also responsible for regular poaching of well-trained professionals 
from the public sector. Christian Vannier examines those members of this middle class who “engage local [rural] 
populations on behalf of international aid and development organizations [NGOs].” He identifies these “indigenous 
professional development workers” as an important interface for the peasant to re-engage with “global governance 
institutions.” See Schuller, "Gluing Globalization," 90-2; and Christian Neil Vannier, “Indigenous Professional 
Development Workers in Haiti,” Michigan Academician 41 (2013): 332-54. 
94 While the Haitian cohort that benefited from working for an NGO included many Haitians with professional and 
advanced education, NGO employment also linked a number of other Haitians providing support services who were 
likewise vulnerable to NGO funding manipulations. Mark Schuller highlights one such individual, Jean-Baptiste, 
who was employed by an NGO as a chauffeur. See Schuller, "Gluing Globalization,” 92. 
95 Schuller, 93. The split accomplished two goals. The first was to create divisions within the peasant movement that 
would sow uncertainty as to Aristide’s mandate and support base. The second was to allow the creation of doubt 
regarding Aristide’s legitimacy by pointing to this left-wing opposition seemingly from within his core base of 
support.  
96 Hallward, 55-7. Hallward outlines that the devil is in the detail regarding the Paris Plan. Many of the terms of the 
SAP were intended to be implemented gradually. For example, voluntary reductions in personnel coupled to 
generous severance packages was called for within the fine print. Selling off of the state-owned industries was to “be 
implemented in a way that will prevent increased concentration of wealth within the country…[by] transfer[ing] part 
of the ownership to traditionally excluded segments of society…”  
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restricting his freedom of action economically and adopted a pragmatic approach that conceded 
that while compliance with the SAP may have been necessary for continued receipt of foreign 
aid, the program was to be fought through “a combination of compliance and compensation.”97  
That difference in philosophies led Aristide to form his own political party, known as 
Fanmi Lavalas or FL, in 1995 with the majority of the Lavalas. The remaining Lavalas members 
in favour of SAP compliance created their own party under the banner of Organization politique 
Lavalas, or OPL.98 The American administration exploited the rift, using it as an opportunity to 
withhold the further distribution of aid monies, arguing the privatization plan had stalled as a 
result.99 This began what journalist Jane Regan argued was “a more permanent, less reversible 
invasion” by USAID and its supported NGOs.100 The administration of OPL president, René 
Préval, would receive over US$1.8 billion in foreign aid from the US during the fiscal years 
1995 to 1999, but the vast majority of that money flowed into Haiti through NGOs rather than 
through the Préval government ministries.101  
Worse, the split allowed the US to divert the conversation away from democratic 
development and instead manufactured a conversation about Aristide and his resemblance to the 
 
97 Hallward. 
98 In 2003, well after the Lavalas split, Peter Daily wrote that Aristide and his OPL brethren were responsible for 
retarding the development of democracy in Haiti: “The principal indictment against Aristide’s supporters was that 
by promoting a personality cult they were severely undermining attempts to consolidate and institutionalize Haiti’s 
fragile democracy and to establish the concepts of pluralism and power-sharing integral to a modern political 
system.” See Peter Daily, “Haiti: The Fall of the House of Aristide,” The New York Review of Books, March 12, 
2003, www.nybooks.com.  
99 Hallward, 58. Hallward claims that when Aristide dragged his heels on the sale of state-owned companies and 
threatened to jail any official who worked to facilitate the sale, the Americans promptly suspended foreign aid 
transfers to Haiti.  
100 Cited in Hallward, 60. See also Schuller, Killing with Kindness, 22-23. This also echoes Nikolas Barry-Shaw and 
Dru Oja Jay who wrote that “NGO funding fragmented the popular movement along class lines, co-opting many of 
the middle-class activists and intellectuals while marginalizing most of Haiti’s poor and their popular 
organizations.” Nikolas Barry-Shaw and Dru Oja Jay, Paved with Good Intentions: Canada’s development NGOs 
from idealism to imperialism (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2012), 120-25. 
101 Schuller, Killing with Kindness, 22. 
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dictator, François Duvalier.102 For example, during a media interview, Leslie M Alexander, the 
American Deputy Chief of Mission in Port-au-Prince from 1991 to 1993, implicitly identified 
Aristide’s behaviour as Duvalierist in orientation: 
After months and months and months of provocations, of inflammatory speeches, no 
puns intended, of actions that suggested that he [Aristide] was moving in an anti-
democratic direction, taking on or using the Duvalier’s playbook, creating his own 
personal gang of thugs, his political opposition, the military and the elites, began to 
become increasingly concerned about where this was going to end up if unchecked.103 
 
In the same interview, Alexander also spoke about the national interests of the Untied 
States and its civilizing mission, stating:  
We in the embassy, in the meantime, were caught in this nasty Washington game of 
“what do we do?” On the one hand everything we knew about Aristide, from every 
source – from intelligence we gathered, from conversations, from his own speeches – 
indicated that he was not a good president and that his policies were not going to be 
beneficial to us. It wasn’t in our national interest to have this man as the president of 
Haiti. Yet on the other hand we had others, and I think legitimately so, saying, be that as 
it may, this man was democratically elected, and we have to support the principle of 
democracy. This was our policy dilemma and I’m sure Haiti was not the first, nor the last 
country where we had this problem. How do you support a person who was 





102 The authoritarian comparison has likewise infiltrated academic circles. Henry F. Carey, for example, identified 
“Sultanism” as a shared characteristic of the Duvalier and Artistide “regimes,” creating an intrinsic link between the 
two. Robert Fatton Jr. similarly argues that Aristide and Duvalier are linked albeit by the inevitability of 
authoritarian habitus (see the next footnote for explanation). See Henry F. Carey, “The Third U.S. Intervention and 
Haiti’s Paramilitary Predicament,” Journal of Haitian Studies 11, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 108; and Fatton, The Roots of 
Haitian Despotism. 
103 “The Overthrow of Haiti’s Aristide,” Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History, Association for Diplomatic Studies 
and Training, https://adst.org/2016/11/overthrow-haitis-aristide/. Alexander’s comments on Aristide can be 
understood as providing affirmation of Robert Fatton’s concept of Haiti and Aristide being under the influence of 
“authoritarian habitus.” Yet even his infamous September 27, 1991, “Père Lebrun” speech contains a warning to the 
“bourgeoisie in Haiti” that, structurally, Haiti must change. While Aristide calls for peaceful change, his speech 
indicates his unwillingness to wait forever. Further, he was well aware that the rule of law in Haiti was being 
undermined and ignored by the commercial and political elite, which, from a political philosophy perspective, raises 
the question about the morality of employing law-making violence. Given foreign interference in his rule, it is 
remarkable that Aristide was as restrained as he was, working under the near impossible standards to which he was 
being held, which in itself is a regularized tactic employed to de-legitimize revolutionaries. For authoritarian 
habitus, see Fatton, The Roots of Haitian Despotism, viii-x. A English translation of Aristide’s “Pere Lebrun” speech 
can be found at http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/43a/009.html.  
104 “The Overthrow of Haiti’s Aristide,” Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History.  
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Yet rather than allowing a conversation on the difficulties in transitioning to democracy 
and away from the large-scale and often horrifying human rights abuses and killings under the 
former dictatorships, the US Embassy steered the conversation towards human rights violations 
and violence under Aristide’s 1991 administration.105 Opposition from both left and right-wing 
elements allowed Aristide’s party to be portrayed as lacking legitimacy based on its failure to 
swiftly resolve Haiti’s problems. That in turn, legitimized the foreign community’s view of his 
removal from power and eventual exile. By 2001, reporting had shifted from the false narrative 
of Aristide being mentally unstable and instead now identified Aristide as being linked to the so-
called Chimères para-military groups. The new narrative claimed the Chimères were created by 
Aristide to eliminate his political enemies, including hostile members of the media106 
The information campaign employed against Aristide reached full maturity by 2004, 
culminating in Aristide’s removal by the US, assisted by its Canadian and French allies. Even as 
armed opposition groups marching on the capital and laying waste to the towns as they 
proceeded, the discussion within international circles revolved around how quickly Aristide 
could be forced to depart Haiti.107 Key to the success of the information campaign was control of 
 
105 Philippe Girard, for example, argued Aristide had begun encouraging his political allies to form “popular gangs” 
as a counter to the military. Girard believes the gangs were intended to function as Aristide’s private army, or more 
likely, as a presidential guard, a move he equated with Francois Duvalier’s creation of his own loyal force, the 
Makoutes. Media reporting likewise picked up on the narrative that Aristide was depicted in CIA briefings as both 
psychotic and a psychopathic, a “mentally unstable leader who fomented mob violence against those who opposed 
him.” Those reports would later be branded as false. Jeb Sprague confirms that Aristide did indeed begin the work to 
create a presidential guard, but notes that the work was through Swiss police trainers to create a US “Secret Service-
style force” for Aristide’s close protection. Attacks against Aristide claiming he was creating military forces loyal to 
him personally continued throughout his presidential administrations. See Chapter 11 of Girard, Haiti; and Sprague, 
Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 55-6. For the CIA reporting and debunking, see Catherine S. 
Manegold, “Innocent Abroad: Jean-Bertrand Aristide,” The New York Times, May 1, 1994, www.nytimes.com. 
106 Even accepting Aristide and the Chimeres were aligned, Peter Hallward placed the alleged human rights abuses 
linked to Aristide and the Chimeres in context, pointing out that at most, 30 political killings could be laid at 
Aristide’s feet through possible links to the Famni Lavalas. See Chapters 6 of Girard, Haiti; and Hallward, Damning 
the Flood, 155-6. 
107 Jeb Sprague provides an excellent overview of the West’s activities in the creation of the “Civil Society 
Initiative” or ISC, a Haitian “oppositionist civil society front,” which worked to provide coherence and organization 
to the various and diverse opposition groups in Haiti. Funded largely by the US State Department through proxies, 
the ISC would help establish the “Group of 184,” a Haitian coalition of business and commercial interests that 
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the media in Haiti. By 2003, Peter Hallward points out that the Group of 184, a Haitian coalition 
of business and commercial interests united in opposition to Aristide’s continued rule, controlled 
most of Haiti’s independent media including radio and newspapers.108 
Even Aristide’s removal in 2004 was carefully orchestrated by the Group of 184 and its 
international supporters. The oppositional information campaign ruthlessly exploited the 
symbology of historic Haitian coups, ensuring that photo coverage of Aristide appeared to show 
a willing president leaving Haiti for exile, in advance of the armed groups advancing from the 
north on the capital and laying waste to the towns as they proceeded. As in the past, Western 
governments would then step in to halt the pillaging armies and re-establish the conditions for 
the status quo in Haiti. The key to this historical re-enactment was American money for those 
parties who played a part in regime change. In the end, and in addition to obstructing Haitian 
democratic development, SAPs and NGOs became the means by which the West waged 
economic warfare against Haiti while the information campaign conducted against Aristide 
became the ways through which Haitian democracy was tragically undermined.109 
 
represented themselves as a peaceful, democratic alternative to Aristide. See Chapter 5 of Sprague, Paramilitarism 
and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti. See also Hallward, Damning the Flood, 101-3, 106-8. 
108 Hallward, 108-9. As Hallward points out, the campaign by “the bitterly partisan” National Association of Haitian 
Media or ANMH had begun prior to Aristide’s re-election in 2000, the aim being to not only “demonize Famni 
Lavalas” but also to give the appearance of a larger and stronger opposition than reality. 
109 NGOs and SAPs created what grassroots Haitians have termed “second-hand democracy or pèpè democracy.” 
There are two reasons behind this judgment. First, despite democratic free and fair elections, NGOs established 
sovereignty over entire sectors of Haitian society which have been abandoned by a government unable or unwilling 
to service. Examples abound including the failure to provide a funded and resourced education system within rural 
Haiti. Much of the work done by NGOs is imposed on the population, without their consent or knowledge. 
Anthropologist Timothy Schwartz provides a vivid and personal account of his work with various NGOs which 
illustrate the lack of accountability. He identifies a major part of the NGO problem as the top-down approach they 
adopt, which leads to a lack of understanding about local needs or grievances and consequently leads to a lock of 
local interest or ownership. In the most extreme, he points to the NGOs losing control over their people, resulting in 
corruption and a complete lack of accountability. Second, the imposition of SAPs was partially responsible for 
creating the conditions leading to the coup against Aristide in 2004. By 2002, the damage from the SAPs including 
the significant downsizing of the Haitian civil service in 2000 and wage freezes were significantly undermining the 
grassroots support for Aristide and FL. As early as 2001, the impact of subsidized American rice imports was 
beginning to draw sharp criticisms from pro-Aristide peasant groups including Tet Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen. For all 
intents and purposes, Haiti was bankrupt under Aristide. The US suspended US$650 million of aid because of 
opposition complaints about irregularities with the 2000 elections. Overall, however, support for Aristide remained 
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 While the question of how democratic Aristide’s rule was at this stage can and should be 
examined, the question is immaterial to understanding the effects of Western interference in 
Haitian domestic politics. Whether or not Aristide was indeed turning to increasingly autocratic 
means to rule Haiti including the use of the Cité Soleil masses to demonstrate in support of his 
administration, does not de-legitimize his term as president. What it does raise are questions 
about which mechanisms are necessary and can be adopted in Haiti to curb and limit such 
autocratic tendencies in the future. Democratic governments ideally include checks and balances 
which are decided upon by their citizenry and enshrined in their legislation.  
A host of Haitians, largely from the political and commercial elite, supported Aristide’s 
removal from power because of the threat he represented to the structural integrity of the 
predatory system then in place. Yet their support did not make his removal either legal or 
morally right.110 And the support and involvement of the foreign community during the 2004 
coup clearly amounted to a flagrant violation of international law. International interference in 
Haiti at this critical juncture, in fact, undermined democratic governance more than the violent 
actions of radical and violent domestic opposition groups. 
 Democracy in fragile states like Haiti is largely embodied in the rule of law as exercised 
through free and fair elections. Yet, despite claiming to be building democracy in Haiti, Western 
 
extremely high. However, the effects of the SAPs emboldened the opposition and in 2003, paramilitaries began 
launching armed attacks on various police stations. By April 2003, when the austerity measures implemented to deal 
with SAPs were causing serious damage to Haitians, Aristide raised the question of reparations from France in the 
amount of some US$21 billion as reimbursement for the 1825 indemnity (plus interest). By February 2004, 
Aristide’s fate was sealed when he was removed from Haiti and taken into exile. See Eirin Mobekk, “Enforcement 
of Democracy in Haiti,” 180; Timothy Schwartz, Travesty in Haiti: A true account of Christian missions, 
orphanages, food aid, fraud and drug trafficking, 2nd ed. (North Carolina, SC: BookSurge Publishing, 2010); Jane 
Powell Leadbeater, “Structural Adjustment Programs: Mortgaging Haitian Sovereignty,” Undercurrent Journal 6, 
no. 2 (2009): 48-55; Hallward, Damning the Flood, 152, 226-7; and Podur, Haiti’s New Dictatorship, 25. 
110 Aristide was subject to legitimate opposition from politically active middle-class rivals, who were upset with his 
preferred strategy and were more willing to make accommodations through negotiations to change the predatory 
system, rather than revolution as appeared to be Aristide’s preferred route to change. The previously discussed 
divisions within his supporters over the role of foreign aid, for example, was one such example. It is critical to note, 
however, that such opposition does not legitimize the illegal removal of Aristide from his office as president. 
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activities aimed at regime change demonstrate a willingness to abandon democracy when it no 
longer suits Western interests. Haiti ceased to be a democratic state when Aristide was removed 
illegally from power through gross interference on the part of the US, France, and Canada as the 
main perpetrators of the unrest which resulted in his exile.  
Setting aside the hands-on role played by the West in orchestrating the 2004 coup, there 
remains an unanswered question on Haiti. How are Haitians to deal with leaders who are 
demagogues, employing authoritarian means to hold onto power, without having to worry about 
the international community interfering whenever it wishes? Once again, Haiti has not been 
allowed, like every other ‘normal’ nation, to govern itself. In the eyes of the West, and for those 
Haitians who are striving for democratic constitutionalism and the rule of law, Haitian 
sovereignty remains illusory. 
Missed Opportunities: Development of a Civil Service 
 
Time alone will tell whether what the Commission has done in the way of restoring the 
legislative branch of the government and what we have recommended in the way of 
accelerated "Haitianization" of the public services will redound to the good of the greatest 
number of Haitians and to the ultimate benefit of the country. The foundations of 
democratic and truly representative government do not now exist in Haiti. It will be a 
long time before they can be created. Once the guiding hand of the United States is 
withdrawn, I believe the "Haitianization" of Haiti will be accelerated. It may be that  
twenty years was all too short a time for the task of regeneration and the establishment 
there of stable government on a lasting basis.111 
- American Diplomat Henry Prather Fletcher 
 
The third element of the core strategy undertaken by the West to deter fundamental 
change in Haitian development is the failure of the international community to seize 
opportunities to create a merit-based civil service with the capacity, competency and capabilities 
 
111 In February 1930, a Presidential Commission was created by President Hoover and dispatched to Haiti to study 
the conditions of the occupation and report on the best means by which the US could extract itself from Haiti. 
Fletcher, a lawyer by trade and former diplomat, was appointed to the Commission and subsequently wrote about his 
experiences while in Haiti on Hoover’s mission. See Fletcher, “Quo Vadis, Haiti?” 533-548. 
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required to provide effective governance and services to the Haitian majority.112 When the 
international community intervened in Haiti and engaged in state-building aimed at developing 
specific sectors within Haiti, those efforts were largely undertaken to shape Haitian society for 
the benefit of the intervening nation and have largely failed. This discussion focuses upon the 
missed opportunities which arose when intervening nations could have developed Haiti’s civil 
service and chose not to, or worse, chose to shape the civil service in ways which harmed or 
were unsuitable to Haiti. 
After achieving independence, Haiti saw the development of a coterie of military leaders 
who cooperated in the defence of the nation, but competed with each other for favour and for 
promotion. The civilian bureaucracies which developed to support the military leaders and their 
strategies incorporated friends and allies, and took the form of what Max Weber would have 
understood in his definition of “a totalitarian organization resulting from the institutionalization 
of charisma in a bureaucratic direction,” which saw bureaucracy as “an end in itself.”113 In other 
words, the bureaucracies that developed were loyal and responsive to the leader rather than the 
nation-state. The leader’s will and direction could override principles such as fairness, human 
rights, and the public good. Sociologist Helen Constas amplified that idea, stating that the 
charismatic or traditional bureaucracies which developed in support of the military leaders are 
 
112 By civil service, I am referring to those public servants responsible for providing public goods and services in a 
variety of sectors, including the security (military, police, judiciary and penal), education, infrastructure, public 
transit, health care and government sectors. 
113 Weber understood legitimacy to be based on one of three foundations: the legal-rational basis under which 
normative rules identified the right to govern and issue commands based on a rules-based order; traditional 
legitimacy, based on customs or beliefs, usually within a hereditary and authoritarian system of governance; and 
legitimacy based on charisma, which “rests on the devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity or heroism of an 
individual person and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.” Weber saw an inevitable 
progression from traditional or charisma-based legitimacy, to the legal-rational model, and with that progression, the 
professionalization of the staff managing or administering government departments as part of a bureaucracy. 
However, as Helen Constas points out, that progression was not obvious and if legitimacy was based on the 
charismatic model, the resulting charismatic bureaucracy would not be rational, meaning that evolution into the 
legal-rational model would not happen without revolution. See Helen Constas, “Max Weber's Two Conceptions of 
Bureaucracy,” American Journal of Sociology 63, no. 4 (Jan. 1958): 401. 
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“basically totalitarian structures and ends unto themselves, and therefore incapable of 
responsibility to anything outside themselves (except under duress).” She believed that “[o]nly if 
a bureaucracy is rooted in a legal-rational order can it remain entirely a technical instrument and, 
hence, a responsible bureaucracy.”114 
 With the Marine Occupation came a putative opportunity to create a legal-rational 
bureaucracy. Yet Marine officials opposed such development throughout almost the entirety of 
the Occupation, begrudgingly allowing that development only late in the Occupation and only 
after drawing considerable and negative attention from Washington. Dantès Bellegarde pointed 
out his own experience, having been brought into President Dartiguenave’s administration in 
1918 as Minister of agriculture and public education. He recounted that “[c]e cabinet entra en 
fonction le 24 juin 1918, et tout de suite il se trouva en butte à la plus farouche hostilité des 
autorités américaines.”115  
 As Minister, Dantès Bellegarde also sought to implement “une Caisse autonome de 
l'Agriculture” based on what was termed additional, light taxation. The program was based on 
“l'organisation du petit et du moyen crédit rural,” the intent being to provide the funds necessary 
for 
la construction des routes, chemins et sentiers, pour les travaux d'arrosage, de drainage et 
d'assèchement, pour l'achat et la fourniture à bon marché aux paysans d'outils, machines 
et appareils perfectionnés, pour le développement et la conservation du bétail, pour la 
constitution ou la restauration des forêts domaniales, pour la lutte contre les animaux 
nuisibles et les maladies cryptogamiques, etc.116 
 
114 Constas, “Max Weber's Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy,” 400-409. 
115 Bellegarde proposed a fundamental overhaul of Haitian agriculture, to include the creation of a national 
economic council to oversee agriculture at the national level but informed by local “sections rurales.” Agricultural 
education was to be achieved through a combination “des professeurs-inspecteurs d'agriculture départementaux 
(agronomes diplômés haïtiens ou étrangers) et communaux (ceux-ci formés en Haïti).” His proposal was presented 
to the US Legation for approval, but two years later, President Dartiguenave messaged President Harding to 
complain that no response had been made to a proposal he considered “la plus grande importance pour l'agriculture 
haïtienne.” See Bellegarde, La résistance haïtienne, 58-64. 




As with his earlier education proposal, the project was likewise denied funding and 
ignored. Unlike the earlier project, Bellegarde believed this project would not only have 
contributed to Haitian growth and prosperity, but more importantly, “elle aurait empêché la 
guerre de destruction et de massacre qui désola les régions du Nord et du Plateau Central et 
causa la mort de plus de 3.000 Haïtiens.”117 
Even as late as 1930, domestic Haitian bureaucratic development had not taken place. 
The American diplomat Henry Fletcher, part of the 1930 American Presidential Commission 
looking into the conditions in Haiti and whether the Marines could be withdrawn, observed that:  
The lack of foresight as far as "Haitianization" is concerned is more conspicuous in 
regard to the Garde than any other service. The policy of the Marine Corps in this respect 
is, in my opinion, open to criticism. After fourteen years only five Haitians have attained 
the rank of captain in the Garde, and the treaty has only six more years to run. We found 
that the Marine Corps – which is in actual control of the Garde through its commandant, 
always a marine officer - had, with or without good reason, filled up all the higher grades 
from its own commissioned personnel. Most of the lower grades are filled with its non-
commissioned officers, all of whom have rendered excellent service, some for as much as 
fourteen years. None of the latter have ever been promoted above the grade of captain. 
The result has been that a dam has been erected which holds back the American non-
commissioned officers at the grade of captain and consequently holds back the Haitian 
lieutenants as well. There may be some satisfactory explanation of this but, if so, I never 
heard it. It must be corrected before any real progress toward "Haitianization" of the 
Garde can be made.118 
 
 Indeed, even John Russell, former Commandant of the Marine Brigade and High 
Commissioner in Haiti, testified before the Commission that “a long-range program designed to 
build a middle class and thus bridge the gap between the ‘elite’ and the masses should be 
adopted….[a task which] would take years.”119 He felt that Haitians would likely be ready by 
 
117 Bellegarde, 65. 
118 Fletcher was speaking specifically about the Garde, but his comments were equally applicable to government 
services generally. Fletcher, “Quo Vadis, Haiti?” 547. 
119 Magdaline W. Shannon, “The U. S. Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in Haiti and Its 
Relationship to President Hoover's Latin American Policy,” Caribbean Studies 15, no. 4 (Jan. 1976): 63. 
320 
 
1936 at the earliest to take over positions of responsibility within the Haitian bureaucracy, the 
sole exception being the role and department of the General Receiver which he saw as needing to 
remain under American control.120 Ironically, however, much of the Commission’s time in Haiti 
was devoted to resolving the political impasse over the holding of elections.  
In the end, Haitianization would be completed two years earlier than projected. By 1934, 
Haiti had control over its bureaucracy including the Garde’s functions, but was still shut out of 
owning its fiscal and economic policy by virtue of the American retention of the Receiver 
General’s office until 1941. Given the criticality of Haiti being able to determine its own 
economic policies, American control would continue to retard the creation of a professional civil 
service. 
In the period between the Marine Occupation and the first Duvalier regime, the civil 
service saw little to no reform, save that begun by Dumarsais Estimé, who sought to make the 
service more representative of Haitian society through the inclusion of more middle- and lower-
class blacks.121 However, with the election of François Duvalier as president in 1957, the civil 
service returned to a charisma-based model, and it evolved into a traditional legitimacy model 
that would eventually embody and promote Duvalier’s politically racialist ideology.122  
 
120 The Hoover Commission would adopt this as one of its recommendations, namely “Rapid Haitianization of the 
services by 1936” and “Selection of racially unbiased employees for the Haitian service.” Hoover would accept the 
recommendations regarding Haitianization without change. Russell, when informed, saw the rapid process as 
leading to the appointment of “incompetent” Haitians. Shannon, “The U. S. Commission for the Study and Review 
of Conditions in Haiti and Its Relationship to President Hoover's Latin American Policy,” 66. 
121 Stenio Vincent and Élie Lescot, who preceded Estimé, sought to bend the civil service, such as it was, to their 
interests, as did Paul Magloire who followed Estimé. Of the rest, Joseph Pierre-Louis, Franck Sylvain and Daniel 
Fignolé were not in power long enough to have a significant impact on the civil service. 
122 Here, I am seizing on the excellent work and analysis of Anselme Remy who defines the Duvalier phenomenon 
as “a racialist ideology in which the basic problem of the society was explained as the natural historical opposition 
of blacks to mulattoes, an antagonistic situation which would only be solved when a black man seized power and a 
black bourgeoise evolved to replace the mulatto bourgeoisie.” Remy points to Duvalier as representative of “an 
ambitious middle class.” See Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 38-65. 
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The civil service operating in support of Duvalier was forced to confront the realities of a 
state without economic promise. As Anselme Remy points out, economic realities forced 
Duvalier to resort to a policy that returned Haiti to begging for foreign aid. For the civil service, 
this meant developing plans that offered up concessions to the US government as incentives to 
attract foreign aid, including, for example, providing the US with a naval base to replace 
Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, as well as significant mining and oil prospecting concessions. 
The United States, however, rejected the incentives that Haiti offered and did not provide 
the desired aid. Moreover, the Kennedy administration changed its foreign policy and began 
actively seeking regime change in Haiti, forcing Duvalier to change his own foreign policy in 
response. By 1963, Duvalier had moved away from actively seeking foreign aid, instead stating: 
“[i]f aid or foreign assistance is offered the Haitian nation, she will accept it respectfully and in a 
spirit of fraternity, as long as this aid or this assistance shall not be accompanied with conditions 
incompatible with her dignity and liberty.”123 
 Duvalier achieved a détente with the administration of Lyndon Johnson by 1964,. 
Anselme Remy believed that “the failure of America’s [Kennedy’s] policy toward Haiti 
convinced the mulatto bourgeoisie of the futility of their opposition to Duvalier.”124 To ensure 
his regime’s survival, Duvalier reached an accommodation, but this time with “a younger, and 
more trustworthy, group of [largely black] politicians…members of a new [political] elite whose 
life was not marked by deprivations and color prejudice.”125 To ensure their continued loyalty 
and because economic realities precluded an independent black bourgeoisie, Duvalier modified 
 
123 François Duvalier, “Œuvres essentielles. La Révolution au pouvoir (1962-1966), ” vol. IV, (Port-au-Prince, 
Presses Nationales d’Haïti, 1967), in Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 60. 




his ideology to allow for the introduction of blacks into “the formerly mulatto-dominated 
bourgeoisie.”126 He wound up with what has been termed “a middle class of parasites,” aided and 
abetted by a civil service under his personal management.127 
By 1969, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment on Haiti summed up the 
dilemma of trying to replace Duvalier, including the absence of an effective civil service capable 
of providing governance: 
Stability is a special problem in Haiti because the sudden termination of President 
Duvalier’s brutal dictatorship would leave the country with no effective institutions or 
trained personnel to provide government services and continuity. During the past decade 
Duvalier has personally handled all major administrative matters. Through intrigue and 
manipulation, he has monopolized channels of communication and subjugated all 
government organizations to his personal whim.128 
 
 From 1974 onwards, the Duvalier regime of Jean-Claude attempted civil service reform, 
constituting an Administration Commission charged with “improvement of public sector 
organizational structures and procedures; development and standardization of personnel 
administration; training and skill development; and decentralization and development of regional 
public sector capacity.”129 Unfortunately, the Commission was repeatedly reorganized with 
changes of leadership and personnel, leading to “a significant amount of wasted effort 
[implementing and understanding internal organizational change] …. rather than concentrating 
on the substance of the administration reform mandate.”130 It would have no lasting effect on the 
 
126 Remy, “The Duvalier Phenomenon,” 63. 
127 Remy. 
128 FRUS, 1969–1976, Volume E–10, Documents On American Republics, 1969–1972, eds. Douglas Kraft and 
James Siekmeier (Washington: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2009), 
Document 380. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d380.  
129 David W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, “The Challenge of administrative reform in post-Duvalier Haiti: 
efficiency, equity and the prospects for systemic change,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 54, 
(1988): 92-3. 
130 Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 93. 
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desired reform of the public service. Instead, reorganizations and turmoil would continue well 
into the 1980s, long after the departure of Baby Doc. 
 Public sector reform after the Duvalier era has been carried out mainly by NGOs. 
Unfortunately, the NGOs have set the priorities rather than the Haitian government. While 
various sectors have been targeted, the main focus for reform has been security sector reform, led 
primarily by the UN, albeit with limited success. The education sector has also received 
significant Western attention, with most reform efforts seeking to shape it to provide suitably 
trained workers for low-technology assembly manufacturing. While other sectors have, from 
time to time, received attention, the NGOs involved have usually had limited objectives and 
funding. 
Overall, public sector development has remained immature. In 2009, a Canadian Defence 
Research and Development Canada (DRDC) report provided an evaluation of peacebuilding in 
Haiti since 2004, with specific emphasis on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH). It judged the Haitian government incapable of providing essential government 
services, leaving Haiti dependent upon international assistance, and predicted that the NGO 
network would remain engaged in the provision of many government services for “the 
foreseeable future.”131 
Summary 
Haiti’s democracy remains fragile, its new security structures inexperienced and untested, 
and economic renewal is at best tentative. A year-and-a-half after the American-led 
intervention, and the political and security situation in Haiti has dramatically improved. 
These improvements have advanced to a point which permits a more modest onwards 
 
131 Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti,” i. 
324 
 
international presence in Haiti, one to ensure a smooth and sure transfer of key functions 
enabling Haitians to assume responsibility for their own future.132 
- Statement by US Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,  
Alexander F. Watson, 1996 
 
Haiti has come a long way to achieve the relative political and security stability it is now 
enjoying, but persistent economic uncertainties, which can result in social exclusion, 
particularly of youth and the most vulnerable, may undermine this progress.133 
- Statement by UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations,  
Jean-Pierre Lacroix, 2018 
 
 Peter Hallward argues there is a connection between Haitian poverty and criminalization. 
He  points to the spiral of poverty leading to despair, which in turn leads to armed gangs and 
eventually criminalization of those gangs followed by combat operations intended to eliminate 
the criminal threat entirely.134 That same connection was present during the Marine Occupation 
and is present now during the UN occupation. Breaking the cycle that ends in criminalization and 
targeted combat operations must be the priority going forward. The first step lies in 
acknowledging the connection and the cycle. 
 The government of Haiti has lost control. Part of that loss can be attributed to Western 
interventions designed around strategic objectives focussed on containment—the prevention of 
‘illegal’ migration, for example—while Haiti has lost sovereignty and ceded government 
capacity to NGOs. The government of Haiti no longer controls the provision of government 
services for much of the country. An ineffective public service is a symptom of Haiti’s economic 
 
132 Alexander F. Watson, “Statement before the US House Appropriations Committee, Washington, D.C.” (21 
March 1996), in US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs Dispatch 7, No. 14 (1 April 1996): 172. 
133 “UN eyes transition of Haiti role from peacekeeping to development,” UN News, 3 April 2018, 
www.news.un.org.  
134 See Hallward, Damning the Flood, 309. In the same vein, Beverly Mullings, Marion Werner & Linda Peake 
explore “racialized discourses” employed to create associations between Haitian aid recipients and black criminality. 
They point to the “increased securitization” of humanitarian interventions, leading to aid donating nations as 
embracing narratives which speak to the need to ‘protect’ aid workers and aid shipments from the local black 
criminal elements. See Beverly Mullings, Marion Werner & Linda Peake, “Fear and Loathing in Haiti: Race and 




mal-development and, moreover, symptomatic of the elite’s lack of interest and commitment to 
the structural overhaul necessary to build a viable constitutional democracy. The West has 
become risk adverse in Haiti, refusing to invest directly in the country or its people. 
 Further, the West has likewise conditioned Haiti’s commercial and political elite, 
including its better educated members, to behave in their own class interests. Peasants protesting 
their condition of extreme poverty have been met by force, approved and employed by external 
powers. Even force and killings perpetrated by Haiti’s homegrown dictators have sparked little to 
no outside interference. Only in instances where Haiti flirted with social revolution did the West 
stir itself to force regime change. Consequently, elites within Haiti seek to exploit their control 
over the government to their own benefit while others able to emigrate do so, exacerbating 
Haiti’s ‘brain drain.’ 
 The result is simple. Haiti, in the rest of the world’s eyes, is considered exceptional.135 
While this is partially attributable to its fragile status, outside observers see Haiti as a pariah not 
worthy of being entrusted with its own sovereignty. The Western strategy employed against 
Haiti—economic warfare, discouraging opportunity, and criminalization of opposition—is 
merely the implementation of this viewpoint. The continued interference in Haitian sovereignty 
through repeated and lengthy occupations confirms that identification. Changing this viewpoint 
is critical for Haiti to have any chance at leaving the status quo behind. The next chapter will 
 
135 Note the argument is not that Haiti is exceptional, other than being the only black slave nation to achieve freedom 
and independence through a successful armed revolution. Rather the argument is that the West has perceived Haiti 
as exceptional and accordingly has treated Haiti as if it were exceptional. Haitian American historian Millery Polyné 
identified this phenomenon when he spoke about “how easily intelligent people (including myself) fall into the trap 
of using Haiti as an embodiment of alterity – exceptionally chaotic and incomprehensible.” As he points out, Haiti is 
too often used as the “exceptional case in the Americas.” He raises a critical question (and an equally important 
corollary) which should be considered by those who favour intervention: “Can the black republic ever be seen as 
postexceptional, and is that state of postexceptionality a mere mimic of the West?” See Introduction from Millery 
Polyné, ed, The Idea of Haiti: Rethinking Crisis and Development (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 
2013), 203 of 6746, 243-263 of 6746 (Kindle version). 
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explore the lessons—learned and unlearned—that have contributed to this view of Haiti and 
what needs to change on the part of the West. 
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Chapter Eleven – Lessons from Interventions 
 
There is a sense of déjà-vu in the process that disposed of Aristide….Once more, Haiti 
will have to try again, try to re-invent itself. But will it be permitted to do so with the 
dearth of allowable models of development under hegemonic globalization?1 
- Haitian historian and Professor Emeritus, Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, 
 
 
MINUSTAH’s greatest deficiency at present is a strategic planning capability which 
would unite the disparate components of the mission and develop a multidisciplinary plan 
to disengage from Haiti.2 
- Colonel Stephen Cadden, Canadian Task Force Commander, 2013-14 
 
This chapter discusses the historical lessons of past Western interventions that should 
inform future peacebuilding and, ideally, encourage Western acknowledgement of past errors in 
Haiti. This section is deliberately visionary, rather than purely pragmatic. It does not tackle the 
issue of whether interventions ought to be, or ought not to be, undertaken.3 Rather, this section 
approaches the issue of interventions and lessons with the objective of determining how best to 
minimize harm to Haiti and Haitian citizens during future interventions. 
Recent humanitarian interventions, including those undertaken in Haiti, have involved 
“coercive democratization,” or the imposition of democracy on an undemocratic society by 
external forces.4  Marina Ottaway claimed that coercive democratization requires that a societal 
 
1 Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel, 265. 
2 Col Steve M. Cadden, “Task Force Port au Prince End of Tour Report for Period 01 July 2013-22 June 2014,” 
Canadian Army Lessons Learned,  
140702-UU-3350_OP_HAMLET_TFCOMD_END_TOUR_REPORT_JUL_13_JUN_14_KMS_VERSION, July 
2014. 
3 The use of the term ‘ought’ is deliberate and makes the connection with ‘Hume’s Law, from the Scottish 
philosopher David Hume, as derived from his ‘Is-Ought’ problem interpretation. Accordingly, this section does not 
seek to examine Haiti and interventions as being justified, morally or otherwise, or not, but instead approaches 
interventions in Haiti as a historical fact and an unfortunate reality of Haitian life going forward, unlikely to end any 
time in the foreseeable future. 
4 The label ‘coercive democracy’ is contested. Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff, for example, point out that 
“there is nothing ‘coercive’ about a process that gives to people the basic political freedoms and rights that they 
purportedly already want and seek to enjoy.” Fen Osler Hampson and David Mendeloff, “Intervention and the 
Nation –Building Debate,” in Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 684. 
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platform necessary to sustain democracy is mature and in place prior to its imposition.5  
Otherwise, in her words, “dependent, Potemkin democracies, that coercive democratization 
produces, risk becoming more part of the problem of renewed confrontation than a solution to 
lingering conflicts.”6  Lakhdar Brahimi made similar comments in 2004 when he argued that: 
The only prudent starting point...is to try and understand as best you can why there was a 
conflict in the first place and to ask 'what is the context in which you find 
yourself?’...That requires time to talk to a lot of people, over and over again; 
unfortunately the most important decisions end up having to be taken...before we are 
knowledgeable enough to anticipate what their implications might be…7 
 
Therein lies the problem. How do we gain an understanding of the local societal interests 
and grievances necessary to inform the direction that development should take to be effective 
and lasting? We need to remember that “democracy…is a political system that recognizes there 
can never be unanimity of interests and views in a society and therefore creates mechanisms to 
institutionalize conflict and manage it.”8 The development not only of the necessary framework 
for democracy, but the necessary political culture to sustain it, entails a lengthy and complicated 
process.  
Unfortunately, as Ottaway points out, the West assumes democracy can be installed 
without pre-conditions and within a society that features divisive societal issues which we, too, 
often do not understand or recognize. When a complex nation like Haiti is involved, this 
becomes even more critical before long-term change can take hold and flourish.9 
 
5 Marina Ottaway, “Is Democracy the Answer?” in Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 603. 
6 Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 615. 
7 Cited in Sultan Barakat, Margaret Chard and Richard Jones, “Attributing Value: Evaluating Success and Failure in 
Post-War Reconstruction,” Third World Quarterly 26, no. 4/5, Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq: A Quixotic 
Beginning to the `Global Democratic Revolution' (2005), 831. 
8 Ottaway, “Is Democracy the Answer?” From Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 604. 
9 Suzy Castor identified a number of Haitian systemic obstacles to democratization which need to be overcome 
including “problems of production, accumulation, and distribution of wealth,” all the while dealing with an 
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Instead of democratizing coercively, Ottaway makes the case for the international 
community to “consider more seriously interim political solutions for post-conflict countries” 
with democracy as a strategic long-term goal that is “impossible in most post-conflict countries 
in the short and even medium terms,” and can only be implemented once the post-conflict state 
has developed the necessary capacity to support it.10  Ottaway’s recommendations contradict the 
premise of past interventions activities, namely that “elections and other measures for re-
establishing political institutions cannot be delayed to wait for the emergence of appropriate 
social and economic conditions for democratic reform.”11  
Ottaway’s lesson requires security and development to be pursued synergistically in a 
synchronized framework. Building state capacity for governance and the provision of essential 
services, while simultaneously meeting the need for an effective public administration and 
overcoming the challenges of creating a safe and secure environment are the key challenges 
going forward.12 Long term investment is also required in Haiti to create sustainable 
development opportunities and to ensure sustainable gains in security.  
Finally, the international community must learn to view Haiti as a country worthy of 
sovereignty. Applying the idea that Haiti deserves only limited or restricted sovereignty has 
 
“oligarchy” supported by the military, the principle aim of which being “to survive, to retain power, and to protect 
their privileges” at all costs. As Castor points out, while the Haitian masses had “taken over the government” they 
had not yet “taken power.” See Castor, “Democracy and Society in Haiti,” 126-37.  
10 Crocker, Leashing the Dogs of War, 615. 
11 Ho-Won Jeongi, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2005), 31. 
12 Dantès Bellegarde had much earlier advocated for a Haitian ‘solution,’ built on a safe and secure environment, 
which saw the development of a Haitian economic and political system that was “equitable to all, favoring personal 
autonomy, individual initiative, and the full expansion of social energies.” See Dantès Bellegarde, “The 




made it into a faux or “apparent state.” 13  It is not surprising then that Haitian elites show no 
willingness to abandon their predatory state model and embrace the nationhood envisioned by 
Trouillot and other like-minded Haitian scholars. 
Lesson One – Understanding Confirmation Bias 
[W]e must not lose sight of the fact that there may be no aspect of Haitian society that is 
not in crisis. Haiti may be the quintessential example of what we call the ‘fragile state.14 
- RCMP Chief Superintendent David Beer 
 
[S]ince independence in 1804, Haiti has been ruled by a succession of authoritarian and 
dictatorial regimes and a culture of democracy and human rights has struggled to make 
any lasting impact on political and social practices. Hence the inadequacy, not to say total 
lack, of a real “State culture” among many political leaders and top government officials. 
In the long run, this recurring deficiency may well undermine the very principle of the 
continuity of the State.15 
- Extract from 2002 UN Economic and Social Council Report 
 
The first lesson of Haiti’s Western interventions is the nature of confirmation bias and its 
impact on rehabilitation and development work in Haiti.16 International narratives about Haiti are 
a primary means by which this bias is manifest.17 Unfortunately, Haiti only ever seems to be 
mentioned in the international press during military coups, food riots, earthquakes, or hurricanes. 
Linking Haiti’s crises to perennial bad luck leads confirmation bias full circle to Haiti’s Vodou 
culture. Western culture, through movies and books, links Vodou to devil worship. Ignorance of 
 
13 Limited or restricted sovereignty which in turn leads to the identification of “apparent states” is based on 
“structures of government that have a distinctive set of institutions and political procedures but have little or no 
actual power to meet the needs of the population.” See Nina Glick Schiller and Georges Fouron. Georges Woke Up 
Laughing: Long-Distance Nationalism and the Search for Home (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 27. 
14 Statement by RCMP Chief Superintendent David Beer, former UN Police Commissioner with the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).  Cited at FAAE, Evidence, Meeting No. 6, 31 May 2006, 13.  
15 UN Economic and Social Council Report E/CN.4/2003/116, “SITUATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN HAITI,” 
23 December 2002, paras 53-54. 
16 Confirmation bias involves the favouring of that information which reinforces previously held positions, beliefs 
and/or biases. 
17 Benedict Anderson explores the development of national narrative and its role in nationalism. See Chapter 11 – 
Memory and Forgetting of Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, rev. ed. (Verso: London, 2006). 
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Haiti’s traditional syncretic religion reinforces the idea of God cursing Haiti. Anthropologist Ira 
Lowenthal highlighted this particular bias, pointing out: “The best thing that ever happened to 
racism is Vodou. They made up their stories about it and their stories confirmed every prejudice 
of every white person in the world.”18 
The most recent example of this trope still having currency was recently seen in response 
to the devastating January 2010 earthquake. In an opinion piece for The New York Times, 
columnist David Brooks wrote: 
As Lawrence E. Harrison explained in his book “The Central Liberal Truth,” Haiti, like 
most of the world’s poorest nations, suffers from a complex web of progress-resistant 
cultural influences. There is the influence of the voodoo [sic] religion, which spreads the 
message that life is capricious and planning futile. There are high levels of social 
mistrust. Responsibility is often not internalized. Child-rearing practices often involve 
neglect in the early years and harsh retribution when kids hit 9 or 10. We’re all supposed 
to politely respect each other’s cultures. But some cultures are more progress-resistant 
than others, and a horrible tragedy was just exacerbated by one of them.19 
 
By way of contrast, Brooks lauds the work of the horde of NGOs, claiming that the 
“more than 10,000 organizations” in Haiti are “doing the Lord’s work, especially these days…”  
Yet, despite their efforts, Brooks claims the Haitian culture is not capable of, and not interested 
in salvation, noting that “even a blizzard of these [NGO] efforts does not seem to add up to 
comprehensive change.”20 
Confirmation bias maintains that Haiti is not capable of planning and undertaking civil 
sector reform. Foreign aid monies flowing into Haiti, and other fragile nations, are not directed 
primarily towards the fragile government, but rather are sent to the myriad of NGOs or through 
 
18 Ira Lowenthal, cited in Kim Wall and Caterina Clerici, “Vodou is elusive and endangered, but it remains the soul 
of Haitian people,” The Guardian, November 07, 2015. www.guardian.com  
19 David Brooks, “The Underlying Tragedy,” The New York Times, January 14, 2010. 
20 Brooks, “The Underlying Tragedy.” 
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international organizations like the UN or OAS. There is an implicit belief that fragile nation 
governments cannot and should not be trusted with aid monies because of corruption and 
incompetence. An example is the previously mentioned January 2009 Canadian Defence 
Research and Development Canada (DRDC) report which provided an evaluation of 
peacebuilding in Haiti since 2004, the conclusion of which judged the Haitian government 
incapable of providing essential government services to its people.21 
Yet, despite the allocation of billions of dollars to Haiti, foreign attempts to stabilize and 
improve Haiti have failed. Despite seven peace support operations in Haiti since 1993, Haiti still 
does not have a proper and functioning security sector (justice, police and penal). And because of 
confirmation bias, Haiti must wait until the international community through agencies like the 
UN or the OAS determine the way ahead and allocate monies accordingly.  
At the same time, Haitians also suffer from the influence of confirmation bias. The long 
shadow cast by the US Occupation has worked against the presence of the UN, whether we are 
discussing the US Marines who deployed as part of the Multinational Interim Force or IMF, or 
the more recent deployment of Nepalese soldiers as part of MINUSTAH, the latter causing the 
devastating cholera outbreak which ravaged the nation.22 With each disaster afflicting the UN 
missions, whether cholera, the use of combat troops to battle gangs in civilian neighbourhoods, 
or the initial UN response to the 2010 earthquake focussed on preventing looters rather than 
 
21 Greene, “Peacebuilding in Haiti.” 
22 UNSCR Resolution 940, for example, was the first time that the UN authorized a military invasion (the MIF) of a 
sovereign nation to “restore democracy,” making Haiti the basis for an experiment. Because the crisis did not 
threaten international peace and security, the rationale for the invasion was quite controversial and very 
discriminating in its application and appeared to be more about the UN having been thwarted by the de facto regime. 
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assisting with rescue efforts, that confirmation bias has grown stronger and deeper roots in 
Haitian society.23  
While it cuts both ways when dealing with Haiti and the international community, the 
most shocking result of confirmation bias has been its influence on Haiti’s position within the 
international community. Throughout its troubled history, Haitian sovereignty has been regularly 
disregarded and violated both physically and otherwise, meaning Haiti’s ability to exercise its 
sovereignty fully has been, and continues to be, compromised.24 The Marine Occupation was 
perhaps the most shocking example, the US narrative centring on selling the idea of Haitians not 
being worthy of holding sovereignty over their own people or their land, when the real motive 
for intervention was debt repayment to the US.  
That history of disregard and violation has continued with recent UN peacekeeping 
interventions. It can likewise be found within an international community which tolerates and 
indeed, signals a preference for international NGOs occupying areas which should be serviced by 
Haitian domestic governance and policy determination. That preference and support for NGOs 
likewise signals a blatant disregard for Haitian sovereignty, reinforcing the perception that the 
West does not see Haiti worthy of being considered a sovereign nation. 
 
 
23 A Reuters report from February 2010 identified the UN peacekeepers focussing their efforts for days after the 
earthquake on tracking down and capturing the more than 3,000 escaped inmates from the destroyed national prison. 
Guatemalan diplomat Edmond Mulet, the acting SRSG of the MINUSTAH mission at the time of the earthquake, 
was quoted as saying: “I still have to patrol, I still have to go after all these criminals and bandits that escaped from 
the national penitentiary, the gang leaders, the criminals, the killers, the kidnappers. I cannot really distract myself 
from doing that.” Tom Brown, “Haiti aid effort marred by slow U.N. response,” Reuters, February 26 2010.  
www.reuters.com  
24 Haitian sovereignty in this instance includes both international sovereignty, associated with international 
recognition by other sovereign states; and domestic sovereignty, centered on state authority and control over its own 
internal affairs. For a discussion of sovereignty and its various elements, see Stephen D. Krasner, ed., Problematic 
Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 
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Lesson Two – Haiti is a Study of Duality  
Bourik swe pou chwal dekore ak dentel.  
[The donkey sweats so the horse can be decorated with lace.]25 
- Haitian proverb 
Related to confirmation bias is the need to recognize that Haitian capacity building must 
be undertaken within the framework of recognizing Haiti’s chronic societal duality.26 That 
duality is based more often than not on conflict and has, in the past, been an obstacle to 
democratic development. This requires understanding and recognizing the dialectic struggle of 
rural peasants versus the urban based masses; peasant grievances versus elite privilege and 
control via the predatory state; Creole versus French; Vodou versus the Catholic Church; civilian 
versus military; the diaspora versus the homeland; state versus nation, etc. 
Haiti’s duality has created a historically bound social framework that has been 
manipulated to justify and rationalize social inequality and favouritism. Cultural awareness on 
the part of international partners is paramount and requires an education that explores the 
detailed issues that have created this duality. Michel-Rolph Trouillot’s masterful thesis is an 
excellent start to creating such an awareness.27  
Resolving issues related to Haiti’s duality requires an effective strategy, one which 
provides for a grievance process that allows participation by all affected stakeholders without 
 
25 Proverbs and translation taken from Prof. Bob Corbett’s Haiti website, 
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/haiti.html.  
26 The idea of Haitian duality has unfortunate connotations of simplistic Western understanding of Haiti within a 
binary framework. Witness, for example, the early work of James G. Leyburn (The Haitian People). However, 
Haitian writers often speak about ‘the two Haitis’ and examine various dualities specific to Haiti. Haitian-American 
anthropologist Gina Athena Ulysse, for example, embraced the idea of two Haitis, one centred on her Haitian 
identity within a diaspora community; and the other being the Haiti of memory, a memory built around colour and 
class “and urban and rural referents…” Trouillot likewise speaks about Haitian duality throughout his works, the 
most relevant being his analysis of the Haitian conflict built on state versus nation (but even here, the separation of 
state and nation is never absolute). See Gina Athena Ulysse, Why Haiti Needs New Narratives: A Post-Quake 
Chronicle (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2015); and Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation.  
27 Trouillot, Haiti, State against Nation. 
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having to resort to violence or being subjected to violence. Ideally, the conflict resolution 
strategy should be collaboratively created within the parameters of a shared responsibility 
partnership rather than imposed from outside. The strategy should be developed by Haitians, on 
behalf of Haitians, using foreign expertise as appropriate to guide its development. 
Lesson Three – Democracy and Elections 
The foundations of democratic and truly representative government do not now exist in 
Haiti. It will be a long time before they can be created…It may be that twenty years was 
all too short a time for the task of regeneration and the establishment there of stable 
government on a lasting basis.28 
- American diplomat Henry Fletcher 
  
When discussing democracy in Haiti, the international community focusses on the 
conduct of free and fair elections, and nothing else. Development of democratic institutions and 
governance mechanisms involves a lengthy process that necessarily takes place following 
elections. It is also a process that takes place organically at the grassroots level, often while the 
necessary state-building is taking place at the national level. Unfortunately, the literature shows 
democratic movements built in Haiti at the grassroots levels have been either dismissed or 
marginalized.29 
Discussed earlier, in Chapter Five, the cacos uprisings were an example of a popular 
movement that was later highjacked and re-directed into what has been termed “social 
 
28 American diplomat Henry Fletcher, part of the 1930 American Presidential Commission looking into the 
conditions in Haiti and whether the Marines could be withdrawn. Fletcher, “Quo Vadis, Haiti?,” 548. 
29 Paul Dejean, Haitian priest, activist and former Ministre des Haïtiens vivant à l'étranger under President Aristide, 
highlighted this problem. Writing about his 1992 experiences with UN Development Program and its operations in 
Haiti, he warned: “Je me méfie comme de la peste de ce terme «consensus» tellement galvaudé ces derniers mois, en 
Haïti, qu'on l'applique sans gêne aucune à toute sorte d'accords ou ententes relevant beaucoup plus de la 
combinaison, imposés, contre son gré, à une immense majorité, par une infime minorité ayant le monopole de la 
force et des armes. Je me pose donc la question: «large consensus» entre qui? De plus, les «autres interventions de 
l'extérieur» ne semblent laisser aucune place aux seules initiatives qui comptent véritablement, celles qui 
proviennent de la population elle-même.” See Paul Dejean, Haïti: alerte, on tue! (Montréal: Les Éditions du 
CIDIHCA, 1993), 86-7. 
336 
 
banditry.”30 That led of course to the term cacos, during the Marine Occupation, coming to 
embody criminality, shifting the narrative away from the unjust nature of the occupation and its 
illegal acts, and instead towards the cacos as bandits preying on society and blocking ‘progress’. 
In addition, the Marine leadership gradually expanded the use of the term until it encompassed 
anyone who objected to the Occupation including, as will be explored later, the opposition 
media. While this was one of the worst examples of criminalization of dissent, there have been 
other egregious examples since that time.31 
For example, during the regime of Henri Namphy, which had replaced Jean-Claude 
Duvalier’s, anti-government protests and general strikes became common as Haitians demanded 
elections to install a representative government.32 Yet despite Namphy heading a dictatorial 
governing council which was known to have committed significant human rights abuses and had 
no real plan for making progress towards democratic rule, the Reagan government believed 
Namphy and his cronies were worth granting US$100 million in aid, a considerable portion of 
which was for military equipment including riot gear that was quickly put to use to suppress the 
masses seeking democracy!33  
 
30 An argument can be made that much of the social banditry nature of the cacos emerges around the time that 
foreign interests (largely German) began to provide money to various strongmen interested in overthrowing the 
government of the day. This is an area that requires more study as there are few academics who have looked at the 
cacos and their history in any depth. See Plummer, Haiti and the Great Powers, 36. 
31 A February 2009 example saw the Haitian CEP constituted for April senatorial elections refuse to recognize 
Fanmi Lavalas candidates, claiming the candidates list was missing the signature of the party’s leader, former 
President Aristide then in forced exile in Africa and unable to return to Haiti following the 2004 coup. See Jeb 
Sprague, “Haiti: Fanmi Lavalas Banned, Voter Apprehension Widespread,” Inter Press Service News Agency,, 17 
April 20090. www.ipsnews.net.  
32 Grievances against the Namphy regime were inspired by a number of problems, mainly economic, including 
ongoing discontent over African Swine Flu (ASF) programs which carried over from the Duvalier regime period, 
but also included anger at a dechoukaj cut short without completing the cleansing of Duvalierists. That would come 
to haunt Namphy, given the earlier April 1986 massacre at Fort Dimanche when Duvalierists infiltrated a large 
crowd of protestors, panicking government forces into firing on the crowds. See Abbott, Haiti: The Duvaliers and 
Their Legacy, 336-7. 




Indeed, US State Department officials remained committed to Namphy despite the July 
1987 massacre of at least 35 Haitians peacefully protesting his regime’s anti-democratic 
measures.34 An anonymous American source claimed: “What we're trying to do is get one step 
further toward getting a legitimate government with greater control, greater moral authority in 
position to clean out some of the bad apples.''35 Similarly, with the Duvalier regimes, the policy 
objective of ensuring communism did not gain a foothold in Haiti outweighed any desire for 
advancing democratic reform. That mindset led, not surprisingly, to US foreign aid to both 
Duvaliers continuing on and off throughout their terms in office. 
Ending the practice of dismissing or marginalizing grassroots democratic development in 
Haiti must be linked to grafting grassroots democratic interests onto national level objectives and 
recognizing that localized development interests vary across the country and even within specific 
regions. This is a process with which the international community has considerable experience 
and expertise; it should be leveraged to create a collaborative working relationship between the 
UN and Haiti that advances cooperation between them. 
Returning to ‘development cooperation’ and a working partnership between the UN and 
Haiti, political scientist Stefano Recchia has developed an excellent model for such a partnership 
based on tackling the ethical questions of postwar reconstruction and how much external 
interference or intervention can be justified. He argues for “transitory shared responsibility” 
whereby “international officials…are deployed inside domestic agencies, ministerial bodies, and 
 
34 Gérard Pierre-Charles, Haïti Jamais Plus! Les Violations de droits de l’homme à l’époque des Duvaliers (Port-au-
Prince: Editions du Cresfed, 2000), 143. 
35 Pierre-Charles, 143. 
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judicial institutions of the postwar society, not merely as technical advisors, but with explicit co-
decisional authority.”36 
Transitory shared responsibility recognizes that the non-democratic element of the model 
is tempered most effectively when the aim of the program is built around creating local, 
grassroots level capacity for peaceful self-government. To be successful and lasting, the work 
undertaken within this model is aimed at building or repairing local domestic sovereignty. 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the program is identification of key local stakeholders who 
have the necessary influence and standing within local communities to provide local credibility 
to the program. 
There is a danger in advocating this model, coming as it does from post-conflict 
development, and having the appearance of yet another imposed paternalistic experiment that 
superficially at least appears highly prescriptive.37 Yet, if the negotiations with the Haitians on 
the implementation of a system like this are conducted in good faith, the prescriptive danger is 
lessened, and development cooperation is strengthened. Negotiations would also allow a 
 
36 Recchia points out that a limited form of this transitory shared responsibility has most recently been undertaken 
successfully in post-war Liberia in 2005. Stefano Recchia, “Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction: How Much 
External Interference Can Be Justified?” Ethics and International Affairs 23, no. 2 (Summer 2009), 178, 180. 
37 Recchia points out that the model is intended for those countries he identifies as “burdened,” a term coined by 
John Rawls, meaning a state which “lacks the necessary institutions, economic resources, and political culture to be 
effectively self-governing.” That differs from the idea of being an “outlaw” state, one in which “basic human 
rights…are systemically violated on a large scale.” Working with Recchia’s concept of “proportionate interference,” 
the violence endemic in an outlaw state would justify “coercive interference,” up to and including military 
intervention to halt the human rights violations as well as the possible imposition of a trusteeship to remove internal 
obstacles to political order and effective self-governing. That trusteeship could eventually shift to the transitory 
shared responsibility model. In the case of Haiti, life under Francois Duvalier would have earned the regime the 
label of outlaw state, whereas the current situation in Haiti falls within the definition of burdened state. See Recchia, 
“Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction,” 172-3. 
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timetable based on metrics to determine a drawdown of the shared responsibility and an eventual 
transition to complete domestic sovereignty.38 
The adjunct lesson of this issue is recognition of the dangers of imposing a development 
model on Haiti which has worked elsewhere. While lessons drawn from other development 
models can and should guide the creation of one for Haiti, imposing a foreign model on Haiti as 
if one size fits all is a recipe for disaster. Haitian social and political structures demand a 
distinctly Haitian solution. At the same time, there are lessons that can be drawn from other 
nations which are applicable to Haiti and should influence the way forward. Likewise, the 
Marbial Valley experiment, discussed in Chapter Seven, provides useful experiences that can be 
cultivated for careful incorporation within a new model for collaborative implementation. This 
issue will be addressed later in ‘Lesson Five – National Ownership of Development’. 
Leaving the issue of national ownership for the moment, two other factors should be 
considered for development modelling going forward. First, those areas which have been 
abdicated by the state and are now dominated by NGOs should be targets for incorporation into 
this model’s implementation. This would include, for example, the development of much of rural 
Haiti wherein Haitian government services have historically been lacking and NGOs have carved 
out niche areas, often without any Haitian supervision.  
Second, those areas of Haiti’s state institutions where domestic expertise is lacking, 
should be chosen to receive international expertise and assistance. Building “according to a logic 
of sliding interference,” a UN-Haitian bilateral determination would identify which agencies and 
 
38 The restoration of complete domestic sovereignty can be managed to both parties’ satisfaction by benchmarking 
the creation of Haitian capabilities in those areas of lacking Haitian capabilities or which have been under-
developed. Throughout, Haitian control over governance policy would be absolute. 
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government departments would benefit from the program and which positions should be reserved 
for international experts who would be granted the essential co-decisional authority to influence 
the development necessary. At the same time, local expertise must be developed to take over 
responsibility as quickly and practically as possible.39 Priorities should be determined by Haitian 
authorities, but would likely include an examination of the ministries responsible for education, 
health care, internal security, finance, and others involved in shaping social policy. 
One of the more interesting areas for shared responsibility, particularly relevant and 
timely for Haiti, is Recchia’s advocacy of hybrid courts, a well-developed transitional justice 
concept. A recent positive example can be seen in Rwanda in its experiment with gacaca courts, 
which began in 1999. An innovative and still controversial grassroots-level initiative, the hybrid 
gacaca courts were provided with the resources and time necessary to allow them to achieve 
legitimacy through a national-international hybrid partnership.40  
An important effect identified from the partnership was the “cross-fertilization of norms.” 
41 Without local collaboration in the design of the program, legitimacy would have been missing 
and that ‘cross-fertilization’ through formal and informal interactions would have been 
 
39 Recchia, “Just and Unjust Postwar Reconstruction,” 179. 
40 One of the keys to the gacaca system flourishing in Rwanda was the training provided by the international NGO, 
Juristes sans Frontieres. Their training of domestic investigators, lawyers and judges brought them to an 
internationally accepted level of competence and thus provided the revised legal process with a legitimacy not only 
from the locals impacted by the system but also from international and national leaders. Widner points out the 
Rwandan government ruled out the introduction of international judges and lawyers to assist with the process like 
other areas, viewing that from a neo-colonial point of view and deciding their ‘intervention’ was a non-starter. Nor 
was there any provision within Rwandan national law that would have permitted foreign lawyers to practice in 
Rwanda or for foreign judges to adjudicate the cases in question. Instead, Rwandan authorities made the decision to 
deal with legal sector development through NGOs. Jennifer Widner, “Courts and Democracy in Postconflict 
Transitions: A Social Scientist‘s Perspective on the African Case,” American Journal of International Law 95 
(2001): 64-75. 




impossible.42 Examining Haiti’s rural justice system in a similar light could spur the 
development of a Haitian hybrid model parallel to Rwanda’s gacaca courts. 
As the development of stable state institutional governance capabilities progress and gain 
strength, the model would incorporate mutually agreed upon mechanisms to allow for that shared 
responsibility to be “re-negotiated” and allow for the reduction in the international presence 
within specific ministries, etc. Benefits of this program are that it not only fosters a strong 
working relationship, but shifts Haiti away from its unhealthy dependency on NGOs, while 
moving Haiti towards a model based on the progressive and complete Haitianization of 
government.43 Finally, with metrics developed collaboratively, the question of when the 
international community would exit under this model becomes more open and transparent to 
all.44 
Lesson Four – Democratic Capacity Building 
The long-awaited departure of former President Jean-Claude Duvalier was greeted with 
elation among Haitians both in Haiti and abroad. The first few weeks after the overthrow 
saw a tremendous surge of relief and hope for a brighter future. People visiting the 
country reported seeing Haitians sweeping the sidewalks, disposing of long-accumulated 
garbage that defaced city streets and painting tree trunks with bright colors. 
Neighborhood community councils were spontaneously created to channel the ideas, 
needs, and suggestions of the people. All Haitians seemed willing to work together to 
defend their newly won freedom and to participate in the creation of a truly democratic 
system. Exiled journalists, politicians, political activists, opponents of the former regime, 
and other nationals who, in protest, had chosen to reside abroad flooded back into the 
country on short visits or to re-establish residency. This euphoria was short-lived, 
 
42 Concerns over the gacaca system have been raised. For example, Andrea Purdeková argued that the local police 
or regional military commander had more sway over the results of the gacaca courts than the local judge in many 
instances. See Andrea Purdeková, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: Surveillance and State Reach in 
Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 49, no. 3 (September 2011): 475-97.  
43 Ironically, this was the ostensible aim of the Marine Occupation, yet one which Marine leaders refused to 
undertake until compelled by American investigations. Even when finally undertaken, the initiatives were 
ineffective.   
44 Spoilers will need to be identified as they can be expected to interfere with the model, particularly as the shared 
responsibility results in capability development within state sectors formerly controlled by others. This can include 
NGOs as well, for example, as opposition political groups. 
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however, for it soon became evident that twenty-nine years of absolute power had left the 
country with a burdensome political legacy that would impede the establishment of a 
democratic system.45 
- Sociologist Yolaine Armand 
 
Western nations have advocated the development of “self-sustaining democratic political 
institutions and robust market-oriented economies” as the means by which good government and 
democracy are developed.46 Those objectives, though, may not align with Haitian interests and 
will need to be tempered, perhaps quite drastically. Objectives will need to be developed with 
Haitians and should be based upon shared values to ensure the interveners can support the 
measures required.  
What this means in practical terms for the international community is that in addition to 
recognizing and implementing Haitian plurality, democratic capacity building will require an 
integrated systems approach to development. Security sector reform (SSR), for example, long the 
focus of attention for UN missions, has been undertaken by the UN primarily through the 
governments of Canada, France, and the US, with the development of a Haitian national police 
as its sole raison d’être, while ignoring the long overdue reforms to Haiti’s judicial and penal 
systems. 
International development in Haiti has been plagued by governance work undertaken 
without the synchronous development of a stable and productive economy. The fundamental 
education (FE) program initiated in the Marbial Valley was typical of this problem. While it 
began with foreign assistance funds, the short timelines of the program coupled to an assumption 
 
45 Yolaine Armand, “Democracy in Haiti: The Legacy of Anti-Democratic Political and Social Traditions,” 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 2, no. 4 (Summer 1989), 539. 
46 Francis Fukuyama, “Nation-Building 101,” The Atlantic Monthly 293, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2004): 159-162. 
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that the Haitian government would maintain the same funding commitment, was erroneous and 
led to the program’s eventual collapse.  
On the other hand, international emphasis on economic reform has also had deleterious 
effects on democratic capacity building. For example, the SAPs demanded by the World Bank 
and IMF failed to recognize that demanding a downsizing of the Haitian civil service 
undermined attempts to remedy the almost complete lack of government services outside of the 
capital and other urban centres. Further, when coupled with the increased role of NGOs in the 
provision of services, SAPs and NGOs have diminished Haitian sovereignty and retarded 
development of Haitian democracy.  
A useful model for developing a comprehensive development plan built on the idea of a 
systems approach is the proposed plan for the 1948 UN Mission of Technical Assistance. The 
plan was flawed in a number of its conclusions, the most flagrant being its encouragement of 
Haitian emigration. Where the plan did show promise was in its systemic and integrated 
approach to Haiti from a holistic government perspective, leading, at the time, to an ambitious 
national plan founded on the idea of effective and efficient use of Haiti’s national means.47 
Coupled to that development plan was the idea of a comprehensive approach to the mission that 
would draw expertise from different social sectors. That approach, shifting away from the 
standard military-heavy UN missions, has the potential to recognize adverse effects before they 
emerge, allowing them to be tackled in a timely manner. 
 
47 The UN Mission report included emigration as a “hopeful” solution to Haiti’s economic plight, which it 
determined was based on a combination of primitive farming methods and soil which was “depleted.” The answer 
was to encourage “large-scale [Haitian] emigration to other Caribbean areas…” See Logan, “Mission to Haiti,” 243. 
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Consider the requirements to implement a comprehensive and universal education system 
in Haiti. Desperately needed to educate the next generations of Haitians to allow them to 
compete within the international community, creating that school system requires a host of large-
scale projects within Haiti that may be beyond the current capabilities of the government. 
Education requires both a physical infrastructure and an investment in human capital. This 
includes improvements to the road system to allow children to reach schools, a widespread 
construction program to provide the schools required to support universal education, and the 
development of a national energy grid to provide the power necessary for the high speed 
networks to ensure access to Internet, computing and technical education, as well as qualified 
teachers and educational resources such as books, paper, computers, etc.  
Alternately, and until that work is complete, upgrading Haiti’s cell tower network can 
permit distant learning and open the way ahead. But again, the cell network also depends upon a 
reliable power system. In the end, and regardless of the approach taken, democratic capacity 
building should be based on a synchronized, systems approach and an understanding of inter-
related elements of Haiti’s infrastructure and social framework. 
Lesson Five – National Ownership of Development 
 
Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions. 
Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries’ national development 
strategies, institutions and procedures48 
- Extract from The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
 
 




 A sovereignty imperative is particularly important in Haiti given the record of 
organizations like the OAS and the UN, as well as interventions by the United States. 
Development requires a framework that identifies the long-term goal of national ownership, 
meaning program sovereignty, by and for Haitians. This necessarily mandates an approach to 
development which is sustainable, devoid of expensive high-tech solutions, and avoids the 
unfortunate tendency in Haiti to introduce patronage into programming. Shifting to a sustainable, 
merit-based system is critical. As noted earlier, Haitian social and political structures demand a 
Haitian model. Haitian ownership of the model is an absolute and non-negotiable requirement for 
success, and, as noted above, has been recognized and embedded as one of the cornerstones of 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, for example.  
 One of the most important institutions from an international perspective has been the 
Haitian National Police service. Yet the training for the national service has emphasized border 
security, judicial police support and crowd or riot control.49 The establishment of community 
policing and training was a low priority for the international community. The importance of this 
particular role for Haitian police has been floating around for quite some time. Local 
communities in Haiti have never enjoyed a close relationship with the Haitian police. Building 
relationships between local police and local community leaders begins by police experts building 
training programs which are based on local community conditions and needs – something major 
 
49 By 2004, the National Police was reported to have a number of specialized units which had received additional 
training: they included a crisis response unit (SWAT); a crowd control unit (CIMOs) each for Port-au-Prince and 
Haiti’s nine Departments; and a Coast Guard unit. See United States Department of State, US Department of State 
Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003 - Haiti, 25 February 2004. www.refworld.org.  
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cities in the US still have not been able or willing to do until recent events have made this 
imperative!50 
Lesson Six – NGO Accountability51 
In Haiti, it is not enough to heal wounds, for every day another wound opens up. It is not 
enough to give the poor food for one day, to buy them antibiotics one day, to teach them 
a few sentences or to write a few words. Hypocrisy. The next day they will be starving 
again, feverish again, and they will never be able to buy books that hold the words that 
might deliver them.52 
- Former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
 
 Although NGOs were discussed earlier in the context of SAPs, the omnipresence of 
NGOs throughout Haiti is not likely to remedy itself in the short term. The international 
community must begin to rein in NGOs now and force them to orient programming towards 
Haitian interests within a consultative framework that emphasizes a shift to developing, hiring 
and mentoring Haitian expertise, rather than maintaining operations which are clearly oriented 
and directed by foreign interests.53 Given the high percentage of NGO financing coming from 
national governments, this is achievable only if the national and international will is present.54 
Lesson Seven – The Haitian Army 
 
50 The May 2020 killing of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis, the latest in a long line of police killings of 
young black men in their own neighbourhoods, was the impetus for renewed mass protests over racial inequality and 
included the urgent requirement for police reform. 
51 One accountability mechanism that has been implemented by the international community is the International Aid 
Transparency Initiative which is a published database which outlines information on aid and how it is being 
employed within targeted nations. See Ramachandran and Walz, “Haiti: Where has all the Money Gone?,” 32. 
52 Jean-Bertrand Aristide, In the Parish of the Poor: Writings from Haiti (New York: Orbis, 1990), cited in Farmer, 
The Uses of Haiti, 306. 
53 Vijay Ramachandran and Julie Walz studied the almost US$6 billion pledged to Haiti in the wake of the 
devastating 2010 earthquake: they found that the Government of Haiti received around one percent of the 
humanitarian aid provided from all donors. The monies instead went to the donor country’s military or civilians 
deployed into Haiti, and international NGOs including the UN. The Red Cross received more at five percent. Even 
Haitian NGOs were largely if not completely excluded: out of a US$5.4 million request for funding (0.4 percent of 
the total aid funding requested by NGOs), ten Haitian NGOs were eventually provided with funding in the amount 
of US$800 thousand. See Ramachandran and Walz, Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?,” 9.  
54 Clearly, this is a big ‘if’. 
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Since Aristide said that he could not abolish the army without the support of the Haitian 
people, the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress commissioned an 
independent polling firm to gauge popular support for the idea. The results were 
stunning: 62 percent of Haitians were strongly in favor of abolition and only 12 percent 
were against.55 
- Former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias 
 
 On the one hand, the Haitian Army is historically a source of national pride. On the other 
hand, the Haitian Army has traditionally been a tool of repression.56 That condition does not 
appear likely to change in the near future, until more robust democratic institutions have taken 
root in Haiti. Practically, Haitian security needs can be met with a robust border security service 
and a coast guard with a broad counter-narcotics mandate.  
Because of that history of repression, and because security force capacity building in 
Haiti has failed to develop a military subordinate to the national government, military foreign aid 
to Haiti should be limited to the training of a police and border force as well as a coast guard for 
counter-narcotics operations. Arms controls should be employed to ensure that Haitian police 
cannot acquire weaponry inappropriate for police operations. 
International police and border patrol training in Haiti was conducted by three different 
nations, France, Canada, and the US, under three different models and around three different sets 
of values and police cultures. That must be changed. A training plan should be developed 
 
55 Oscar Arias, Washington Post, in Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 397. 
56 Any discussion of the Haitian military will stray dangerously close to becoming prescriptive and move away from 
the central idea of seeking to assist Haitians in solving their own problems by dictating the way ahead. My thoughts, 
nonetheless, are that the Haitian Army in particular has proven to be a beast which has been largely outside the 
control of the civilian authority and leans towards self-enrichment. Further, a national army is an unnecessary 
expense at this stage in Haiti’s development, and more than likely to be destabilizing. It may prove unaffordable 
over the long term as well. There are alternatives Haiti could explore, including moving away from a regular Army 
and embracing a national guard-style gendarmerie organization to provide for Haiti’s national security. The Costa 
Rican Fuerza Pública [Public Force] is one such regional model worth considering. But without any real threat, a 
quick analysis of Haiti’s security requirements show rural and urban security concerns are more aptly embodied in a 
robust police force that includes a paramilitary capability. 
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collaboratively with Haitians to reflect Haitian values and the type of security force Haitians 
want. Otherwise, Haiti runs the risk of inheriting security forces based on the status quo of 
repression. 
Lesson Eight – Foreign Loans 
Liberia and Haiti, the most thoroughly controlled countries [in terms of fiscal 
management], were nearly the only nations in the capitalist world that maintained 
payments on international debts throughout the Great Depression…These, of course were 
the dollar diplomacy dependencies where US influence had been most overwhelming. 
The social costs of putting payments ahead of other social and economic priorities were 
borne…only because of the constabularies that the Unites States had trained…. 57 
- Historian Emily S Rosenberg 
 
To effect positive and real change to Haiti’s economic situation, the international 
community should consider a total loan forgiveness programme.58 Foreign lending practices 
should be re-examined and reformed. In 2005, when the cancellation of Haiti’s foreign debt was 
broached in connection with the “Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)” initiative, Haiti 
owed around US$1.3 billion. By December 2017, that debt had more than doubled to US$2.762 
billion!59 Much of that debt is created by the government deficit financing necessary to maintain 
the public sector. That deficit can be reduced by Haitianizing the bureaucracy and eliminating 
foreign NGO civil service activities. A risk adverse international community must learn to give 
foreign aid directly to the Haitian government, not international NGOs. 
 
How to avoid making the Same Mistakes. 
Development actors need to re-orient their approach towards genuine partnerships based 
on improved risk-sharing within the framework of national state-building strategies and 
 
57 Rosenberg, Financial Missionaries to the World, 48/61. 
58 Given the concentration of wealth in the West and the past abuses of Haiti by Western nations, total loan 
forgiveness would be the least that should be done to acknowledge past harm. 
59 CIA World Factbook. www.cia.gov.  
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frameworks. The degree, scope and timing of their engagement should match actual 
requirements to engender true national ownership and responsibility.60 
- Extract from 2005 UN Development Program Workshop Report 
 
Starting with what does not work is strangely apropos as well as being an improbable 
point of departure for the historical study of Western interference through peacebuilding in Haiti. 
First, imposed solutions do not work. The Marine Occupation imposed various social and 
economic ‘improvements’ upon Haiti. None worked except for Haiti’s continued servicing of its 
foreign debt, the result of the presence of the American Financial Advisor. Education reform was 
quickly abandoned, and infrastructure was allowed to fall into disrepair. 
Consider a more recent example. As part of its work to develop a sustainable market-
based economy in Haiti, the USAID underwrote and planned the development of the Caracol 
Industrial Park (CIP) in northeast Haiti, all without engaging the locals in the project’s 
development.61 That failure to engage led the Caracol mayor, Landry Colas, to express his 
“surprise” when informed of the project, observing ironically: “I would have chosen another site, 
given that this one was already occupied by people earning a living. But I’m no expert.”62  
The development of the 246-hectare light manufacturing facility displaced 366 Haitian 
farmers from an area of fertile agricultural land. Despite promises, compensation for the 
displaced farmers never materialized, and less than half of the 20,000 jobs promised between 
2012 and 2018 ever materialized. Worse, the tax exempt, duty-free zone was constructed with 
 
60 “Rebuilding Post-Conflict Societies: Lessons from a Decade of Global Experience,” UN Development Program 
Workshop Report, New York, 19-21 September 2005, 3. 
61 Background information on the Caracol Industrial Park is drawn from Deborah Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where 
Haiti Wasn’t Broken,” The New York Times, 5 July 2012, www.nytimes.com.; and Claire Lauterbach, “Caracol 
Industrial Park: Social and Gender Impacts of Year One of Haiti’s newest IFI-funded Industrial Park,” Gender 
Action, 2013. Sontag’s article also relates the claim by historian Laurent Dubois that the land appropriated for the 
eventual manufacturing site was the former site of an infamous US Marine Occupation-era prison labour camp. 




US$224 million in reconstruction money that had been earmarked for the replacement of housing 
destroyed as a result of the 2010 earthquake.63 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) built the facility on the “fragile 
ecosystem of Caracol Bay, which contains the country’s most extensive mangrove reserve and a 
large strip of coral reef.”64 Not only was an environmental study not completed, but the IADB 
rushed the project through without completing the normal planning process. The CIP 
development project echoed many of the same practices that had plagued the earlier SHADA 
rubber experiment, including over-estimating the market for products from the facility and the 
negative social and economic impact of diverting land use to benefit the new project. The 
IADB’s Haiti department manager, José Agustín Aguerre, typified the company’s scorn for the 
detailed planning this project should have received:  
If one had to do this in the normal process of planning and then funding and then 
decision-making, and only then start looking for clients and only then start construction, 
we would have gone 10 years without having an industrial park.65 
 
Rapid construction of industrial parks like Caracol are understood by the West as a 
technique for quick job creation.66 Yet, as historian Laurent Dubois has pointed out, the Caracol 
industrial park project is a continuation of an endless cycle of “tired” ideas to which Haiti has 
been subjected with the aim of ‘modernizing’ the country as well as typifying the thinking 
behind returning Haiti to the status quo.67  
 
63 Lauterbach, “Caracol Industrial Park,” 5-6. 
64 Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken.” 
65 Quoted in Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken.” 
66 Ken Ellingwood, “Uncovering jobs a major challenge since Haiti earthquake,” Los Angeles Times, 12 August 
2010. www.latimes.com  
67 Ironically, the Caracol development was built almost next door to a similar industrial park, Codevi. Codevi was 
distinguished as the only unionized clothing manufacturing operation in Haiti, whereas the prime tenant in the 
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This is a critical concept to grasp. Historically, the limited peacebuilding undertaken in 
Haiti has been planned with the aim of re-establishing the Western concept of the Haitian status 
quo as quickly as possible. The chronic issues which underlie Haitian unrest and peasant 
grievances are rarely if ever tackled and remain undisturbed. Instead of overhauling the system 
and reforming, for example, the dynamic of a state centered around elite control of the political 
and economic spheres in Haiti, the West intervenes over regional security issues like mass 
migration and democratic unrest leaking beyond Haiti’s porous borders.  
Democratic governance remains in the background, largely limited, in the eyes of the 
international community, to aspirations for ‘free and fair’ elections. This was the cri de cœur 
from President Préval. In his 2011 statement to the UN, he lamented the failure of the UN to 
transition beyond the status quo from military occupation to a police and development mission:  
I would suggest some thinking on the effectiveness of (the council’s) interventions which 
have effectively led to 11 years military presence in a country that has no war…The 
danger of violent confrontation, once it had passed, peacekeeping operations did not 
quickly enough adapt to the new situation. Instability in Haiti is basically due to 
underdevelopment — in other words, unsatisfied elementary socioeconomic rights.68 
 
Initiatives at the grassroots level have shown success, more so than those imposed from 
the national level or by outside agencies. International or national level initiatives are typically 
constrained by time and resources. They lead to triage of the current system rather than building 
capacity for democratic practice. What is really needed are systemic overhauls based upon an 
agreed local framework backstopped by adequate time and resources. By co-opting the process, 
 
Caracol facility is the South Korean clothing company, Sae-A, which is known for using violence in support of its 
antiunion activities in other company locations. Sontag, “Earthquake Relief Where Haiti Wasn’t Broken.” 




national authorities disenfranchise the locals and raise questions about the legitimacy of the 
transformation underway. 
One critical and oft over-looked requirement of grassroots initiatives is planning the 
linkage between local and national-level programs. This requires a willingness at both levels to 
demonstrate flexibility and compromise to nest community level activities within the national 
planning framework. Likewise, national level planning cannot be formulaic; it must empower 
local communities to make their own decisions while respecting the bounds of national 
programming. 
A second important consideration is that the majority of Haitians reject invasions of their 
country, good intentions or not. Historically, interventions in Haiti produced high numbers of 
Haitian casualties and triggered opposition. Haitians are a proud people who have shown a 
remarkable aptitude for resistance. Disparate Haitian groups uniting to resist outside interference 
in Haiti form a constant theme in Haiti’s history. The Marines fought two major counter-
insurgency campaigns in Haiti to quell resistance and killed large numbers of Haitians to ‘pacify’ 
the people. Likewise, the UN conducted a series of mini wars against armed gangs inside the 
Port-au-Prince urban neighbourhoods before it established control of the capital. It conducted 
major combat operations from 2004 to 2006. By 2018, media reporting showed armed gangs 
once more confronting and outgunning the Haitian police, a remarkable resurgence of their 
capabilities. 
 Conflict continues despite the UN’s presence because, as pointed out earlier, the 
underlying causes of societal unrest are not addressed. Nor are those roots of conflict well 
understood or carefully considered by the UN agencies. For example, the US Multi-National 
Force (MNF) reported that in early January 1995, “a safe and secure environment had been 
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attained. Although dissident elements and Aristide opponents still existed, there was a lack of a 
credible threat to the mission.”69 In other words, because the violence from anti-Aristide 
elements was not directed against the MNF, its leaders certified that they had achieved the safe 
and secure environment necessary for the hand-off to UNMIH control. They ignored the intra-
societal conflict between pro- and anti-Aristide supporters simmering beneath the surface.  
Disregarding why the intra-societal violence was conveniently in hiatus came back to 
haunt UNMIH. Two months after it assumed responsibility for Haiti, the Human Rights Watch 
organization reported that violence had escalated and crime rates were soaring.70 As the June 
1995 elections approached, observers concluded the safe and secure environment supposedly 
created by the MNF was finished. UNMIH simply lacked the understanding and the capabilities 
necessary to create a safe and secure environment.71  
Human Rights Watch, for example, noted that while UNMIH took responsibility for 
national safety and security, they failed to consider the close proximity of adversarial parties 
within local Port-au-Prince urban neighbourhoods. Consequently, when their national security 
planning failed to establish local neighbourhood security, Haitians took it upon themselves to 
create their own neighbourhood security. Those local security forces, known as “brigades de 
vigilance,” would foreshadow the rise of armed gangs.72  
 
69 “Haiti Initial Impressions, Volume III,” US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), July 1995, 26/156. 
70 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Conditions Prior to the June 1995 Elections, 1 June 1995, available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a7f14.html [accessed 9 August 2019]. 
71 The mission also failed to understand the spoilers involved, including their goals and the means available to them. 
The concept of the “spoiler” comes from Stephen John Stedman who defined them as “leaders and parties who 
believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to 
undermine attempts to achieve it.” Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”, International 
Security 22, no. 2 (Autumn 1997), 5. 
72 Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Conditions Prior to the June 1995 Elections. 
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 Third, military forces do not make good development agents. The peacebuilding model 
needs to be built on an understanding of the complexity behind creating or buttressing a state and 
its constituent institutions which in turns allows the development of ‘nation’. Yet UN missions 
remain heavily oriented towards combat troops who are not trained to create state institutions nor 
in the cultural changes required to move beyond the conflict prone status quo which required the 
intervention.73 Even when deployed to provide security, the troops are often drawn into the role 
of armed humanitarian work. Even if there is some merit to the concept of armed humanitarians 
drawn from highly disciplined and capable Western armies, they are not readily available nor are 
many Western nations willing to commit to missions like Haiti which demand time commitments 
that require decades for success, as Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, have amply 
demonstrated. 
Even on a mission like security sector reform, the UN missions in Haiti struggled for over 
15 years and through the deployment of six different missions to create a viable, sustainable, and 
non-corrupt police force capable of enforcing law and order in Haiti. Despite that commitment, 
the UN still managed to fail at that task.74 Add in the failure to overhaul the penal sector and 
 
73 As an aside, there is no such thing as ‘peacekeeping’ soldiers. Western armies do not train specifically for 
peacekeeping duties. Rather, they train to conduct combat operations and supplement that training with what has 
been termed stability operations. Additionally, they do mission theatre specific training which is usually cultural 
training on the people and the target country. The troops that deploy on UN missions, however, are combat troops, 
trained in combat as the means by which they resolve problems. Not surprisingly then, the solution MINUSTAH 
decided upon to deal with the armed gangs’ problem reflected their training and focussed on a violent assault into an 
urban neighbourhood, complete with aerial machine gun fire and the use of high explosive mortar rounds. 
74 In his ‘End of Tour Report’, the Canadian Commander Task Force Port au Prince, Colonel Stephen M. Cadden, 
wrote: “the objectives and progress of MINUSTAH remain as opaque and vague as described by my predecessor... 
The mission remains dysfunctional with a lack of clear objectives, implementation plans or a coherent exit strategy 
which will permit the eventual disengagement of UN agencies, particularly MINUSTAH, from the country. Instead, 
stove piped planning and a lack of centralized oversight have resulted in significant expenditure of resources with 
undeniable, but not optimal, progress. Pressures on the UN Peacekeeping budget have caused the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to express concern over the long presence of MINUSTAH, and seek a 
rationalization which will allow resources to be diverted to other, more pressing, missions.” See Cadden, “Task 
Force Port au Prince End of Tour Report for Period 01 July 2013-22 June 2014.”  
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court system, and it quickly becomes clear that UN military-dominated missions are not 
particularly good at development. 
Further, the necessary specialized civilian components that should be guiding 
development are often notoriously absent or are too few in number. Consequently, much of the 
essential development work is ceded to NGOs who, ironically, likewise suffer from resource and 
expertise constraints. They often also have specific and narrow mandates which mitigate against 
a strategic, holistic approach to development, and instead encourage stove-piping and 
development squatting.75 
Interventions cannot succeed without overcoming obstacles such as international 
interventions embodying international values that are incompatible with Haitian interests, 
including an interventionist ‘tradition’ rooted in a history of neo-colonialism and aspirations 
which do not represent the interests of the majority of Haitians. There are intervention models 
like the transitory shared responsibility model which can potentially bridge those obstacles while 
minimizing the impact from neo-colonialism.  
The onus for change should be on the international community for it has damaged Haiti 
the most historically. An obvious first step is to change the philosophical basis of any 
intervention and to bring it in line with Johan Galtung’s concept of a “positive peace” based on 
“the integration of human society” while abandoning the current emphasis on restoration of the 
status quo built around “negative peace” or the “absence of violence, the absence of war.”76 Too 
often, international interventions in Haiti have done just enough to rehabilitate the fragile state, 
 
75 Development squatting refers to the tactic whereby an NGO will stake out an area of development and then resist 
or refuse to cooperate with other NGOs or international agencies which likewise seek to work in that area of 
development. 
76 "An Editorial," Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 1 (1964): 2; and Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace 
Research,” Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-191.  
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but not enough to prevent backsliding, supporting Robert Rotberg’s idea that the “failure and 
collapse of nation-states… [is] a dynamic process.”77  
The critical second step is for the West to cease viewing Haiti as unique. Haiti is unique 
as the only slave state to achieve independence and freedom through a successful armed revolt.78 
Beyond that uniqueness, Haiti is a member state within the international community and should 
be treated as such. Her fragility is a separate matter and not something that should be used as an 
excuse to violate Haitian sovereignty. Rather, Haiti’s fragile state should require not only 
changes within Haiti, but a more measured and collaborative dialogue between Haiti and the 
international community on changes going forward while acknowledging the West’s historic role 
in creating the conditions for Haiti’s continued fragility. 
This is not to suggest that all Haiti’s problems are externally created. Haiti has 
responsibility for its own development. Unfortunately, it remains a pre-industrial nation, the light 
assembly industry notwithstanding. In addition to recognizing what has not worked, Haiti also 
suffers from a number of chronic problems which it must overcome before state-building and 
development success are possible.  
The first step towards development is the requirement for a sustainable economy.79 This 
in turn is dependent upon an economic model which is less subject to the vagaries of the current 
 
77 Robert Rotberg, “The Challenges of Weak, Failing, and Collapsed States,” in Chester Crocker, Fen Ostler 
Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds., Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), 91. 
78 Haiti is unique for at least two other reasons. It is the only former slave colony to have paid its former colonial 
master an indemnity in return for formal international recognition, thus removing its ‘illegal’ status. And Haiti is 
universally recognized as the first decolonized republic to have banned slavery “universally and immediately.” As a 
fragile state, however, Haiti should not be considered or treated as unique. See Nick Nesbitt, “Haiti, the Monstrous 
Anomaly,” in Polyné, ed., The Idea of Haiti, 3. 
79 Key to a sustainable economy is building an economy which meets the people’s needs while avoiding harm to the 
environment. Inclusive and sustainable economic growth is in fact one of the UN’s sustainable development goals, a 




export economy model, built largely around low skilled labour and intensive light industry. 
While light industry is a useful tool for rapid economic growth, too rapid growth leads capitalists 
to shift capital to other developing sectors as Haitian wages improve and workers’ demands 
multiply. The history of states moving a developing state to a developed state under the light 
industry model shows it to be difficult, precarious, and slow. 
 A second step is to break the current predatory business-state relationship, ending the 
unrestrained ability of the ruling elites to abuse state power for personal gain. This problem is 
complex and resistant to a quick fix; it requires Haiti to develop a sustainable economic model 
that broadens economic participation and produces a cultural shift within Haiti’s elite.80 The 
latter means adoption of shared societal responsibilities and investment in the Haitian economy 
to benefit Haitian community development. Such a cultural shift, virtually unprecedented, could 
drive the nation-building phase of Haitian development, for the ‘greater Haitian good.’ The War 
of 1812 functioned to drive American capital to invest in textile manufacturing in New England 
using the most modern equipment designs. Isolating Haitian capital to encourage domestic 
investment is another option.81  
 Related to this step is the need to develop a joint venture relationship between the state 
and the ruling party, or parties, which emphasizes the development of investment in priority 
areas while concurrently keeping corruption at bay. Haitian development leaders must prioritize 
anti-corruption measures to minimize graft and corruption, allowing state revenues to flow into 
 
80 This was in fact what Jean Price-Mars sought to accomplish and was outlined in his work, Ainsi parla l’Oncle, 
within his campaign of “moral re-establishment.” See Magdaline W. Shannon, Jean Price-Mars, the Haitian Elite 
and the American Occupation, 1915-1935 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996), 33. 
81 Preventing British cloth imports from 1812 to 1815 opened the door to New England cloth manufacturers. The 
war acted as a 100% tariff on British cloth. See Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 
1790-1860, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall), 1961. 
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development. Corruption is an indicator of a lack of faith in the current system. Other models 
encourage formation of public interest companies to deliver vital government services.82 Such an 
approach works to maximize individual citizen involvement and discourage corruption and 
graft.83 
 With the establishment of a sustainable economy comes the expansion of the national 
civil service, with new bureaucratic capacity and democratic institutionalization pushed into 
previously neglected areas of Haiti. These steps depend on a sustainable economic model for 
Haiti that generates reliable sources of state revenue and a prioritized state plan for institutional 
development. At the same time, the expanded bureaucracy must overcome the patronage issue 
which has afflicted prior attempts to enlarge bureaucratic capacity. Professionalizing the civil 
service requires creating arm’s length hiring practices backstopped by objective standards of 
merit. Transparent hiring practices, with associated grievance mechanisms, will minimize the 
potential for corrupt patronage hiring. 
  
 
82 Public interest companies (PICs) are a type of public-private partnership, characterized as not usually having 
shareholders; operating independently from the state; and having been mandated to provide a state service. In 
Canada, for example, NAV Canada is organized as a PIC with responsibility for providing all of Canada’s air traffic 
control capabilities. For more detail on PICs, see Paul Maltby, “Public Interest Companies: Fad or permanent 
fixture?” New Economy, https://www.ippr.org/files/uploadedFiles/projects/New%20economy%20final.pdf.  
83 This is not to suggest that anti-corruption mechanisms, domestic and international, are not required. Rather, that 
the approach is in line with the idea of the World Bank’s ‘power to the people’ as a means of increasing open and 





Peace means much more than the absence of war. Human security can no longer be 
understood in purely military terms. Rather, it must encompass economic development, 
social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament, and respect for 
human rights and rule of law.84 
-   UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
 
Aopeau ou ou vini, aopeau ou oupralle.85  
[You come into this world with your skin and that is what you will have when you leave 
it.] 
- Haitian proverb 
 
  
My aim in this thesis was to answer the question, “How do we help Haitians help 
themselves?” That simple question, as I discovered, is quite a bit more complicated than 
expected. It is made up of many parts. How do we learn to collaborate with Haitians to determine 
a suitable way forward on development based on their interests and needs; implement that 
development without enabling the Haitian state to become ‘addicted’ to foreign aid or predatory 
loans yet again; assist Haitians in making their development plan a reality despite obstacles like 
land registry issues, massive deforestation and environmental damage, and the class and colour 
issues which have precluded development of a national consensus on the way forward, to just 
name a few; and all the while resist paternalism and racism or the temptation to change direction 
when we disagree with Haitian desires? 
As an aside, while I am sticking to my original research question, my co-advisor, 
Professor Carolyn Fick, raised what could be a more critical research question: “How do 
 
84 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “Towards a Culture of Peace,” 15. From Mayor, Federico, Letters to future 
generations (Paris, France: UNESCO Publishing, 1999). www.unesco.org.  
85 This nineteenth century Creole proverb is roughly similar in sentiment to the French saying, “Plus ca change, plus 
c’est la même chose” when discussing the idea of accommodation, particularly on the part of the Haitian peasant and 
his or her perceived position within Haiti. Too often, Western observers have understood this proverb to mean that 
only by dramatic, grand change will the Haitian peasant be moved to change…in the modern vernacular, change 
comes only when the peasant has his world rocked. 
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Haitians help the West to provide its collaborative aid?” Collaboration requires an understanding 
of the Haitian stakeholders who have an interest in foreign aid and creating mechanisms to 
reconcile their disparate interests and aims within a collaborative process, a not inconsiderable 
task! Just reconciling the competing priorities and objectives of two similar, yet different peasant 
organizations, the Mouvman Peyizan Papay [Papaye Peasant Movement] or MPP, which is the 
largest peasant movement in Haiti, and the Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan Ayisyen [Heads Together Small 
Producers of Haiti], the other Haitian peasant farmer organization, which is most concerned with 




To answer the initial question, my research determined what historical lessons, positive 
or negative, could be gleaned from past Western interventions in Haiti that are applicable to the 
future goal of rehabilitating and moving Haiti from fragile state status to that of a functioning 
and stable state within the international community of nations. 
Findings and Contributions to the Research Field 
At the core of that problem is the need to determine how to restrain the impulses of 
foreign nations who obstruct or divert Haiti’s chosen path forward.86 My research and analysis 
has shown that the West conducted a deliberate campaign against Haiti which created a fragile 
state by undermining national security and the development of political processes and 
institutions, Haiti’s economy, and the provision of social services to the Haitian citizenry. The 
 
86 While external nations must shift their cultural approach to Haiti towards Galtung’s positive peace, they also must 
respect that restraint on their destructive interventionist behaviour should come from Haitians who must tell outside 
experts what to do, what not to do and what has and has not worked in the past. Again, respect for Haitian 
stakeholders, and not simply finding Haitian front men for the appearance of consultation or collaboration, is an 
imperative for positive change. 
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West’s strategy employed three distinctive elements: criminalization of opposition to 
interventions; economic warfare employing NGOs and SAP policies aimed at maintaining 
Haiti’s attractiveness as a source of cheap, plentiful labour; and a deliberate failure to encourage 
opportunities for fundamental, positive change in Haitian development. 
My analysis of Western interference in Haiti during the Latin American and Caribbean 
post-independence period has exposed a number of trends in Western policies including the use 
of force to extort money from the Haitian government; the deliberate undermining of Haitian 
sovereignty through constant interference in Haitian elections, despite free and fair elections 
being considered the bedrock of Western democracy; a preference for stability and the status quo 
in Haiti over any support for social revolutionary trends; and, of course, the targeted funding of 
Haitian security forces, both army and police, the principal instruments of repression employed 
against peasant democracy.  
As a metanarrative, my thesis brings together various micro-narratives which highlight 
Western impact on specific areas of Haitian culture, including colour and class, militarism, land, 
and the state. Set within a chronological framework, this thesis contributes to Haitian 
historiography as well as providing historical insight into practices which have had a significant 
influence on peacebuilding generally. In this area, my analysis and the lessons derived will be 
useful to experts designing future development models for fragile states. 
Challenges 
I encountered a number of challenges along the way. The first was that much of the 
current material on interventions in the UN-era is still classified. Canadian material on Cabinet 
level decisions require declassification. My ‘Access to Information’ (ATI) requests for 
information on 1990s Canadian peace support missions with the UN in Haiti were returned with 
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90 percent of the material redacted. Further, ATI requests took well over a year to process and 
involved substantial delays as my requests were narrowed until the ATI coordinator felt they 
were reasonable to process. In one ATI I requested, for example, documents that outlined the 
RCMP training programs employed in Haiti for a period of five years. That request was 
eventually reduced to a request for a specific six-month window, but returned with most of the 
material redacted. 
I ran into similar issues at the Canadian National Archives with much of the material 
involving Haiti, even from the 1950s, 60s and 70s, still classified. Requests to declassify some of 
the material I was interested in had already been submitted years earlier and were still 
outstanding. I was able to exploit the Canadian and American Army lessons learned 
organizations, but much of the material, while providing information on tactical operations, 
provided little to no information about command decisions. The sole exception was a number of 
useful post-command letters written by various senior Canadian commanders. 
A second challenge was undertaking this research while a serving member of the 
Canadian Armed Forces. Numerous deployments have made planning research trips less than 
ideal and precluded a number of my planned trips. For example, rather than being able to exploit 
the US Department of State (FRUS) archives in person, I had to rely on the online archives for 
much of my research. While the FRUS online archive is quite good, in-person research would 
have been optimal as not all documents are online. 
Areas for Future Research 
Much research remains to be accomplished in the future. The relationship between the 
state and nation-building – key components of peacebuilding – is an emerging research field that 
requires deeper examination and greater clarity. As well, the evolution of Haiti’s authentic 
363 
 
national and collective identity – the very foundation of its engagement with the international 
community – requires further study.87  The national identity of Haitians is deeply rooted in its 
past and its present – from the colonial period to today – and it must be thoroughly 
deconstructed.88 Cultural and social rifts have fractured Haitian society and impeded the 
formation of national unity, simultaneously consigning most Haitians to membership in an 
oppressed underclass. Recognizing that these fault lines preclude Haitians from achieving 
national unity, international intervenors in Haiti have consistently exploited these divisions, 
converting what should have been an internal problem into an excuse for international 
intervention in Haiti’s domestic affairs. While it is clear that the international community 
possesses state-building expertise, it is likewise clear that it lacks the authentic knowledge and 
the legitimacy essential to nation-building and shaping the national identity of Haitians– it 
should stay out of the process! How Haiti can effectively block international interference in its 
nation-building process is a question that cries out for more research.89 
The paths that fragile states may productively follow to become stable democracies is 
another area for further research. Most of the exemplars of fragile states moving towards 
 
87 The seminal work in the area of national identity and nationalism is Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: 
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined political 
community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” By imagined, he points out that “the members 
of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.  
88 See, for example, Gérarde Magloire, “Haitian-ness, Frenchness and History: Deconstructing the History of the 
French Component of Haitian National Identity,” Journal of Haitian Studies 5, no. 6 (1999-2000): 30-43.  
89 Concordia University historian, Dr. Max Bergholz, has reappraised the legacy of Benedict Anderson and the 
continued importance of his seminal work, Imagined Communities, in a recent 2018 article where he points out that 
the study of “human cognition in relation to nationalism, or “how and why people in the past came to think – or not 
think – of themselves as belonging to a national community,” is an under-researched field. That idea of examining 
Haitians’ cognition as it relates to their concept of national identity and nation reflects a shift away from the Western 
deconstruction of nation in relation to ideology, elites, and socioeconomic modelling. The idea of examining 
Haitians’ human cognition in relation to national identity and nationhood  would necessitate the recognition and 
embracing by Western scholars, of long-standing and deeply rooted Haitian cultural, literary, artistic, and linguistic 
traditions and other sources of expression, in order begin to understand how Haitians view national identity – and to 
understand what Haitians mean by the ‘imaginaire’ in conceiving the nation. See Max Bergholz, “Thinking the 
Nation: Reappraising Benedict Anderson’s Contribution to the Study of Nationalism,” American Historical Review 
123, no. 2 (April 2018): 518-528. 
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developed status have emerged only recently and the hidden flaws of a number of them have 
produced setbacks. What lessons can be derived from the history of fragile states that reveal a 
path along which Haiti can forge ahead despite the threat of interventions? 
Historically, one area which should be revisited is that of gunboat diplomacy and its 
impact on state development. Many of the histories of this phenomenon are dated and largely 
examine gunboat diplomacy within the foreign policy of the time. A deeper exploration of how it 
affected Latin American and Caribbean state development would be useful. 
An economic history of the various predatory loan programs within the Latin American 
and Caribbean regions would also be useful, as would exploring their impact on state 
development and understanding them within the specific foreign policies of the lending nations. 
 Research on the Marine counter-insurgency campaign during the Occupation period is 
another area that should be explored. Further research would help us understand exactly how 
destructive they were to Haitian lives and property, as well as its impact on national unity.90 
Recommendations 
Recommendations from my analysis are based on Western treatment of Haiti and the 
attitudes which spawned it. My model is pragmatic and recognizes these practices will continue. 
There are avenues, however, for lessening exploitation and neo-colonialism, leading to genuine 
collaboration, but only if Western governments embrace four tenets as guides for their 
development work. The first tenet is a recognition of the commitment of time and resources 
required for implementing a successful development strategy on the part of both the international 
 
90 In the short term, ironically, as the Marine Occupation progressed, Haitian stakeholders became more unified in 
their opposition to the Occupation. In the long term, the Occupation cemented Haitian opposition to any form of 
armed intervention. Unfortunately, and despite Haitian intellectuals like Jean Price-Mars seeking long-term cultural 
shifts that allowed for progressive democratic participation by all Haitians, the Occupation did more damage to the 
development of a unified Haitian national identity, something that should be explored and acknoweldged. 
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community and the Haitian people. The second is understanding that security and development 
are linked, and that security is more than just security sector reform. Human security includes 
freedom from poverty.  
The third is understanding that Haiti will not become a democracy solely as a result of 
successful economic development. Conversely, the international community must understand 
that successful economic development does not necessarily lead to antipathy towards or rejection 
of authoritarianism. The fourth tenet is the most obvious. Education is the most critical tool for 
sustainable development in Haiti. Ideally, embracing those four tenets begins the process of 
ending predatory practices and giving Haitian development a fighting chance to succeed.  
Finally, the West must step away from its mistaken belief that Haiti is unworthy of being 
a sovereign nation. Haitian society is not something to be ‘fixed.’ The West must revise its view 
of Haiti, cease its meddling, and accept it as a peer country within the international community 
of nations. Regime change by the West, such as toppling and deporting a democratically elected 
president was criminal and immoral. It must not become normative behaviour going forward. 
Western leaders need to stop seeing Haiti as clay to be molded and treat it within the boundaries 
of international legal conventions. 
The last word goes to a Haitian who wrote to Professor Emily Balch and her investigative 
team during their 1926 visit, towards the later period of the Marine Occupation. Unfortunately, 
the original letter is only available within Professor Balch’s report in its translated form and the 
eloquent writer remains unnamed. He stated:  
Efforts to help the masses have been made again and again and in many ways, but the 
poverty of our budgets and the instability due to the causes mentioned made progress 
difficult and slow. Nevertheless a Haitian civilization was in process of development. 
That is what the men of your country do not understand. They came and interrupted it. 
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They act like barbarians, for they have established nothing but a coarse materialism, the 
religion of money, the worship of force and success.91 
 
Afterword – A Brief Foray into the Field of Development Strategy 
 
Democracy clearly needs to be rooted in basic institutions and practices that preserve 
democratic values. Not only do Haitians, at all levels, lack these institutions but the only 
system of government the vast majority of the population has known is Duvalierism, a 
particularly violent manifestation of state power. Having brought down this absolutist 
state in the name of democratic freedoms, Haiti is left with little or no central control and 
without the means of creating an alternative to the absolutist state.92 
- Professor of Francophone (Haitian and French Caribbean) Literature J. Michael Dash 
 
When discussing the way forward for Haiti based on the adoption of a viable 
development model, both J. Michael Dash and Michel-Rolph Trouillot provide valuable wisdom. 
They each identified the need to develop the institutions and practices that underlie sustainable 
democracy. Dash, in the introductory quote to this section, made this case while likewise 
acknowledging that democracy cannot successfully overcome the continuing influence of 
Duvalierism.  
Trouillot likewise echoes this position, pointing to Haitian democratic movements that 
have repeatedly sought to emerge or transition from Duvalierism. In 1994, Trouillot wrote that 
“[i]f Duvalierism impedes the advent of the rule of law, the weakness of democratic institutions, 
in turn, keep Duvalierism alive.”93 His position was that “neither changes in the state apparatus 
nor institutional reform are enough to compel real change in Haiti.”94 Instead, Trouillot felt the 
only way to solve Haiti’s systemic problems were by tackling those weak institutions which 
 
91 Balch, Occupied Haiti, 178-9. 
92 J. Michael Dash, “Why can’t Haiti be a ‘banana democracy’?” The Sunday Gleaner, 22 February 2004, G2. 
93 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, “Haiti’s Nightmare and the Lessons of History,” NACLA Report on the Americas 27, No. 
4 (1994), 51. 
94 Trouillot, “Haiti’s Nightmare and the Lessons of History.” 
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allow Duvalierism to continue to thrive, namely the “class structure of the country…the military 
organization of a society at war with itself…a fiscal system that discourages production and 
investment, and finally…sociocultural elitism.”95 For Trouillot, accomplishing that level of 
societal reform meant embracing an understanding that “Haitian democracy will happen in the 
deep hinterland or it will not exist at all.”96 
Suzy Castor reflected on foreign interference and domination in Haitian affairs, both 
internal and external, and how both have served to reinforce systemic vulnerabilities. In a vicious 
circle, the continued “structural weakness of the [Haitian] productive system…accentuated 
outside domination and dependence.”97 Even when internal or external stakeholders push for 
changes to Haiti, Castor believes the system in place forces them to align their activities with the 
weak structures and agencies within Haiti which have no interest in changing the dysfunctional 
status quo. Her conclusion is that “democratization in Haiti is necessarily contingent upon 
solving the problems of production, accumulation, and distribution of wealth.”98 
Castor recognized the need for assistance from the international community, pointing out 
that democratizing Haiti requires “international relations based on dignity and respect.”99 Central 
to that dignity and respect, of course, is the international community getting over what Castor 
 
95 Trouillot, “Haiti’s Nightmare and the Lessons of History,” 51. In 2004, J. Michael Dash’s writing, unfortunately 
but unsurprisingly, still echoed with Trouillot’s earlier thoughts. Dash lamented the insidiousness of Duvalierism 
and the need to develop the sustainable institutions necessary to create that alternative to ‘the absolutist state.’ See J. 
Michael Dash, “Why can’t Haiti be a ‘banana democracy’?” The Sunday Gleaner, 22 February 2004, G2. 
96 Trouillot, “Haiti’s Nightmare and the Lessons of History,” 51. Haitian sociologist Jean Casimir recently expressed 
similar sentiments, pointing out that Haitians have traditionally been able to “annuler ou réduire sensiblement leur 
pouvoir de destruction, pour nous prodiguer des soins, de l'affection et du bonheur au cœur des relations 
communautaires que, dès notre débarquement, nous nous sommes mis à tisser.” See Jean Casimir, La nation 
haïtienne et l’État (Montréal : Les Éditions du CIDIHCA, 2018), 10. 
97 According to Castor, that domination takes the form of “continuous decapitation through trade deficits, profit 
remittances by foreign investors, payment of foreign-debt obligations, transfer of holdings by the Haitian oligarchy 
to foreign banks, and acquisition of land outside the country.” Castor, “Democracy and Society in Haiti,” 129. 




terms “fear of popular participation.” Dash likewise identifies the international community as a 
source of assistance for the “radical restructuring of Haitian society” which, in his estimation, 
“can be helped…by external forces who are committed to long-term nation- building…”100  
At the same time, Dash is quite clear that external assistance does not equal ‘saving’ 
Haiti. He is quite blunt on this point: 
Haiti cannot be saved by those on the outside if only for the simple reason that a modem 
democratic society can neither be imposed by the well-armed nor inserted by the well-
meaning. Haitians will have to find the capacity for patience and compromise in order to 
extricate themselves from their predicament.101 
 
He elaborated upon this in a 2012 interview in which he pointed out that the challenge in the 
aftermath of the Duvalier era was construction of a “non-authoritarian Haitian state.”102 Clearly, 
one imposed on Haiti from outside by an international authoritarian force would, regardless of 
the intent, be lacking any legitimacy and merely prolong agitation for social change in Haiti. At 
the same time, absent foreign assistance, that the social change needed and the emergence of a 
strong Haitian state do not appear likely. This is Haiti’s and the international community’s 
shared dilemma. 
The Haitian sociologist, Jean Casimir, likewise raised serious reservations over the 
question of Western interference in Haiti: 
[L]orsque nous pensons développement, nous nous mettons des menottes et rêvons de 
colonisation ou, au bas mot, de tutelle étrangère. Je confesse ne pas connaître de pays 
moderne, qui ne soit capitaliste et raciste. Je ne suis donc pas intéressé au développement 
moderne, capitaliste et raciste d’Haïti, ni à savoir si un développement dans cette 
direction, en le supposant désirable, est possible ou pas. J'essaie de trouver comment nous 
 
100 Dash does demand that such assistance avoid “sending contradictory signals, wittingly or unwittingly, to political 
elements in Haiti.” He points out that Aristide’s restoration to power in 1994 was followed by the international 
community’s departure from Haiti “before any real institutional change was established in Haiti.” See Dash, “Why 
can’t Haiti be a ‘banana democracy’?” 
101 Dash. 




nous sommes débrouillés dans ce milieu que nous n'avons pas choisi et ne pouvons ni 
changer ni éviter.103 
 
He then concluded: 
Sur cette base, je déduis que l'État-nation est une souricière. Les concepts clés que 
l'Occident nous offre pour penser notre façon de nous gouverner – c’est-à-dire l'État-
bureaucratie-administration-fonction publique - sont piégés et ne peuvent pas nous sortir 
de la pauvreté abjecte. Nous devons élaborer d'autres instruments de pensée qui 
traduisent notre pouvoir d'agir et notre joie de vivre. Dans ces périmètres réduits que nous 
contrôlons encore, il est possible de travailler à renforcer notre efficacité, c'est-à-dire 
notre État, - l'état où nous sommes -, celui dont nous ne sommes pas exclus et dont nous 
ne pouvons pas être exclus. Si nous avons pu nous construire un passé sans l'aide de 
l'Occident moderne, capitaliste et raciste, j'ai peine à croire que les États amis, qui ne sont 
pas responsables de notre existence, et n'ont fait ni notre joie, ni notre bonheur, soient si 
importants pour notre futur.104 
 
Casimir’s reservations over the idea of the West leading Haitian state-building once again 
raises questions around legitimacy, but also begs the question: if not the West, then who?105 As 
Dash and Trouillot have pointed out, Haiti will require external assistance to overcome the 
systemic roadblocks to democratic development. 
 
Tenets of Development Assistance 
[T]he goal of nation building should not be to impose common identities on deeply 
divided peoples but to organize states that can administer their territories and allow 
people to live together despite differences. And if organizing such a state within the old 
internationally recognized borders does not seem possible, the international community 
should admit that nation building may require the disintegration of old states and the 
formation of new ones.106 
- Political scientist Marina S. Ottaway 
 
103 Jean Casimir, La nation haïtienne et l’État (Montréal : Les Éditions du CIDIHCA, 2018), 8-9. 
104 Casimir, La nation haïtienne et l’État, 10. 
105 My co-advisor, Professor Carolyn Fick, raised an interesting idea which is unfortunately outside the scope of my 
thesis. What about asking progressive Latin American nations like Mexico or Cuba to assist with state-building? 
Perhaps in a role akin more so to a mentor, providing their advice and feedback based on their own experiences? 
106 Marina S. Ottaway, “Nation Building,” Foreign Policy 132 (September-October 2002), 17.  
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 Proceeding from the position of external assistance being a requirement for Haitian 
democratic development, this section identifies several basic tenets which should inform that 
assistance in the future. These are based not only on the works of Trouillot, Dash and Castor, but 
also upon the lessons from past interventions undertaken in Haiti. The first tenet of development 
work is commitment. Not only must the international community and the Haitian people commit 
to a development plan, they both need to find to the time and the resources needed to fully 
implement that plan. Development of fragile nations must be measured in decades, not months or 
years.107 UN missions in Haiti measure their mandates in years. Mandates and related task 
priorities have changed too fast for development to take root. Not surprisingly, UN missions in 
Haiti have failed to achieve their lofty goals. 
UN missions have also lacked legitimacy in the eyes of most Haitians, failed to consult 
Haitians or align with their interests and cultural values. Key to achieving legitimacy and 
fostering domestic ownership of a development plan is creating them through a strong and 
collaborative consultation process. Such a process would also lead to commitment to a UN 
strategy from Haitians. Ideally mediated by an impartial third party, consultations can integrate 
Haitian expectations from the development stage to the completion of a multi-decade plan.  
The outcome of the process should be a national consensus, cutting across colour and 
class strata, incorporating national objectives and the means necessary to achieve the agreed 
upon national development plan.108 Put simply, this requires that Haitians define a national 
 
107 Most countries with democratic government find sustaining a development vision over the decades required is 
often stymied by short-term political horizons shaped by elections typically three to five years apart. While a 
flexible development framework helps alleviate some of this problem, the key is the continuity provided by a 
professional civil service which can help successive governments stay on track by catering to short-term political 
goals while retaining a focus on long-term strategic planning objectives. 
108 The follow-up to the development of such a national plan is selling the plan to international donors, presuming 
Haiti will continue to require international aid for the foreseeable future. Of course, the development plan proposed 
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vision for the country and agree on the steps necessary to achieve it. Without a national 
consensus going forward, a national development plan will continue to be handicapped by 
resistance and will ultimately fail. 
The second tenet of development work is that development is linked to security and must 
be tackled as part of a systems approach to strategic planning. Past UN missions have also seen 
security as consisting solely of security sector reform (SSR) work, an approach which has not 
worked based on evidence from past interventions.109 In fragile states, SSR as carried out by the 
UN is flawed and contributes to instability.110 Fragile regimes usually employ their security 
forces, police and military, as agents of repression and violence against their citizenry.   
To undertake SSR work as a priority objective within a foreign intervention, without 
tackling the requirement to change the underlying repressive culture, merely ensures the 
repressive security forces become more capable of the same repressive tactics they previously 
employed. SSR usually tackles only technical issues of policing and security, and fails to explore 
those issues resulting from or responsible for Haitian instability and fragility. The result is a 
police force that is technically proficient at various police functions – crowd or riot control is the 
main task taught – but lacking the proper cultural foundation in concepts like community 
policing, public accountability, adherence and respect for the rule of law, and respect for human 
rights and human dignity. That failure to align police practices with local community 
requirements and expectations is a chronic shortcoming. 
 
should include a weaning from foreign aid and onto a flight path which leads to a sustainable economy and away 
from dependence on aid. 
109 The earlier discussion of the need to embrace Johan Galtung’s concept of ‘positive peace’ is critical to 
understanding this point. For Haiti, the numerous UN missions which have emphasized security through the re-
creation of police and military forces, despite chronic poverty and unrest resulting from focusing solely on security, 
point to failure when security is disconnected from development. 
110 SSR is understood to include security force capacity building, whether police or military. 
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Military aid transfers to Haiti embodied the failure to understand Haiti’s cultural 
foundation. Since the 1960s, the US has provided Haitian dictators and repressive regimes with 
crowd control equipment as part of military aid transfers. The most blatant example was the 
Reagan administration’s 1985 transfer of crowd control equipment to Haiti as part of a US$3.2 
million military aid package, despite the violent repression already launched by the dying regime 
of Jean-Claude Duvalier.111 Similarly, in the early 1990s, following the coup against President 
Aristide, the US again shipped riot control gear to Haiti, this time to the coup regime, through the 
US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.  
In each case, the UN SSR work has included training to integrate and effectively use the 
newly acquired equipment. Yet, in each instance, the Haitian security forces have routinely 
employed the new equipment against Haitians seeking democratic reform, including those who 
protested Aristide’s overthrow. Engaging in SSR while knowing that such abuses were taking 
place within Haiti was and is clearly counter-productive. Yet it continues to happen. 
For development in a chronic fragile state to take root, the presence and maintenance of a 
safe and secure environment is a non-negotiable prerequisite. Unfortunately, the employment of 
the Haitian security forces to create such an environment has not worked. Haiti has proven to be 
highly susceptible to coups, most often undertaken by or with the connivance of security forces. 
For the international community, this is a dilemma. How can that safe and secure environment be 
provided without capable Haitian security forces while knowing that the securitization of 
previous UN missions in Haiti had degenerated into abuse and had failed to accomplish that aim? 
 
111 See Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, 38. 
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The third tenet of development work is the recognition that economic development does 
not “breed” a democracy, and that the belief that “rapid growth destabilizes [authoritarian] 
regimes is false.”112 Political science professors Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi 
studied the relationship between economic development and democracy, and found that 
economic development becomes critical once democracy is established.113 Emerging 
democracies, on the other hand, are more vulnerable to economic and social shocks, but can 
achieve lasting stability.114 Przeworski and Limongi’s findings point to fragile states like Haiti as 
requiring international interference to assist in achieving the democratic success its people seek. 
That solution reeks of neo-colonialism. However, there are models like the transitory shared 
responsibility suggested by Stefano Recchia which allow for proportionate interference in Haiti’s 
domestic affairs. In other words, models are available for international interference which permit 
Haiti to choose the ‘best’ worst models. 
The fourth and last tenet of development work is that education is the most critical tool 
for sustainable development.115 Yet simply implementing an education system is not enough. 
 
112 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49, no. 2 
(January 1997), 167, 176. 
113 However, their findings also suggest that authoritarianism was better suited to encouraging economic 
development because of the single-mindedness of the authoritarian regime if it is not engaged in self-enrichment or 
other corrupt practices. While clearly not advocating for such repression, the two political scientists argue that 
authoritarian regimes possess more repressive measures with which to suppress citizen’s grievances caused by 
controversial development. The previously discussed Caracol industrial park case study is an example of this. Adam 
Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49, no. 2 (January 1997), 
167, 176. 
114 Democratic stability should be understood as a function of the distribution of wealth and the presence of a 
thriving middle class. According to Przeworski and Limongi in 1997, “[t]he probability that a democracy will die 
during any particular year in a country with an annual per capital income above [US]$4,000 is practically zero.” The 
level of per capita income remains a useful metric for democratic stability, albeit one which needs to be regularly 
updated and placed in context of the prevailing socio-economic realities of any given country. See Przeworski and 
Limongi, 166. 
115 The Brookings Institute’s Center for Universal Education issued a 2013 report on education in fragile states 
which identified four outcomes from investing in education in a fragile state, namely that it “advanced economic 
development, it strengthened humanitarian action, it contributed to security and state building, and it mitigated the 
impacts of disasters.” Of the three, and not to discount the importance of the other three reasons for investing in 
education, I am focusing on economic development. See Rebecca Winthrop and Elena Matsui, “A New Agenda for 
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The education system needs to be universal and accessible to all elements of society.116 To 
achieve universality, the system must be ‘indigenized’. For Haiti, this means an education system 
that embraces the Creole and French language and cultural norms within a bilingual system.117 
Achieving Haitian indigenization, however, requires a revolutionary shift of attitude by 
the societal elite and the international community. Without ascribing motive, successive Haitian 
governments have ignored and underfunded the education system, with the rural areas resigned 
to NGOs providing much of the existing education. Ghanaian elites, for example, much like 
Haiti’s elites, remain wedded to the colonial education system, which emphasized and prioritized 
Western colonial attitudes and behaviours. But in Ghana’s case, English remained the lingua 
franca of education, which made it more accessible than it was in Haiti. 
Undertaking a reform of Ghana’s system was complicated further by the rivalry between 
the state and the educated elite, both of which competed for control of education, as well as the 
involvement of the Catholic Church. Haiti shares a similar situation to that which confronted 
Ghana. The island nation of Mauritius likewise had similar issues when undertaking to 
 
Education in Fragile States,” Center for Universal Education at Brookings Working Paper 10, August 2013.  
www.brookings.edu.  
116 This was one of the key findings of the US Moton Commission, created by President Hoover to investigate the 
education system implemented by the US during the Marine Occupation. The Commission concluded a grave error 
had been made when “a distinct and separate [primary] system of [vocational-style] schools” was established. 
Pamphile, Clash of Cultures, 142. 
117 Indigenizing an education system can be difficult. Not the least problem can be the requirement to develop, 
within the local language, the means to communicate the concepts central to various academic courses. This was the 
case with Ghana, for example, when “Africanizing” maths and sciences was further complicated by the lack of a 
single suitable language to allow the conversion and teaching of those courses. Ghana has multiple languages. The 
same issues will surface with Creole. Note this does not mean these are insurmountable obstacles, rather that 
overhauling the education system will require serious strategic planning. See Hubert O. Quist, “Secondary 
Education – A ‘Tool’ for National Development in Ghana. A Critical Appraisal of the Post-Colonial Context,” 
African Development / Afrique et Développement 28, no. 3/4 (2003): 186-210,  www.jstor/stable/24482700  
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indigenize its education system. However, its solution prioritized the link between universal, free 
education and “social unity.”118 
The incorporation of a process for indigenization and centralization notwithstanding, the 
Haitian education system must be designed to provide a universal education which allows the 
nation to move beyond the status quo and into the ranks of middle-class status. At the same time, 
Haitian education must help advance democracy at the same time.119 This requires a robust and 
well-developed secondary education system, the aim of which is to allow progress through 
scientific and technological development. Otherwise, Haiti as a fragile state risks remaining 
trapped in low-technology, labour-intensive industries like mining, agriculture, and assembly 
industries such as clothing or footwear. In addition to providing a critical base in science and 
technology, higher education programming also improves a society’s ability to deal with shocks 
to the state, economic or otherwise. Economic shocks leave developing states highly vulnerable 
to collapse and encourage a return to more authoritarian rule to deal with unhappy citizens living 
with the aftermath of the shock. 
Development Assistance and Its Impact on Sovereignty 
S'agit-il des esclaves de Saint-Domingue ou des employés de la sous-traitance actuelle, 
l'intégration au monde moderne coûte justement l'exclusion des masses. Les majorités - 
ce qui fait le poids parce que substantif et réel - sont converties, dans ce projet moderne, 
en une bizarrerie à remodeler. L'assimilation des Haïtiens à la modernité implique une 
formule ou une autre d'occupation par les étrangers, ou - si l'on tient à être optimiste - une 
 
118 Joseph Stiglitz, “The Mauritius miracle, or how to make a big success of a small economy,” The Guardian, 7 
March 2011, www.theguardian.com. See also UNESCO for more material on Mauritius and education, including the 
country’s education and human resources strategy, https://uil.unesco.org/i/doc/lifelong-learning/policies/mauritius-
education-and-human-resources-strategy-plan-2008-2020.pdf.  
119 Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi who concluded, at noted earlier, that democracies become stable when 
per capita income levels average over US$4,000 annually. While not guaranteeing that the democracy will not fail, 
they concluded the likelihood is high that a state will remain stable when incomes are at or above that level. That 
suggests that while the annual US$4,000 income may be an arbitrary figure, we may nonetheless be able to 




formule de gouvernement chargé de détruire toute possibilité de conserver notre 
spécificité afin de nous introduire au monde moderne, occidental, capitaliste et raciste. 
Les Haïtiens ne peuvent pas appartenir à la modernité et devenir occidentaux, capitalistes 
et racistes sans cesser d'être ce qu'ils ont construit historiquement.120 
- Haitian Sociologist Jean Casimir 
 
 Development assistance should be viewed as a spectrum with the strategy of ‘doing 
nothing’ other than ‘containing’ instability at the one end and the imposition of neo-colonial 
trusteeship at the other end. However, before examining the range of development policies 
available and exploring their positive and negative elements, I will explore the option of non-
interference or, more precisely, the idea of zero foreign interference in Haiti. Is such an option 
possible to avoid creating Casimir’s souricière or mousetrap? Is such an option feasible? Can –or 
should– Haiti be left on its own to create its own version of democracy?121 
Alternately, can –or should– the West embrace non-intervention when addressing Haiti? 
Non-intervention would include both normative diplomacy and economic relations with other 
nations both in the region and globally, but it would preclude interference in Haitian internal 
affairs which can be expected to get bloody as the various internal factions fight for power. 
Foreign aid would be withheld save for humanitarian purposes. Non-interference is an attractive 
option. It centres on a Haiti that is able, through its various stakeholders, to work its way towards 
a state solution that heralds a future democratic solution. 
 
120 Jean Casimir, La nation haïtienne et l’État (Montréal: Les Éditions du CIDIHCA, 2018), 7. 
121 I am relying on the definition of non-intervention as provided by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, co-chairs 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). They identified non-intervention as: 
“a sovereign state is empowered by international law to exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its territorial 
borders, and other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in its internal affairs.” Note that non-
intervention is related conceptually to sovereignty. See Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility 
to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81, No. 6 (2002): 99-110. 
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Yet as Trouillot, Dash and Castor, among others, have pointed out, this type of thinking 
is quite impractical.122 Without assistance in overcoming the chronic and systemic deficiencies 
of Haiti, the status quo will remain, barring violent revolution. Averting that violence, which also 
disrupts vested foreign interests in the country, reinforces the inevitability of foreign assistance. 
That unfortunate conviction underlies the essence of this section. If Western interference in Haiti 
is inevitable, development modelling should be approached with the goal of minimizing the 
damage such interference will do to Haitians. 
Assistance to a fragile state spans a range of options that have and continue to be 
exercised. This includes the ‘no assistance’ option during which the international community 
tolerates instability and violence within the fragile state, only intervening for the purpose of 
containment. In a fragile state like Haiti, nascent democratic movements are forced to confront 
and overcome, without outside assistance, institutional conditions which preclude change. Too 
often, and to keep the instability contained within the fragile state, Western states enact measures 
that seek to quarantine the state. 
 Containment is accompanied by Western governments issuing a biased narrative, 
vilifying the fragile nation. Ignoring development issues and democratic movements, both of 
which raise awareness and foster questions concerning the responsibility to assist on the part of 
the international community, the typically unsympathetic narrative labels the fragile state as a 
 
122 During my thesis defense in 2019, Professor Bellegarde-Smith, speaking as my external examiner, mentioned 
that should the West decide to adopt a hands-off policy with Haiti and instead waited for Haitians to request their 
aid, he felt that a dechoukaj [cleansing] was inevitable. That then raised the question of whether the West – and the 
US in particular – would stand by while former allies and proxies were slaughtered during the dechoukaj. Indeed, it 
became quite apparent from our discussion that the West would certainly intervene in such a case and would likely 




haven of chaos rooted in drugs, crime, terrorism, or all three.123 The narrative which emerges 
regularly for Haiti during periods of instability characterizes it as an exceptional entity, grounded 
in inveterate misery and poverty, interspersed with rare images of individual resiliency.124 
 Moving beyond the ‘no assistance’ or containment model are various levels of assistance. 
At the bottom is assistance designed solely with the minimalist goal of restoring security. While 
sharing much in common with containment, this model often includes military or security 
assistance. For Haiti, this has meant the provision of older weaponry, uniforms and equipment 
including aircraft and armoured vehicles. Further, whereas containment seeks to restrict chaos 
and instability within the fragile state, securitized assistance often seeks to resolve the chaotic 
situation using quick and violent suppression. This involves designating a local strongman to 
receive security aid, allowing him to control the fragile state as quickly as possible. Democratic 
development is sacrificed on the altar of stability, and revolution is controlled. 
 Ideally, development assistance beyond the minimum or that focusing on security only, 
should be undertaken within a synchronized and comprehensive framework which tackles 
security issues and democratic institutions holistically.125 Input from various levels of Haitian 
 
123 Witness, for example, the over-generalizing within Sir Robert Cooper’s The Breaking of Nations: Order and 
Chaos in the 21st Century, which examines the idea of a new security order within Europe. Cooper, a former 
diplomat, and writer, who believes outside of Europe, save for rare exceptions, there is only chaos and disorder. That 
idea of only encountering chaos and disorder necessarily pre-establishes a discordant and adversarial relationship 
with any non-European nation, something which has been seen regularly when the world deals with Haiti. 
124 The West’s response to the 2010 earthquake, which devastated Haiti, was largely based initially on “securitizing” 
the response, including deployment of naval elements to ensure Haitians did not seek to flee the devastation by sea. 
That response was quickly followed by a wave of NGOs invading Haiti, all professing to do good works, but often 
in a competition for Western aid monies as they carved up the humanitarian response. Little to no reference was 
made to Haitian local interests, and the humanitarian aid monies pledged in massive quantities were quick to dry up 
or disappear, Haiti itself being blamed for their disappearance. See Beverly Mullings, Marion Werner and Linda 
Peake, “Fear and Loathing in Haiti: Race and Politics of Humanitarian Dispossession,” ACME: An international E-
Journal for Critical Geography 9, No. 3 (2010): 282-300; and Nadège T. Clitandre, “Haitian Exceptionalism in the 
Caribbean and the Project of Rebuilding Haiti,” Journal of Haitian Studies 17, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 146-53. 
www.jstor.org/stable/41715438.  
125 Law professor Saira Mohamed has argued that the UN’s shift from security issues to those of peacebuilding more 
broadly have shifted such issues away from being within the mandate of Security Council and “fall instead within 
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society with the grassroots level seen as the most important, is the second critical element. While 
there are various means of ensuring that a partnership is developed between the assisting nations 
and Haiti, the transitory shared responsibility model identified by Stefano Recchia, and discussed 
earlier in Chapter Eleven – Lessons from Interventions – offers an innovative approach with 
minimal impact on Haitian sovereignty.126 A significant problem with the model is that the 
partnership arrangements would be made with the government in power and could undermine the 
legitimacy of such a partnership in the future. 
Further along the assistance spectrum and involving a significant impact on sovereignty, 
is revival of the UN’s Trusteeship Council and assignment to it of some oversight 
responsibilities.127 Berkeley professor of law Saira Mohamed has proposed clear boundaries 
between securitization through UN Security Council management of the military and police 
facets of peacekeeping, and Trusteeship Council supervision of the peacebuilding parts of 
governance. Some legal scholars would require the Trusteeship Council to obtain consent from 
the former government prior to it claiming a legitimate right to oversee reform of a fragile 
state.128 At the same time, even hinting at a trusteeship in Haiti would be a major blow to 
 
the much broader province of the Trusteeship Council.” She argues that the Trusteeship Council “possesses special 
competence in these matters and has been equipped since its creation with mechanisms that provide for legitimacy 
and protect accountability in governance…[and, accordingly the Council] is a better UN organ to manage the 
governance tasks of contemporary peacebuilding.” See Saira Mohamed, “From Keeping Peace to Building Peace: A 
Proposal for a Revitalized United Nations Trusteeship Council,” Columbia Law Review 105, no. 3 (Apr. 2005), 822-
3. www.jstor.org/stable/4099479.  
126 There is no question that Haiti is a sovereign nation, but its sovereignty is regularly subject to interference. 
Because Haiti does not provide political goods and services to all its citizens, the state has effectively ceded 
elements of its sovereignty to other foreign nations through extensive and pervasive NGO operations. 
127 Anyone who understands the vehemence of Haitian reactions to part Western interventions know how strongly 
Haitians would oppose such a move. Yet a huge civil war, a massive government-sponsored bloodbath killing large 
numbers of unarmed civilians, or the total disintegration of the Haitian government, could trigger the ‘unthinkable.’ 
The UN ruled East Timor and Kosovo for several years and came close to ruling Liberia and other collapsing states 
in the 1990s. Under certain circumstances, it could be called upon to do so again. In such circumstances,  
128 See, for example, Tom Parker, The Ultimate Intervention: Revitalizing the UN Trusteeship Council for the 21st 
Century, (Sandvika, Norway: Centre for European and Asian Studies at the Norwegian School of Management, 
2003). The proposals to revive the Trusteeship Council point to greater transparency and accountability for results 
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national pride, and would be virulently resisted just as the Haitian resisted the Marine invasion 
and occupation.  
Rwanda: The Good and the Bad 
How do Rwandans envisage their future? What kind of society do they want to become? 
How can they construct a united and inclusive Rwandan identity? What are the 
transformations needed to emerge from a deeply unsatisfactory social and economic 
situation? These are the main questions Rwanda Vision 2020 addresses.129 
- Rwandan Vision 2020 
 
Before discussing specific development options for Haiti, the case of Rwanda and its 
development under President Paul Kagame is worth exploring as it yields positive ideas as well 
as warning of what to avoid. Kagame began his nation’s strategic development planning with “a 
national consultative process” in 1998-99, from which emerged the adoption of the national goal 
to “fundamentally transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by the year 2020.”130 That 
national goal promoted six primary pillars and three cross-cutting areas of commonality that 
reflected Rwandan concerns and interests that had emerged through the national consultations. 
The result was a national development plan, “Rwanda Vision 2020,” outlined in Figure 2 below. 
 
than past UN missions. They require serious consideration and debate before any efforts are made to implement 
them. 
129 Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, “Rwanda Vision 2020,” Kigali, July 200, 6. 
130 Vision 2020 identified specific objectives related to middle-income country status including an annual per capita 
income of US$900; a decrease in poverty by 30 percent; and an increase in life expectancy from 49 years to 55. See 




Figure 2: Rwandan Vision 2020 Development Strategy 
Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s regime offers a cautionary tale while highlighting 
Przeworski and Limongi’s theories on authoritarianism within a developing nation.131 Kagame 
has taken a leaf out of François Duvalier’s playbook, creating a state system which “indirectly 
controlled” the people through a system, of “widespread and locally embedded webs of 
administration” which “coopted multiple people into its ranks.”132 Like Duvalierism, Kagame’s 
system allowed the “dispossessed and disempowered just a little authority over the rest” which 
 
131 Kagame has been linked to the April 1994 downing of the aircraft carrying Rwandan President Juvénal 
Habyarimana and the Burundian President, Cyprien Ntaryamira, killing both men, although this allegation is still 
unproven. Recently, Human Rights Watch claims to have documented at least 37 extrajudicial killings by Rwandan 
security forces between July 2016 and March 2017. See “ ‘All Thieves Must Be Killed’: Extrajudicial Executions in 
Western Rwanda,” Human Rights Watch, 13 July 2017, www.hrw.org.  
132 Andrea Purdeková, “’Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes’: Surveillance and State Reach in Rwanda,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 49, no. 3 (September 2011): 477-8. 
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then lowered the likelihood of discontent and rebellion.133 Andrea Purdeková claims the result 
has been a state system which “effectively dispatches rather than decentralizes control.”134  
Despite criticisms levelled at his authoritarian rule, Kagame’s economic development 
program, based on his national strategy, “Vision 2020,” has been hailed as “impressive” and 
“spectacular.”135 In 1998, the Government of National Unity under Kagame made the decision to 
break the cycle of Hutu/Tutsi violence epitomized by the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 
determine, through collaboration with its citizens, “what kind of Nation we [Rwandans] want in 
the future.”136 
The Rwandan case under Kagame points to the requirement to include external assistance 
and expertise in any development strategy. His regime has embraced an education policy that 
emphasized not only technology and engineering, but also the oft-neglected management field, 
which is required to produce the civil service management expertise necessary to guide policy 
development during crisis periods. Rwanda clearly understands the requirement for robust 
secondary education system.  
 
133 Purdeková, 483. 
134 For example, Kagame rewrote the Rwandan Constitution to legalize one party rule, held elections in which he has 
received almost 100% of the electoral vote, and stands accused of grievous human rights abuses including the 
sanctioning of extra-judicial killings. He also employed his authority to pass legislation that contribute to his 
development model. For example, he outlawed plastic bags in Rwanda, leading to a “zero tolerance” policy on bags 
which has seen those caught with plastic bags face fines of up to US$19,000, up to four years in jail, and the 
requirement that they publicly confess to their ‘crime.’ For more detail, see Andrea Purdeková, “’Even if I am not 
here, there are so many eyes’: Surveillance and State Reach in Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 49, 
no. 3 (September 2011): 475-97. See also Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, “Public Shaming and Even Prison for Plastic 
Bag Use in Rwanda,” The New York Times, October 28, 2017, www.nytimes.com. 
135 The Vision 2020 plan has been rebranded Vision 2050. See George B. N. Ayittey, “The Non-Sustainability of 
Rwanda’s Economic Miracle,” Journal of Management and Sustainability 7, no. 2 (2017): 88-104. 
http://doi.org/10.5539/jms.v7n2p88. Likewise, various articles in The New York Times have used “miracle” when 
reporting on Rwanda and its economic status under Kagame. See, for example, Murithi Mutiga, “Rwanda’s 
Unfinished Miracle,” The New York Times, July 30, 2014, www.nytimes.com.  
136 Vision 2020, 2. 
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Yet, as noted earlier, Kagame’s regime in Rwanda is moving down the path to 
authoritarianism to ensure his vision is implemented. While Kagame claims to handle state funds 
honestly and to always act in the national interest, he is an authoritarian who has no compunction 
about human rights violations. 
Haiti’s Development Options 
Promotion of Haiti’s tourist industry was made the responsibility of a five-man council 
today. The council members represent private enterprise interested in tourism and the 
body is to be free of political control. The Ministry of Tourism was abolished.137 
- The New York Times, 1958 
 
 Having identified historic lessons and development tenets that might guide strategic 
development, Haiti has two options that warrant discussion at this juncture. Key to both is the 
direction Haitian leaders decide upon for economic development. 
Development Model 1: The Status quo. Haiti is a nation heavily dependent upon foreign 
aid, which provides over 20 percent of its annual operating budget. Coupled to foreign aid is the 
provision of services by NGOs rather than from the national government. Remittances from 
Haitians abroad currently account for about a quarter of Haiti’s GDP.138 The growth in 
remittances represents the loss of precious skilled Haitians to the foreign labour markets, as those 
who are skilled enough to be competitive in foreign job markets are leaving Haiti. Remittances to 
 
137 “Haiti Sets Up Tourism Council,” The New York Times, 2 October 1958, www.nytimes.com. 
138 In 1994, remittances from abroad amounted to around US$50 million. By 2001, that amount had risen to US$600 
million and in 2010, the IADB estimated remittances were worth US$1.5 billion to the Haitian economy. Linked to 
remittances is, of course, the lost monies from expensive fees incurred to transfer the money to Haiti, fees running as 
high as 20% of the amount being sent. One bright spot is that cell phone technology is beginning to make those 
money transfers easier and more competitive. See Pablo Fajnzylber and J. Humberto, Remittances and 
Development: Lessons from Latin America (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2008), 5. See also P.C. Acosta, C. 




Haiti flow mostly from the US, followed by Canada and France.139 While numerous studies on 
developing countries have shown that families invest much of the remittance money flowing into 
countries like Haiti in education, dependence on remittances represents a failed economic 
development strategy.140 
 Under the status quo option, Haiti continues to exploit its main competitive advantage –
cheap unskilled labour – to supply workers to labour intensive, light industries like clothing 
assembly plants. By offering tax incentives, Haiti will continue to entice clothing manufacturers 
to Haiti, provided it can maintain low wages and prevent unionization. Haiti also has a fledgling 
tourism industry that, assuming stability reigns, could also be developed – under this status quo 
model – to provide employment.141 
An excellent example of this low wage development model is the 2017 “cluster 
development” plan built by Professor Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School.142 Cluster 
 
139 In 2005, the average remittance from Haitians in the US averaged around US$180 monthly, not a huge sum, but 
as of 2000, there were just under 420,000 Haitians in the US, meaning over US$75 million monthly was being sent 
to Haiti from the US alone. Note that remittances were not always money either. A significant portion of remittances 
were “non-cash” due to Haiti’s high cost of living and shortages of household items including clothing and 
foodstuffs. In the case of non-cash remittances, middlemen ‘transfer’ agencies established bulk commercial shipping 
facilities to service large numbers of expatriate shipping requirements. Non-cash remittances became particularly 
critical during humanitarian crises and at holidays. Commercial firms and some NGOs have also sold space in their 
own commercial shipping containers to service expatriate remittance requests, although how prevalent this service 
has been is unknown. See Patricia Fagen, Remittances in crisis: A Haiti case study (London, U.K.: Humanitarian 
Policy Group Background Paper, April 2006). 
140 See, for example, Maria Cristina Zhunio, Sharmila Vishwasrao, and Eric P. Chiang, “The influence of 
remittances on education and health outcomes: a cross country study,” Applied Economics 44, no. 35 (2011): 4605-
4616. DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.593499; or A. Cox Edwards, and M. Ureta, “International migration, 
remittances and schooling: evidence from El Salvador,” Journal of Development Economics 72, no. 2 (2003): 429-
61. 
141 Tourism in 2012 provided Haiti with US$200 million, largely from one million visitors arriving on cruise ships. 
However, in 2013 and the political issues related to the Martelly government, tourism revenue declined to US$160 
million. Trenton Daniel, "Haiti hopes push to woo tourists pays off," The Burlington Free Press (July 8, 2013), 5A. 
142 The plan is contained in an online PowerPoint presentation titled “A Strategy for Haitian Prosperity” (dated 22 
September 2017) https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/20170922-A-Strategy-for-Haitian-Prosperity-
Michael-E-Porter_d961c43a-f86f-42bc-8e64-7377ba0c360e.pdf. Professor Porter is affiliated with a consulting 




development is defined as creating a “geographically proximate group of interconnected 
companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities (external economies).”143  
The key is the development of education institutions, for example, in proximity to 
industry. For tourism, as an example, post-secondary institutions offer specific tourism-related 
curricula including hotel management, finances, food services, catering, and other related 
subjects. Ideally, the training institutes and the local tourism trade would work to create work 
placement programs to provide on-the-job training as part of the school program. 
The involvement of the diaspora and of course, the implementation of anti-corruption 
measures are critical to success under the status quo model.144 The diaspora represents those with 
skills required by the Haitian government in the future as well as potential investment money. 
The implementation of anti-corruption measures to ensure money and resources are not diverted 
from the development framework, should also inspire and retain Western confidence as the 
economic strategy progresses. 
The downside of the model is twofold. First, this is an expensive model, requiring 
substantial investment in education to succeed and development of the right skills for Haitians to 
move forward. Substantial investment in infrastructure is also required but will generate a low 
rate of return on the investment, meaning continued reliance on foreign aid and loans.  
 
143 Cluster development represents a systems approach to economic development and can be understood within a 
Whole of Government approach when optimized and if adopted more completely than has been the case so far 
(witness the limited employment of the concept in Haiti’s clothing assembly industry). See Porter, “A Strategy for 
Haitian Prosperity,” slide 19. 
144 For an excellent overview of Haiti’s diaspora including historical background, see Professor Tatiana Wah, 
“Engaging the Haitian Diaspora,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs 9 (Spring 2013): 56-69. 
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Second, a further shortcoming of this model is that it is unlikely to generate the income 
levels necessary to move Haiti into middle-class status as defined earlier. Moving from a 
developing nation to a developed nation and attaining a per capita income that stabilizes Haiti as 
a developed democracy is a lengthy, expensive, and difficult process. There are no fragile state 
antecedents to provide a pathway to success.  
During its development, Haiti remains vulnerable to economic shocks such as natural 
disasters that cause humanitarian crises like the 2010 earthquake which killed 300,000 Haitians, 
and severe tropical storms. The status quo development model does not build the resiliency 
necessary for Haitians to weather such catastrophic problems in the future. Because of these 
issues, perpetuating the status quo model is not recommended; it is unlikely to produce success. 
Development Model 2: Quantum Leap. At the other end of the development scale is a 
revolutionary approach to development that shows some signs of succeeding in at least one 
pioneering nation, Rwanda, which Haiti might well consider replicating. Kagame made it his 
short-term goal to wean Rwanda from dependence on foreign aid and implement a sustainable 
development model based on a knowledge-based economy rather than its agrarian-based 
economy.145 For the long-term, Rwanda has recognized the criticality of a “productive” middle 
class “and has linked it to the “fostering [of] entrepreneurship,” the centrepiece of the economic 
strategy underway.146 
 
145 Kagame appears to be making strides in this direction. For example, the Rwandan central bank was recently 
identified as examining cryptocurrency applications, after studying a number of Western nations’ experiences with 
digital currencies. See Saul Butera, “Rwandan Central Bank Studying Ways of Issuing Digital Currency,” BNN 
Bloomberg, August 22, 2019. www.bnnbloomberg.ca. See also Nicholas Kulish, “Rwanda Reaches for New 
Economic Model,” The New York Times, March 23, 2014. www.nytimes.com.  
146 VISION 2020, 13. 
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That Rwanda and Haiti share a number of similarities makes Rwandan development a 
useful model for Haiti to consider, albeit subject to the cautionary caveats regarding 
authoritarianism identified previously.147 Broadly, both countries are close in population and 
area. They are similar in GDP, Haiti at US$9.6 million in 2018 and Rwanda at US$9.5 million; 
have similar levels of indebtedness; and are remarkably similar in the value of their exports, 
US$980 million for Haiti in 2017 and US$1.2 billion for Rwanda. Life expectancy differs a bit, 
with Haiti at 63.5 years while Rwanda sits at 67.5 years. Both are also largely agrarian 
economies. 
Keeping Rwanda’s Vision 2020 in mind, and ensuring the tenets and lessons previously 
elaborated upon are used to guide Haitian development, the ‘Quantum Leap’ model approaches 
development as a decades-long process that prioritizes the development of a national education 
system available universally to all deserving Haitians which in turn shifts Haiti to a knowledge-
based economic model. In the short term, development of the education system would prioritize 
investment in the elementary and secondary levels, with a long-term goal being the development 
of a robust and world-class post-secondary system built on high technology research and 
development.148 
 
147 Statistics in this section are drawn from the World Bank, IMF and Eurostat sites. Major differences are revealed 
when the government budgets are compared, and Rwanda moves into a significant lead. While government deficits 
are not too different, Rwanda spends almost 50 percent again as much as Haiti on education. UNESCO data show 
Rwanda holding a lead in overall literacy at 73 percent as of 2018, while Haiti in 2016 was languishing at 61 
percent. In both countries, males hold a significant literate advantage over females. Defence is another major 
difference with Rwanda spending around US$10 per citizen versus Haiti’s spending nothing. Haitian imports are 
about 50 percent more than Rwanda’s. Haitian remittance dependence is also a major source of revenue whereas 
Rwanda relies on much less at around US$180 million. However, Rwanda sends around US$300 million abroad 
whereas Haiti sends less than US$96 million abroad. One critical difference, of course, is that while Haiti is part of 
an island, Rwanda is completely landlocked. 
148 Note that Haiti has three prestigious universities, the Université d'État d'Haïti, the Université Quisqueya and the 
Université Notre Dame d’Haiti. Most of the remaining universities and colleges in Haiti have been called “the 
Haitian equivalent of Career Quest — private vocational schools with no libraries, no labs and uncertified teachers.” 




 Haitians face specific problems that have historically contributed to Haitian instability, 
including experiencing more natural disasters than most Caribbean countries. Those natural 
disasters were amplified by a number of factors that include most Haitians living in coastal areas; 
substandard infrastructure and housing; and subsistence agriculture weakened by severe 
environmental damage. Yet those problem areas can, through a radical vision, be turned to 
Haiti’s competitive advantage.  
The key to the success of the quantum leap approach is a post-secondary research and 
development goal that focusses on solving several problems for the benefit of Haitians.149 
Employing the cluster model, Haiti would develop integrated clusters to deal with Haiti’s 
problem areas. Developing earthquake and hurricane-proof building designs and materials, for 
example, would not only raise Haiti’s probability of surviving its natural disasters, but would 
also generate commercial opportunities.150 Likewise, in the field of agriculture, encouraging the 
development of post-secondary education facilities specializing in hydroponics and aquaponics 
would not only encourage the development of sustainable domestic food production, but also 
gradual reforestation as agricultural land is reclaimed.  
Last but not least, Haiti should consider renewable energy like solar, wind and tidal 
power projects as a research and development objective, given its climate, location, and fossil 
fuel dependency. A national focus in this area would help Haiti deal with its fossil fuel 
 
149 The American Association for the Advancement of Science produced an interesting plan for Haiti that provided 
for the development of a “robust science sector” that would “support future development.” See American 
Association for the Advancement of Science. "Science and science education critical for Haiti's future, says 
international team." ScienceDaily. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/09/110915131647.htm. 
150 This goal clearly should be developed within a systems approach. For example, a key first step, of course, would 
be to develop building and construction standards to be applied construction going forward. Tied to development of 
standards should be the development of standardized building inspection regimes, which in turn would be linked to 
the development and implementation of anti-corruption measures specific to this field. None of the goals identified 
should be understood as stand-alone, but rather as inter-related. Otherwise, as with the UN’s experience of police 
force development in Haiti, dysfunctional development will become the result. 
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dependency, all of which is imported at considerable cost in hard currency. Likewise, Haiti’s 
weak and unstable electrical grid could be substantially improved through investments in 
technology and alternate energy sources allowing Haitians to abandon wood for fuel, and thereby 
reducing deforestation and other environmental damage.  
The last area for Haiti to focus on in the short- to mid-term is the development of its civil 
service. In the short-term, this requires pouring money into scholarships to send Haitians abroad 
to study civil service management and bring those skills back to Haiti’s government institutions. 
A short-term remediation of this problem would include consideration of the transitory shared 
responsibility model discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Long-term considerations include whether to continue to seek expertise from abroad, or 
instead develop and exploit Haitian expertise. Likewise, building in anti-corruption measures 
into Haiti’s breakthrough plan would foster a civil service culture fighting this problem through 
merit-based promotion standards, greater accountability for results and higher salaries. 
Making the Case for Western Reparations 
The peculiarity of Haiti’s demand for reparations is the fact that it has absolutely nothing 
to do with restorative justice with regards to enslavement. The reparative demand is 
solely concerned with the siphoning of one national treasury to another through coercion. 
Haitians are asking the French government to return stolen money. The debt France owes 
Haiti is not just moral, but also deeply financial and political.151 
- Haitian American academic Westenley Alcenat 
 
When development planning is bantered about, the question that always arises is how to 
fund it without relying on either foreign aid or foreign loans. This is the time to examine the case 
for Western reparations for Haiti as compensation for the damage done by decades of abuse. The 
 
151 Westenley Alcenat, “The Case for Haitian Reparations,” The Jacobin, 14 January 2017. www.jacobinmag.com  
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two key perpetrators are first, France, responsible for having engaged in and profited from the 
horrific slave trade to Saint Domingue, and for coercing Haiti to pay indemnity payments in 
return for recognizing Haiti’s independence; and second, the United States, for its abuse and 
killing of Haitians during the Marine Occupation period as well as the chronic problems which 
continue to plague Haiti as a result of Occupation policies. The case for French reparations has 
been made by a number of individuals, most recently in April 2003 by President Aristide.152 The 
case for reparations in response to the abuse and killings during the Marine Occupation, and the 
more insidious and less obvious damage caused by predatory loans and the ‘Dollar Diplomacy’ 
foreign policy, has yet to be made. 
Reparations payments for both the French colonial and US neocolonial abuse of Haitians 
and Haiti is not without precedent. While the German post-Second World War reparations to 
Holocaust victims, and to Israel, are the most obvious precedent for the payment of reparations, 
post-colonial reparations have also been paid as well. For example, the United Kingdom paid 
over 5,000 Kenyans more than US$25 million in compensation for the violence British forces 
and their allies inflicted to repress the 1950s Mau Mau uprising to end colonial rule. The 
Caribbean Community created the CARICOM Reparations Commission in 2013 with the goal of 
establishing “the moral, ethical and legal case for the payment of Reparations by the 
Governments of all the former colonial powers and the relevant institutions of those countries, to 
 
152 As noted earlier, Aristide made the case for repayment of the indemnity only, but calculated as of 2003 to be 
US$21 billion. I am not aware of any reparation dollar value attached to the slave trade. In 2013, French Justice 
Minister Christiane Taubira called on the French government of President François Hollande to explore land 
redistribution within former French colonies including her region of birth, French Guiana. “In the overseas 
territories there was a land grab, the general result was that the descendants of slaves were left without access to 
land. Therefore we should think about – without sparking a civil war – regrouping properties that were divided and 
about land reform.” Taubira’s proposal was rejected. See Joseph Bamat, “French minister wants land for slaves’ 




the nations and people of the Caribbean Community for the Crimes against Humanity of Native 
Genocide, the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade and a racialized system of chattel Slavery.” The Italian 
government of Prime Minster Silvio Berlusconi signed a treaty with the Muammar Ghaddafi 
government in 2008 that provided for the payment of reparations for the colonial past in the 
amount of US$5 billion over 20 years.153 
There are also numerous case studies of specific nations paying their own citizens 
reparations for ill treatment, including South Africa for apartheid crimes, the US for its treatment 
of Japanese Americans, and Peru for violence it used against its citizens during its lengthy war to 
defeat the Sendero Luminoso insurgency. The US is currently in the midst of considering 
reparations for the criminal slave trade and its impact on African Americans.154 The Herero and 
Nama people recently launched a lawsuit against the German government, demanding 
reparations for the genocide perpetrated against their ancestors during the Kaiser Reich. 
Reparations should be considered as a means for resolving some of Haiti’s problems. 
Rather than reparations payments to individual Haitians, reparations funds could be used to 
create programs geared towards Haitian development.155 Take the example of West Germany 
which provided reparation payments to the State of Israel, as well as to individual Holocaust 
 
153 The treaty and reparations were suspended in August 2011 as a result of the Libyan civil war. The Treaty was 
reactivated in December 2011 and around US$670 million were unfrozen and dispersed to the new Libyan 
government. See “ITALY-LIBYA: Reactivation of the Treaty of Friendship,” Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and International Cooperation Press Release 15 December 2011, 
https://www.esteri.it/mae/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/approfondimenti/2011/12/20111215_italialibiatrattatoamic
izia.html?LANG=EN.   
154 Reparation demands against the US are diverse and encompass claims not only for American slavery, but also for 
American involvement in, and profits from, the Atlantic slave trade. A further link has also been made to African 
underdevelopment and its relationship to the West, slavery and the slave trade. For an introduction to the issues 
involved in reparations, see Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, “Reparations to Africa and the Group of Eminent 
Persons,” Cahiers d’Études africaines 173-174 (2004): 81-97, http://journals.openedition.org/etudesafricaines/4543. 
See also Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Case for Reparations,” The Atlantic, June 2014, www.theatlantic.com.  
155 This statement should not be taken to mean that individual Haitians will not or should not receive payments from 
repatriation funds, but rather that such payments should solely be within the purview of the Haitian government. 
392 
 
victims. The money provided to the State of Israel during the period from 1953 to 1963 “funded 
about a third of the total investment in Israel’s electrical system…and nearly half the total 
investment in the railways.”156  
For Haiti, a similar program would clearly benefit development programs, including, for 
example, the post-secondary education program identified as a key component of the Quantum 
Leap option above. The potential money would be sufficient, for example, to allow high 
technology research and development centres to be quickly developed in Haiti, speeding up 
Haitian development from many decades to a relatively few years. With reparation packages 
from both nations, Haiti would be able to leap solidly into the information age. 
Yet a reparations package to Haiti should not be only cash money. Part of the French 
indemnity imposed on Haiti compelled a tariff reduction which crippled Haitian commercial 
development. It would be apropos to have a reparations package requiring the foreign 
community to pass national legislation obliging the acceptance of Haitian goods into key 
Western national markets without low quantity caps and high tariff obligations. The intent of this 
part of the reparations proposal is twofold. First, reparations to Haiti would include an 
appropriate and meaningful component that goes beyond mere cash transfers; and second, 
Haitian commercial development would receive a desperately needed stimulus that would allow 
it to become sustainable. Ideally, the domestic industries that result would permit the eventual 
shift of the Haitian workforce away from the labour-intensive light industry into areas with 
higher profits and a greater multiplier effect. 
 
156 Israeli historian Tom Segev, in Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Case for Reparations,” The Atlantic, June 2014. 
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A third component of any reparation package would also include debt relief for Haiti. 
Given the history of the West’s predatory loan programs, this, too, would be apropos and the 
morally right course of action. Debt relief for Haiti has been provided in the past, but has never 
been adequate and has never been provided at a time when Haiti is economically stable enough 
to move forward without falling back onto foreign loans. As part of a reparations package, Haiti 
would be able to fully exploit the cash component of the package and, as Rwanda demonstrated, 
replace its dependency on foreign aid and loans with a sustainable development model. A final 
note is that any reparations package should be provided directly to Haiti and for Haitians, not 
funnelled through NGOs, for example, for their salaries and other expenses. Haitians must decide 
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